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513 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Stéphane Lesimple b68ebe67f2 fix: fwdb: ignore MCEdb versions where an official Intel version exists (fixes #430) 2022-03-30 09:10:55 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple a6c943d38f release v0.45 2022-03-27 12:41:17 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple dd162301ff chore: update fwdb to v222+i20220208 2022-03-27 12:38:44 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5f6471d9a4 feat: set default TMPDIR for Android (#415) 2022-03-27 12:31:05 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 2a5b965b98 feat: add --allow-msr-write, no longer write by default (#385), detect when writing is denied 2022-03-24 12:37:19 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple ee266d43b7 chore: fix indentation 2022-03-21 22:22:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple b61baa90df feat: bsd: for unimplemented CVEs, at least report when CPU is not affected 2022-03-21 22:22:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple a98d92f8bc chore: wording: model not vulnerable -> model not affected 2022-03-21 22:22:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple b7c8c4115a feat: implement detection for MCEPSC under BSD 2022-03-21 22:22:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 4e7c52767d chore: update Intel Family 6 models 2022-03-21 22:22:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 8473d9ba6b chore: ensure vars are set before being dereferenced (set -u compat) 2022-03-21 22:22:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0af4830224 fix: is_ucode_blacklisted: fix some model names 2022-03-21 22:22:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 81a4329d71 feat: add --cpu, apply changes to (read|write)_msr, update fwdb to v221+i20220208 2022-03-21 22:22:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3679776f3c chore: only attempt to load msr and cpuid module once 2022-03-21 22:22:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple ba131fcd2f chore: read_cpuid: use named constants 2022-03-21 22:22:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple ae6bc31c2c feat: hw check: add IPRED, RRSBA, BHI features check 2022-03-21 22:22:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 6d7a6b3666 feat: add subleaf != 0 support for read_cpuid 2022-03-21 22:22:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 16f2160be5 chore: fwdb: update to v220+i20220208 2022-03-17 19:39:39 +01:00
Aditya-Tolikar 7cad9301b3 typo
'A' is more 'X' *than 'B'.
Previously: 'A' is more 'X' that 'B'.
2022-03-17 19:26:12 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 580549812a fix: retpoline: detection on 5.15.28+ (#420) 2022-03-17 19:25:24 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple a485c7882a doc: readme: make the FAQ entry more visible 2021-05-25 13:22:54 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7d13f7a0ef doc: add an FAQ entry about CVE support 2021-05-25 13:17:03 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 226b2375ab chore: speculative execution -> transient execution 2021-05-25 12:39:51 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 052a3e66d1 doc: more FAQ and README 2021-05-25 12:31:30 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 05d862709d fix: has_vmm false positive with pcp
Fix by matching the full procname with pgrep (-x),
so that the 'pmdakvm' process doesn't match.

Closes #394
2021-05-25 12:31:07 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3846913899 fix: refuse to run under MacOS and ESXi 2021-05-24 22:42:23 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple a87ace1f98 doc: add an FAQ.md and update the README.md accordingly 2021-05-24 22:27:46 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0ba71a443e fix: mcedb: v191 changed the MCE table format
Also update the builtin db to v191+i20210217

Closes #400
2021-05-24 12:55:44 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3a486e9985 arm64: variant 4: detect ssbd mitigation from kernel img, system.map or kconfig 2021-04-02 15:38:31 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 23564cda5d fix: variant4: added case where prctl ssbd status is tagged as 'unknown' 2021-04-02 15:38:31 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0ea21d09bd fix: extract_kernel: don't overwrite kernel_err if already set
Fixes #395
2021-04-02 15:33:02 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 08e30e156d chore: readme: framapic is gone, host the screenshots on GitHub 2021-02-22 21:22:11 +01:00
Zhiyuan Dai 6d35e780f4 arm64: phytium: Add CPU Implementer Phytium
This patch adds 0x70 check for phytium implementer id in function
parse_cpu_details. Also adds that Phytium Soc is not vulnerable to variant 3/3a
2021-01-13 19:14:09 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 4ec3154be0 chore: replace 'Vulnerable to' by 'Affected by' in the hw section
This seems to be less confusing, suggested by #356
2020-11-10 18:56:25 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 843f26630d feat: arm: add Cortex A77 and Neoverse-N1 (fixes #371) 2020-11-10 18:36:42 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7fc2ec65b9 bump to v0.44 2020-11-09 18:41:43 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple c8cdfd54da chore: fwdb: update to v165.20201021+i20200616 2020-11-08 21:25:18 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple f0c33c7a32 fix: fwdb: use the commit date as the intel fwdb version
fixes #379
2020-11-08 21:25:18 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 9e874397da chore: fwdb: update to v163.20200930+i20200904 2020-10-05 20:06:49 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 76cb73f3cb fix: fwdb: update Intel's repository URL 2020-10-05 20:06:49 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 90f23d286e chore: update fwdb to v160.20200912+i20200722 2020-09-14 21:45:09 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple e41e311a7f feat: add zstd kernel decompression (#370) 2020-09-14 21:42:55 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 1f75f01630 fwdb: update MCEdb to v148 & Intel firmwares to 2020-04-27 2020-06-13 18:11:12 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 14a53b19da chore: add CVE to the README 2020-06-10 00:07:14 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple d8f0ddd7a5 chore: fix indentation 2020-06-10 00:07:14 +02:00
Agata Gruza 62d3448a54 Added support for SRBDS related vulnerabilities 2020-06-10 00:07:14 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple cb6d139629 chore: tests: now expect 15 CVEs instead of 14 (fix) 2020-06-09 22:56:25 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7e2db09ed9 chore: tests: now expect 15 CVEs instead of 14 2020-06-09 22:51:50 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 33cf1cde79 enh: arm: add experimental support for binary arm images 2020-06-06 17:29:32 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 4a3006e196 fix: arm64: cve-2017-5753: kernels 4.19+ use a different nospec macro 2020-06-06 17:29:32 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 36f98eff95 fwdb: update MCEdb to v147 & Intel firmwares to 2020-04-27 2020-05-31 13:03:58 +02:00
xaitax fa7b8f9567 Typo 2020-05-08 16:17:09 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3beefc2587 enh: rsb filling: no longer need the 'strings' tool to check for kernel support in live mode 2020-03-10 22:29:54 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 27c36fdb80 fwdb: update to v135.20200303+i20200205 2020-03-10 22:29:39 +01:00
Matt Christian 3d21dae168 Fixes for FreeBSD to parse CPU info. 2020-02-06 19:56:35 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7d2a510146 chore: update fwdb to v132.20200108+i20191124 2020-02-01 18:58:25 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple a1a35c9b35 chore: github: add check run on pull requests 2020-01-10 13:19:36 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple eec77e1ab9 fix: fwdb update: remove Intel extract tempdir on exit 2019-12-10 20:21:52 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5633d374de fix: has_vmm: ignore kernel threads when looking for a hypervisor (fixes #278) 2019-12-10 19:10:45 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple a343bccb49 bump to v0.43 2019-12-08 15:37:17 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 1f604c119b fix var typo 2019-12-08 15:25:54 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple bfed3187a6 fix: variant3a: Silvermont CPUs are not vulnerable to variant 3a 2019-12-08 14:39:31 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0cd7e1164f feat: detect vanilla 5.4+ locked down mode 2019-12-06 23:03:36 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 71129d6b48 fix: tsx: rtm feature bit is in EBX(11) 2019-12-02 19:07:10 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 6e799e8b01 fix: mcepsc: fix logic error on non-speculative CPUs that prevented detection of MCEPSC immunity 2019-11-25 23:03:04 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 4993b04922 fix: taa: CPUs having TAA_NO bit set are not vulnerable 2019-11-25 21:14:54 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 4fc2afe1bc feat: add TSX_CTRL MSR detection in hardware info 2019-11-25 20:58:49 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple bd47275501 feat: add detection of iTLB Multihit vuln/mitigation (CVE-2018-12207) 2019-11-25 19:13:09 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 8ddf6b2d6d enh: replace shell wildcard by a find to avoid potiental error (list of args too long) 2019-11-24 17:26:13 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 16b6490ffc chore: avoid ${var:-]} syntax, badly confusing vim's syntax highlighter 2019-11-24 17:26:13 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 18df38fae6 fix: sgx: on locked down kernels, fallback to CPUID bit for detection
on locked down kernels (Fedora / Red Hat feature that prevents writing
to MSRs from userspace, even if root), we can't write to FLUSH_CMD MSR
to verify that it's present. So fallback to checking the existence of
the L1D flush CPUID feature bit to infer that the microcode has been
updated in a recent enough version that also mitigates SGX (fixes for
both issues have been included in the same microcode updates for all
Intel CPUs)
2019-11-24 17:26:01 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple a306757c22 fix: detect Red Hat locked down kernels (impacts MSR writes) 2019-11-24 17:26:01 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple e01f97ee75 fix: fwdb: don't use local db if it's older than our builtin version 2019-11-24 17:25:41 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple fa7f814f4f chore: rename mcedb cmdline parameters to fwdb 2019-11-24 17:25:41 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple bb32a16a86 update fwdb to v130.20191104+i20191027 2019-11-24 17:25:41 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 8c84c0ba17 enh: fwdb: use both Intel GitHub repo and MCEdb to build our database 2019-11-24 17:25:41 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 6abe1bc62b enh: kernel decompression: better tolerance over missing tools
fixes #297
2019-11-23 16:43:00 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5ca7fe91ff fix: pteinv: don't check kernel image if not available 2019-11-23 14:01:56 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 4ba68fba74 fix: silence useless error from grep (fixes #322) 2019-11-23 13:51:00 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 59ad312773 fix: msr: fix msr module detection under Ubuntu 19.10 (fixes #316) 2019-11-19 22:35:08 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 418533c47e chore: remove LICENSE file, SPDX id is enough 2019-11-18 11:28:20 -08:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3e757b6177 chore: add github check workflow 2019-11-18 11:28:20 -08:00
Stéphane Lesimple f724f94085 enh: kernel: autodetect customized arch kernels from cmdline 2019-11-17 13:36:52 -08:00
Stéphane Lesimple dcf540888d enh: mock: implement reading from /proc/cmdline 2019-11-17 13:36:52 -08:00
Stéphane Lesimple 9911c243b2 feat: use --live with --kernel/--config/--map to override file detection in live mode 2019-11-17 13:36:52 -08:00
Stéphane Lesimple cb279a49ec enh(taa): more complete version 2019-11-13 01:07:10 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple c100ce4c0d mcedb: update from v112 to v130 2019-11-12 21:19:03 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 4741b06160 fix: batch mode for TAA 2019-11-12 21:16:21 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple e0a1c2ec77 fix shellcheck warnings 2019-11-12 20:06:12 +01:00
Agata Gruza c18b88d745 Fixing typo 2019-11-12 19:40:47 +01:00
Agata Gruza d623524342 Added support for TAA related vulnerabilities 2019-11-12 19:40:47 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple f5ec320fe5 enh: rework the vuln logic of MDS with --paranoid (fixes #307) 2019-09-22 04:02:33 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple cc224c0522 fix: mocking value for read_msr
we were returning the mocking value before actually setting it.
also remove spaces around the returned value (no behavior change)
2019-09-22 01:38:18 +02:00
Corey Wright 0518604fe6 Use kernel_err to avoid misreporting missing Linux kernel image
When checking for CVE-2017-5715 (i.e. `check_CVE_2017_5715_linux()`),
if we can't inspect (with `readelf`) or decompress the Linux kernel
image, then we report there is no kernel image (i.e. `we need the
kernel image` or `kernel image missing`, respectively), which confuses
users when the associated file exists.

Instead use `kernel_err` to provide a correct and detailed description
of the problem (e.g. `missing '...' tool, please install it, usually
it's in the '...' package`), so the user can take the prescribed
action.
2019-09-22 01:09:58 +02:00
Erik Zettel d57fecec91 spectre-meltdown-checker.sh: fix typos 2019-09-20 23:50:52 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple f835f4d07d Explain that Enhanced IBRS is better for performance than classic IBRS 2019-08-16 12:53:39 +02:00
Agata Gruza 482d6c200a Enhanced IBRS capabilities
There are two flavors of IBRS: plain and enhanced. This patch tells which flavor of IBRS is in use.
2019-08-16 12:53:39 +02:00
David Guglielmi 91d0699029 update MCEdb from v111 to v112 2019-06-03 22:49:03 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple fcc4ff4de2 update MCEdb from v110 to v111, bump to v0.42 2019-05-24 22:49:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0bd38ddda0 enh: -v -v now implies --dump-mock-data 2019-05-24 11:36:39 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple e83dc818cd feat(mds): implement FreeBSD mitigation detection 2019-05-24 11:17:04 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple d69ea67101 feat(mock): add --dump-mock-data 2019-05-24 10:49:40 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple dfe0d10f2a fix(mds): remove useless display of MD_CLEAR info in non-hw section 2019-05-24 10:20:48 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 58a5acfdbb fix(bsd): read_msr returned data in an incorrect format 2019-05-24 09:33:56 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple ccb4dbef7c enh(mock): avoid reading the sysfs interface outside sys_interface_check() for higher mocking coverage 2019-05-24 09:28:18 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple afbb26277f feat(mock): add mocking functionality to help reproducing issues under specific CPUs 2019-05-24 09:28:18 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 77b34d48c6 fix(mds): check MDS_NO bit in is_cpu_mds_free() 2019-05-24 09:28:18 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 497efe6a82 fix(l1tf): RDCL_NO bit didn't take precedence for vulnerability check on some Intel CPUs 2019-05-24 09:28:18 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 62b46df4e7 fix(l1tf): remove libvirtd from hypervisor detection (#278) 2019-05-18 14:22:42 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7d1f269bed fix(mds): AMD confirms they're not vulnerable 2019-05-16 11:31:28 +02:00
Erich Ritz 4f9ca803c8 Fix help text (#285)
* fix --help message

Commit 7b72c20f89 added help text for the
--cve switch, and the "can be specified multiple times" note got
associated with the --cve switch instead of staying with the --variant
switch.  Restore the line to belong to the --variant switch help
message.

* Add new variants to error message

Commit 8e870db4f5 added new variants but
did not add them to the error message that listed the allowable
variants.  Add them now.
2019-05-15 19:34:51 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5788cec18b fix(mds): ARM and CAVIUM are not thought to be vulnerable 2019-05-15 10:56:49 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple ae56ec0bc5 bump to v0.41 2019-05-15 09:57:28 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 871443c9db fix typos in README 2019-05-15 00:28:55 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 8fd4e3ab01 fix(xen): remove xenbus and xenwatch as they also exist in domU 2019-05-15 00:23:05 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple de793a7204 feat(mds): more verbose info about kernel support and microcode support for mitigation 2019-05-15 00:21:08 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 11790027d3 feat(mds): add alias ZombieLoad for CVE-2018-12130 2019-05-14 21:42:36 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5939c38c5c update mcedb from v109 to v110 to better detect MDS microcodes 2019-05-14 20:31:27 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple db7d3206fd feat(mds): add detection of availability of MD_CLEAR instruction 2019-05-14 20:30:47 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 1d13a423b8 adjust README 2019-05-14 20:16:01 +02:00
Agata Gruza 8e870db4f5 Added support for MDS related vulnerabilities (#282) 2019-05-14 19:21:20 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple d547ce4ab4 fix(ssb): fix error when no process uses prctl to set ssb mitigation
fixes #281
2019-05-13 15:35:58 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple d187827841 enh(vmm): add Xen daemons detection 2019-05-08 20:44:54 +02:00
Hans-Joachim Kliemeck 2e304ec617 enh(xen): improvements for xen systems (#270)
* add mitigation detection for l1tf for xen based systems
* add information for hardware mitigation
* add xen support for meltdown
2019-05-07 20:35:52 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple fcc04437e8 update builtin MCEdb from v96 to v109 2019-05-07 20:29:59 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple d31a9810e6 enhance previous commit logic 2019-05-05 20:09:53 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 4edb867def fix(vmm): revert to checking the running processes to detect a hypervisor
More information available on #278
2019-05-05 20:04:25 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 1264b1c7a3 chore: more shellcheck 0.6 fixes 2019-05-05 18:34:09 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7beca1ac50 fix: invalid names in json batch mode (fixes #279) 2019-05-05 18:15:41 +02:00
David 8ad10e15d3 chore: Comply with Shellcheck SC2209 (#280) 2019-05-05 17:31:18 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple bfa4de96e6 enh(l1tf): in paranoid mode, assume we're running a hypervisor unless stated otherwise
This change ensures we check for SMT and advise the user to disable it for maximum security.
Doing this, we'll help users mitigate a whole range of vulnerabilities taking advantage of SMT to attack purely from userland other userland processes, as seen in CVE-2018-5407 (also see #261)
2019-04-21 14:05:43 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple b022b27a51 feat(ssbd): in live mode, report whether the mitigation is active (fix #210) 2019-04-20 20:27:45 +02:00
Dario Faggioli c4bae6ee6a IBRS kernel reported active even if sysfs has "IBRS_FW" only (#275) (#276)
On a (pre-SkyLake) system, where /sys/.../vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 is
"Mitigation: Full generic retpoline, IBPB: conditional, IBRS_FW, RSB filling"

the tool, incorrectly, reports, a couple of lines above:
* IBRS enabled and active:  YES  (for kernel and firmware code)

Use '\<IBRS\>', as suggested by @jirislaby, in upstream issue #275
(https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/275) when
checking whether IBRS is enabled/active for the kernel.

With that, the output becomes:
* IBRS enabled and active:  YES  (for firmware code only)

which is actually the case.

