320 Commits
v0.04 ... v0.39

Author SHA1 Message Date
360be7b35f fix: hide arch_capabilities_msr_not_read warning under !intel 2018-08-13 15:42:56 +02:00
5f59257826 bump to v0.39 2018-08-13 15:33:03 +02:00
92d59cbdc1 chore: adjust some comments, add 2 missing inits 2018-08-11 10:31:10 +02:00
4747b932e7 feat: add detection of RSBA feature bit and adjust logic accordingly 2018-08-10 10:26:23 +02:00
860023a806 fix: ARCH MSR was not read correctly, preventing proper SSB_NO and RDCL_NO detection 2018-08-10 10:26:23 +02:00
ab67a9221d feat: read/write msr now supports msr-tools or perl as dd fallback 2018-08-10 10:26:23 +02:00
f4592bf3a8 Add Arch armv5/armv7 kernel image location (#227) 2018-08-09 22:13:30 +02:00
be15e47671 chore: setting master to v0.38+ 2018-08-09 14:25:22 +02:00
d3481d9524 Add support for the kernel being within a btrfs subvolume (#226)
- /boot may be within a named root subvolume (eg. "/@/boot")
- /boot may be in its own subvolume (eg. "/@boot")
2018-08-09 14:00:35 +02:00
21af561148 bump to v0.38 2018-08-07 10:55:50 +02:00
cb740397f3 feat(arm32): add spectrev1 mitigation detection 2018-08-07 10:42:03 +02:00
84195689af change: default to --no-explain, use --explain to get detailed mitigation help 2018-08-04 16:31:41 +02:00
b637681fa8 fix: debug output: msg inaccuracy for ARM checks 2018-08-04 16:19:54 +02:00
9316c30577 fix: armv8: models < 0xd07 are not vulnerable 2018-08-04 16:19:54 +02:00
f9dd9d8cb9 add guess for archlinuxarm aarch64 kernel image on raspberry pi 3 (#222) 2018-08-01 00:15:52 +02:00
0f0d103a89 fix: correctly init capabilities_ssb_no var in all cases 2018-07-26 10:18:14 +02:00
b262c40541 fix: remove spurious character after an else statement 2018-07-25 21:55:50 +02:00
cc2910fbbc fix: read_cpuid: don't use iflag=skip_bytes for compat with old dd versions
This closes #215 #199 #193
2018-07-23 09:12:30 +02:00
30c4a1f6d2 arm64: cavium: Add CPU Implementer Cavium (#216)
This patch adds 0x43 check for cavium implementor id in function
parse_cpu_details. Also adds that Cavium Soc is not vulnerable to variant 3/3a

Signed-off-by: Manish Jaggi <manish.jagg@cavium.com>
2018-07-22 19:06:19 +02:00
cf06636a3f fix: prometheus output: use printf for proper \n interpretation (#204) 2018-06-21 23:35:51 +02:00
60077c8d12 fix(arm): rewrite vuln logic from latest arm statement for Cortex A8 to A76 2018-06-21 23:24:18 +02:00
c181978d7c fix(arm): Updated arm cortex status (#209)
* Cortex A8 Vulnerable

Arm Cortex A8 is vulnerable to variants 1 & 2  (https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability)

Part number is 0xc08 (https://developer.arm.com/docs/ddi0344/b/system-control-coprocessor/system-control-coprocessorregisters/c0-main-id-register)

False negative reported by @V10lator in #206

* ARM Cortex A12 Vulnerable to 1&2

https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability

* A76 vulnerable to variant 4

All arch 8 cortex A57-A76 are vulnerable to variant 4.

https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability

* Whitelist variant4 nonvuln Arms

* ARM Cortex Whitelist & Cumulative Blacklist

Applies all information about vulnerabilities of ARM Cortex processors (from https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability).

Whitelist & blacklist approach, using both vulnerable and non vulnerable status for each identified CPU, with vulnerabilities tracked cumulatively for multi CPU systems.
2018-06-16 12:14:39 +02:00
Jan
9a6406a9a2 chore: add docker support (#203) 2018-06-14 20:25:35 +02:00
5962d20ba7 fix(variant4): whitelist from common.c::cpu_no_spec_store_bypass (#202)
* variant4 from common.c::cpu_no_spec_store_bypass

Variant 4 - Add function to 'whitelist' the hand-full of CPUs unaffected by speculative store bypass. 

This would allow improved determination of variant 4 status ( #189 ) of immune CPUs while waiting for the 4.17/stable patches to be backported to distro kernels.

Source of cpu list : https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c#n945)
Modeled after is_cpu_specex_free()

* amd families fix

amd families are reported by parse_cpu_details() in decimal

* remove duplicates

Only list processors which speculate and are immune to variant 4.
Avoids duplication with non-speculating CPUs listed in is_cpu_specex_free()
2018-05-27 15:14:29 +02:00
17a3488505 fix(help): add missing references to variants 3a & 4 (#201) 2018-05-24 16:35:57 +02:00
e54e8b3e84 chore: remove warning in README, fix display indentation 2018-05-24 16:32:53 +02:00
39c778e3ac fix(amd): AMD families 0x15-0x17 non-arch MSRs are a valid way to control SSB 2018-05-23 23:08:07 +02:00
2cde6e4649 feat(ssbd): add detection of proper CPUID bits on AMD 2018-05-23 22:50:52 +02:00
f4d51e7e53 fix(variant4): add another detection way for Red Hat kernel 2018-05-23 22:47:54 +02:00
85d46b2799 feat(variant4): add more detailed explanations 2018-05-23 21:08:58 +02:00
61e02abd0c feat(variant3a): detect up to date microcode 2018-05-23 21:08:08 +02:00
114756fab7 fix(amd): not vulnerable to variant3a 2018-05-23 20:38:43 +02:00
ea75969eb7 fix(help): Update variant options in usage message (#200) 2018-05-22 15:54:25 +02:00
ca391cbfc9 fix(variant2): correctly detect IBRS/IBPB in SLES kernels 2018-05-22 12:06:46 +02:00
68af5c5f92 feat(variant4): detect SSBD-aware kernel 2018-05-22 12:05:46 +02:00
19be8f79eb doc: update README with some info about variant3 and variant4 2018-05-22 09:43:29 +02:00
f75cc0bb6f feat(variant4): add sysfs mitigation hint and some explanation about the vuln 2018-05-22 09:39:11 +02:00
f33d65ff71 feat(variant3a): add information about microcode-sufficient mitigation 2018-05-22 09:38:29 +02:00
725eaa8bf5 feat(arm): adjust vulnerable ARM CPUs for variant3a and variant4 2018-05-22 09:19:29 +02:00
c6ee0358d1 feat(variant4): report SSB_NO CPUs as not vulnerable 2018-05-22 09:18:30 +02:00
22d0b203da fix(ssb_no): rename ssbd_no to ssb_no and fix shift 2018-05-22 00:38:31 +02:00
3062a8416a fix(msg): add missing words 2018-05-22 00:10:08 +02:00
6a4318addf feat(variant3a/4): initial support for 2 new CVEs 2018-05-22 00:06:56 +02:00
c19986188f fix(variant2): adjust detection for SLES kernels 2018-05-19 09:53:12 +02:00
7e4899bcb8 ibrs can't be enabled on no ibrs cpu (#195)
* ibrs can't be enabled on no ibrs cpu

