88 Commits
v0.14 ... v0.30

Author SHA1 Message Date
dcc4488340 Merge pull request #80 from speed47/cpuid_spec_ctrl
v0.30, cpuid spec ctrl and other enhancements
2018-01-14 16:48:02 +01:00
32e3fe6c07 bump to v0.30 to reflect changes 2018-01-14 16:45:59 +01:00
f488947d43 Merge pull request #79 from andir/add-nixos
add support for NixOS kernel
2018-01-14 16:40:10 +01:00
71213c11b3 ibrs: check for spec_ctrl_ibrs in cpuinfo 2018-01-14 16:36:51 +01:00
2964c4ab44 add support for NixOS kernel
this removes the need to specify the kernel version manually on NixOS
2018-01-14 16:18:29 +01:00
749f432d32 also check for spec_ctrl flag in cpuinfo 2018-01-14 15:47:51 +01:00
a422b53d7c also check for cpuinfo flag 2018-01-14 15:47:51 +01:00
c483a2cf60 check spec_ctrl support using cpuid 2018-01-14 15:47:51 +01:00
dead0054a4 fix: proper detail msg in vuln status 2018-01-14 15:47:22 +01:00
8ed7d465aa Merge pull request #77 from speed47/exitcode
proper return codes regardless of the batch mode
2018-01-14 14:25:12 +01:00
e5e4851d72 proper return codes regardless of the batch mode 2018-01-14 14:24:31 +01:00
7f92717a2c add info about accuracy when missing kernel files 2018-01-13 13:59:17 +01:00
b47d505689 AMD now vuln to variant2 (as per their stmt) 2018-01-13 13:35:31 +01:00
4a2d051285 minor is_cpu_vulnerable() changes (#71)
* correct is_cpu_vulnerable() comment

As far as I can tell, the function and usage are correct for the comment
to be inverted.

Add a clarifying note as to why the value choice makes sense.

* exit on invalid varient

If this happens, it's a bug in the script. None of the calling code
checks for status 255, so don't let a scripting bug cause a false
negative.