I double checked that, if the same kernel is used on a post-SkyLake
hardware, which on openSUSE uses IBRS as, even with this change, the
tool (this time correctly) reports:
* IBRS enabled and active:  YES  (for kernel and firmware code)
2019-04-20 14:04:29 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 23e7db044e fix(bsd): load vmm if not already loaded, fixes #274
As we read sysctl values under the vmm hierarchy, the modules needs to be loaded,
so if not already done, we load it before testing for CVE-2018-3620 and CVE-2018-3646
2019-04-19 19:47:04 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple fc4981bb94 update MCEDB from v84 to v96 2019-01-20 19:52:46 +01:00
Dajiang Zhong 419508758e add spectre and meltdown mitigation technologies checking for Hygon CPU (#271)
* add spectre and meltdown mitigation technologies checking for Hygon CPU

* update microarhitecture name for Hygon CPU family 24 with moksha
2019-01-20 19:32:36 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple d7d2e6934b fix: typo in bare metal detection (fixes #269) 2018-12-12 00:24:17 +01:00
Jan b0083d918e Remove unneeded volumes in Dockerfile (#266) 2018-12-10 19:42:13 +01:00
Lily Wilson 904a83c675 Fix Arch kernel image detection (#268)
currently, the script tries to use the wrong kernel image on Arch if an
alternative kernel (hardened, zen, or lts) is in use. Fortunately, all
the Arch kernel packages place a symlink to the kernel image as /usr/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/vmlinuz, so simply removing the guess for Arch fixes the issue.
2018-12-10 19:36:58 +01:00
Rob Gill 906f54cf9d Improved hypervisor detection (#259)
* Code consistency

``` opt_batch_format="text" ``` replaced by ``` opt_batch_format='text' ```
```nrpe_vuln='"" ``` replaced by ``` nrpe_vuln='' ``` , as used by other parse options

Redundant ``` ! -z ``` replaced by ``` -n ```, as used elsewhere

Signed-off-by: Rob Gill <rrobgill@protonmail.com>

* Improved hypervisor detection

Tests for presence of hypervisor flag in /proc/cpuino
Tests for evidence of hypervisor in dmesg

Signed-off-by: Rob Gill <rrobgill@protonmail.com>

* formatting fix

Signed-off-by: Rob Gill <rrobgill@protonmail.com>

* Set $l1d_mode to -1 in cases where cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf is not available

(prevents invalid number error when evaluating [ "$l1d_mode" -ge 1 ])

Signed-off-by: Rob Gill <rrobgill@protonmail.com>

* Update Intel Atom 6 cpu names to align with kernel

Update processor names of atom 6 family processors to align with those from kernel as of October 2018.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h?id=f2c4db1bd80720cd8cb2a5aa220d9bc9f374f04e
Update list of known immune processors from
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/commit/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c?id=f2c4db1bd80720cd8cb2a5aa220d9bc9f374f04e

* Fix unset $l1d_mode

Another instance of unset l1d_mode causing error "./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh: 3867: [: Illegal number:"

* chore: update readme with brief summary of L1tfs

L1tf mitigation and impact details from

https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html and https://blogs.oracle.com/oraclesecurity/intel-l1tf

* typo
2018-12-10 19:33:07 +01:00
Brett T. Warden c45a06f414 Warn on missing kernel info (#265)
Missing kernel information can cause all sorts of false positives or
negatives. This is worth at least a warning, and repeating immediately
following the status.
2018-11-25 18:37:03 +01:00
Brett T. Warden 4a6fa070a4 Fix misdetection of files under Clear Linux (#264) 2018-11-25 18:14:04 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple c705afe764 bump to v0.40 2018-10-03 20:56:46 +02:00
Stanislav Kholmanskikh 401ccd4b14 Correct aarch64 KPTI dmesg message
As it's seen in unmap_kernel_at_el0 (both the function definition
and its usage in arm64_features[]) from arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
the kernel reports this string:

CPU features: detected: Kernel page table isolation (KPTI)

or (before commit e0f6429dc1c0 ("arm64: cpufeature: Remove redundant "feature"
in reports")):

CPU features: detected feature: Kernel page table isolation (KPTI)

if KPTI is enabled on the system.

So on let's adjust check_variant3_linux() to make it grep these
strings if executed on an aarch64 platform.

Tested on a Cavium ThunderX2 machine.

Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kholmanskikh <stanislav.kholmanskikh@oracle.com>
2018-10-03 20:49:55 +02:00
Stanislav Kholmanskikh 55120839dd Fix a typo in check_variant3_linux()
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kholmanskikh <stanislav.kholmanskikh@oracle.com>
2018-10-03 20:49:55 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple f5106b3c02 update MCEDB from v83 to v84 (no actual change) 2018-09-30 16:57:35 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 68289dae1e feat: add --update-builtin-mcedb to update the DB inside the script 2018-09-30 16:56:58 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3b2d529654 feat(l1tf): read & report ARCH_CAPABILITIES bit 3 (SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH) 2018-09-29 13:16:07 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple cbb18cb6b6 fix(l1tf): properly detect status under Red Hat/CentOS kernels 2018-09-29 13:01:13 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 299103a3ae some fixes when script is not started as root 2018-09-29 13:01:13 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple dc5402b349 chore: speed optimization of hw check and indentation fixes 2018-09-29 13:01:13 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 90c2ae5de2 feat: use the MCExtractor DB as the reference for the microcode versions
Use platomav's MCExtractor DB as the reference to decide whether our CPU microcode is the latest or not.
We have a builtin version of the DB in the script, but an updated version can be fetched and stored locally with --update-mcedb
2018-09-29 13:01:13 +02:00
Michael Lass 53d6a44754 Fix detection of CVE-2018-3615 (L1TF_SGX) (#253)
* Add another location of Arch Linux ARM kernel

* Fix detection of CVE-2018-3615

We change the value of variantl1tf in the line directly before so its
value will never be "immune". Instead we can directly use the value of
variantl1tf to initialize variantl1tf_sgx.
2018-09-29 11:35:10 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 297d890ce9 fix ucode version check regression introduced by fbbb19f under BSD 2018-09-23 15:00:39 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0252e74f94 feat(bsd): implement CVE-2018-3620 and CVE-2018-3646 mitigation detection 2018-09-22 12:26:56 +02:00
Nicolas Sauzede fbbb19f244 Fix cases where a CPU ucode version is not found in $procfs/cpuinfo. (#246)
* Fix cases where a CPU ucode version is not found in $procfs/cpuinfo.

When running whithin a virtual machine, it seems like $procfs/cpuinfo doesn't contain
a 'microcode' line, which triggers a script runtime error.
Fall back to '0x0' in this case, as other part of the script seems to already this
as a default value anyway.

* Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting.
2018-09-19 22:00:59 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 1571a56ce2 feat: add L1D flush cpuid feature bit detection 2018-09-19 09:05:23 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3cf9141601 fix: don't display summary if no CVE was tested (e.g. --hw-only) 2018-09-19 09:04:52 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple bff38f1b26 BSD: add not-implemented-yet notice for Foreshadow-NG 2018-09-18 22:06:01 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple b419fe7c63 feat(variant4): properly detect SSBD under BSD 2018-09-18 22:00:32 +02:00
alexvong1995 f193484a4a chore: fix deprecated SPDX license identifier (#249) (#251)
The SPDX license identifier 'GPL-3.0' has been deprecated according to
<https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-3.0.html>.
2018-09-18 20:00:53 +02:00
Laszlo Toth 349d77b3b6 Fix kernel detection when /lib/kernel exists on a distro (#252)
Commit b48b2177b7 ("feat: Add Clear Linux Distro (#244)") broke kernel
detection for distros using that directory for other purposes than
storing the kernel image.

Example:
 # pacman -Qo /lib/kernel
/usr/lib/kernel/ is owned by mkinitcpio 24-2
/usr/lib/kernel/ is owned by systemd 239.2-1

Signed-off-by: Laszlo Toth <laszlth@gmail.com>
2018-09-18 20:00:20 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple e589ed7f02 fix: don't test SGX again in check_CVE_2018_3615, already done by is_cpu_vulnerable 2018-09-17 22:28:04 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple ae1206288f fix: remove some harcoded /proc paths, use $procfs instead 2018-09-17 22:26:20 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple b44d2b5470 chore: remove 'experimental' notice of Foreshadow from README 2018-09-17 21:48:20 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7b72c20f89 feat(l1tf): explode L1TF in its 3 distinct CVEs 2018-09-17 21:44:48 +02:00
Luis Ponce b48b2177b7 feat: Add Clear Linux Distro (#244)
Add path of Clear Linux kernel binary and kernel config file.
2018-09-15 15:51:49 +02:00
Pierre Gaxatte 8f31634df6 feat(batch): Add a batch short option for one line result (#243)
When using this script on a large amount a machine (via clustershell or
instance) it can be easier to have a very short result on one line
showing only the vulnerabilities
2018-09-15 15:45:10 +02:00
Luis Ponce 96798b1932 chore: add SPDX GPL-3.0 license identifier (#245)
The spectre-meltdown-checker.sh file is missing licensing information.
The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be
used instead of the full boiler plate text.
2018-09-15 15:33:41 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 687ce1a7fa fix: load cpuid module if absent even when /dev/cpu/0/cpuid is there 2018-09-08 23:15:50 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 80e0db7cc4 fix: don't show erroneous ucode version when latest version is unknown (fixes #238) 2018-08-28 20:51:46 +02:00
David Guglielmi e8890ffac6 feat(config): support for genkernel kernel config file (#239)
Add support for distributions using genkernel.
2018-08-28 20:24:37 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple b2f64e1132 fix README after merge 2018-08-18 12:09:34 +02:00
unrealization 42a3a61f1d Slightly improved Docker configuration (#230)
* Listed the required volumes in the Dockerfile.

* Added docker-compose.yml for convenience as users won't need to manually
specify volumes and stuff when running through docker-compose.

Adjusted README.md to reflect this change.
2018-08-18 12:06:16 +02:00
Karsten Weiss afb36c519d Fix typo: 'RBS filling' => 'RSB filling' (#237) 2018-08-18 12:05:17 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0009c0d473 fix: --batch now implies --no-color to avoid colored warnings 2018-08-18 12:04:18 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple dd67fd94d7 feat: add FLUSH_CMD MSR availability detection (part of L1TF mitigation) 2018-08-16 19:05:09 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 339ad31757 fix: add missing l1tf CPU vulnerability display in hw section 2018-08-16 15:19:29 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 794c5be1d2 feat: add optional git describe support to display inter-release version numbers 2018-08-16 15:18:47 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple a7afc585a9 fix several incorrect ucode version numbers 2018-08-16 10:51:55 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple fc1dffd09a feat: implement detection of latest known versions of intel microcodes 2018-08-15 12:53:49 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple e942616189 feat: initial support for L1TF 2018-08-15 12:05:08 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 360be7b35f fix: hide arch_capabilities_msr_not_read warning under !intel 2018-08-13 15:42:56 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5f59257826 bump to v0.39 2018-08-13 15:33:03 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 92d59cbdc1 chore: adjust some comments, add 2 missing inits 2018-08-11 10:31:10 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 4747b932e7 feat: add detection of RSBA feature bit and adjust logic accordingly 2018-08-10 10:26:23 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 860023a806 fix: ARCH MSR was not read correctly, preventing proper SSB_NO and RDCL_NO detection 2018-08-10 10:26:23 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple ab67a9221d feat: read/write msr now supports msr-tools or perl as dd fallback 2018-08-10 10:26:23 +02:00
0x9fff00 f4592bf3a8 Add Arch armv5/armv7 kernel image location (#227) 2018-08-09 22:13:30 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple be15e47671 chore: setting master to v0.38+ 2018-08-09 14:25:22 +02:00
Nathan Parsons d3481d9524 Add support for the kernel being within a btrfs subvolume (#226)
- /boot may be within a named root subvolume (eg. "/@/boot")
- /boot may be in its own subvolume (eg. "/@boot")
2018-08-09 14:00:35 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 21af561148 bump to v0.38 2018-08-07 10:55:50 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple cb740397f3 feat(arm32): add spectrev1 mitigation detection 2018-08-07 10:42:03 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 84195689af change: default to --no-explain, use --explain to get detailed mitigation help 2018-08-04 16:31:41 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple b637681fa8 fix: debug output: msg inaccuracy for ARM checks 2018-08-04 16:19:54 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 9316c30577 fix: armv8: models < 0xd07 are not vulnerable 2018-08-04 16:19:54 +02:00
Lily Wilson f9dd9d8cb9 add guess for archlinuxarm aarch64 kernel image on raspberry pi 3 (#222) 2018-08-01 00:15:52 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0f0d103a89 fix: correctly init capabilities_ssb_no var in all cases 2018-07-26 10:18:14 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple b262c40541 fix: remove spurious character after an else statement 2018-07-25 21:55:50 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple cc2910fbbc fix: read_cpuid: don't use iflag=skip_bytes for compat with old dd versions
This closes #215 #199 #193
2018-07-23 09:12:30 +02:00
manish jaggi 30c4a1f6d2 arm64: cavium: Add CPU Implementer Cavium (#216)
This patch adds 0x43 check for cavium implementor id in function
parse_cpu_details. Also adds that Cavium Soc is not vulnerable to variant 3/3a

Signed-off-by: Manish Jaggi <manish.jagg@cavium.com>
2018-07-22 19:06:19 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple cf06636a3f fix: prometheus output: use printf for proper \n interpretation (#204) 2018-06-21 23:35:51 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 60077c8d12 fix(arm): rewrite vuln logic from latest arm statement for Cortex A8 to A76 2018-06-21 23:24:18 +02:00
Rob Gill c181978d7c fix(arm): Updated arm cortex status (#209)
* Cortex A8 Vulnerable

Arm Cortex A8 is vulnerable to variants 1 & 2  (https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability)

Part number is 0xc08 (https://developer.arm.com/docs/ddi0344/b/system-control-coprocessor/system-control-coprocessorregisters/c0-main-id-register)

False negative reported by @V10lator in #206

* ARM Cortex A12 Vulnerable to 1&2

https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability

* A76 vulnerable to variant 4

All arch 8 cortex A57-A76 are vulnerable to variant 4.

https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability

* Whitelist variant4 nonvuln Arms

* ARM Cortex Whitelist & Cumulative Blacklist

Applies all information about vulnerabilities of ARM Cortex processors (from https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability).

Whitelist & blacklist approach, using both vulnerable and non vulnerable status for each identified CPU, with vulnerabilities tracked cumulatively for multi CPU systems.
2018-06-16 12:14:39 +02:00
Jan 9a6406a9a2 chore: add docker support (#203) 2018-06-14 20:25:35 +02:00
Rob Gill 5962d20ba7 fix(variant4): whitelist from common.c::cpu_no_spec_store_bypass (#202)
* variant4 from common.c::cpu_no_spec_store_bypass

Variant 4 - Add function to 'whitelist' the hand-full of CPUs unaffected by speculative store bypass. 

This would allow improved determination of variant 4 status ( #189 ) of immune CPUs while waiting for the 4.17/stable patches to be backported to distro kernels.

Source of cpu list : https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c#n945)
Modeled after is_cpu_specex_free()

* amd families fix

amd families are reported by parse_cpu_details() in decimal

* remove duplicates

Only list processors which speculate and are immune to variant 4.
Avoids duplication with non-speculating CPUs listed in is_cpu_specex_free()
2018-05-27 15:14:29 +02:00
Rob Gill 17a3488505 fix(help): add missing references to variants 3a & 4 (#201) 2018-05-24 16:35:57 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple e54e8b3e84 chore: remove warning in README, fix display indentation 2018-05-24 16:32:53 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 39c778e3ac fix(amd): AMD families 0x15-0x17 non-arch MSRs are a valid way to control SSB 2018-05-23 23:08:07 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 2cde6e4649 feat(ssbd): add detection of proper CPUID bits on AMD 2018-05-23 22:50:52 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple f4d51e7e53 fix(variant4): add another detection way for Red Hat kernel 2018-05-23 22:47:54 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 85d46b2799 feat(variant4): add more detailed explanations 2018-05-23 21:08:58 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 61e02abd0c feat(variant3a): detect up to date microcode 2018-05-23 21:08:08 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 114756fab7 fix(amd): not vulnerable to variant3a 2018-05-23 20:38:43 +02:00
Rob Gill ea75969eb7 fix(help): Update variant options in usage message (#200) 2018-05-22 15:54:25 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple ca391cbfc9 fix(variant2): correctly detect IBRS/IBPB in SLES kernels 2018-05-22 12:06:46 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 68af5c5f92 feat(variant4): detect SSBD-aware kernel 2018-05-22 12:05:46 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 19be8f79eb doc: update README with some info about variant3 and variant4 2018-05-22 09:43:29 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple f75cc0bb6f feat(variant4): add sysfs mitigation hint and some explanation about the vuln 2018-05-22 09:39:11 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple f33d65ff71 feat(variant3a): add information about microcode-sufficient mitigation 2018-05-22 09:38:29 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 725eaa8bf5 feat(arm): adjust vulnerable ARM CPUs for variant3a and variant4 2018-05-22 09:19:29 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple c6ee0358d1 feat(variant4): report SSB_NO CPUs as not vulnerable 2018-05-22 09:18:30 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 22d0b203da fix(ssb_no): rename ssbd_no to ssb_no and fix shift 2018-05-22 00:38:31 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3062a8416a fix(msg): add missing words 2018-05-22 00:10:08 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 6a4318addf feat(variant3a/4): initial support for 2 new CVEs 2018-05-22 00:06:56 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple c19986188f fix(variant2): adjust detection for SLES kernels 2018-05-19 09:53:12 +02:00
Rob Gill 7e4899bcb8 ibrs can't be enabled on no ibrs cpu (#195)
* ibrs can't be enabled on no ibrs cpu