If the cpu is identified, and does not support SPEC_CTRL or IBRS, then ibrs can't be enabled, even if supported by the kernel.
Instead of reporting IBRS enabled and active UNKNOWN, report IBRS enabled and active NO.
2018-05-17 15:39:48 +02:00
5cc77741af Update spectre-meltdown-checker.sh 2018-05-05 13:00:44 +02:00
1c0f6d9580 cpuid and msr module check
This adds a check before loading the cpuid and msr modules under linux, ensuring they are not unloaded in exit_cleanup() if they were initially present.
2018-05-05 13:00:44 +02:00
4acd0f647a Suggestion to change VM to a CPU with IBRS capability 2018-04-20 20:35:12 +02:00
fb52dbe7bf set master branch to v0.37+ 2018-04-20 20:34:42 +02:00
edebe4dcd4 bump to v0.37 2018-04-18 23:51:45 +02:00
83ea78f523 fix: arm: also detect variant 1 mitigation when using native objdump 2018-04-17 18:50:32 +02:00
602b68d493 fix(spectrev2): explain that retpoline is possible for Skylake+ if there is RSB filling, even if IBRS is still better 2018-04-16 09:27:28 +02:00
97bccaa0d7 feat: rephrase IBPB warning when only retpoline is enabled in non-paranoid mode 2018-04-16 09:13:25 +02:00
68e619b0d3 feat: show RSB filling capability for non-Skylake in verbose mode 2018-04-16 09:08:25 +02:00
a6f4475cee feat: make IBRS_FW blue instead of green 2018-04-16 09:07:54 +02:00
223f5028df feat: add --paranoid to choose whether we require IBPB 2018-04-15 23:05:30 +02:00
c0108b9690 fix(spectre2): don't explain how to fix when NOT VULNERABLE 2018-04-15 20:55:55 +02:00
a3016134bd feat: make RSB filling support mandatory for Skylake+ CPUs 2018-04-15 20:55:31 +02:00
59d85b39c9 feat: detect RSB filling capability in the kernel 2018-04-15 20:55:01 +02:00
baaefb0c31 fix: remove shellcheck warnings 2018-04-11 22:24:03 +02:00
d452aca03a fix: invalid bash syntax when ibpb_enabled or ibrs_enabled are empty 2018-04-11 10:29:42 +02:00
10b8d94724 feat: detect latest Red Hat kernels' RO ibpb_enabled knob 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
8606e60ef7 refactor: no longer display the retoline-aware compiler test when we can't tell for sure 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
6a48251647 fix: regression in 51aeae25, when retpoline & ibpb are enabled 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
f4bf5e95ec fix: typos 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
60eac1ad43 feat: also do PTI performance check with (inv)pcid for BSD 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
b3cc06a6ad fix regression introduced by 82c25dc 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
5553576e31 feat(amd/zen): re-introduce IBRS for AMD except ZEN family 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
e16ad802da feat(ibpb=2): add detection of SMT before concluding the system is not vulnerable 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
29c294edff feat(bsd): explain how to mitigate variant2 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
59714011db refactor: IBRS_ALL & RDCL_NO are Intel-only 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
51e8261a32 refactor: separate hw checks for Intel & AMD 2018-04-10 22:49:28 +02:00
2a4bfad835 refactor: add is_amd and is_intel funcs 2018-04-10 22:49:28 +02:00
7e52cea66e feat(spectre2): refined how status of this vuln is decided and more precise explanations on how to fix 2018-04-10 22:49:28 +02:00
417d7aab91 Fix trailing whitespace and mixed indent styles; 2018-04-10 22:42:47 +02:00
67bf761029 Fix some user facing typos with codespell -w -q3 . 2018-04-08 18:44:13 +02:00
0eabd266ad refactor: decrease default verbosity for some tests 2018-04-05 22:20:16 +02:00
b77fb0f226 fix: don't override ibrs/ibpb results with later tests 2018-04-05 22:04:20 +02:00
89c2e0fb21 fix(amd): show cpuinfo and ucode details 2018-04-05 21:39:27 +02:00
b88f32ed95 feat: print raw cpuid, and fetch ucode version under BSD 2018-04-05 00:07:12 +02:00
7a4ebe8009 refactor: rewrite read_cpuid to get more common code parts between BSD and Linux 2018-04-05 00:06:24 +02:00
0919f5c236 feat: add explanations of what to do when a vulnerability is not mitigated 2018-04-05 00:03:04 +02:00
de02dad909 feat: rework Spectre V2 mitigations detection w/ latest vanilla & Red Hat 7 kernels 2018-04-05 00:01:54 +02:00
07484d0ea7 add dump of variables at end of script in debug mode 2018-04-04 23:58:15 +02:00
a8b557b9e2 fix(cpu): skip CPU checks if asked to (--no-hw) or if inspecting a kernel of another architecture 2018-04-03 19:36:28 +02:00
619b2749d8 fix(sysfs): only check for sysfs for spectre2 when in live mode 2018-04-03 19:32:36 +02:00
94857c983d update readme 2018-04-03 16:00:36 +02:00
056ed00baa feat(arm): detect spectre variant 1 mitigation 2018-04-03 15:52:25 +02:00
aef99d20f3 fix(pti): when PTI activation is unknown, don't say we're vulnerable 2018-04-03 12:45:17 +02:00
e2d7ed2243 feat(arm): support for variant2 and meltdown mitigation detection 2018-04-01 17:50:18 +02:00
eeaeff8ec3 set version to v0.36+ for master branch between releases 2018-04-01 17:45:01 +02:00
f5269a362a feat(bsd): add retpoline detection for BSD 2018-04-01 17:42:29 +02:00
f3883a37a0 fix(xen): adjust message for DomUs w/ sysfs 2018-03-31 13:44:04 +02:00
b6fd69a022 release: v0.36 2018-03-27 23:08:38 +02:00
7adb7661f3 enh: change colors and use red only to report vulnerability 2018-03-25 18:15:08 +02:00
c7892e3399 update README.md 2018-03-25 14:18:39 +02:00
aa74315df4 feat: speed up kernel version detection 2018-03-25 13:42:19 +02:00
0b8a09ec70 fix: mis adjustments for BSD compat 2018-03-25 13:26:00 +02:00
b42d8f2f27 fix(write_msr): use /dev/zero instead of manually echoing zeroes 2018-03-25 12:53:50 +02:00
f191ec7884 feat: add --hw-only to only show CPU microcode/cpuid/msr details 2018-03-25 12:48:37 +02:00
28da7a0103 misc: message clarifications 2018-03-25 12:48:03 +02:00
ece25b98a1 feat: implement support for NetBSD/FreeBSD/DragonFlyBSD 2018-03-25 12:28:02 +02:00
889172dbb1 feat: add special extract_vmlinux mode for old RHEL kernels 2018-03-25 11:55:44 +02:00
37ce032888 fix: bypass MSR/CPUID checks for non-x86 CPUs 2018-03-25 11:55:44 +02:00
701cf882ad feat: more robust validation of extracted kernel image 2018-03-25 11:55:44 +02:00
6a94c3f158 feat(extract_vmlinux): look for ELF magic in decompressed blob and cut at found offset 2018-03-25 11:55:42 +02:00
2d993812ab feat: add --prefix-arch for cross-arch kernel inspection 2018-03-25 11:55:10 +02:00
4961f8327f fix(ucode): fix blacklist detection for some ucode versions 2018-03-19 12:09:39 +01:00
ecdc448531 Check MSR in each CPU/Thread (#136) 2018-03-17 17:17:15 +01:00
12ea49fe0c fix(kvm): properly detect PVHVM mode (fixes #163) 2018-03-16 18:29:58 +01:00
053f1613de fix(doc): use https:// URLs in the script comment header 2018-03-16 18:24:59 +01:00
bda18d04a0 fix: pine64: re-add vmlinuz location and some error checks 2018-03-10 16:02:44 +01:00
2551295541 doc: use https URLs 2018-03-10 15:20:07 +01:00
d5832dc1dc feat: add ELF magic detection on kernel image blob for some arm64 systems 2018-03-10 14:57:25 +01:00
d2f46740e9 feat: enhance kernel image version detection for some old kernels 2018-03-10 14:57:25 +01:00
2f6a6554a2 Produce output for consumption by prometheus-node-exporter
A report of all vulnerable machines to be produced with a query such as:

    spexec_vuln_status{status!="OK"}
2018-02-27 11:08:39 +01:00
30842dd9c0 release: bump to v0.35 2018-02-16 10:35:49 +01:00
b4ac5fcbe3 feat(variant2): better explanation when kernel supports IBRS but CPU does not 2018-02-16 10:34:01 +01:00
fef380d66f feat(readme): add quick run section 2018-02-15 21:19:49 +01:00
55a6fd3911 feat(variant1): better detection for Red Hat/Ubuntu patch 2018-02-15 21:19:49 +01:00
35c8a63de6 Remove the color in the title 2018-02-15 20:21:00 +01:00
5f914e555e fix(xen): declare Xen's PTI patch as a valid mitigation for variant3 2018-02-14 14:24:55 +01:00
66dce2c158 fix(ucode): update blacklisted ucodes list from latest Intel info 2018-02-14 14:14:16 +01:00
155cac2102 Teach checker how to find kernels installed by systemd kernel-install 2018-02-10 20:51:33 +01:00
22cae605e1 fix(retpoline): remove the "retpoline enabled" test
This test worked for some early versions of the retpoline
implementation in vanilla kernels, but the corresponding
flag has been removed from /proc/cpuinfo in latest kernels.
The full information is available in /sys instead, which
was already implemented in the script.
2018-02-09 20:12:33 +01:00
eb75e51975 fix(ucode): update list of blacklisted ucodes from 2018-02-08 Intel document
Removed 2 ucodes and added 2 other ones
2018-02-09 19:56:27 +01:00
253e180807 Update spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
Dots better than colon for indicating waiting.
2018-02-06 19:02:56 +01:00
5d6102a00e enh: show kernel version in offline mode 2018-02-02 11:27:04 +01:00
a2dfca671e feat: detect disrepancy between found kernel image and running kernel 2018-02-02 11:13:54 +01:00
36bd80d75f enh: speedup by not decompressing kernel on --sysfs-only 2018-02-02 11:13:31 +01:00
1834dd6201 feat: add skylake era cpu detection routine 2018-02-02 11:12:10 +01:00
3d765bc703 enh: lazy loading of cpu informations 2018-02-02 11:11:51 +01:00
07afd95b63 feat: better cleanup routine on exit & interrupt 2018-02-02 11:09:36 +01:00
b7a10126d1 fix: ARM CPU display name & detection
Fix ARM CPU display name, and properly
detect known vulnerable ARM CPUs when
multiple different model cores are
present (mostly Android phones)
2018-02-02 11:00:23 +01:00
6346a0deaa fix: --no-color workaround for android's sed 2018-02-02 10:59:49 +01:00
8106f91981 release: bump to v0.34 2018-01-31 16:28:54 +01:00
b1fdf88f28 enh: display ucode info even when not blacklisted 2018-01-31 16:21:32 +01:00
4d29607630 cleanup: shellcheck pass 2018-01-31 16:15:20 +01:00
0267659adc cleanup: remove superseded atom detection code
This is now handled properly by checking the CPU
vendor, family, model instead of looking for the
commercial name of the CPU in /proc/cpuinfo
2018-01-31 16:15:20 +01:00
247b176882 feat: detect known speculative-execution free CPUs
Based on a kernel patch that has been merged to Linus' tree.
Some of the detections we did by grepping the model name
will probably no longer be needed.
2018-01-31 16:15:20 +01:00
bcae8824ec refacto: create a dedicated func to read cpuid bits 2018-01-31 16:15:20 +01:00
71e7109c22 refacto: move cpu discovery bits to a dedicated function 2018-01-31 16:15:20 +01:00
aa18b51e1c fix(variant1): smarter lfence check
Instead of just counting the number of LFENCE
instructions, now we're only counting the those
that directly follow a jump instruction.
2018-01-31 14:34:54 +01:00
b738ac4bd7 fix: regression introduced by previous commit
449: ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh: 3: parameter not set
This happened only on blacklisted microcodes, fixed by
adding set +u before the return
2018-01-31 12:13:50 +01:00
799ce3eb30 update blacklisted ucode list from kernel source 2018-01-31 11:26:23 +01:00
f1e18c136f doc(disclaimer): Spectre affects all software
Add a paragraph in the disclaimer stating that this tool focuses
on the kernel side of things, and that for Spectre, any software
might be vulnerable.
2018-01-30 14:37:52 +01:00
e05ec5c85f feat(variant1): detect vanilla mitigation
Implement detection of mitigation for Variant 1 that is
being pushed on vanilla kernel.
Current name of the patch:
"spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti" (v6)
Also detect some distros that already backported this
patch without modifying the vulnerabilities sysfs hierarchy.
This detection is more reliable than the LFENCE one, trust
it and skip the LFENCE heuristic if a match is found.
2018-01-30 12:55:34 +01:00
6e544d6055 fix(cpu): Pentium Exxxx are vulnerable to Meltdown 2018-01-29 11:18:15 +01:00
90a65965ff adjust: show how to enable IBRS/IBPB in -v only 2018-01-29 11:06:15 +01:00
9b53635eda refacto: fix shellcheck warnings for better compat
Now `shellcheck -s sh` no longer shows any warnings.
This should improve compatibility with exotic shells
as long as they're POSIX compliant.
2018-01-29 10:34:08 +01:00
7404929661 Fix printing of microcode to use cpuinfo values
The values used should be the ones that come from cpuinfo instead of
the test values. The following line will print the last tuple tested
instead of the actual values of the CPU.