If the cpu is identified, and does not support SPEC_CTRL or IBRS, then ibrs can't be enabled, even if supported by the kernel.
Instead of reporting IBRS enabled and active UNKNOWN, report IBRS enabled and active NO.
2018-05-17 15:39:48 +02:00
rrobgill 5cc77741af Update spectre-meltdown-checker.sh 2018-05-05 13:00:44 +02:00
rrobgill 1c0f6d9580 cpuid and msr module check
This adds a check before loading the cpuid and msr modules under linux, ensuring they are not unloaded in exit_cleanup() if they were initially present.
2018-05-05 13:00:44 +02:00
Onno Zweers 4acd0f647a Suggestion to change VM to a CPU with IBRS capability 2018-04-20 20:35:12 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple fb52dbe7bf set master branch to v0.37+ 2018-04-20 20:34:42 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple edebe4dcd4 bump to v0.37 2018-04-18 23:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 83ea78f523 fix: arm: also detect variant 1 mitigation when using native objdump 2018-04-17 18:50:32 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 602b68d493 fix(spectrev2): explain that retpoline is possible for Skylake+ if there is RSB filling, even if IBRS is still better 2018-04-16 09:27:28 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 97bccaa0d7 feat: rephrase IBPB warning when only retpoline is enabled in non-paranoid mode 2018-04-16 09:13:25 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 68e619b0d3 feat: show RSB filling capability for non-Skylake in verbose mode 2018-04-16 09:08:25 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple a6f4475cee feat: make IBRS_FW blue instead of green 2018-04-16 09:07:54 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 223f5028df feat: add --paranoid to choose whether we require IBPB 2018-04-15 23:05:30 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple c0108b9690 fix(spectre2): don't explain how to fix when NOT VULNERABLE 2018-04-15 20:55:55 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple a3016134bd feat: make RSB filling support mandatory for Skylake+ CPUs 2018-04-15 20:55:31 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 59d85b39c9 feat: detect RSB filling capability in the kernel 2018-04-15 20:55:01 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple baaefb0c31 fix: remove shellcheck warnings 2018-04-11 22:24:03 +02:00
Igor Lubashev d452aca03a fix: invalid bash syntax when ibpb_enabled or ibrs_enabled are empty 2018-04-11 10:29:42 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 10b8d94724 feat: detect latest Red Hat kernels' RO ibpb_enabled knob 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 8606e60ef7 refactor: no longer display the retoline-aware compiler test when we can't tell for sure 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 6a48251647 fix: regression in 51aeae25, when retpoline & ibpb are enabled 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple f4bf5e95ec fix: typos 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 60eac1ad43 feat: also do PTI performance check with (inv)pcid for BSD 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple b3cc06a6ad fix regression introduced by 82c25dc 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5553576e31 feat(amd/zen): re-introduce IBRS for AMD except ZEN family 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple e16ad802da feat(ibpb=2): add detection of SMT before concluding the system is not vulnerable 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 29c294edff feat(bsd): explain how to mitigate variant2 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 59714011db refactor: IBRS_ALL & RDCL_NO are Intel-only 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 51e8261a32 refactor: separate hw checks for Intel & AMD 2018-04-10 22:49:28 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 2a4bfad835 refactor: add is_amd and is_intel funcs 2018-04-10 22:49:28 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7e52cea66e feat(spectre2): refined how status of this vuln is decided and more precise explanations on how to fix 2018-04-10 22:49:28 +02:00
Benjamin Bouvier 417d7aab91 Fix trailing whitespace and mixed indent styles; 2018-04-10 22:42:47 +02:00
Sylvestre Ledru 67bf761029 Fix some user facing typos with codespell -w -q3 . 2018-04-08 18:44:13 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0eabd266ad refactor: decrease default verbosity for some tests 2018-04-05 22:20:16 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple b77fb0f226 fix: don't override ibrs/ibpb results with later tests 2018-04-05 22:04:20 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 89c2e0fb21 fix(amd): show cpuinfo and ucode details 2018-04-05 21:39:27 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple b88f32ed95 feat: print raw cpuid, and fetch ucode version under BSD 2018-04-05 00:07:12 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7a4ebe8009 refactor: rewrite read_cpuid to get more common code parts between BSD and Linux 2018-04-05 00:06:24 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0919f5c236 feat: add explanations of what to do when a vulnerability is not mitigated 2018-04-05 00:03:04 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple de02dad909 feat: rework Spectre V2 mitigations detection w/ latest vanilla & Red Hat 7 kernels 2018-04-05 00:01:54 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 07484d0ea7 add dump of variables at end of script in debug mode 2018-04-04 23:58:15 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple a8b557b9e2 fix(cpu): skip CPU checks if asked to (--no-hw) or if inspecting a kernel of another architecture 2018-04-03 19:36:28 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 619b2749d8 fix(sysfs): only check for sysfs for spectre2 when in live mode 2018-04-03 19:32:36 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 94857c983d update readme 2018-04-03 16:00:36 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 056ed00baa feat(arm): detect spectre variant 1 mitigation 2018-04-03 15:52:25 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple aef99d20f3 fix(pti): when PTI activation is unknown, don't say we're vulnerable 2018-04-03 12:45:17 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple e2d7ed2243 feat(arm): support for variant2 and meltdown mitigation detection 2018-04-01 17:50:18 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple eeaeff8ec3 set version to v0.36+ for master branch between releases 2018-04-01 17:45:01 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple f5269a362a feat(bsd): add retpoline detection for BSD 2018-04-01 17:42:29 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple f3883a37a0 fix(xen): adjust message for DomUs w/ sysfs 2018-03-31 13:44:04 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple b6fd69a022 release: v0.36 2018-03-27 23:08:38 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7adb7661f3 enh: change colors and use red only to report vulnerability 2018-03-25 18:15:08 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple c7892e3399 update README.md 2018-03-25 14:18:39 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple aa74315df4 feat: speed up kernel version detection 2018-03-25 13:42:19 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0b8a09ec70 fix: mis adjustments for BSD compat 2018-03-25 13:26:00 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple b42d8f2f27 fix(write_msr): use /dev/zero instead of manually echoing zeroes 2018-03-25 12:53:50 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple f191ec7884 feat: add --hw-only to only show CPU microcode/cpuid/msr details 2018-03-25 12:48:37 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 28da7a0103 misc: message clarifications 2018-03-25 12:48:03 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple ece25b98a1 feat: implement support for NetBSD/FreeBSD/DragonFlyBSD 2018-03-25 12:28:02 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 889172dbb1 feat: add special extract_vmlinux mode for old RHEL kernels 2018-03-25 11:55:44 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 37ce032888 fix: bypass MSR/CPUID checks for non-x86 CPUs 2018-03-25 11:55:44 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 701cf882ad feat: more robust validation of extracted kernel image 2018-03-25 11:55:44 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 6a94c3f158 feat(extract_vmlinux): look for ELF magic in decompressed blob and cut at found offset 2018-03-25 11:55:42 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 2d993812ab feat: add --prefix-arch for cross-arch kernel inspection 2018-03-25 11:55:10 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 4961f8327f fix(ucode): fix blacklist detection for some ucode versions 2018-03-19 12:09:39 +01:00
Alex ecdc448531 Check MSR in each CPU/Thread (#136) 2018-03-17 17:17:15 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 12ea49fe0c fix(kvm): properly detect PVHVM mode (fixes #163) 2018-03-16 18:29:58 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 053f1613de fix(doc): use https:// URLs in the script comment header 2018-03-16 18:24:59 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple bda18d04a0 fix: pine64: re-add vmlinuz location and some error checks 2018-03-10 16:02:44 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 2551295541 doc: use https URLs 2018-03-10 15:20:07 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple d5832dc1dc feat: add ELF magic detection on kernel image blob for some arm64 systems 2018-03-10 14:57:25 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple d2f46740e9 feat: enhance kernel image version detection for some old kernels 2018-03-10 14:57:25 +01:00
Sam Morris 2f6a6554a2 Produce output for consumption by prometheus-node-exporter
A report of all vulnerable machines to be produced with a query such as:

    spexec_vuln_status{status!="OK"}
2018-02-27 11:08:39 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 30842dd9c0 release: bump to v0.35 2018-02-16 10:35:49 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple b4ac5fcbe3 feat(variant2): better explanation when kernel supports IBRS but CPU does not 2018-02-16 10:34:01 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple fef380d66f feat(readme): add quick run section 2018-02-15 21:19:49 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 55a6fd3911 feat(variant1): better detection for Red Hat/Ubuntu patch 2018-02-15 21:19:49 +01:00
Sylvestre Ledru 35c8a63de6 Remove the color in the title 2018-02-15 20:21:00 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5f914e555e fix(xen): declare Xen's PTI patch as a valid mitigation for variant3 2018-02-14 14:24:55 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 66dce2c158 fix(ucode): update blacklisted ucodes list from latest Intel info 2018-02-14 14:14:16 +01:00
Calvin Walton 155cac2102 Teach checker how to find kernels installed by systemd kernel-install 2018-02-10 20:51:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 22cae605e1 fix(retpoline): remove the "retpoline enabled" test
This test worked for some early versions of the retpoline
implementation in vanilla kernels, but the corresponding
flag has been removed from /proc/cpuinfo in latest kernels.
The full information is available in /sys instead, which
was already implemented in the script.
2018-02-09 20:12:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple eb75e51975 fix(ucode): update list of blacklisted ucodes from 2018-02-08 Intel document
Removed 2 ucodes and added 2 other ones
2018-02-09 19:56:27 +01:00
積丹尼 Dan Jacobson 253e180807 Update spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
Dots better than colon for indicating waiting.
2018-02-06 19:02:56 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5d6102a00e enh: show kernel version in offline mode 2018-02-02 11:27:04 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple a2dfca671e feat: detect disrepancy between found kernel image and running kernel 2018-02-02 11:13:54 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 36bd80d75f enh: speedup by not decompressing kernel on --sysfs-only 2018-02-02 11:13:31 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 1834dd6201 feat: add skylake era cpu detection routine 2018-02-02 11:12:10 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3d765bc703 enh: lazy loading of cpu informations 2018-02-02 11:11:51 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 07afd95b63 feat: better cleanup routine on exit & interrupt 2018-02-02 11:09:36 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple b7a10126d1 fix: ARM CPU display name & detection
Fix ARM CPU display name, and properly
detect known vulnerable ARM CPUs when
multiple different model cores are
present (mostly Android phones)
2018-02-02 11:00:23 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 6346a0deaa fix: --no-color workaround for android's sed 2018-02-02 10:59:49 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 8106f91981 release: bump to v0.34 2018-01-31 16:28:54 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple b1fdf88f28 enh: display ucode info even when not blacklisted 2018-01-31 16:21:32 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 4d29607630 cleanup: shellcheck pass 2018-01-31 16:15:20 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0267659adc cleanup: remove superseded atom detection code
This is now handled properly by checking the CPU
vendor, family, model instead of looking for the
commercial name of the CPU in /proc/cpuinfo
2018-01-31 16:15:20 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 247b176882 feat: detect known speculative-execution free CPUs
Based on a kernel patch that has been merged to Linus' tree.
Some of the detections we did by grepping the model name
will probably no longer be needed.
2018-01-31 16:15:20 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple bcae8824ec refacto: create a dedicated func to read cpuid bits 2018-01-31 16:15:20 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 71e7109c22 refacto: move cpu discovery bits to a dedicated function 2018-01-31 16:15:20 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple aa18b51e1c fix(variant1): smarter lfence check
Instead of just counting the number of LFENCE
instructions, now we're only counting the those
that directly follow a jump instruction.
2018-01-31 14:34:54 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple b738ac4bd7 fix: regression introduced by previous commit
449: ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh: 3: parameter not set
This happened only on blacklisted microcodes, fixed by
adding set +u before the return
2018-01-31 12:13:50 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 799ce3eb30 update blacklisted ucode list from kernel source 2018-01-31 11:26:23 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple f1e18c136f doc(disclaimer): Spectre affects all software
Add a paragraph in the disclaimer stating that this tool focuses
on the kernel side of things, and that for Spectre, any software
might be vulnerable.
2018-01-30 14:37:52 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple e05ec5c85f feat(variant1): detect vanilla mitigation
Implement detection of mitigation for Variant 1 that is
being pushed on vanilla kernel.
Current name of the patch:
"spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti" (v6)
Also detect some distros that already backported this
patch without modifying the vulnerabilities sysfs hierarchy.
This detection is more reliable than the LFENCE one, trust
it and skip the LFENCE heuristic if a match is found.
2018-01-30 12:55:34 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 6e544d6055 fix(cpu): Pentium Exxxx are vulnerable to Meltdown 2018-01-29 11:18:15 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 90a65965ff adjust: show how to enable IBRS/IBPB in -v only 2018-01-29 11:06:15 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 9b53635eda refacto: fix shellcheck warnings for better compat
Now `shellcheck -s sh` no longer shows any warnings.
This should improve compatibility with exotic shells
as long as they're POSIX compliant.
2018-01-29 10:34:08 +01:00
Joseph Mulloy 7404929661 Fix printing of microcode to use cpuinfo values
The values used should be the ones that come from cpuinfo instead of
the test values. The following line will print the last tuple tested
instead of the actual values of the CPU.

Line 689: _debug "is_ucode_blacklisted: no ($model/$stepping/$ucode)"
2018-01-26 18:23:18 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple bf46fd5d9b update: new screenshots for README.md 2018-01-26 15:15:24 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0798bd4c5b fix: report arch_capabilities as NO when no MSR
When the arch_capabilities MSR is not there, it means
that all the features it might advertise can be considered
as NO instead of UNKNOWN
2018-01-26 14:55:01 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 42094c4f8b release: v0.33 2018-01-26 14:20:29 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 03d2dfe008 feat: add blacklisted Intel ucode detection
Some Intel microcodes are known to cause instabilities
such as random reboots. Intel advises to revert to a
previous version if a newer one that fixes those issues
is not available. Detect such known bad microcodes.
2018-01-26 14:19:54 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 9f00ffa5af fix: fallback to UNKNOWN when we get -EACCES
For detection of IBRS_ALL and RDCL_NO, fallback to
UNKNOWN when we were unable to read the CPUID or MSR.
2018-01-26 14:16:34 +01:00
Matthieu Cerda 7f0d80b305 xen: detect if the host is a Xen Dom0 or PV DomU (fixes #83) 2018-01-25 11:04:30 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple d1c1f0f0f0 fix(batch): fix regression introduced by acf12a6
In batch mode, $echo_cmd was not initialized early
enough, and caused this error:
./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh: 899: ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh: -ne: not found
Fix it by initing echo_cmd unconditionally at the start
2018-01-24 17:57:19 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple acf12a6d2d feat(cpu) add STIBP, RDCL_NO, IBRS_ALL checks
Move all the CPU checks to their own section,
for clarity. We now check for IBRS, IBPB, STIBP,
RDCL_NO and IBRS_ALL. We also show whether the
system CPU is vulnerable to the three variants,
regardless of the fact that mitigations are in
place or not, which is determined in each vuln-
specific section.
2018-01-24 14:44:16 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple b45e40bec8 feat(stibp): add STIBP cpuid feature check 2018-01-24 12:19:02 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3c1d452c99 fix(cpuid): fix off-by-one SPEC_CTRL bit check 2018-01-24 12:18:56 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 53b9eda040 fix: don't make IBPB mandatory when it's not there
On some kernels there could be IBRS support but not
IBPB support, in that case, don't report VULN just
because IBPB is not enabled when IBRS is
2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3b0ec998b1 fix(cosmetic): tiny msg fixes 2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple d55bafde19 fix(cpu): trust is_cpu_vulnerable even w/ debugfs
For variant3 under AMD, the debugfs vulnerabilities hierarchy
flags the system as Vulnerable, which is wrong. Trust our own
is_cpu_vulnerable() func in that case
2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 147462c0ab fix(variant3): do our checks even if sysfs is here 2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple ddc7197b86 fix(retpoline): retpoline-compiler detection
When kernel is not compiled with retpoline option, doesn't
have the sysfs vulnerability hierarchy and our heuristic to
detect a retpoline-aware compiler didn't match, change result
for retpoline-aware compiler detection from UNKNOWN to NO.
When CONFIG_RETPOLINE is not set, a retpoline-aware compiler
won't produce different asm than a standard one anyway.
2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple e7aa3b9d16 feat(retpoline): check if retpoline is enabled
Before we would just check if retpoline was compiled
in, now we also check that it's enabled at runtime
(only in live mode)
2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple ff5c92fa6f feat(sysfs): print details even with sysfs
Before, when the /sys kernel vulnerability interface
was available, we would bypass all our tests and just
print the output of the vulnerability interface. Now,
we still rely on it when available, but we run our
checks anyway, except for variant 1 where the current
method of mitigation detection doesn't add much value
to the bare /sys check
2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 443d9a2ae9 feat(ibpb): now also check for IBPB on variant 2
In addition to IBRS (and microcode support), IBPB
must be used to mitigate variant 2, if retpoline
support is not available. The vulnerability status
of a system will be defined as "non vulnerable"
if IBRS and IBPB are both enabled, or if IBPB
is enabled with a value of 2 for RedHat kernels,
see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3e454f1817 fix(offline): report unknown when too few info
In offline mode, in the worst case where an invalid
config file is given, and we have no vmlinux image
nor System.map, the script was reporting Variant 2
and Variant 3 as vulnerable in the global status.
Replace this by a proper pair of UNKNOWNs
2018-01-23 22:20:34 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple c8a25c5d97 feat: detect invalid kconfig files 2018-01-23 21:48:19 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 40381349ab fix(dmesg): detect when dmesg is truncated
To avoid false negatives when looking for a message
in dmesg, we were previously also grepping in known
on-disk archives of dmesg (dmesg.log, kern.log).
This in turn caused false positives because we have no
guarantee that we're grepping the dmesg of the current
running kernel. Hence we now only look in the live
`dmesg`, detect if it has been truncated, and report
it to the user.
2018-01-21 16:26:08 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0aa5857a76 fix(cpu): Pentium Exxxx series are not vulnerable
Pentium E series are not in the vulnerable list from
Intel, and Spectre2 PoC reportedly doesn't work on
an E5200
2018-01-21 16:13:17 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple b3b7f634e6 fix(display): use text-mode compatible colors
in text-mode 80-cols TERM=linux terminals, colors
were not displaying properly, one had to use
--no-color to be able to read some parts of the
text.
2018-01-21 12:32:22 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 263ef65fec bump to v0.32 2018-01-20 12:49:12 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple a1bd233c49 revert to a simpler check_vmlinux() 2018-01-20 12:26:26 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple de6590cd09 cache is_cpu_vulnerable result for performance 2018-01-20 12:24:23 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 56d4f82484 is_cpu_vulnerable: implement check for multi-arm systems 2018-01-20 12:24:23 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7fa2d6347b check_vmlinux: when readelf doesn't work, try harder with another way 2018-01-20 12:23:55 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3be5e90481 be smarter to find a usable echo command 2018-01-20 12:23:55 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 995620a682 add pine64 vmlinuz location 2018-01-20 12:23:19 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 193e0d8d08 arm: cosmetic fix for name and handle aarch64 2018-01-20 12:22:48 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 72ef94ab3d ARM: display a friendly name instead of empty string 2018-01-20 12:22:48 +01:00
Harald Hoyer ccc0453df7 search in /lib/modules/$(uname -r) for vmlinuz, config, System.map
On Fedora machines /lib/modules/$(uname -r) has all the files.
2018-01-20 11:19:34 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 14ca49a042 Atom N270: implement another variation 2018-01-19 18:47:38 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple db357b8e25 CoreOS: remove ephemeral install of a non-used package 2018-01-18 10:17:25 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 42a57dd980 add kern.log as another backend of dmesg output 2018-01-17 17:17:39 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5ab95f3656 fix(atom): don't use a pcre regex, only an extended one 2018-01-17 12:01:13 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5b6e39916d fix(atom): properly detect Nxxx Atom series 2018-01-17 11:07:47 +01:00
Willy Sudiarto Raharjo 556951d5f0 Add Support for Slackware.
Signed-off-by: Willy Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@gmail.com>
2018-01-16 11:55:03 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7a88aec95f Implement CoreOS compatibility mode (#84)
* Add special CoreOS compatibility mode
* CoreOS: refuse --coreos if we're not under CoreOS
* CoreOS: warn if launched without --coreos option
* is_coreos: make stderr silent
* CoreOS: tiny adjustments
2018-01-16 10:33:01 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple bd18323d79 bump to v0.31 to reflect changes 2018-01-14 22:34:09 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple b89d67dd15 meltdown: detecting Xen PV, reporting as not vulnerable 2018-01-14 22:31:21 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 704e54019a is_cpu_vulnerable: add check for old Atoms 2018-01-14 21:32:56 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple d96093171a verbose: add PCID check for performance impact of PTI 2018-01-14 17:18:34 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple dcc4488340 Merge pull request #80 from speed47/cpuid_spec_ctrl
v0.30, cpuid spec ctrl and other enhancements
2018-01-14 16:48:02 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 32e3fe6c07 bump to v0.30 to reflect changes 2018-01-14 16:45:59 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple f488947d43 Merge pull request #79 from andir/add-nixos
add support for NixOS kernel
2018-01-14 16:40:10 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 71213c11b3 ibrs: check for spec_ctrl_ibrs in cpuinfo 2018-01-14 16:36:51 +01:00
Andreas Rammhold 2964c4ab44 add support for NixOS kernel
this removes the need to specify the kernel version manually on NixOS
2018-01-14 16:18:29 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 749f432d32 also check for spec_ctrl flag in cpuinfo 2018-01-14 15:47:51 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple a422b53d7c also check for cpuinfo flag 2018-01-14 15:47:51 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple c483a2cf60 check spec_ctrl support using cpuid 2018-01-14 15:47:51 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple dead0054a4 fix: proper detail msg in vuln status 2018-01-14 15:47:22 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 8ed7d465aa Merge pull request #77 from speed47/exitcode
proper return codes regardless of the batch mode
2018-01-14 14:25:12 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple e5e4851d72 proper return codes regardless of the batch mode 2018-01-14 14:24:31 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7f92717a2c add info about accuracy when missing kernel files 2018-01-13 13:59:17 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple b47d505689 AMD now vuln to variant2 (as per their stmt) 2018-01-13 13:35:31 +01:00
Corey Hickey 4a2d051285 minor is_cpu_vulnerable() changes (#71)
* correct is_cpu_vulnerable() comment

As far as I can tell, the function and usage are correct for the comment
to be inverted.