Line 689: _debug "is_ucode_blacklisted: no ($model/$stepping/$ucode)"
2018-01-26 18:23:18 +01:00
bf46fd5d9b update: new screenshots for README.md 2018-01-26 15:15:24 +01:00
0798bd4c5b fix: report arch_capabilities as NO when no MSR
When the arch_capabilities MSR is not there, it means
that all the features it might advertise can be considered
as NO instead of UNKNOWN
2018-01-26 14:55:01 +01:00
42094c4f8b release: v0.33 2018-01-26 14:20:29 +01:00
03d2dfe008 feat: add blacklisted Intel ucode detection
Some Intel microcodes are known to cause instabilities
such as random reboots. Intel advises to revert to a
previous version if a newer one that fixes those issues
is not available. Detect such known bad microcodes.
2018-01-26 14:19:54 +01:00
9f00ffa5af fix: fallback to UNKNOWN when we get -EACCES
For detection of IBRS_ALL and RDCL_NO, fallback to
UNKNOWN when we were unable to read the CPUID or MSR.
2018-01-26 14:16:34 +01:00
7f0d80b305 xen: detect if the host is a Xen Dom0 or PV DomU (fixes #83) 2018-01-25 11:04:30 +01:00
d1c1f0f0f0 fix(batch): fix regression introduced by acf12a6
In batch mode, $echo_cmd was not initialized early
enough, and caused this error:
./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh: 899: ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh: -ne: not found
Fix it by initing echo_cmd unconditionally at the start
2018-01-24 17:57:19 +01:00
acf12a6d2d feat(cpu) add STIBP, RDCL_NO, IBRS_ALL checks
Move all the CPU checks to their own section,
for clarity. We now check for IBRS, IBPB, STIBP,
RDCL_NO and IBRS_ALL. We also show whether the
system CPU is vulnerable to the three variants,
regardless of the fact that mitigations are in
place or not, which is determined in each vuln-
specific section.
2018-01-24 14:44:16 +01:00
b45e40bec8 feat(stibp): add STIBP cpuid feature check 2018-01-24 12:19:02 +01:00
3c1d452c99 fix(cpuid): fix off-by-one SPEC_CTRL bit check 2018-01-24 12:18:56 +01:00
53b9eda040 fix: don't make IBPB mandatory when it's not there
On some kernels there could be IBRS support but not
IBPB support, in that case, don't report VULN just
because IBPB is not enabled when IBRS is
2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
3b0ec998b1 fix(cosmetic): tiny msg fixes 2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
d55bafde19 fix(cpu): trust is_cpu_vulnerable even w/ debugfs
For variant3 under AMD, the debugfs vulnerabilities hierarchy
flags the system as Vulnerable, which is wrong. Trust our own
is_cpu_vulnerable() func in that case
2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
147462c0ab fix(variant3): do our checks even if sysfs is here 2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
ddc7197b86 fix(retpoline): retpoline-compiler detection
When kernel is not compiled with retpoline option, doesn't
have the sysfs vulnerability hierarchy and our heuristic to
detect a retpoline-aware compiler didn't match, change result
for retpoline-aware compiler detection from UNKNOWN to NO.
When CONFIG_RETPOLINE is not set, a retpoline-aware compiler
won't produce different asm than a standard one anyway.
2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
e7aa3b9d16 feat(retpoline): check if retpoline is enabled
Before we would just check if retpoline was compiled
in, now we also check that it's enabled at runtime
(only in live mode)
2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
ff5c92fa6f feat(sysfs): print details even with sysfs
Before, when the /sys kernel vulnerability interface
was available, we would bypass all our tests and just
print the output of the vulnerability interface. Now,
we still rely on it when available, but we run our
checks anyway, except for variant 1 where the current
method of mitigation detection doesn't add much value
to the bare /sys check
2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
443d9a2ae9 feat(ibpb): now also check for IBPB on variant 2
In addition to IBRS (and microcode support), IBPB
must be used to mitigate variant 2, if retpoline
support is not available. The vulnerability status
of a system will be defined as "non vulnerable"
if IBRS and IBPB are both enabled, or if IBPB
is enabled with a value of 2 for RedHat kernels,
see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
2018-01-24 09:04:25 +01:00
3e454f1817 fix(offline): report unknown when too few info
In offline mode, in the worst case where an invalid
config file is given, and we have no vmlinux image
nor System.map, the script was reporting Variant 2
and Variant 3 as vulnerable in the global status.
Replace this by a proper pair of UNKNOWNs
2018-01-23 22:20:34 +01:00
c8a25c5d97 feat: detect invalid kconfig files 2018-01-23 21:48:19 +01:00
40381349ab fix(dmesg): detect when dmesg is truncated
To avoid false negatives when looking for a message
in dmesg, we were previously also grepping in known
on-disk archives of dmesg (dmesg.log, kern.log).
This in turn caused false positives because we have no
guarantee that we're grepping the dmesg of the current
running kernel. Hence we now only look in the live
`dmesg`, detect if it has been truncated, and report
it to the user.
2018-01-21 16:26:08 +01:00
0aa5857a76 fix(cpu): Pentium Exxxx series are not vulnerable
Pentium E series are not in the vulnerable list from
Intel, and Spectre2 PoC reportedly doesn't work on
an E5200
2018-01-21 16:13:17 +01:00
b3b7f634e6 fix(display): use text-mode compatible colors
in text-mode 80-cols TERM=linux terminals, colors
were not displaying properly, one had to use
--no-color to be able to read some parts of the
text.
2018-01-21 12:32:22 +01:00
263ef65fec bump to v0.32 2018-01-20 12:49:12 +01:00
a1bd233c49 revert to a simpler check_vmlinux() 2018-01-20 12:26:26 +01:00
de6590cd09 cache is_cpu_vulnerable result for performance 2018-01-20 12:24:23 +01:00
56d4f82484 is_cpu_vulnerable: implement check for multi-arm systems 2018-01-20 12:24:23 +01:00
7fa2d6347b check_vmlinux: when readelf doesn't work, try harder with another way 2018-01-20 12:23:55 +01:00
3be5e90481 be smarter to find a usable echo command 2018-01-20 12:23:55 +01:00
995620a682 add pine64 vmlinuz location 2018-01-20 12:23:19 +01:00
193e0d8d08 arm: cosmetic fix for name and handle aarch64 2018-01-20 12:22:48 +01:00
72ef94ab3d ARM: display a friendly name instead of empty string 2018-01-20 12:22:48 +01:00
ccc0453df7 search in /lib/modules/$(uname -r) for vmlinuz, config, System.map
On Fedora machines /lib/modules/$(uname -r) has all the files.
2018-01-20 11:19:34 +01:00
14ca49a042 Atom N270: implement another variation 2018-01-19 18:47:38 +01:00
db357b8e25 CoreOS: remove ephemeral install of a non-used package 2018-01-18 10:17:25 +01:00
42a57dd980 add kern.log as another backend of dmesg output 2018-01-17 17:17:39 +01:00
5ab95f3656 fix(atom): don't use a pcre regex, only an extended one 2018-01-17 12:01:13 +01:00
5b6e39916d fix(atom): properly detect Nxxx Atom series 2018-01-17 11:07:47 +01:00
556951d5f0 Add Support for Slackware.
Signed-off-by: Willy Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@gmail.com>
2018-01-16 11:55:03 +01:00
7a88aec95f Implement CoreOS compatibility mode (#84)
* Add special CoreOS compatibility mode
* CoreOS: refuse --coreos if we're not under CoreOS
* CoreOS: warn if launched without --coreos option
* is_coreos: make stderr silent
* CoreOS: tiny adjustments
2018-01-16 10:33:01 +01:00
bd18323d79 bump to v0.31 to reflect changes 2018-01-14 22:34:09 +01:00
b89d67dd15 meltdown: detecting Xen PV, reporting as not vulnerable 2018-01-14 22:31:21 +01:00
704e54019a is_cpu_vulnerable: add check for old Atoms 2018-01-14 21:32:56 +01:00
d96093171a verbose: add PCID check for performance impact of PTI 2018-01-14 17:18:34 +01:00
dcc4488340 Merge pull request #80 from speed47/cpuid_spec_ctrl
v0.30, cpuid spec ctrl and other enhancements
2018-01-14 16:48:02 +01:00
32e3fe6c07 bump to v0.30 to reflect changes 2018-01-14 16:45:59 +01:00
f488947d43 Merge pull request #79 from andir/add-nixos
add support for NixOS kernel
2018-01-14 16:40:10 +01:00
71213c11b3 ibrs: check for spec_ctrl_ibrs in cpuinfo 2018-01-14 16:36:51 +01:00
2964c4ab44 add support for NixOS kernel
this removes the need to specify the kernel version manually on NixOS
2018-01-14 16:18:29 +01:00
749f432d32 also check for spec_ctrl flag in cpuinfo 2018-01-14 15:47:51 +01:00
a422b53d7c also check for cpuinfo flag 2018-01-14 15:47:51 +01:00
c483a2cf60 check spec_ctrl support using cpuid 2018-01-14 15:47:51 +01:00
dead0054a4 fix: proper detail msg in vuln status 2018-01-14 15:47:22 +01:00
8ed7d465aa Merge pull request #77 from speed47/exitcode
proper return codes regardless of the batch mode
2018-01-14 14:25:12 +01:00
e5e4851d72 proper return codes regardless of the batch mode 2018-01-14 14:24:31 +01:00
7f92717a2c add info about accuracy when missing kernel files 2018-01-13 13:59:17 +01:00
b47d505689 AMD now vuln to variant2 (as per their stmt) 2018-01-13 13:35:31 +01:00
4a2d051285 minor is_cpu_vulnerable() changes (#71)
* correct is_cpu_vulnerable() comment