Add a clarifying note as to why the value choice makes sense.

* exit on invalid varient

If this happens, it's a bug in the script. None of the calling code
checks for status 255, so don't let a scripting bug cause a false
negative.

* no need to set vulnerable CPUs

According to comment above this code:
'by default, everything is vulnerable, we work in a "whitelist" logic here.'
2018-01-13 13:16:37 +01:00
Sylvestre Ledru f3551b9734 Only show the name of the script, not the full path (#72) 2018-01-13 13:14:19 +01:00
Sylvestre Ledru 45b98e125f fix some typos (#73) 2018-01-13 13:13:40 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple dce917bfbb add --version, bump to v0.28 2018-01-12 19:10:44 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 8f18f53aba add cpu model in output 2018-01-12 19:08:12 +01:00
M. Willis Monroe d3f102b3b3 Typofix in readme (#61) 2018-01-12 13:58:04 +01:00
M. Willis Monroe 8bd093173d Fixed a few spelling errors (#60) 2018-01-12 11:46:36 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple bfe5a3b840 add some debug 2018-01-12 10:53:19 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 6a0242eea3 bump to v0.27 2018-01-11 15:36:41 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple bc4e39038a fix(opcodes): fix regression introduced in previous commit
We were saying unknown instead of vulnerable when the count of lfence opcodes was low
This was not impacting batch mode or the final decision, just the human-readable output of the script.
2018-01-11 15:35:57 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 62f8ed6f61 adding support for new /sys interface (#55)
* adding support for new /sys interface
* fix(objdump): prefer -d instead of -D, some kernels crash objdump otherwise
2018-01-11 12:23:16 +01:00
Gianluca Varisco 56b67f8082 Typo in README (#54) 2018-01-11 12:01:31 +01:00
Tobias Rüetschi 52a8f78885 send warning to stderr. (#53)
With --batch json there must not be any other output on stdout, so redirect warnings to stderr will show the warning on the console and only the json output is on stdout.
2018-01-11 09:55:43 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple a09a5ba38f bump to v0.25 to reflect changes 2018-01-11 09:08:29 +01:00
Abdoul Bah 5a7d8d7edf Produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef... (#50)
Produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef...
2018-01-11 09:04:13 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 49fdc6c449 Merge pull request #51 from cowanml/file_read_check_fixup
fixed file read test
2018-01-10 21:39:09 +01:00
Matt Cowan af3de2a862 fixed file read test 2018-01-10 15:17:14 -05:00
Stéphane Lesimple c6e1b0ac8a feat(kernel): add support for LZ4 decompression 2018-01-10 20:10:57 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple b913dacc1b Merge pull request #48 from speed47/opensuse
fix(opensuse): add specific location for ibrs_enabled file
2018-01-10 18:41:30 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple eb0ebef5a8 fix(opensuse): add specific location for ibrs_enabled file 2018-01-10 17:40:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple e0254025e8 Merge pull request #47 from speed47/readme
update readme
2018-01-10 17:12:54 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple bd010340e6 update readme 2018-01-10 17:12:33 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple a658de2f01 fix(kernel): fix detection for separate /boot partitions 2018-01-10 16:27:16 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 4aed5589fe Merge pull request #44 from speed47/bootimage
feat(kernel): check the BOOT_IMAGE info from cmdline before trying th…
2018-01-10 16:13:00 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 8ed1f5e3af feat(kernel): check the BOOT_IMAGE info from cmdline before trying the default names 2018-01-10 15:46:29 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple ffc542eb82 bump to v0.23 to reflect changes 2018-01-10 15:25:55 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 74bc7ba637 add --variant to specify what check we want to run 2018-01-10 15:22:30 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5389ac6844 Merge pull request #41 from bang-communications/master
NRPE mode
2018-01-10 15:11:45 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 36fb83215a Merge pull request #42 from simon-vasseur/style
added some style (screenshot in readme)
2018-01-10 15:07:34 +01:00
Marcus Downing 59fe8c2ad8 Error on unknown batch format 2018-01-10 13:57:10 +00:00
Simon Vasseur b8d28e7f61 added some style 2018-01-10 14:55:58 +01:00
Marcus Downing 7c11d07865 Stray tab 2018-01-10 11:59:33 +00:00
Marcus Downing 7c5cfbb8c3 batch nrpe 2018-01-10 11:57:45 +00:00
Marcus Downing 381038eceb NRPE mode 2018-01-10 11:18:45 +00:00
Stéphane Lesimple d6e4aa43f0 Merge pull request #37 from deufrai/better-dmesg-support
Improve PTI detection
2018-01-09 19:52:45 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple e5e09384f0 typofix 2018-01-09 18:54:35 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7222367f04 add disclaimer and bump to 0.21 2018-01-09 18:52:21 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple ab512687cf Merge pull request #38 from Alkorin/fixARM
Fix ARM checks
2018-01-09 18:47:25 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple a5aaa790a0 Merge pull request #39 from Alkorin/typo
Fix small typo in error message
2018-01-09 18:45:58 +01:00
Alkorin 335439dee0 Fix small typo in error message 2018-01-09 18:44:15 +01:00
Alkorin 45297b6f7d Fix ARM checks 2018-01-09 18:41:48 +01:00
Frederic CORNU a7b14306d5 Improve PTI detection even more
when PTI detection relies on dmesg, dmesg output is checked first
then /var/log/dmesg if dmesg output lacks boot time messages
2018-01-09 18:26:32 +01:00
Frederic CORNU 608952ff71 Improve PTI detection
In case of a busy or misconfigured server, kernel message buffer loop
can be filled with messages broadcasted later than boot time. So dmesg
command wont return boot time messages.

Grepping /var/log/dmesg fixes it and this log file location semms pretty
standard across many common distros
2018-01-09 18:17:39 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 1c3d349667 Merge pull request #31 from Feandil/batch
Add a "batch" and "verbose" mode
2018-01-09 18:12:39 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple b93b13263d fix(pti): remove escapes since we use grep -E now 2018-01-09 16:01:44 +01:00
Vincent Brillault ad342cab06 Introduce "verbose" and "batch" modes
Rewrite the way the output is processed:
- Define verbosity level (currently warn, info (default) & verbose)
- Add a batch mode, for simple machine parsing
2018-01-09 15:58:13 +01:00
Vincent Brillault 5fd85e288b No-color: interpret string (-e) to be able to mach \x1B 2018-01-09 15:57:10 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 322f4efc8f fix broken logic of 68961f9, increment version to 0.20 2018-01-09 14:55:12 +01:00
Vincent Brillault b6bfcdbd45 Move configuration at the beginning of the script 2018-01-09 14:18:02 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 19b01078c2 Merge pull request #32 from speed47/arm
adding known non-vulnerable ARM chips
2018-01-09 13:57:27 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 68961f98c2 adding known non-vulnerable ARM chips 2018-01-09 13:11:48 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple f0f2ea9b11 v0.19: introduce --no-color 2018-01-09 10:32:51 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 6f1bdba1d9 bump to v0.18 to reflect changes 2018-01-09 09:21:42 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7b05105a54 Merge pull request #25 from Feandil/proc_config
When using /proc/config.gz, indicate it more clearly
2018-01-09 09:19:36 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 8aed2d4086 Merge pull request #26 from Feandil/proc_kallsym
Use /proc/kallsyms to get symbols, if available
2018-01-09 09:17:18 +01:00
Vincent Brillault f4140a992a Use /proc/kallsyms to get symbols, if available 2018-01-09 08:58:09 +01:00
Vincent Brillault 2c51b00a90 When using /proc/config.gz, indicate it more clearly 2018-01-09 08:54:07 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 2d94514c07 adding mention of heuristic for variant 1 check 2018-01-09 08:43:52 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0e8f97afbc Merge pull request #24 from angus-p/Remove-extra-space
remove superfluous space from test line 315
2018-01-09 08:34:10 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 70323a30da Merge pull request #23 from mradcliffe/issue-22
Increases tmp directory uniqueness to 6 characters to support Slackware
2018-01-09 08:33:32 +01:00
angus-p cc0b325383 remove superfluous space from test line 315
Extra space was causing non-existent variable to be tested resulting in 'YES' if running in live mode and IBRS compiled in
2018-01-09 03:47:25 +00:00
Matthew Radcliffe 4454f03136 Increases tmp directory uniqueness to 6 characters to support Slackware 2018-01-08 22:28:55 -05:00
Stéphane Lesimple 949f316f89 missed version bump + README typofix 2018-01-08 23:15:42 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5082afae61 Merge pull request #19 from speed47/offline_mode
implement offline mode and help
2018-01-08 23:13:19 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple d73a24cb5b implement offline mode and help 2018-01-08 23:09:17 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 75332e6e0f Merge pull request #18 from GrimKriegor/linux-libre_support
Linux-libre support
2018-01-08 23:07:41 +01:00
Grim Kriegor 2d33a4369e Linux-libre support 2018-01-08 21:56:11 +00:00
Stéphane Lesimple 8d4d295309 bump to v0.16 to reflect changes 2018-01-08 17:48:20 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 1ff437edbb Merge pull request #16 from Alkorin/fixes
Fixes
2018-01-08 17:45:59 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 34656827f5 detect retpoline-compliant compiler from latest LKML patches 2018-01-08 17:32:19 +01:00
Alkorin 8c8a8d35fd Detect if 'readelf' is present 2018-01-08 16:52:09 +01:00
Alkorin debd10b517 Detect if 'strings' is present 2018-01-08 16:51:20 +01:00
Alkorin 21f81ff5c9 Detect if uncompress binaries are present 2018-01-08 16:51:14 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 206e4b7fbc add detection of retpoline-aware compiler 2018-01-08 16:28:00 +01:00
Alkorin 1a14483c98 Use 'readelf' instead of 'file' to detect kernel 2018-01-08 15:56:19 +01:00
Alkorin 26564206db Do not execute checks if we already found that PTI is enabled 2018-01-08 15:56:19 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 207168e097 detect if the used compiler supports retpoline (WIP) 2018-01-08 15:45:09 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple f8ca11e56a Merge pull request #12 from sebastianw/fix-double-print
Remove superfluous 'YES' output when checking cpuinfo
2018-01-08 15:05:15 +01:00
Sebastian Wiesinger c88acdd31d Remove superfluous 'YES' output when checking cpuinfo 2018-01-08 14:50:59 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 88df48f4a7 Merge pull request #11 from sebastianw/kaiser-cpu-flag
Recognize 'kaiser' flag in /proc/cpuinfo
2018-01-08 14:45:40 +01:00
Sebastian Wiesinger 124ce8e27a Recognize 'kaiser' flag in /proc/cpuinfo 2018-01-08 14:38:43 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 7bbcfe0df7 Merge pull request #7 from Feandil/redhat
Redhat support
2018-01-08 14:17:33 +01:00
Vincent Brillault a792348928 RedHat uses a different configuration name 2018-01-08 12:59:12 +01:00
Vincent Brillault 66f7708095 Refactor RedHat support:
- Isolate file check to different elif (allowing to add more)
- Do the PTI debugfs check first (faster and supposed to be dynamic)
- If pti_enable is 0, don't trust dmesg (supposed to be dynamic)
2018-01-08 12:59:03 +01:00
Vincent Brillault 34ef5ef21b Delay umount (for RedHat access to pti_enable) 2018-01-08 12:58:22 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple edbdf0da1f push the lfence opcodes threshold to 70 2018-01-08 12:49:23 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 68adbfdf14 Merge pull request #10 from Alkorin/permissionDenied
Avoid 'cat: /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled: Permission denied'
2018-01-08 12:44:09 +01:00
Alkorin 47c30babf1 Avoid 'cat: /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled: Permission denied' 2018-01-08 12:41:28 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple ef7a5c4cf6 adding uname -v to get potential additional vendor information 2018-01-08 12:22:56 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 4406910bea Merge pull request #8 from Feandil/debugfs
Fix debugfs mount check
2018-01-08 12:19:23 +01:00
Vincent Brillault b7197d6f54 Fix debugfs mount check 2018-01-08 12:15:51 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple c792fa35bf add kernel version information to the output 2018-01-08 12:14:12 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple d1498fe03f Merge pull request #5 from fccagou/centos
fix(centos): check according to redhat patch.
2018-01-08 12:10:07 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 12bdd0e412 root check is now more visible 2018-01-08 11:31:19 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 89f9bef577 Merge pull request #4 from dguglielmi/add-genkernel-support
Add support for Gentoo genkernel image path
2018-01-08 11:24:07 +01:00
fccagou 0f50e04dab fix(centos): check according to redhat patch. https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301 2018-01-08 11:14:22 +01:00
David Guglielmi bf056ae73d Add support for Gentoo genkernel image path 2018-01-08 11:08:53 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 623e180ae1 Merge pull request #3 from TheHendla/arch_boot_img
add arch linux bootimage path
2018-01-08 10:51:59 +01:00
Frederik Schreiber 40a9d43c44 add arch linux bootimage path 2018-01-08 10:36:29 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple c1004d5171 fix extract-vmlinux for non-gzip 2018-01-08 09:56:29 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple fa0850466e add some comments, enhance pti detection 2018-01-08 09:37:54 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5c14384e15 Merge pull request #1 from t-nelis/root-check
Improve "running as root" check
2018-01-08 08:58:21 +01:00
Thibault Nélis 1aaca63dcf Improve "running as root" check
Small issue with the USER environment variable:

  $ echo $USER
  thib
  $ sudo sh -c 'echo $USER'
  thib
  $ sudo -i sh -c 'echo $USER'
  root

Rather than recommending users to use sudo --login / -i, use the (very
widespread/portable) id program to retrieve the effective user ID
instead and don't change the recommendation.