As far as I can tell, the function and usage are correct for the comment
to be inverted.

Add a clarifying note as to why the value choice makes sense.

* exit on invalid varient

If this happens, it's a bug in the script. None of the calling code
checks for status 255, so don't let a scripting bug cause a false
negative.

* no need to set vulnerable CPUs

According to comment above this code:
'by default, everything is vulnerable, we work in a "whitelist" logic here.'
2018-01-13 13:16:37 +01:00
f3551b9734 Only show the name of the script, not the full path (#72) 2018-01-13 13:14:19 +01:00
45b98e125f fix some typos (#73) 2018-01-13 13:13:40 +01:00
dce917bfbb add --version, bump to v0.28 2018-01-12 19:10:44 +01:00
8f18f53aba add cpu model in output 2018-01-12 19:08:12 +01:00
d3f102b3b3 Typofix in readme (#61) 2018-01-12 13:58:04 +01:00
8bd093173d Fixed a few spelling errors (#60) 2018-01-12 11:46:36 +01:00
bfe5a3b840 add some debug 2018-01-12 10:53:19 +01:00
6a0242eea3 bump to v0.27 2018-01-11 15:36:41 +01:00
bc4e39038a fix(opcodes): fix regression introduced in previous commit
We were saying unknown instead of vulnerable when the count of lfence opcodes was low
This was not impacting batch mode or the final decision, just the human-readable output of the script.
2018-01-11 15:35:57 +01:00
62f8ed6f61 adding support for new /sys interface (#55)
* adding support for new /sys interface
* fix(objdump): prefer -d instead of -D, some kernels crash objdump otherwise
2018-01-11 12:23:16 +01:00
56b67f8082 Typo in README (#54) 2018-01-11 12:01:31 +01:00
52a8f78885 send warning to stderr. (#53)
With --batch json there must not be any other output on stdout, so redirect warnings to stderr will show the warning on the console and only the json output is on stdout.
2018-01-11 09:55:43 +01:00
a09a5ba38f bump to v0.25 to reflect changes 2018-01-11 09:08:29 +01:00
5a7d8d7edf Produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef... (#50)
Produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef...
2018-01-11 09:04:13 +01:00
49fdc6c449 Merge pull request #51 from cowanml/file_read_check_fixup
fixed file read test
2018-01-10 21:39:09 +01:00
af3de2a862 fixed file read test 2018-01-10 15:17:14 -05:00
c6e1b0ac8a feat(kernel): add support for LZ4 decompression 2018-01-10 20:10:57 +01:00
b913dacc1b Merge pull request #48 from speed47/opensuse
fix(opensuse): add specific location for ibrs_enabled file
2018-01-10 18:41:30 +01:00
eb0ebef5a8 fix(opensuse): add specific location for ibrs_enabled file 2018-01-10 17:40:33 +01:00
e0254025e8 Merge pull request #47 from speed47/readme
update readme
2018-01-10 17:12:54 +01:00
bd010340e6 update readme 2018-01-10 17:12:33 +01:00
a658de2f01 fix(kernel): fix detection for separate /boot partitions 2018-01-10 16:27:16 +01:00
4aed5589fe Merge pull request #44 from speed47/bootimage
feat(kernel): check the BOOT_IMAGE info from cmdline before trying th…
2018-01-10 16:13:00 +01:00
8ed1f5e3af feat(kernel): check the BOOT_IMAGE info from cmdline before trying the default names 2018-01-10 15:46:29 +01:00
ffc542eb82 bump to v0.23 to reflect changes 2018-01-10 15:25:55 +01:00
74bc7ba637 add --variant to specify what check we want to run 2018-01-10 15:22:30 +01:00
5389ac6844 Merge pull request #41 from bang-communications/master
NRPE mode
2018-01-10 15:11:45 +01:00
36fb83215a Merge pull request #42 from simon-vasseur/style
added some style (screenshot in readme)
2018-01-10 15:07:34 +01:00
59fe8c2ad8 Error on unknown batch format 2018-01-10 13:57:10 +00:00
b8d28e7f61 added some style 2018-01-10 14:55:58 +01:00
7c11d07865 Stray tab 2018-01-10 11:59:33 +00:00
7c5cfbb8c3 batch nrpe 2018-01-10 11:57:45 +00:00
381038eceb NRPE mode 2018-01-10 11:18:45 +00:00
d6e4aa43f0 Merge pull request #37 from deufrai/better-dmesg-support
Improve PTI detection
2018-01-09 19:52:45 +01:00
e5e09384f0 typofix 2018-01-09 18:54:35 +01:00
7222367f04 add disclaimer and bump to 0.21 2018-01-09 18:52:21 +01:00
ab512687cf Merge pull request #38 from Alkorin/fixARM
Fix ARM checks
2018-01-09 18:47:25 +01:00
a5aaa790a0 Merge pull request #39 from Alkorin/typo
Fix small typo in error message
2018-01-09 18:45:58 +01:00
335439dee0 Fix small typo in error message 2018-01-09 18:44:15 +01:00
45297b6f7d Fix ARM checks 2018-01-09 18:41:48 +01:00
a7b14306d5 Improve PTI detection even more
when PTI detection relies on dmesg, dmesg output is checked first
then /var/log/dmesg if dmesg output lacks boot time messages
2018-01-09 18:26:32 +01:00
608952ff71 Improve PTI detection
In case of a busy or misconfigured server, kernel message buffer loop
can be filled with messages broadcasted later than boot time. So dmesg
command wont return boot time messages.