  $ id -u
  1000
  $ sudo id -u
  0
  $ sudo -i id -u
  0
2018-01-08 01:22:14 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 96dfa03c00 fix for uncompressed vmlinux case 2018-01-08 00:45:12 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 05c79425ab detect kpti directly in vmlinux if option is not there 2018-01-07 22:47:41 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 9def0c949a update readme 2018-01-07 20:13:10 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 64eb1d005c add couple missing elses 2018-01-07 18:49:15 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple bffda8b3e7 remove dependency on rdmsr 2018-01-07 18:36:56 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 13f2133a97 cosmetic fix 2018-01-07 18:14:08 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 8c2fd0f0bb fix MSR reading, need rdmsr for now 2018-01-07 18:13:25 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 761c2b80e4 cosmetic fix 2018-01-07 17:19:37 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple d6977928e5 msg fix 2018-01-07 17:15:08 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple bd4c74331e add retpolines check 2018-01-07 16:57:14 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 82972f8790 fix status unknown for variant 1 2018-01-07 16:32:34 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 30de4f6336 remove hardcoded kernel image path 2018-01-07 16:25:50 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 9ed1fcd98a cosmetic + v0.02 2018-01-07 16:22:30 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple ef7c0d7ec5 add variant 1 check 2018-01-07 16:16:11 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3b760822ff fix echo under some shells 2018-01-07 16:00:01 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0201b02313 typofix 2018-01-07 15:37:50 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple c937e6603b add System.map way of detecting kpti build 2018-01-07 15:36:05 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0c4591f8ec fix readme 2018-01-07 15:02:59 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 4211178b3a v0.01 2018-01-07 15:00:59 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3b59139e79 Initial commit 2018-01-07 15:00:15 +01:00
14 changed files with 6679 additions and 2158 deletions
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name: CI
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v1
- name: install prerequisites
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y shellcheck jq sqlite3 iucode-tool
- name: shellcheck
run: shellcheck -s sh spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
- name: check indentation
run: |
if [ $(grep -cPv "^\t*\S|^$" spectre-meltdown-checker.sh) != 0 ]; then
echo "Badly indented lines found:"
grep -nPv "^\t*\S|^$" spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
exit 1
else
echo "Indentation seems correct."
fi
- name: check direct execution
run: |
expected=15
nb=$(sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
if [ "$nb" -ne "$expected" ]; then
echo "Invalid number of CVEs reported: $nb instead of $expected"
exit 1
else
echo "OK $nb CVEs reported"
fi
- name: check docker-compose run execution
run: |
expected=15
docker-compose build
nb=$(docker-compose run --rm spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
if [ "$nb" -ne "$expected" ]; then
echo "Invalid number of CVEs reported: $nb instead of $expected"
exit 1
else
echo "OK $nb CVEs reported"
fi
- name: check docker run execution
run: |
expected=15
docker build -t spectre-meltdown-checker .
nb=$(docker run --rm --privileged -v /boot:/boot:ro -v /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu:ro -v /lib/modules:/lib/modules:ro spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
if [ "$nb" -ne "$expected" ]; then
echo "Invalid number of CVEs reported: $nb instead of $expected"
exit 1
else
echo "OK $nb CVEs reported"
fi
- name: check fwdb update
run: |
nbtmp1=$(find /tmp 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --update-fwdb; ret=$?
if [ "$ret" != 0 ]; then
echo "Non-zero return value: $ret"
exit 1
fi
nbtmp2=$(find /tmp 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
if [ "$nbtmp1" != "$nbtmp2" ]; then
echo "Left temporary files!"
exit 1
fi
if ! [ -e ~/.mcedb ]; then
echo "No .mcedb file found after updating fwdb"
exit 1
fi
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__pycache__/
*.py[cod]
*.egg-info/
.venv/
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FROM alpine:3.7
RUN apk --update --no-cache add kmod binutils grep perl
COPY . /check
ENTRYPOINT ["/check/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh"]
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# Questions
- [What to expect from this tool?](#what-to-expect-from-this-tool)
- [Why was this script written in the first place?](#why-was-this-script-written-in-the-first-place)
- [Why are those vulnerabilities so different than regular CVEs?](#why-are-those-vulnerabilities-so-different-than-regular-cves)
- [What do "affected", "vulnerable" and "mitigated" mean exactly?](#what-do-affected-vulnerable-and-mitigated-mean-exactly)
- [What are the main design decisions regarding this script?](#what-are-the-main-design-decisions-regarding-this-script)
- [Everything is indicated in `sysfs` now, is this script still useful?](#everything-is-indicated-in-sysfs-now-is-this-script-still-useful)
- [How does this script work?](#how-does-this-script-work)
- [Which BSD OSes are supported?](#which-bsd-oses-are-supported)
- [Why is my OS not supported?](#why-is-my-os-not-supported)
- [The tool says there is an updated microcode for my CPU, but I don't have it!](#the-tool-says-there-is-an-updated-microcode-for-my-cpu-but-i-dont-have-it)
- [The tool says that I need a more up-to-date microcode, but I have the more recent version!](#the-tool-says-that-i-need-a-more-up-to-date-microcode-but-i-have-the-more-recent-version)
- [Which rules are governing the support of a CVE in this tool?](#which-rules-are-governing-the-support-of-a-cve-in-this-tool)
# Answers
## What to expect from this tool?
This tool does its best to determine where your system stands on each of the collectively named [transient execution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transient_execution_CPU_vulnerability) vulnerabilities (also sometimes called "speculative execution" vulnerabilities) that were made public since early 2018. It doesn't attempt to run any kind of exploit, and can't guarantee that your system is secure, but rather helps you verifying if your system is affected, and if it is, checks whether it has the known mitigations in place to avoid being vulnerable.
Some mitigations could also exist in your kernel that this script doesn't know (yet) how to detect, or it might falsely detect mitigations that in the end don't work as expected (for example, on backported or modified kernels).
Please also note that for Spectre vulnerabilities, all software can possibly be exploited, this tool only verifies that the kernel (which is the core of the system) you're using has the proper protections in place. Verifying all the other software is out of the scope of this tool. As a general measure, ensure you always have the most up to date stable versions of all the software you use, especially for those who are exposed to the world, such as network daemons and browsers.
This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to definitive conclusions about your security: hardware vulnerabilities are [complex beasts](#why-are-those-vulnerabilities-so-different-than-regular-cves), and collective understanding of each vulnerability is evolving with time.
## Why was this script written in the first place?
The first commit of this script is dated *2018-01-07*, only 4 days after the world first heard about the Meltdown and the Spectre attacks. With those attacks disclosure, a _whole new range of vulnerabilities_ that were previously thought to be mostly theoretical and only possible in very controlled environments (labs) - hence of little interest for most except researchers - suddenly became completely mainstream and apparently trivial to conduct on an immensely large number of systems.
On the few hours and days after that date, the whole industry went crazy. Proper, verified information about these vulnerabilities was incredibly hard to find, because before this, even the CPU vendors never had to deal with managing security vulnerabilities at scale, as software vendors do since decades. There were a lot of FUD, and the apparent silence of the vendors was enough for most to fear the worst. The whole industry had everything to learn about this new type of vulnerabilities. However, most systems administrators had a few simple questions:
- Am **I** vulnerable? And if yes,
- What do I have to do to mitigate these vulnerabilities on **my** system?
Unfortunately, answering those questions was very difficult (and still is to some extent), even if the safe answer to the first question was "you probably are". This script was written to try to give simple answers to those simple questions, and was made to evolve as the information about these vulnerabilities became available. On the first few days, there was several new versions published **per day**.
## Why are those vulnerabilities so different than regular CVEs?
Those are hardware vulnerabilities, while most of the CVEs we see everyday are software vulnerabilities. A quick comparison would be:
Software vulnerability:
- Can be fixed? Yes.
- How to fix? Update the software (or uninstall it!)
Hardware vulnerability:
- Can be fixed? No, only mitigated (or buy new hardware!)
- How to ~~fix~~ mitigate? In the worst case scenario, 5 "layers" need to be updated: the microcode/firmware, the host OS kernel, the hypervisor, the VM OS kernel, and possibly all the software running on the VM.
A more detailed video explanation is available here: https://youtu.be/2gB9U1EcCss?t=85
## What do "affected", "vulnerable" and "mitigated" mean exactly?
- **Affected** means that your CPU's hardware, as it went out of the factory, is known to be concerned by a specific vulnerability, i.e. the vulnerability applies to your hardware model. Note that it says nothing about whether a given vulnerability can actually be used to exploit your system. However, an unaffected CPU will never be vulnerable, and doesn't need to have mitigations in place.
- **Vulnerable** implies that you're using an **affected** CPU, and means that a given vulnerability can be exploited on your system, because no (or insufficient) mitigations are in place.
- **Mitigated** implies that a previously **vulnerable** system has followed all the steps (updated all the required layers) to ensure a given vulnerability cannot be exploited. About what "layers" mean, see [the previous question](#why-are-those-vulnerabilities-so-different-than-regular-cves).
## What are the main design decisions regarding this script?
There are a few rules that govern how this tool is written.
1) It should be okay to run this script in a production environment. This implies, but is not limited to:
* 1a. Never modify the system it's running on, and if it needs to e.g. load a kernel module it requires, that wasn't loaded before it was launched, it'll take care to unload it on exit
* 1b. Never attempt to "fix" or "mitigate" any vulnerability, or modify any configuration. It just reports what it thinks is the status of your system. It leaves all decisions to the sysadmin.
* 1c. Never attempt to run any kind of exploit to tell whether a vulnerability is mitigated, because it would violate 1a), could lead to unpredictable system behavior, and might even lead to wrong conclusions, as some PoC must be compiled with specific options and prerequisites, otherwise giving wrong information (especially for Spectre). If you want to run PoCs, do it yourself, but please read carefully about the PoC and the vulnerability. PoCs about a hardware vulnerability are way more complicated and prone to false conclusions than PoCs for software vulnerabilities.
2) Never look at the kernel version to tell whether it supports mitigation for a given vulnerability. This implies never hardcoding version numbers in the script. This would defeat the purpose: this script should be able to detect mitigations in unknown kernels, with possibly backported or forward-ported patches. Also, don't believe what `sysfs` says, when possible. See the next question about this.
3) Never look at the microcode version to tell whether it has the proper mechanisms in place to support mitigation for a given vulnerability. This implies never hardcoding version numbers in the script. Instead, look for said mechanisms, as the kernel would do.
4) When a CPU is not known to be explicitly unaffected by a vulnerability, make the assumption that it is. This strong design choice has it roots in the early speculative execution vulnerability days (see [this answer](#why-was-this-script-written-in-the-first-place)), and is still a good approach as of today.
## Everything is indicated in `sysfs` now, is this script still useful?
A lot as changed since 2018. Nowadays, the industry adapted and this range of vulnerabilities is almost "business as usual", as software vulnerabilities are. However, due to their complexity, it's still not as easy as just checking a version number to ensure a vulnerability is closed.
Granted, we now have a standard way under Linux to check whether our system is affected, vulnerable, mitigated against most of these vulnerabilities. By having a look at the `sysfs` hierarchy, and more precisely the `/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/` folder, one can have a pretty good insight about its system state for each of the listed vulnerabilities. Note that the output can be a little different with some vendors (e.g. Red Hat has some slightly different output than the vanilla kernel for some vulnerabilities), but it's still a gigantic leap forward, given where we were in 2018 when this script was started, and it's very good news. The kernel is the proper place to have this because the kernel knows everything about itself (the mitigations it might have), and the CPU (its model, and microcode features that are exposed).
However I see a few reasons why this script might still be useful to you, and that's why its development has not halted when the `sysfs` hierarchy came out:
- A given version of the kernel doesn't have knowledge about the future. To put it in another way: a given version of the kernel only has the understanding of a vulnerability available at the time it was compiled. Let me explain this: when a new vulnerability comes out, new versions of the microcode and kernels are released, with mitigations in place. With such a kernel, a new `sysfs` entry will appear. However, after a few weeks or months, corner cases can be discovered, previously-thought unaffected CPUs can turn out to be affected in the end, and sometimes mitigations can end up being insufficient. Of course, if you're always running the latest kernel version from kernel.org, this issue might be limited for you. The spectre-meltdown-checker script doesn't depend on a kernel's knowledge and understanding of a vulnerability to compute its output. That is, unless you tell it to (using the `--sysfs-only` option).
- Mitigating a vulnerability completely can sometimes be tricky, and have a lot of complicated prerequisites, depending on your kernel version, CPU vendor, model and even sometimes stepping, CPU microcode, hypervisor support, etc. The script gives a very detailed insight about each of the prerequisites of mitigation for every vulnerability, step by step, hence pointing out what is missing on your system as a whole to completely mitigate an issue.
- The script can be pointed at a kernel image, and will deep dive into it, telling you if this kernel will mitigate vulnerabilities that might be present on your system. This is a good way to verify before booting a new kernel, that it'll mitigate the vulnerabilities you expect it to, especially if you modified a few config options around these topics.
- The script will also work regardless of the custom patches that might be integrated in the kernel you're running (or you're pointing it to, in offline mode), and completely ignores the advertised kernel version, to tell whether a given kernel mitigates vulnerabilities. This is especially useful for non-vanilla kernel, where patches might be backported, sometimes silently (this has already happened, too).
- Educational purposes: the script gives interesting insights about a vulnerability, and how the different parts of the system work together to mitigate it.
There are probably other reasons, but that are the main ones that come to mind. In the end, of course, only you can tell whether it's useful for your use case ;)
## How does this script work?
On one hand, the script gathers information about your CPU, and the features exposed by its microcode. To do this, it uses the low-level CPUID instruction (through the `cpuid` kernel module under Linux, and the `cpucontrol` tool under BSD), and queries to the MSR registers of your CPU (through the `msr` kernel module under Linux, and the `cpucontrol` tool under BSD).
On another hand, the script looks into the kernel image your system is running on, for clues about the mitigations it supports. Of course, this is very specific for each operating system, even if the implemented mitigation is functionally the same, the actual code is completely specific. As you can imagine, the Linux kernel code has a few in common with a BSD kernel code, for example. Under Linux, the script supports looking into the kernel image, and possibly the System.map and kernel config file, if these are available. Under BSD, it looks into the kernel file only.
Then, for each vulnerability it knows about, the script decides whether your system is [affected, vulnerable, and mitigated](#what-do-affected-vulnerable-and-mitigated-mean-exactly) against it, using the information it gathered about your hardware and your kernel.
## Which BSD OSes are supported?
For the BSD range of operating systems, the script will work as long as the BSD you're using supports `cpuctl` and `linprocfs`. This is not the case for OpenBSD for example. Known BSD flavors having proper support are: FreeBSD, NetBSD, DragonflyBSD. Derivatives of those should also work. To know why other BSDs will likely never be supported, see [why is my OS not supported?](#why-is-my-os-not-supported).
## Why is my OS not supported?
This tool only supports Linux, and [some flavors of BSD](#which-bsd-oses-are-supported). Other OSes will most likely never be supported, due to [how this script works](#how-does-this-script-work). It would require implementing these OSes specific way of querying the CPU. It would also require to get documentation (if available) about how this OS mitigates each vulnerability, down to this OS kernel code, and if documentation is not available, reverse-engineer the difference between a known old version of a kernel, and a kernel that mitigates a new vulnerability. This means that all the effort has to be duplicated times the number of supported OSes, as everything is specific, by construction. It also implies having a deep understanding of every OS, which takes years to develop. However, if/when other tools appear for other OSes, that share the same goal of this one, they might be listed here as a convenience.
## The tool says there is an updated microcode for my CPU, but I don't have it!
Even if your operating system is fully up to date, the tool might still tell you that there is a more recent microcode version for your CPU. Currently, it uses (and merges) information from two sources:
- The official [Intel microcode repository](https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files)
- The awesome platomav's [MCExtractor database](https://github.com/platomav/MCExtractor) for non-Intel CPUs
Generally, for Intel CPUs it means that Intel does have a more recent version for your CPU, and for other CPUs it means that a more recent version has already been seen in the wild. However, your OS vendor might have chosen not to ship this new version (yet), maybe because it's currently being tested, or for other reasons. This tool can't tell you when or if this will be the case. You should ask your vendor about it. Technically, you can still go and upgrade your microcode yourself, and use this tool to confirm whether you did it successfully. Updating the microcode for you is out of the scope of this tool, as this would violate [rule 1b](#what-are-the-main-design-decisions-regarding-this-script).
## The tool says that I need a more up-to-date microcode, but I have the more recent version!
This can happen for a few reasons:
- Your CPU is no longer supported by the vendor. In that case, new versions of the microcode will never be published, and vulnerabilities requiring microcode features will never be fixed. On most of these vulnerabilities, you'll have no way to mitigate the issue on a vulnerable system, appart from buying a more recent CPU. Sometimes, you might be able to mitigate the issue by disabling a CPU feature instead (often at the cost of speed). When this is the case, the script will list this as one of the possible mitigations for the vulnerability.
- The vulnerability is recent, and your CPU has not yet received a microcode update for the vendor. Often, these updates come in batches, and it can take several batches to cover all the supported CPUs.
In both cases, you can contact your vendor to know whether there'll be an update or not, and if yes, when. For Intel, at the time this FAQ entry was written, such guidance was [available here](https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/topics/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html).
## Which rules are governing the support of a CVE in this tool?
On the early days, it was easy: just Spectre and Meltdown (hence the tool name), because that's all we had. Now that this range of vulnerability is seeing a bunch of newcomers every year, this question is legitimate.
To stick with this tool's goal, a good indication as to why a CVE should be supported, is when mitigating it requires either kernel modifications, microcode modifications, or both.
Counter-examples include (non-exhaustive list):
- [CVE-2019-14615](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/340), mitigating this issue is done by updating the Intel driver. This is out of the scope of this tool.
- [CVE-2019-15902](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/304), this CVE is due to a bad backport in the stable kernel. If the faulty backport was part of the mitigation of another supported CVE, and this bad backport was detectable (without hardcoding kernel versions, see [rule 2](#why-are-those-vulnerabilities-so-different-than-regular-cves)), it might have been added as a bullet point in the concerned CVE's section in the tool. However, this wasn't the case.
- The "[Take A Way](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/344)" vulnerability, AMD said that they believe this is not a new attack, hence there were no microcode and no kernel modification made. As there is nothing to look for, this is out of the scope of this tool.
- [CVE-2020-0550](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/347), the vendor thinks this is hardly exploitable in the wild, and as mitigations would be too performance impacting, as a whole the industry decided to not address it. As there is nothing to check for, this is out of the scope of this tool.
- [CVE-2020-0551](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/348), the industry decided to not address it, as it is believed mitigations for other CVEs render this attack practically hard to make, Intel just released an updated SDK for SGX to help mitigate the issue, but this is out of the scope of this tool.
Look for the [information](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+label%3Ainformation) tag in the issues list for more examples.
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Spectre & Meltdown Checker
==========================
A shell script to assess your system's resilience against the several [transient execution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transient_execution_CPU_vulnerability) CVEs that were published since early 2018, and give you guidance as to how to mitigate them.
CVE | Name | Aliases
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------
[CVE-2017-5753](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5754) | Bounds Check Bypass | Spectre Variant 1
[CVE-2017-5715](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5715) | Branch Target Injection | Spectre Variant 2
[CVE-2017-5754](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5754) | Rogue Data Cache Load | Meltdown, Variant 3
[CVE-2018-3640](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-3640) | Rogue System Register Read | Variant 3a
[CVE-2018-3639](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-3639) | Speculative Store Bypass | Variant 4
[CVE-2018-3615](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-3615) | L1 Terminal Fault | L1TF, Foreshadow (SGX)
[CVE-2018-3620](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-3620) | L1 Terminal Fault | L1TF, Foreshadow-NG (OS)
[CVE-2018-3646](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-3646) | L1 Terminal Fault | L1TF, Foreshadow-NG (VMM)
[CVE-2018-12126](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-12126) | Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling | MSBDS, Fallout
[CVE-2018-12130](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-12130) | Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling | MFBDS, ZombieLoad
[CVE-2018-12127](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-12127) | Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling | MLPDS, RIDL
[CVE-2019-11091](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11091) | Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory | MDSUM, RIDL
[CVE-2019-11135](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11135) | TSX asynchronous abort | TAA, ZombieLoad V2
[CVE-2018-12207](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-12207) | Machine Mheck Exception on Page Size Changes | MCEPSC, No eXcuses, iTLB Multihit
[CVE-2020-0543](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-0543) | Special Register Buffer Data Sampling | SRBDS
Supported operating systems:
- Linux (all versions, flavors and distros)
- FreeBSD, NetBSD, DragonFlyBSD and derivatives (others BSDs are [not supported](FAQ.md#which-bsd-oses-are-supported))
For Linux systems, the tool will detect mitigations, including backported non-vanilla patches, regardless of the advertised kernel version number and the distribution (such as Debian, Ubuntu, CentOS, RHEL, Fedora, openSUSE, Arch, ...), it also works if you've compiled your own kernel. More information [here](FAQ.md#how-does-this-script-work).
Other operating systems such as MacOS, Windows, ESXi, etc. [will most likely never be supported](FAQ.md#why-is-my-os-not-supported).
Supported architectures:
- `x86` (32 bits)
- `amd64`/`x86_64` (64 bits)
- `ARM` and `ARM64`
- other architectures will work, but mitigations (if they exist) might not always be detected
## Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
- What is the purpose of this tool?
- Why was it written?
- How can it be useful to me?
- How does it work?
- What can I expect from it?
All these questions (and more) have detailed answers in the [FAQ](FAQ.md), please have a look!
## Easy way to run the script
- Get the latest version of the script using `curl` *or* `wget`
```bash
curl -L https://meltdown.ovh -o spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
wget https://meltdown.ovh -O spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
```
- Inspect the script. You never blindly run scripts you downloaded from the Internet, do you?
```bash
vim spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
```
- When you're ready, run the script as root
```bash
chmod +x spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
```
### Run the script in a docker container
#### With docker-compose
```shell
docker-compose build
docker-compose run --rm spectre-meltdown-checker
```
#### Without docker-compose
```shell
docker build -t spectre-meltdown-checker .
docker run --rm --privileged -v /boot:/boot:ro -v /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu:ro -v /lib/modules:/lib/modules:ro spectre-meltdown-checker
```
## Example of script output
- Intel Haswell CPU running under Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
![haswell](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/218502/108764885-6dcfc380-7553-11eb-81ac-4d19060a3acf.png)
- AMD Ryzen running under OpenSUSE Tumbleweed
![ryzen](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/218502/108764896-70321d80-7553-11eb-9dd2-fad2a0a1a737.png)
- Batch mode (JSON flavor)
![batch](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/218502/108764902-71634a80-7553-11eb-9678-fd304995fa64.png)
## Quick summary of the CVEs
**CVE-2017-5753** bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1)
- Impact: Kernel & all software
- Mitigation: recompile software *and* kernel with a modified compiler that introduces the LFENCE opcode at the proper positions in the resulting code
- Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible
**CVE-2017-5715** branch target injection (Spectre Variant 2)
- Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation 1: new opcode via microcode update that should be used by up to date compilers to protect the BTB (by flushing indirect branch predictors)
- Mitigation 2: introducing "retpoline" into compilers, and recompile software/OS with it
- Performance impact of the mitigation: high for mitigation 1, medium for mitigation 2, depending on your CPU
**CVE-2017-5754** rogue data cache load (Meltdown)
- Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough
- Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium
**CVE-2018-3640** rogue system register read (Variant 3a)
- Impact: TBC
- Mitigation: microcode update only
- Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible
**CVE-2018-3639** speculative store bypass (Variant 4)
- Impact: software using JIT (no known exploitation against kernel)
- Mitigation: microcode update + kernel update making possible for affected software to protect itself
- Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium
**CVE-2018-3615** l1 terminal fault (Foreshadow-NG SGX)
- Impact: Kernel & all software (any physical memory address in the system)
- Mitigation: microcode update
- Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible
**CVE-2018-3620** l1 terminal fault (Foreshadow-NG SMM)
- Impact: Kernel & System management mode
- Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTE inversion)
- Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible
**CVE-2018-3646** l1 terminal fault (Foreshadow-NG VMM)
- Impact: Virtualization software and Virtual Machine Monitors
- Mitigation: disable ept (extended page tables), disable hyper-threading (SMT), or updated kernel (with L1d flush)
- Performance impact of the mitigation: low to significant
**CVE-2018-12126** [MSBDS] Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (Fallout)
**CVE-2018-12130** [MFBDS] Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (ZombieLoad)
**CVE-2018-12127** [MLPDS] Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (RIDL)
**CVE-2019-11091** [MDSUM] Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory (RIDL)
- Note: These 4 CVEs are similar and collectively named "MDS" vulnerabilities, the mitigation is identical for all
- Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation: microcode update + kernel update making possible to protect various CPU internal buffers from unprivileged speculative access to data
- Performance impact of the mitigation: low to significant
**CVE-2019-11135** TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA, ZombieLoad V2)
- Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation: microcode update + kernel update making possible to protect various CPU internal buffers from unprivileged speculative access to data
- Performance impact of the mitigation: low to significant
**CVE-2018-12207** machine check exception on page size changes (No eXcuses, iTLB Multihit)
- Impact: Virtualization software and Virtual Machine Monitors
- Mitigation: disable hugepages use in hypervisor, or update hypervisor to benefit from mitigation
- Performance impact of the mitigation: low to significant
**CVE-2020-0543** Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)
- Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation: microcode update + kernel update helping to protect various CPU internal buffers from unprivileged speculative access to data
- Performance impact of the mitigation: low
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version: '2'
services:
spectre-meltdown-checker:
build:
context: ./
dockerfile: ./Dockerfile
image: spectre-meltdown-checker:latest
container_name: spectre-meltdown-checker
privileged: true
network_mode: none
volumes:
- /boot:/boot:ro
- /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu:ro
- /lib/modules:/lib/modules:ro
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@@ -1,266 +0,0 @@
# Daily transient-execution vulnerability scan — classification step
You are a scheduled agent running inside a GitHub Actions job. A preceding
workflow step has already fetched all configured sources, applied HTTP
conditional caching, deduped against prior state, and written the pre-filtered
list of new items to `new_items.json`. Your only job is to classify each item.
## Scope — read the authoritative docs before classifying
The project's own docs define what belongs in this tool. **Read them early
in the run** (once per run; Claude caches, these don't change daily):
1. **`./checker/DEVELOPMENT.md`** — "Project Mission" section. What the
script does, what it explicitly does not do, its platform scope
(Linux + BSD on x86/amd64/ARM/ARM64).
2. **`./checker/dist/doc/FAQ.md`** — the section titled
_"Which rules are governing the support of a CVE in this tool?"_.
This is the **operative test**:
> A CVE belongs in scope when mitigating it requires **kernel
> modifications, microcode modifications, or both** — and those
> modifications are **detectable** by this tool (no hardcoded kernel
> versions; look for actual mechanisms).
3. **`./checker/dist/doc/UNSUPPORTED_CVE_LIST.md`** — explicit list of
CVEs ruled out, grouped by reason:
- _Already covered by a parent CVE check_ (e.g. SpectreRSB ⊂ Spectre V2).
- _No detectable kernel/microcode mitigation_ (vendor won't fix, GPU
driver-only, userspace-only, etc.).
- _Not a transient / speculative execution vulnerability at all_.
Match incoming items against those exclusion patterns. If a CVE is a
subvariant of a covered parent, or has no kernel/microcode mitigation
this tool can detect, or is simply not a transient-execution issue, it
is **unrelated** — not `tocheck`. Out-of-scope items with zero ambiguity
should not linger in the `tocheck` backlog.
In-scope shortlist (for quick reference; the README's CVE table is the
authoritative source): Spectre v1/v2/v4, Meltdown, Foreshadow/L1TF,
MDS (ZombieLoad/RIDL/Fallout), TAA, SRBDS, iTLB Multihit, MMIO Stale
Data, Retbleed, Zenbleed, Downfall (GDS), Inception/SRSO, DIV0, Reptar,
RFDS, ITS, TSA-SQ/TSA-L1, VMScape, BPI, FP-DSS — and similar
microarchitectural side-channel / speculative-execution issues on
Intel / AMD / ARM CPUs with a detectable mitigation.
Explicitly out of scope: generic software CVEs, GPU driver bugs,
networking stacks, filesystem bugs, userspace crypto issues, unrelated
kernel subsystems, CPU bugs that the industry has decided not to mitigate
(nothing for the tool to check), and CVEs fixed by userspace/SDK updates
only.
## Inputs
- `new_items.json` — shape:
```json
{
"scan_date": "2026-04-18T14:24:43+00:00",
"window_cutoff": "2026-04-17T13:24:43+00:00",
"per_source": { "phoronix": {"status": 200, "new": 2, "total_in_feed": 75} },
"items": [
{
"source": "phoronix",
"stable_id": "CVE-2026-1234",
"title": "...",
"permalink": "https://...",
"guid": "...",
"published_at": "2026-04-18T05:00:00+00:00",
"extracted_cves": ["CVE-2026-1234"],
"vendor_ids": [],
"snippet": "first 400 chars of description, tags stripped"
}
],
"reconsider": [
{
"canonical_id": "INTEL-SA-00145",
"current_bucket": "toimplement",
"title": "Lazy FP State Restore",
"sources": ["intel-psirt"],
"urls": ["https://www.intel.com/.../intel-sa-00145.html"],
"extracted_cves": [],
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T09:41:44+00:00"
}
]
}
```
- `items` are fresh observations from today's fetch: already inside the
time window and not yet present in state under any alt-ID.
- `reconsider` holds existing `toimplement`/`tocheck` entries from state,
submitted for re-review each run (see the "Reconsideration" section
below). On days where both arrays are empty, write stub output files
with `(no new items in this window)`.
- `./checker/` is a checkout of the **`test`** branch of this repo (the
development branch where coded-but-unreleased CVE checks live). This is
the source of truth for whether a CVE is already covered. Grep this
directory — not the working directory root, which only holds the
vuln-watch scripts and has no checker code.
## Classification rules
For each item in `items`, pick exactly one bucket:
- **toimplement** — clearly in-scope per the FAQ test (kernel/microcode
mitigation exists AND is detectable by this tool), and **not already
covered** by `./checker/`. Verify the second half: grep `./checker/`
for each `extracted_cves` entry *and* for any codename in the title
(e.g., "FP-DSS", "Inception"). If either matches, the right bucket is
`unrelated` (already covered) or `tocheck` (maintainer should confirm
whether an existing check handles the new variant).
- **tocheck** — there is a **specific question a maintainer must answer**
before this can be filed anywhere else. Examples:
- Ambiguity about whether an existing check (e.g. parent Spectre V2)
transitively covers this new sub-variant, or whether a fresh entry
is warranted.
- Embedded-only ARM SKU and it's unclear if the tool's ARM support
reaches that class of SKU.
- Vendor advisory published without a CVE ID yet, but the vuln looks
in-scope; revisit once the CVE is assigned.
- Contradictory statements across sources about whether a mitigation
is detectable (kernel-patch vs. userspace-only vs. microcode).
**Do NOT use `tocheck` as a catch-all** for "I'm not sure". Most items
have a clear answer once you consult UNSUPPORTED_CVE_LIST.md and the
FAQ rule. If you can articulate the specific question a maintainer
needs to answer — `tocheck`. If the only reason is "maybe?" — it's
`unrelated`.
- **unrelated** — everything else. Including:
- Matches a pattern in UNSUPPORTED_CVE_LIST.md (subvariant of covered
parent, no detectable mitigation, not transient-execution).
- Fails the FAQ rule (userspace-only fix, driver update, industry
decided not to mitigate).
- Non-CPU security topic (kernel filesystem bug, network stack, crypto
library, GPU driver, compiler flag change, distro release notes).
**Tie-breakers** (note the direction — this used to bias the other way):
- Prefer `unrelated` over `tocheck` when the item matches a category in
UNSUPPORTED_CVE_LIST.md or plainly fails the FAQ rule. Growing the
`tocheck` backlog with obvious-unrelateds wastes human time more than
a confident `unrelated` does.
- Prefer `tocheck` over `toimplement` when the CVE is still "reserved" /
"pending" — false positives in `toimplement` create phantom work.
`WebFetch` is available for resolving genuine `tocheck` ambiguity.
Budget: **3 follow-ups per run total**. Do not use it for items you
already plan to file as `unrelated` or `toimplement`.
## Reconsideration rules (for `reconsider` entries)
Each `reconsider` entry is an item *already* in state under `current_bucket`
= `toimplement` or `tocheck`, from a prior run. Re-examine it against the
**current** `./checker/` tree and the scope docs above. This pass is the
right place to prune the `tocheck` backlog: prior runs (before these
scope docs were wired in) may have hedged on items that now have a clear
`unrelated` answer — demote them aggressively. You may:
- **Demote** `toimplement` → `tocheck` or `unrelated` if the checker now
covers the CVE/codename (grep confirms), or if reinterpreting the
advisory shows it's out of scope.
- **Demote** `tocheck` → `unrelated` if new context settles the ambiguity
as out-of-scope.
- **Promote** `tocheck` → `toimplement` if you now have firm evidence it's
a real, in-scope, not-yet-covered CVE.
- **Leave it unchanged** (same bucket) — emit a record anyway; it's cheap
and documents that the reconsideration happened today.
- **Reassign the canonical ID** — if a CVE has since been assigned to a
vendor advisory (e.g., an INTEL-SA that previously had no CVE), put the
CVE in `extracted_cves` and use it as the new `canonical_id`. The merge
step will rekey the record under the CVE and keep the old ID as an alias.
For every reconsider record you emit, set `"reconsider": true` in its
classification entry — this tells the merge step to **overwrite** the
stored bucket (including demotions), not just promote.
## Outputs
Compute `TODAY` = the `YYYY-MM-DD` prefix of `scan_date`. Write three files at
the repo root, overwriting if present:
- `watch_${TODAY}_toimplement.md`
- `watch_${TODAY}_tocheck.md`
- `watch_${TODAY}_unrelated.md`
These delta files cover the **`items`** array only — they answer "what
did today's fetch surface". Reconsider decisions update state (and surface
in the `current_*.md` snapshots the merge step rewrites); don't duplicate
them here.
Each file uses level-2 headers per source short-name, then one bullet per
item: the stable ID, the permalink, and 12 sentences of context.
```markdown
## oss-sec
- **CVE-2026-1234** — https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/18/3
New Intel transient-execution bug "Foo"; affects Redwood Cove cores.
Not yet covered (grepped CVE-2026-1234 and "Foo" — no matches).
```
If a bucket has no items, write `(no new items in this window)`.
Append the following block to the **tocheck** file (creating it if
otherwise empty):
```markdown
## Run summary
- scan_date: <value>
- per-source counts (from per_source): ...
- fetch failures (status != 200/304): ...
- total classified this run: toimplement=<n>, tocheck=<n>, unrelated=<n>
- reconsidered: <n> entries re-reviewed; <list any bucket transitions, e.g.
"CVE-2018-3665: toimplement -> tocheck (now covered at src/vulns/...)">,
or "no transitions" if every reconsider kept its existing bucket.
```
## `classifications.json` — required side-channel for the merge step
Also write `classifications.json` at the repo root. It is a JSON array, one
record per item in `new_items.json.items`:
```json
[
{
"stable_id": "CVE-2026-1234",
"canonical_id": "CVE-2026-1234",
"bucket": "toimplement",
"extracted_cves": ["CVE-2026-1234"],
"sources": ["phoronix"],
"urls": ["https://www.phoronix.com/news/..."]
}
]
```
Rules:
- One record per input item (`items` + `reconsider`). For items, use the
same `stable_id` as in `new_items.json`. For reconsider entries, use the
entry's `canonical_id` from state as the record's `stable_id`.
- `canonical_id`: prefer the first `extracted_cves` entry if any; otherwise
the item's `stable_id`. **Use the same `canonical_id` for multiple items