Grepping /var/log/dmesg fixes it and this log file location semms pretty
standard across many common distros
2018-01-09 18:17:39 +01:00
1c3d349667 Merge pull request #31 from Feandil/batch
Add a "batch" and "verbose" mode
2018-01-09 18:12:39 +01:00
b93b13263d fix(pti): remove escapes since we use grep -E now 2018-01-09 16:01:44 +01:00
ad342cab06 Introduce "verbose" and "batch" modes
Rewrite the way the output is processed:
- Define verbosity level (currently warn, info (default) & verbose)
- Add a batch mode, for simple machine parsing
2018-01-09 15:58:13 +01:00
5fd85e288b No-color: interpret string (-e) to be able to mach \x1B 2018-01-09 15:57:10 +01:00
322f4efc8f fix broken logic of 68961f9, increment version to 0.20 2018-01-09 14:55:12 +01:00
b6bfcdbd45 Move configuration at the beginning of the script 2018-01-09 14:18:02 +01:00
19b01078c2 Merge pull request #32 from speed47/arm
adding known non-vulnerable ARM chips
2018-01-09 13:57:27 +01:00
68961f98c2 adding known non-vulnerable ARM chips 2018-01-09 13:11:48 +01:00
f0f2ea9b11 v0.19: introduce --no-color 2018-01-09 10:32:51 +01:00
6f1bdba1d9 bump to v0.18 to reflect changes 2018-01-09 09:21:42 +01:00
7b05105a54 Merge pull request #25 from Feandil/proc_config
When using /proc/config.gz, indicate it more clearly
2018-01-09 09:19:36 +01:00
8aed2d4086 Merge pull request #26 from Feandil/proc_kallsym
Use /proc/kallsyms to get symbols, if available
2018-01-09 09:17:18 +01:00
f4140a992a Use /proc/kallsyms to get symbols, if available 2018-01-09 08:58:09 +01:00
2c51b00a90 When using /proc/config.gz, indicate it more clearly 2018-01-09 08:54:07 +01:00
2d94514c07 adding mention of heuristic for variant 1 check 2018-01-09 08:43:52 +01:00
0e8f97afbc Merge pull request #24 from angus-p/Remove-extra-space
remove superfluous space from test line 315
2018-01-09 08:34:10 +01:00
70323a30da Merge pull request #23 from mradcliffe/issue-22
Increases tmp directory uniqueness to 6 characters to support Slackware
2018-01-09 08:33:32 +01:00
cc0b325383 remove superfluous space from test line 315
Extra space was causing non-existent variable to be tested resulting in 'YES' if running in live mode and IBRS compiled in
2018-01-09 03:47:25 +00:00
4454f03136 Increases tmp directory uniqueness to 6 characters to support Slackware 2018-01-08 22:28:55 -05:00
949f316f89 missed version bump + README typofix 2018-01-08 23:15:42 +01:00
5082afae61 Merge pull request #19 from speed47/offline_mode
implement offline mode and help
2018-01-08 23:13:19 +01:00
d73a24cb5b implement offline mode and help 2018-01-08 23:09:17 +01:00
75332e6e0f Merge pull request #18 from GrimKriegor/linux-libre_support
Linux-libre support
2018-01-08 23:07:41 +01:00
2d33a4369e Linux-libre support 2018-01-08 21:56:11 +00:00
8d4d295309 bump to v0.16 to reflect changes 2018-01-08 17:48:20 +01:00
1ff437edbb Merge pull request #16 from Alkorin/fixes
Fixes
2018-01-08 17:45:59 +01:00
34656827f5 detect retpoline-compliant compiler from latest LKML patches 2018-01-08 17:32:19 +01:00
8c8a8d35fd Detect if 'readelf' is present 2018-01-08 16:52:09 +01:00
debd10b517 Detect if 'strings' is present 2018-01-08 16:51:20 +01:00
21f81ff5c9 Detect if uncompress binaries are present 2018-01-08 16:51:14 +01:00
206e4b7fbc add detection of retpoline-aware compiler 2018-01-08 16:28:00 +01:00
1a14483c98 Use 'readelf' instead of 'file' to detect kernel 2018-01-08 15:56:19 +01:00
26564206db Do not execute checks if we already found that PTI is enabled 2018-01-08 15:56:19 +01:00
207168e097 detect if the used compiler supports retpoline (WIP) 2018-01-08 15:45:09 +01:00
f8ca11e56a Merge pull request #12 from sebastianw/fix-double-print
Remove superfluous 'YES' output when checking cpuinfo
2018-01-08 15:05:15 +01:00
c88acdd31d Remove superfluous 'YES' output when checking cpuinfo 2018-01-08 14:50:59 +01:00
88df48f4a7 Merge pull request #11 from sebastianw/kaiser-cpu-flag
Recognize 'kaiser' flag in /proc/cpuinfo
2018-01-08 14:45:40 +01:00
124ce8e27a Recognize 'kaiser' flag in /proc/cpuinfo 2018-01-08 14:38:43 +01:00
7bbcfe0df7 Merge pull request #7 from Feandil/redhat
Redhat support
2018-01-08 14:17:33 +01:00
a792348928 RedHat uses a different configuration name 2018-01-08 12:59:12 +01:00
66f7708095 Refactor RedHat support:
- Isolate file check to different elif (allowing to add more)
- Do the PTI debugfs check first (faster and supposed to be dynamic)
- If pti_enable is 0, don't trust dmesg (supposed to be dynamic)
2018-01-08 12:59:03 +01:00
34ef5ef21b Delay umount (for RedHat access to pti_enable) 2018-01-08 12:58:22 +01:00
edbdf0da1f push the lfence opcodes threshold to 70 2018-01-08 12:49:23 +01:00
68adbfdf14 Merge pull request #10 from Alkorin/permissionDenied
Avoid 'cat: /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled: Permission denied'
2018-01-08 12:44:09 +01:00
47c30babf1 Avoid 'cat: /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled: Permission denied' 2018-01-08 12:41:28 +01:00
ef7a5c4cf6 adding uname -v to get potential additional vendor information 2018-01-08 12:22:56 +01:00
4406910bea Merge pull request #8 from Feandil/debugfs
Fix debugfs mount check
2018-01-08 12:19:23 +01:00
b7197d6f54 Fix debugfs mount check 2018-01-08 12:15:51 +01:00
c792fa35bf add kernel version information to the output 2018-01-08 12:14:12 +01:00
d1498fe03f Merge pull request #5 from fccagou/centos
fix(centos): check according to redhat patch.
2018-01-08 12:10:07 +01:00
12bdd0e412 root check is now more visible 2018-01-08 11:31:19 +01:00
89f9bef577 Merge pull request #4 from dguglielmi/add-genkernel-support
Add support for Gentoo genkernel image path
2018-01-08 11:24:07 +01:00
0f50e04dab fix(centos): check according to redhat patch. https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301 2018-01-08 11:14:22 +01:00
bf056ae73d Add support for Gentoo genkernel image path 2018-01-08 11:08:53 +01:00
623e180ae1 Merge pull request #3 from TheHendla/arch_boot_img
add arch linux bootimage path
2018-01-08 10:51:59 +01:00
40a9d43c44 add arch linux bootimage path 2018-01-08 10:36:29 +01:00
c1004d5171 fix extract-vmlinux for non-gzip 2018-01-08 09:56:29 +01:00
fa0850466e add some comments, enhance pti detection 2018-01-08 09:37:54 +01:00
5c14384e15 Merge pull request #1 from t-nelis/root-check
Improve "running as root" check
2018-01-08 08:58:21 +01:00
1aaca63dcf Improve "running as root" check
Small issue with the USER environment variable:

  $ echo $USER
  thib
  $ sudo sh -c 'echo $USER'
  thib
  $ sudo -i sh -c 'echo $USER'
  root

Rather than recommending users to use sudo --login / -i, use the (very
widespread/portable) id program to retrieve the effective user ID
instead and don't change the recommendation.