that are really the same CVE from different sources** — the merge step
will collapse them into one entry and add alias rows automatically.
- **Populate `extracted_cves` / `canonical_id` from context when the feed
didn't.** If the title, body, or a well-known transient-execution codename
mapping lets you identify a CVE the feed didn't emit (e.g., "Lazy FP
State Restore" → `CVE-2018-3665`, "LazyFP" → same, "FP-DSS" → whatever
CVE AMD/Intel assigned), put the CVE in `extracted_cves` and use it as
`canonical_id`. This prevents Intel's CVE-less listing entries from
creating orphan `INTEL-SA-NNNNN` records in the backlog.
- `sources` / `urls`: arrays; default to the item's own single source and
permalink if you didn't enrich further.
- **`reconsider: true`** — set on every record that corresponds to an
input from the `reconsider` array. The merge step uses this flag to
overwrite the stored bucket instead of merging by "strongest wins" —
this is what enables demotions.
- If both `items` and `reconsider` are empty, write `[]`.
## Guardrails
- Do NOT modify any repo source code. Only write the four output files.
- Do NOT create commits, branches, or PRs.
- Do NOT call tools that post externally (Slack, GitHub comments, issues, …).
- Do NOT re-fetch the RSS/HTML sources — that was the prior step's job.
`WebFetch` is only for drilling into a specific advisory/article URL to
resolve a `tocheck` ambiguity (budget 3).
- If total runtime exceeds 10 minutes, finish what you have, write partial
outputs (+ a note in the tocheck run summary), and exit cleanly.
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Fetch all configured sources, dedup against state/seen.json, emit new_items.json.
Writes updated per-source HTTP cache metadata (etag, last_modified, hwm_*) back
into state/seen.json. Does NOT touch state.seen / state.aliases — that is the
merge step's job, after Claude has classified the new items.
Usage:
SCAN_DATE=2026-04-18T14:24:43Z python -m scripts.vuln_watch.fetch_and_diff
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import datetime
import gzip
import json
import os
import pathlib
import re
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from typing import Any, Iterable
import feedparser # type: ignore[import-untyped]
from .sources import REQUEST_TIMEOUT, SOURCES, Source, USER_AGENT
from . import state
CVE_RE = re.compile(r"CVE-\d{4}-\d{4,7}")
DEFAULT_WINDOW_HOURS = 25
DEFAULT_RECONSIDER_AGE_DAYS = 7
MAX_ITEMS_PER_FEED = 200
SNIPPET_MAX = 400
NEW_ITEMS_PATH = pathlib.Path("new_items.json")
def parse_iso(ts: str | None) -> datetime.datetime | None:
if not ts:
return None
try:
return datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(ts.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
except ValueError:
return None
def now_from_scan_date(scan_date: str) -> datetime.datetime:
dt = parse_iso(scan_date)
if dt is None:
dt = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)
return dt
def conditional_get(
url: str,
etag: str | None,
last_modified: str | None,
user_agent: str = USER_AGENT,
) -> tuple[int | str, bytes | None, str | None, str | None]:
"""Perform a conditional GET.
Returns (status, body, new_etag, new_last_modified).
status is:
- 200 with body on success
- 304 with body=None when unchanged
- an int HTTP error code on server-side errors
- a string describing a network/transport failure
"""
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={
"User-Agent": user_agent,
# AMD's CDN stalls on non-gzip clients; asking for gzip speeds up
# every source and is strictly beneficial (we decompress locally).
"Accept-Encoding": "gzip",
})
if etag:
req.add_header("If-None-Match", etag)
if last_modified:
req.add_header("If-Modified-Since", last_modified)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=REQUEST_TIMEOUT) as resp:
body = resp.read()
if resp.headers.get("Content-Encoding", "").lower() == "gzip":
try:
body = gzip.decompress(body)
except OSError:
pass # server lied about encoding; use as-is
return (
resp.status,
body,
resp.headers.get("ETag"),
resp.headers.get("Last-Modified"),
)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
if e.code == 304:
return (304, None, etag, last_modified)
return (e.code, None, etag, last_modified)
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as e:
return (f"network:{type(e).__name__}", None, etag, last_modified)
def extract_cves(text: str) -> list[str]:
seen: set[str] = set()
out: list[str] = []
for m in CVE_RE.findall(text or ""):
if m not in seen:
seen.add(m)
out.append(m)
return out
def extract_vendor_ids(text: str, patterns: Iterable[str]) -> list[str]:
seen: set[str] = set()
out: list[str] = []
for p in patterns:
for m in re.findall(p, text or ""):
if m not in seen:
seen.add(m)
out.append(m)
return out
def pick_stable_id(vendor_ids: list[str], cves: list[str], guid: str, link: str) -> str:
"""Pick canonical-ish stable ID: vendor advisory → CVE → guid → permalink.
CVE is preferred over guid/URL so that the same CVE seen via different
feeds collapses on its stable_id alone (in addition to the alias map).
"""
if vendor_ids:
return vendor_ids[0]
if cves:
return cves[0]
if guid:
return guid
return link
def clean_snippet(s: str) -> str:
s = re.sub(r"<[^>]+>", " ", s or "")
s = re.sub(r"\s+", " ", s)
return s.strip()
def _struct_time_to_iso(st: Any) -> str | None:
if not st:
return None
try:
return datetime.datetime(*st[:6], tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc).isoformat()
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
def parse_feed_body(src: Source, body: bytes) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
parsed = feedparser.parse(body)
items: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
for entry in parsed.entries[:MAX_ITEMS_PER_FEED]:
link = (entry.get("link") or "").strip()
guid = (entry.get("id") or entry.get("guid") or "").strip()
title = (entry.get("title") or "").strip()
summary = entry.get("summary") or ""
published_at = (
_struct_time_to_iso(entry.get("published_parsed"))
or _struct_time_to_iso(entry.get("updated_parsed"))
)
blob = f"{title}\n{summary}"
cves = extract_cves(blob)
vendor_ids = extract_vendor_ids(blob, src.advisory_id_patterns)
stable_id = pick_stable_id(vendor_ids, cves, guid, link)
items.append({
"source": src.name,
"stable_id": stable_id,
"title": title,
"permalink": link,
"guid": guid,
"published_at": published_at,
"extracted_cves": cves,
"vendor_ids": vendor_ids,
"snippet": clean_snippet(summary)[:SNIPPET_MAX],
})
return items
def _parse_intel_psirt(src: Source, text: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Intel's security-center page uses a table of <tr class="data"> rows:
<tr class="data" ...>
<td ...><a href="/.../intel-sa-NNNNN.html">Title</a></td>
<td>INTEL-SA-NNNNN</td>
<td>March 10, 2026</td> <- Last updated
<td>March 10, 2026</td> <- First published
</tr>
We pick the later of the two dates as `published_at` (most recent
activity) so updates to older advisories also show up in the window.
"""
items: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
seen_ids: set[str] = set()
permalink_base = src.display_url or src.url
for m in re.finditer(r'<tr class="data"[^>]*>(.*?)</tr>', text, re.DOTALL):
row = m.group(1)
sid = re.search(r'INTEL-SA-\d+', row)
if not sid:
continue
advisory_id = sid.group(0)
if advisory_id in seen_ids:
continue
seen_ids.add(advisory_id)
link_m = re.search(r'href="([^"#]+)"', row)
permalink = urllib.parse.urljoin(permalink_base, link_m.group(1)) if link_m else permalink_base
title_m = re.search(r'<a[^>]*>([^<]+)</a>', row)
title = title_m.group(1).strip() if title_m else advisory_id
published_at: str | None = None
for ds in re.findall(r'<td[^>]*>\s*([A-Z][a-z]+ \d{1,2}, \d{4})\s*</td>', row):
try:
dt = datetime.datetime.strptime(ds, "%B %d, %Y").replace(tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
iso = dt.isoformat()
if published_at is None or iso > published_at:
published_at = iso
except ValueError:
continue
items.append({
"source": src.name,
"stable_id": advisory_id,
"title": title,
"permalink": permalink,
"guid": "",
"published_at": published_at,
"extracted_cves": extract_cves(row),
"vendor_ids": [advisory_id],
"snippet": clean_snippet(row)[:SNIPPET_MAX],
})
return items[:MAX_ITEMS_PER_FEED]
def _parse_amd_psirt(src: Source, text: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""AMD's product-security page has a bulletin table where each row ends
with two `<td data-sort="YYYY-MM-DD HHMMSS">` cells (Published Date,
Last Updated Date). The machine-readable `data-sort` attribute is far
easier to parse than the human-readable text alongside it.
"""
items: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
seen_ids: set[str] = set()
permalink_base = src.display_url or src.url
for m in re.finditer(r'<tr[^>]*>(.*?AMD-SB-\d+.*?)</tr>', text, re.DOTALL):
row = m.group(1)
sid = re.search(r'AMD-SB-\d+', row)
if not sid:
continue
advisory_id = sid.group(0)
if advisory_id in seen_ids:
continue
seen_ids.add(advisory_id)
link_m = re.search(r'href="([^"#]+)"', row)
permalink = urllib.parse.urljoin(permalink_base, link_m.group(1)) if link_m else permalink_base
title_m = re.search(r'<a[^>]*>([^<]+)</a>', row)
title = title_m.group(1).strip() if title_m else advisory_id
published_at: str | None = None
for (y, mo, d, h, mi, s) in re.findall(
r'data-sort="(\d{4})-(\d{2})-(\d{2})\s+(\d{2})(\d{2})(\d{2})"', row
):
iso = f"{y}-{mo}-{d}T{h}:{mi}:{s}+00:00"
if published_at is None or iso > published_at:
published_at = iso
items.append({
"source": src.name,
"stable_id": advisory_id,
"title": title,
"permalink": permalink,
"guid": "",
"published_at": published_at,
"extracted_cves": extract_cves(row),
"vendor_ids": [advisory_id],
"snippet": clean_snippet(row)[:SNIPPET_MAX],
})
return items[:MAX_ITEMS_PER_FEED]
def _parse_html_generic(src: Source, text: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Fallback regex-only extractor for HTML sources with no known table
layout (arm-spec, transient-fail's tree.js). Emits `published_at=None`
— items pass the window filter as fail-safe, but state.seen dedup
prevents re-emission across runs."""
items: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
seen_ids: set[str] = set()
permalink_base = src.display_url or src.url
for pat in src.advisory_id_patterns:
for m in re.finditer(pat, text):
advisory_id = m.group(0)
if advisory_id in seen_ids:
continue
seen_ids.add(advisory_id)
window = text[max(0, m.start() - 400): m.end() + 400]
href_match = re.search(r'href="([^"#]+)"', window)
if href_match:
permalink = urllib.parse.urljoin(permalink_base, href_match.group(1))
else:
permalink = permalink_base
cves_in_window = extract_cves(window)
is_cve = advisory_id.startswith("CVE-")
cves = cves_in_window if not is_cve else list({advisory_id, *cves_in_window})
vendor_ids = [] if is_cve else [advisory_id]
items.append({
"source": src.name,
"stable_id": advisory_id,
"title": advisory_id,
"permalink": permalink,
"guid": "",
"published_at": None,
"extracted_cves": cves,
"vendor_ids": vendor_ids,
"snippet": clean_snippet(window)[:SNIPPET_MAX],
})
return items[:MAX_ITEMS_PER_FEED]
_HTML_PARSERS = {
"intel-psirt": _parse_intel_psirt,
"amd-psirt": _parse_amd_psirt,
}
def parse_html_body(src: Source, body: bytes) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Dispatch to a per-source HTML parser when one is registered;
fall back to the generic regex-over-advisory-IDs extractor."""
text = body.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
parser = _HTML_PARSERS.get(src.name, _parse_html_generic)
return parser(src, text)
def parse_body(src: Source, body: bytes) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
return parse_feed_body(src, body) if src.kind in ("rss", "atom") else parse_html_body(src, body)
def compute_cutoff(
scan_now: datetime.datetime,
last_run: str | None,
window_hours: float = DEFAULT_WINDOW_HOURS,
) -> datetime.datetime:
base = scan_now - datetime.timedelta(hours=window_hours)
lr = parse_iso(last_run)
if lr is None:
return base
widened = scan_now - (scan_now - lr + datetime.timedelta(hours=1))
return min(base, widened)
def _resolve_window_hours() -> float:
"""Pick up WINDOW_HOURS from the environment (set by workflow_dispatch).
Falls back to DEFAULT_WINDOW_HOURS for cron runs or local invocations."""
raw = os.environ.get("WINDOW_HOURS", "").strip()
if not raw:
return float(DEFAULT_WINDOW_HOURS)
try:
v = float(raw)
if v <= 0:
raise ValueError("must be > 0")
return v
except ValueError:
print(f"warning: ignoring invalid WINDOW_HOURS={raw!r}, using {DEFAULT_WINDOW_HOURS}",
file=sys.stderr)
return float(DEFAULT_WINDOW_HOURS)
def _resolve_reconsider_age_days() -> float:
"""Pick up RECONSIDER_AGE_DAYS from the environment. Entries whose last
review (reconsidered_at, or first_seen if never reconsidered) is more
recent than this many days ago are skipped. 0 = reconsider everything
every run (no throttle)."""
raw = os.environ.get("RECONSIDER_AGE_DAYS", "").strip()
if not raw:
return float(DEFAULT_RECONSIDER_AGE_DAYS)
try:
v = float(raw)
if v < 0:
raise ValueError("must be >= 0")
return v
except ValueError:
print(f"warning: ignoring invalid RECONSIDER_AGE_DAYS={raw!r}, "
f"using {DEFAULT_RECONSIDER_AGE_DAYS}", file=sys.stderr)
return float(DEFAULT_RECONSIDER_AGE_DAYS)
def backlog_to_reconsider(
data: dict[str, Any],
scan_now: datetime.datetime,
min_age_days: float = DEFAULT_RECONSIDER_AGE_DAYS,
) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Walk state.seen and emit toimplement/tocheck entries for re-review.
Throttle: skip entries whose "last review" timestamp is more recent
than `min_age_days` ago. "Last review" is `reconsidered_at` if Claude
has already reconsidered the entry at least once, otherwise
`first_seen` (the initial classification was itself a review). With
`min_age_days=0` the throttle is disabled — every qualifying entry
is emitted on every run.
Items in `unrelated` are never emitted — those are settled.
A CVE alias pointing at this canonical is included in `extracted_cves`
so Claude sees every known CVE for the item without having to consult
the full alias map.
"""
seen = data.get("seen", {})
aliases = data.get("aliases", {})
by_canonical: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
for alt, canon in aliases.items():
by_canonical.setdefault(canon, []).append(alt)
# Any entry whose last review is newer than this ISO cutoff is throttled.
cutoff = (scan_now - datetime.timedelta(days=min_age_days)).isoformat()
out: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
for canonical, rec in seen.items():
if rec.get("bucket") not in ("toimplement", "tocheck"):
continue
last_reviewed = rec.get("reconsidered_at") or rec.get("first_seen") or ""
if min_age_days > 0 and last_reviewed and last_reviewed > cutoff:
continue
cves: list[str] = []
if canonical.startswith("CVE-"):
cves.append(canonical)
for alt in by_canonical.get(canonical, []):
if alt.startswith("CVE-") and alt not in cves:
cves.append(alt)
out.append({
"canonical_id": canonical,
"current_bucket": rec.get("bucket"),
"title": rec.get("title") or "",
"sources": list(rec.get("sources") or []),
"urls": list(rec.get("urls") or []),
"extracted_cves": cves,
"first_seen": rec.get("first_seen"),
"reconsidered_at": rec.get("reconsidered_at"),
})
return out
def candidate_ids(item: dict[str, Any]) -> list[str]:
"""All identifiers under which this item might already be known."""
seen: set[str] = set()
out: list[str] = []
for cand in (
*(item.get("extracted_cves") or []),
*(item.get("vendor_ids") or []),
item.get("stable_id"),
item.get("guid"),
item.get("permalink"),
):
if cand and cand not in seen:
seen.add(cand)
out.append(cand)
return out
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--scan-date", default=os.environ.get("SCAN_DATE", ""))
ap.add_argument("--output", type=pathlib.Path, default=NEW_ITEMS_PATH)
args = ap.parse_args()
scan_now = now_from_scan_date(args.scan_date)
scan_date_iso = scan_now.isoformat()
window_hours = _resolve_window_hours()
reconsider_age_days = _resolve_reconsider_age_days()
data = state.load()
cutoff = compute_cutoff(scan_now, data.get("last_run"), window_hours)
per_source: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}
all_new: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
for src in SOURCES:
meta = dict(data["sources"].get(src.name, {}))
status, body, etag, last_modified = conditional_get(
src.url, meta.get("etag"), meta.get("last_modified"),
user_agent=src.user_agent or USER_AGENT,
)
meta["last_fetched_at"] = scan_date_iso
meta["last_status"] = status
if isinstance(status, str) or (isinstance(status, int) and status >= 400 and status != 304):
per_source[src.name] = {"status": status, "new": 0}
data["sources"][src.name] = meta
continue
if status == 304 or body is None:
per_source[src.name] = {"status": 304, "new": 0}
data["sources"][src.name] = meta
continue
# Refresh cache headers only on successful 200.
if etag:
meta["etag"] = etag
if last_modified:
meta["last_modified"] = last_modified
items = parse_body(src, body)
total = len(items)
in_window = []
for it in items:
pub = parse_iso(it.get("published_at"))
if pub is None or pub >= cutoff:
in_window.append(it)
new: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
hwm_pub = meta.get("hwm_published_at")
hwm_id = meta.get("hwm_id")
for it in in_window:
if state.lookup(data, candidate_ids(it)) is not None:
continue
new.append(it)
pub = it.get("published_at")
if pub and (not hwm_pub or pub > hwm_pub):
hwm_pub = pub
hwm_id = it.get("stable_id")
if new:
meta["hwm_published_at"] = hwm_pub
meta["hwm_id"] = hwm_id
data["sources"][src.name] = meta
per_source[src.name] = {"status": status, "new": len(new), "total_in_feed": total}
all_new.extend(new)
# Persist updated HTTP cache metadata regardless of whether Claude runs.
state.save(data)
reconsider = backlog_to_reconsider(data, scan_now, reconsider_age_days)
out = {
"scan_date": scan_date_iso,
"window_cutoff": cutoff.isoformat(),
"per_source": per_source,
"items": all_new,
"reconsider": reconsider,
}
args.output.write_text(json.dumps(out, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
# GitHub Actions step outputs. Downstream `if:` conditions gate the
# classify step on `new_count || reconsider_count`; both must be 0
# for Claude to be skipped.
gh_out = os.environ.get("GITHUB_OUTPUT")
if gh_out:
with open(gh_out, "a") as f:
f.write(f"new_count={len(all_new)}\n")
f.write(f"reconsider_count={len(reconsider)}\n")
failures = [
s for s, v in per_source.items()
if not (isinstance(v["status"], int) and v["status"] in (200, 304))
]
f.write(f"fetch_failures_count={len(failures)}\n")
print(f"Scan date: {scan_date_iso}")
print(f"Window: {window_hours:g} h")
print(f"Cutoff: {cutoff.isoformat()}")
print(f"New items: {len(all_new)}")
if reconsider_age_days == 0:
print(f"Reconsider: {len(reconsider)} (throttle disabled)")
else:
print(f"Reconsider: {len(reconsider)} (throttle: "
f"skip entries reviewed <{reconsider_age_days:g}d ago)")
for s, v in per_source.items():
print(f" {s:14s} status={str(v['status']):>16} new={v['new']}")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
-298
View File
@@ -1,298 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Merge Claude's classifications.json into state/seen.json.
Inputs:
state/seen.json (already has updated .sources from fetch_and_diff)
classifications.json (written by the Claude step; list of records)
new_items.json (fallback source of per-item metadata, if Claude
omitted urls/sources in a record)
Each classification record has shape:
{
"stable_id": "...", # required (the key used in new_items.json)
"canonical_id": "...", # optional; defaults to first extracted_cves, else stable_id
"bucket": "toimplement|tocheck|unrelated",
"extracted_cves": ["...", ...], # optional
"sources": ["...", ...], # optional
"urls": ["...", ...], # optional
"reconsider": true # optional; set by Claude for reconsidered
# backlog entries — merge overwrites
# the stored bucket (incl. demotions)
# instead of promoting
}
Behavior:
- For records WITHOUT `reconsider: true` (fresh items):
upsert seen[canonical_id], union sources/urls, promote bucket strength.
- For records WITH `reconsider: true` (previously-classified entries):
overwrite the stored bucket unconditionally (permits demotions), union
sources/urls. If Claude's canonical_id differs from the stable_id (the
previous canonical), rekey the seen entry under the new ID and leave
the old as an alias used when a CVE has since been assigned to what
was previously a bare vendor-ID entry.
- For every alt_id in (stable_id, vendor_ids, extracted_cves) that differs
from canonical_id, set aliases[alt_id] = canonical_id.
- Update last_run to SCAN_DATE.
- Prune entries older than RETENTION_DAYS (180) before writing.
- Also writes the three daily watch_*.md files as stubs if Claude didn't run
(i.e. when new_items.json was empty and the classify step was skipped).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import datetime
import json
import os
import pathlib
import sys
from typing import Any
from . import state
RETENTION_DAYS = 180
NEW_ITEMS_PATH = pathlib.Path("new_items.json")
CLASSIFICATIONS_PATH = pathlib.Path("classifications.json")
def _load_json(path: pathlib.Path, default: Any) -> Any:
if not path.exists():
return default
return json.loads(path.read_text())
def _canonical(record: dict[str, Any], fallback_meta: dict[str, Any] | None) -> str:
if record.get("canonical_id"):
return record["canonical_id"]
cves = record.get("extracted_cves") or (fallback_meta or {}).get("extracted_cves") or []
if cves:
return cves[0]
return record["stable_id"]
def _alt_ids(record: dict[str, Any], fallback_meta: dict[str, Any] | None) -> list[str]:
ids: list[str] = []
ids.append(record.get("stable_id", ""))
ids.extend(record.get("extracted_cves") or [])
if fallback_meta:
ids.extend(fallback_meta.get("extracted_cves") or [])
ids.extend(fallback_meta.get("vendor_ids") or [])