  $ id -u
  1000
  $ sudo id -u
  0
  $ sudo -i id -u
  0
2018-01-08 01:22:14 +01:00
96dfa03c00 fix for uncompressed vmlinux case 2018-01-08 00:45:12 +01:00
05c79425ab detect kpti directly in vmlinux if option is not there 2018-01-07 22:47:41 +01:00
9def0c949a update readme 2018-01-07 20:13:10 +01:00
64eb1d005c add couple missing elses 2018-01-07 18:49:15 +01:00
bffda8b3e7 remove dependency on rdmsr 2018-01-07 18:36:56 +01:00
13f2133a97 cosmetic fix 2018-01-07 18:14:08 +01:00
8c2fd0f0bb fix MSR reading, need rdmsr for now 2018-01-07 18:13:25 +01:00
761c2b80e4 cosmetic fix 2018-01-07 17:19:37 +01:00
d6977928e5 msg fix 2018-01-07 17:15:08 +01:00
3 changed files with 3267 additions and 208 deletions

7
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FROM alpine:3.7
RUN apk --update --no-cache add kmod binutils grep perl
COPY . /check
ENTRYPOINT ["/check/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh"]

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@ -1,51 +1,112 @@
Spectre & Meltdown Checker Spectre & Meltdown Checker
========================== ==========================
A simple shell script to tell if your Linux installation is vulnerable A shell script to tell if your system is vulnerable against the several "speculative execution" CVEs that were made public in 2018.
against the 3 "speculative execution" CVEs: - CVE-2017-5753 aka Spectre Variant 1
- CVE-2017-5715 aka Spectre Variant 2
- CVE-2017-5754 aka Meltdown or Variant 3
- CVE-2018-3640 aka Variant 3a
- CVE-2018-3639 aka Variant 4
CVE-2017-5753 bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1) Supported operating systems:
- Linux (all versions, flavors and distros)
- BSD (FreeBSD, NetBSD, DragonFlyBSD)
Supported architectures:
- x86 (32 bits)
- amd64/x86_64 (64 bits)
- ARM and ARM64
- other architectures will work, but mitigations (if they exist) might not always be detected
For Linux systems, the script will detect mitigations, including backported non-vanilla patches, regardless of the advertised kernel version number and the distribution (such as Debian, Ubuntu, CentOS, RHEL, Fedora, openSUSE, Arch, ...), it also works if you've compiled your own kernel.
For BSD systems, the detection will work as long as the BSD you're using supports `cpuctl` and `linprocfs` (this is not the case of OpenBSD for example).
## Easy way to run the script
- Get the latest version of the script using `curl` *or* `wget`
```bash
curl -L https://meltdown.ovh -o spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
wget https://meltdown.ovh -O spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
```
- Inspect the script. You never blindly run scripts you downloaded from the Internet, do you?
```bash
vim spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
```
- When you're ready, run the script as root
```bash
chmod +x spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
```
### Run the script in a docker container
```shell
docker build -t spectre-meltdown-checker .
docker run --rm --privileged -v /boot:/boot:ro -v /lib/modules:/lib/modules:ro -v /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu:ro spectre-meltdown-checker
```
## Example of script output
- Intel Haswell CPU running under Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
![haswell](https://framapic.org/1kWmNwE6ll0p/ayTRX9JRlHJ7.png)
- AMD Ryzen running under OpenSUSE Tumbleweed
![ryzen](https://framapic.org/TkWbuh421YQR/6MAGUP3lL6Ne.png)
- Batch mode (JSON flavor)
![batch](https://framapic.org/HEcWFPrLewbs/om1LdufspWTJ.png)
## Quick summary of the CVEs
**CVE-2017-5753** bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1)
- Impact: Kernel & all software - Impact: Kernel & all software
- Mitigation: recompile software *and* kernel with a modified compiler that introduces the LFENCE opcode at the proper positions in the resulting code - Mitigation: recompile software *and* kernel with a modified compiler that introduces the LFENCE opcode at the proper positions in the resulting code
- Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible - Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible
CVE-2017-5715: branch target injection (Spectre Variant 2) **CVE-2017-5715** branch target injection (Spectre Variant 2)
- Impact: Kernel - Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation 1: new opcode via microcode update that should be used by up to date compilers to protect the BTB (by flushing indirect branch predictors) - Mitigation 1: new opcode via microcode update that should be used by up to date compilers to protect the BTB (by flushing indirect branch predictors)
- Mitigation 2: introducing "retpoline" into compilers, and recompile software/OS with it - Mitigation 2: introducing "retpoline" into compilers, and recompile software/OS with it
- Performance impact of the mitigation: high for mitigation 1, medium for mitigation 2, depending on your CPU - Performance impact of the mitigation: high for mitigation 1, medium for mitigation 2, depending on your CPU
CVE-2017-5754: rogue data cache load (Meltdown) **CVE-2017-5754** rogue data cache load (Meltdown)
- Impact: Kernel - Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough - Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough
- Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium - Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium
Example of the output of the script: **CVE-2018-3640** rogue system register read (Variant 3a)
- Impact: TBC
- Mitigation: microcode update only
- Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible
``` **CVE-2018-3639** speculative store bypass (Variant 4)
$ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.02
CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1' - Impact: software using JIT (no known exploitation against kernel)
* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: NO (only 38 opcodes found, should be >= 60) - Mitigation: microcode update + kernel update making possible for affected software to protect itself
> STATUS: VULNERABLE - Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2' ## Understanding what this script does and doesn't
* Mitigation 1
* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO
* Kernel support for IBRS: NO
* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: NO
* IBRS enabled for User space: NO
* Mitigation 2
* Kernel recompiled with retpolines: UNKNOWN (check not yet implemented)
> STATUS: VULNERABLE (IBRS hardware + kernel support OR retpolines-compiled kernel are needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3' This tool does its best to determine whether your system is immune (or has proper mitigations in place) for the collectively named "speculative execution" vulnerabilities. It doesn't attempt to run any kind of exploit, and can't guarantee that your system is secure, but rather helps you verifying whether your system has the known correct mitigations in place.
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES However, some mitigations could also exist in your kernel that this script doesn't know (yet) how to detect, or it might falsely detect mitigations that in the end don't work as expected (for example, on backported or modified kernels).
* PTI enabled and active: YES
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (PTI mitigates the vulnerability) Your system exposure also depends on your CPU. As of now, AMD and ARM processors are marked as immune to some or all of these vulnerabilities (except some specific ARM models). All Intel processors manufactured since circa 1995 are thought to be vulnerable, except some specific/old models, such as some early Atoms. Whatever processor one uses, one might seek more information from the manufacturer of that processor and/or of the device in which it runs.
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The nature of the discovered vulnerabilities being quite new, the landscape of vulnerable processors can be expected to change over time, which is why this script makes the assumption that all CPUs are vulnerable, except if the manufacturer explicitly stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement.
Please also note that for Spectre vulnerabilities, all software can possibly be exploited, this tool only verifies that the kernel (which is the core of the system) you're using has the proper protections in place. Verifying all the other software is out of the scope of this tool. As a general measure, ensure you always have the most up to date stable versions of all the software you use, especially for those who are exposed to the world, such as network daemons and browsers.
This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to conclusions about your security.

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