guid = fallback_meta.get("guid")
if guid:
ids.append(guid)
link = fallback_meta.get("permalink")
if link:
ids.append(link)
return [i for i in ids if i]
def _unique(seq: list[str]) -> list[str]:
seen: set[str] = set()
out: list[str] = []
for x in seq:
if x and x not in seen:
seen.add(x)
out.append(x)
return out
def merge(
data: dict[str, Any],
classifications: list[dict[str, Any]],
new_items_by_stable_id: dict[str, dict[str, Any]],
scan_date: str,
) -> None:
for rec in classifications:
if not rec.get("stable_id"):
continue
if rec.get("reconsider"):
_apply_reconsider(data, rec, scan_date)
else:
_apply_new_item(data, rec, new_items_by_stable_id, scan_date)
def _apply_new_item(
data: dict[str, Any],
rec: dict[str, Any],
new_items_by_stable_id: dict[str, dict[str, Any]],
scan_date: str,
) -> None:
stable_id = rec["stable_id"]
meta = new_items_by_stable_id.get(stable_id, {})
canonical = _canonical(rec, meta)
bucket = rec.get("bucket", "unrelated")
title = (meta.get("title") or "").strip()
existing = data["seen"].get(canonical)
if existing is None:
data["seen"][canonical] = {
"bucket": bucket,
"first_seen": scan_date,
"seen_at": scan_date,
"title": title,
"sources": _unique(list(rec.get("sources") or []) + ([meta.get("source")] if meta.get("source") else [])),
"urls": _unique(list(rec.get("urls") or []) + ([meta.get("permalink")] if meta.get("permalink") else [])),
}
else:
existing["bucket"] = state.promote_bucket(existing["bucket"], bucket)
existing["seen_at"] = scan_date
existing.setdefault("first_seen", existing.get("seen_at") or scan_date)
if not existing.get("title") and title:
existing["title"] = title
existing["sources"] = _unique(list(existing.get("sources") or []) + list(rec.get("sources") or []) + ([meta.get("source")] if meta.get("source") else []))
existing["urls"] = _unique(list(existing.get("urls") or []) + list(rec.get("urls") or []) + ([meta.get("permalink")] if meta.get("permalink") else []))
for alt in _alt_ids(rec, meta):
if alt != canonical:
data["aliases"][alt] = canonical
def _apply_reconsider(
data: dict[str, Any],
rec: dict[str, Any],
scan_date: str,
) -> None:
"""Re-review of a previously-classified entry. The record's stable_id
is the entry's current canonical key in state; `canonical_id` may name
a new key (e.g. a freshly-assigned CVE) in which case we rekey."""
old_key = rec["stable_id"]
new_canonical = _canonical(rec, None)
bucket = rec.get("bucket", "unrelated")
# Resolve the current record — may need to follow an alias if the
# backlog snapshot the classifier reviewed is slightly out of sync.
current_key = old_key if old_key in data["seen"] else data["aliases"].get(old_key)
if not current_key or current_key not in data["seen"]:
print(f"warning: reconsider record for {old_key!r} points at no "
f"state entry; skipping.", file=sys.stderr)
return
existing = data["seen"][current_key]
# Overwrite bucket unconditionally (allows demotions) and stamp the
# reconsideration date so we can later throttle if this grows.
existing["bucket"] = bucket
existing["seen_at"] = scan_date
existing["reconsidered_at"] = scan_date
# Union any fresh sources/urls the classifier surfaced.
if rec.get("sources"):
existing["sources"] = _unique(list(existing.get("sources") or []) + list(rec["sources"]))
if rec.get("urls"):
existing["urls"] = _unique(list(existing.get("urls") or []) + list(rec["urls"]))
# Alias every alt ID the classifier provided to the current key
# (before a possible rekey below redirects them).
for alt in _alt_ids(rec, None):
if alt != current_key:
data["aliases"][alt] = current_key
# Rekey if Claude newly identified a canonical ID (e.g., a CVE for a
# vendor-ID entry). If the destination already exists, merge; else
# move. In both cases, retarget all aliases and leave the old key
# itself as an alias.
if new_canonical and new_canonical != current_key:
if new_canonical in data["seen"]:
dest = data["seen"][new_canonical]
dest["bucket"] = state.promote_bucket(dest.get("bucket", "unrelated"), existing.get("bucket", "unrelated"))
dest["sources"] = _unique(list(dest.get("sources") or []) + list(existing.get("sources") or []))
dest["urls"] = _unique(list(dest.get("urls") or []) + list(existing.get("urls") or []))
if not dest.get("title") and existing.get("title"):
dest["title"] = existing["title"]
dest["seen_at"] = scan_date
dest["reconsidered_at"] = scan_date
dest.setdefault("first_seen", existing.get("first_seen") or scan_date)
del data["seen"][current_key]
else:
data["seen"][new_canonical] = existing
del data["seen"][current_key]
for alias_key, target in list(data["aliases"].items()):
if target == current_key:
data["aliases"][alias_key] = new_canonical
data["aliases"][current_key] = new_canonical
# Clean up any self-aliases the retarget may have produced.
for k in [k for k, v in data["aliases"].items() if k == v]:
del data["aliases"][k]
def ensure_stub_reports(scan_date: str) -> None:
"""If the Claude step was skipped, write empty stub watch_*.md files so the
report artifact is consistent across runs."""
day = scan_date[:10] # YYYY-MM-DD
stub = "(no new items in this window)\n"
for bucket in ("toimplement", "tocheck", "unrelated"):
p = pathlib.Path(f"watch_{day}_{bucket}.md")
if not p.exists():
p.write_text(stub)
def write_snapshots(data: dict[str, Any], scan_date: str) -> None:
"""Write current_toimplement.md and current_tocheck.md — full backlog
snapshots reflecting every entry in state under those buckets. A human
who reads only the latest run's artifact sees the complete picture
without having to consult prior runs."""
for bucket in ("toimplement", "tocheck"):
entries = [
(cid, rec) for cid, rec in data["seen"].items()
if rec.get("bucket") == bucket
]
# Oldest first — long-lingering items stay at the top as a reminder.
entries.sort(key=lambda kv: kv[1].get("first_seen") or kv[1].get("seen_at") or "")
out = [
f"# Current `{bucket}` backlog",
"",
f"_Snapshot as of {scan_date}. "
f"{len(entries)} item(s). Oldest first._",
"",
]
if not entries:
out.append("(backlog is empty)")
else:
for cid, rec in entries:
title = rec.get("title") or ""
first_seen = (rec.get("first_seen") or rec.get("seen_at") or "")[:10]
sources = ", ".join(rec.get("sources") or []) or "(none)"
out.append(f"- **{cid}**" + (f"{title}" if title else ""))
out.append(f" first seen {first_seen} · sources: {sources}")
for u in rec.get("urls") or []:
out.append(f" - {u}")
out.append("")
pathlib.Path(f"current_{bucket}.md").write_text("\n".join(out))
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--scan-date", default=os.environ.get("SCAN_DATE", ""))
ap.add_argument("--classifications", type=pathlib.Path, default=CLASSIFICATIONS_PATH)
ap.add_argument("--new-items", type=pathlib.Path, default=NEW_ITEMS_PATH)
args = ap.parse_args()
scan_date = args.scan_date or datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc).isoformat()
data = state.load()
classifications = _load_json(args.classifications, [])
new_items_doc = _load_json(args.new_items, {"items": []})
new_items_by_stable_id = {it["stable_id"]: it for it in new_items_doc.get("items", []) if it.get("stable_id")}
if not isinstance(classifications, list):
print(f"warning: {args.classifications} is not a list; ignoring", file=sys.stderr)
classifications = []
merge(data, classifications, new_items_by_stable_id, scan_date)
data["last_run"] = scan_date
scan_now = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(scan_date.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
before, after = state.prune(data, RETENTION_DAYS, scan_now)
state.save(data)
ensure_stub_reports(scan_date)
write_snapshots(data, scan_date)
print(f"Merged {len(classifications)} classifications.")
print(f"Pruned seen: {before} -> {after} entries (retention={RETENTION_DAYS}d).")
print(f"Aliases: {len(data['aliases'])}.")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
-59
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@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
"""Declarative list of sources polled by the daily vuln scan."""
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Literal
Kind = Literal["rss", "atom", "html"]
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Source:
name: str
url: str
kind: Kind
# For HTML sources: regexes used to extract advisory IDs from the page.
advisory_id_patterns: tuple[str, ...] = ()
# Human-facing URL to use as permalink fallback when `url` points at a
# non-browsable endpoint (e.g. a JS data file). Empty = use `url`.
display_url: str = ""
# Per-source UA override. AMD's CDN drops connections when the UA string
# contains a parenthesized URL, while Intel/ARM's WAF rejects UAs that
# don't identify themselves — so we can't use one UA everywhere.
# Empty = use the module-level USER_AGENT.
user_agent: str = ""
SOURCES: tuple[Source, ...] = (
Source("phoronix", "https://www.phoronix.com/rss.php", "rss"),
Source("oss-sec", "https://seclists.org/rss/oss-sec.rss", "rss"),
Source("lwn", "https://lwn.net/headlines/newrss", "rss"),
Source("project-zero", "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default", "atom"),
Source("vusec", "https://www.vusec.net/feed/", "rss"),
Source("comsec-eth", "https://comsec.ethz.ch/category/news/feed/", "rss"),
# api.msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/rss is the real RSS endpoint; the
# msrc.microsoft.com/... URL returns the SPA shell (2.7 KB) instead.
Source("msrc", "https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/rss", "rss"),
Source("cisa", "https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-advisories/all.xml", "rss"),
Source("cert-cc", "https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/atomfeed/", "atom"),
Source("intel-psirt", "https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/default.html", "html",
(r"INTEL-SA-\d+",)),
Source("amd-psirt", "https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security.html", "html",
(r"AMD-SB-\d+",),
user_agent="spectre-meltdown-checker/vuln-watch"),
Source("arm-spec", "https://developer.arm.com/Arm%20Security%20Center/Speculative%20Processor%20Vulnerability", "html",
(r"CVE-\d{4}-\d{4,7}",)),
# transient.fail renders its attack table from tree.js client-side; we
# pull the JS file directly (CVE regex works on its JSON-ish body).
Source("transient-fail", "https://transient.fail/tree.js", "html",
(r"CVE-\d{4}-\d{4,7}",),
display_url="https://transient.fail/"),
)
# Identify ourselves honestly. Akamai/Cloudflare WAFs fronting intel.com,
# developer.arm.com, and cisa.gov return 403 when the UA claims "Mozilla"
# but TLS/HTTP fingerprint doesn't match a real browser — an honest bot UA
# passes those rules cleanly.
USER_AGENT = (
"spectre-meltdown-checker/vuln-watch "
"(+https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker)"
)
REQUEST_TIMEOUT = 30
-137
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@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
"""Load/save/migrate/lookup helpers for state/seen.json.
Schema v2:
{
"schema_version": 2,
"last_run": "<iso8601>|null",
"sources": {
"<name>": {
"etag": "...",
"last_modified": "...",
"hwm_id": "...",
"hwm_published_at": "<iso8601>",
"last_fetched_at": "<iso8601>",
"last_status": 200|304|<http-err>|"<str-err>"
}
},
"seen": {
"<canonical_id>": {
"bucket": "toimplement|tocheck|unrelated",
"seen_at": "<iso8601>",
"sources": ["<source-name>", ...],
"urls": ["<permalink>", ...]
}
},
"aliases": { "<alt_id>": "<canonical_id>" }
}
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import datetime
import json
import pathlib
from typing import Any
STATE_PATH = pathlib.Path("state/seen.json")
SCHEMA_VERSION = 2
def empty() -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
"last_run": None,
"sources": {},
"seen": {},
"aliases": {},
}
def load(path: pathlib.Path = STATE_PATH) -> dict[str, Any]:
if not path.exists():
# Fallback: a committed bootstrap seed, used to bridge a workflow
# rename (old workflow_id's artifacts are invisible to the new one).
# Remove the bootstrap file once one successful run has produced a
# normal artifact, otherwise it will shadow any future first-run.
bootstrap = path.parent / f"{path.name}.bootstrap"
if bootstrap.exists():
print(f"state: seeding from {bootstrap} (no prior-run artifact found)")
path = bootstrap
if not path.exists():
return empty()
data = json.loads(path.read_text())
return _migrate(data)
def save(data: dict[str, Any], path: pathlib.Path = STATE_PATH) -> None:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.write_text(json.dumps(data, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
def _migrate(data: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Bring any older schema up to SCHEMA_VERSION."""
version = data.get("schema_version")
if version == SCHEMA_VERSION:
data.setdefault("sources", {})
data.setdefault("aliases", {})
data.setdefault("seen", {})
return data
# v1 shape: {"last_run": ..., "seen": {<id>: {bucket, seen_at, source, cve?}}}
migrated_seen: dict[str, Any] = {}
aliases: dict[str, str] = {}
for key, entry in (data.get("seen") or {}).items():
rec = {
"bucket": entry.get("bucket", "unrelated"),
"seen_at": entry.get("seen_at"),
"sources": [entry["source"]] if entry.get("source") else [],
"urls": [key] if isinstance(key, str) and key.startswith("http") else [],
}
migrated_seen[key] = rec
# If a v1 entry had a CVE that differs from the key, alias the CVE -> key.
cve = entry.get("cve")
if cve and cve != key:
aliases[cve] = key
return {
"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
"last_run": data.get("last_run"),
"sources": {},
"seen": migrated_seen,
"aliases": aliases,
}
def lookup(data: dict[str, Any], candidate_ids: list[str]) -> str | None:
"""Return the canonical key if any candidate is already known, else None."""
seen = data["seen"]
aliases = data["aliases"]
for cid in candidate_ids:
if not cid:
continue
if cid in seen:
return cid
canonical = aliases.get(cid)
if canonical and canonical in seen:
return canonical
return None
_BUCKET_STRENGTH = {"unrelated": 0, "tocheck": 1, "toimplement": 2}
def promote_bucket(current: str, incoming: str) -> str:
"""Return whichever of two buckets represents the 'stronger' classification."""
return incoming if _BUCKET_STRENGTH.get(incoming, 0) > _BUCKET_STRENGTH.get(current, 0) else current
def prune(data: dict[str, Any], days: int, now: datetime.datetime) -> tuple[int, int]:
"""Drop seen entries older than `days`, and aliases pointing at dropped keys."""
cutoff = (now - datetime.timedelta(days=days)).isoformat()
before = len(data["seen"])
data["seen"] = {
k: v for k, v in data["seen"].items()
if (v.get("seen_at") or "9999") >= cutoff
}
data["aliases"] = {k: v for k, v in data["aliases"].items() if v in data["seen"]}
return before, len(data["seen"])
+6261
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-824
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@@ -1,824 +0,0 @@
{
"aliases": {
"CVE-2018-3615": "CVE-2018-3646",
"CVE-2018-3620": "CVE-2018-3646",
"CVE-2025-54505": "https://www.phoronix.com/news/AMD-FP-DSS-Zen-1-Bug",
"CVE-2026-33691": "https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q2/175",
"CVE-2026-41113": "https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q2/176",
"CVE-2026-4519": "CVE-2026-4786",
"https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-33055": "CVE-2026-33055",
"https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-33056": "CVE-2026-33056",
"https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-4786": "CVE-2026-4786",
"https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-5160": "CVE-2026-5160",
"https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-6100": "CVE-2026-6100",
"https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q2/173": "CVE-2026-33691",
"https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q2/176": "CVE-2026-41113",
"https://transient.fail/": "CVE-2019-11091"
},
"last_run": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"schema_version": 2,
"seen": {
"AMD-SB-7050": {
"bucket": "tocheck",
"first_seen": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"seen_at": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"sources": [
"amd-psirt"
],
"title": "",
"urls": []
},
"AMD-SB-7053": {
"bucket": "toimplement",
"first_seen": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"seen_at": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"sources": [
"amd-psirt"
],
"title": "",
"urls": []
},
"CVE-2017-5715": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"transient-fail"
],
"title": "CVE-2017-5715",
"urls": [
"https://transient.fail/"
]
},
"CVE-2017-5753": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"transient-fail"
],
"title": "CVE-2017-5753",
"urls": [
"https://transient.fail/"
]
},
"CVE-2017-5754": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"transient-fail"
],
"title": "CVE-2017-5754",
"urls": [
"https://transient.fail/"
]
},
"CVE-2018-12126": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"transient-fail"
],
"title": "CVE-2018-12126",
"urls": [
"https://transient.fail/"
]
},
"CVE-2018-12127": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"transient-fail"
],
"title": "CVE-2018-12127",
"urls": [
"https://transient.fail/"
]
},
"CVE-2018-12130": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"transient-fail"
],
"title": "CVE-2018-12130",
"urls": [
"https://transient.fail/"
]
},
"CVE-2018-3639": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"transient-fail"
],
"title": "CVE-2018-3639",
"urls": [
"https://transient.fail/"
]
},
"CVE-2018-3640": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"transient-fail"
],
"title": "CVE-2018-3640",
"urls": [
"https://transient.fail/"
]
},
"CVE-2018-3646": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"transient-fail"
],
"title": "CVE-2018-3615",
"urls": [
"https://transient.fail/"
]
},
"CVE-2018-3665": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"transient-fail"
],
"title": "CVE-2018-3665",
"urls": [
"https://transient.fail/"
]
},
"CVE-2019-11091": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"transient-fail"
],
"title": "CVE-2019-11091",
"urls": [
"https://transient.fail/"
]
},
"CVE-2019-11135": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"transient-fail"
],
"title": "CVE-2019-11135",
"urls": [
"https://transient.fail/"
]
},
"CVE-2025-66335": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"seen_at": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"sources": [
"oss-sec"
],
"title": "",
"urls": []
},
"CVE-2026-25917": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"seen_at": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"sources": [
"oss-sec"
],
"title": "",
"urls": []
},
"CVE-2026-30898": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"seen_at": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"sources": [
"oss-sec"
],
"title": "",
"urls": []
},
"CVE-2026-30912": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"seen_at": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"sources": [
"oss-sec"
],
"title": "",
"urls": []
},
"CVE-2026-32228": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"seen_at": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"sources": [
"oss-sec"
],
"title": "",
"urls": []
},
"CVE-2026-32690": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"seen_at": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"sources": [
"oss-sec"
],
"title": "",
"urls": []
},
"CVE-2026-33055": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"msrc"
],
"title": "CVE-2026-33055 tar-rs incorrectly ignores PAX size headers if header size is nonzero",
"urls": [
"https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-33055"
]
},
"CVE-2026-33056": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"msrc"
],
"title": "CVE-2026-33056 tar-rs: unpack_in can chmod arbitrary directories by following symlinks",
"urls": [
"https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-33056"
]
},
"CVE-2026-33691": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"oss-sec"
],
"title": "Re: [CVE-2026-33691] OWASP CRS whitespace padding bypass vulnerability",
"urls": [
"https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q2/173",
"https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q2/174",
"https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q2/175"
]
},
"CVE-2026-39314": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"seen_at": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"sources": [
"oss-sec"
],
"title": "",
"urls": []
},
"CVE-2026-40170": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"seen_at": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"sources": [
"oss-sec"
],
"title": "",
"urls": []
},
"CVE-2026-40948": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"seen_at": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"sources": [
"oss-sec"
],
"title": "",
"urls": []
},
"CVE-2026-41113": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"oss-sec"
],
"title": "CVE-2026-41113: RCE in sagredo fork of qmail",
"urls": [
"https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q2/176"
]
},
"CVE-2026-41254": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"seen_at": "2026-04-18T14:24:43Z",
"sources": [
"oss-sec"
],
"title": "",
"urls": []
},
"CVE-2026-4786": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"msrc"
],
"title": "CVE-2026-4786 Incomplete mitigation of CVE-2026-4519, %action expansion for command injection to webbrowser.open()",
"urls": [
"https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-4786"
]
},
"CVE-2026-5160": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
"first_seen": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"seen_at": "2026-04-19T14:06:07.928573+00:00",
"sources": [
"msrc"
],
"title": "CVE-2026-5160",
"urls": [
"https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-5160"
]
},
"CVE-2026-6100": {
"bucket": "unrelated",
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