* no need to set vulnerable CPUs

According to comment above this code:
'by default, everything is vulnerable, we work in a "whitelist" logic here.'
2018-01-13 13:16:37 +01:00
f3551b9734 Only show the name of the script, not the full path (#72) 2018-01-13 13:14:19 +01:00
45b98e125f fix some typos (#73) 2018-01-13 13:13:40 +01:00
dce917bfbb add --version, bump to v0.28 2018-01-12 19:10:44 +01:00
8f18f53aba add cpu model in output 2018-01-12 19:08:12 +01:00
d3f102b3b3 Typofix in readme (#61) 2018-01-12 13:58:04 +01:00
8bd093173d Fixed a few spelling errors (#60) 2018-01-12 11:46:36 +01:00
bfe5a3b840 add some debug 2018-01-12 10:53:19 +01:00
6a0242eea3 bump to v0.27 2018-01-11 15:36:41 +01:00
bc4e39038a fix(opcodes): fix regression introduced in previous commit
We were saying unknown instead of vulnerable when the count of lfence opcodes was low
This was not impacting batch mode or the final decision, just the human-readable output of the script.
2018-01-11 15:35:57 +01:00
62f8ed6f61 adding support for new /sys interface (#55)
* adding support for new /sys interface
* fix(objdump): prefer -d instead of -D, some kernels crash objdump otherwise
2018-01-11 12:23:16 +01:00
56b67f8082 Typo in README (#54) 2018-01-11 12:01:31 +01:00
52a8f78885 send warning to stderr. (#53)
With --batch json there must not be any other output on stdout, so redirect warnings to stderr will show the warning on the console and only the json output is on stdout.
2018-01-11 09:55:43 +01:00
a09a5ba38f bump to v0.25 to reflect changes 2018-01-11 09:08:29 +01:00
5a7d8d7edf Produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef... (#50)
Produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef...
2018-01-11 09:04:13 +01:00
49fdc6c449 Merge pull request #51 from cowanml/file_read_check_fixup
fixed file read test
2018-01-10 21:39:09 +01:00
af3de2a862 fixed file read test 2018-01-10 15:17:14 -05:00
c6e1b0ac8a feat(kernel): add support for LZ4 decompression 2018-01-10 20:10:57 +01:00
b913dacc1b Merge pull request #48 from speed47/opensuse
fix(opensuse): add specific location for ibrs_enabled file
2018-01-10 18:41:30 +01:00
eb0ebef5a8 fix(opensuse): add specific location for ibrs_enabled file 2018-01-10 17:40:33 +01:00
e0254025e8 Merge pull request #47 from speed47/readme
update readme
2018-01-10 17:12:54 +01:00
bd010340e6 update readme 2018-01-10 17:12:33 +01:00
a658de2f01 fix(kernel): fix detection for separate /boot partitions 2018-01-10 16:27:16 +01:00
4aed5589fe Merge pull request #44 from speed47/bootimage
feat(kernel): check the BOOT_IMAGE info from cmdline before trying th…
2018-01-10 16:13:00 +01:00
8ed1f5e3af feat(kernel): check the BOOT_IMAGE info from cmdline before trying the default names 2018-01-10 15:46:29 +01:00
ffc542eb82 bump to v0.23 to reflect changes 2018-01-10 15:25:55 +01:00
74bc7ba637 add --variant to specify what check we want to run 2018-01-10 15:22:30 +01:00
5389ac6844 Merge pull request #41 from bang-communications/master
NRPE mode
2018-01-10 15:11:45 +01:00
36fb83215a Merge pull request #42 from simon-vasseur/style
added some style (screenshot in readme)
2018-01-10 15:07:34 +01:00
59fe8c2ad8 Error on unknown batch format 2018-01-10 13:57:10 +00:00
b8d28e7f61 added some style 2018-01-10 14:55:58 +01:00
7c11d07865 Stray tab 2018-01-10 11:59:33 +00:00
7c5cfbb8c3 batch nrpe 2018-01-10 11:57:45 +00:00
381038eceb NRPE mode 2018-01-10 11:18:45 +00:00
d6e4aa43f0 Merge pull request #37 from deufrai/better-dmesg-support
Improve PTI detection
2018-01-09 19:52:45 +01:00
e5e09384f0 typofix 2018-01-09 18:54:35 +01:00
7222367f04 add disclaimer and bump to 0.21 2018-01-09 18:52:21 +01:00
ab512687cf Merge pull request #38 from Alkorin/fixARM
Fix ARM checks
2018-01-09 18:47:25 +01:00
a5aaa790a0 Merge pull request #39 from Alkorin/typo
Fix small typo in error message
2018-01-09 18:45:58 +01:00
335439dee0 Fix small typo in error message 2018-01-09 18:44:15 +01:00
45297b6f7d Fix ARM checks 2018-01-09 18:41:48 +01:00
a7b14306d5 Improve PTI detection even more
when PTI detection relies on dmesg, dmesg output is checked first
then /var/log/dmesg if dmesg output lacks boot time messages
2018-01-09 18:26:32 +01:00
608952ff71 Improve PTI detection
In case of a busy or misconfigured server, kernel message buffer loop
can be filled with messages broadcasted later than boot time. So dmesg
command wont return boot time messages.

Grepping /var/log/dmesg fixes it and this log file location semms pretty
standard across many common distros
2018-01-09 18:17:39 +01:00
1c3d349667 Merge pull request #31 from Feandil/batch
Add a "batch" and "verbose" mode
2018-01-09 18:12:39 +01:00
b93b13263d fix(pti): remove escapes since we use grep -E now 2018-01-09 16:01:44 +01:00
ad342cab06 Introduce "verbose" and "batch" modes
Rewrite the way the output is processed:
- Define verbosity level (currently warn, info (default) & verbose)
- Add a batch mode, for simple machine parsing
2018-01-09 15:58:13 +01:00
5fd85e288b No-color: interpret string (-e) to be able to mach \x1B 2018-01-09 15:57:10 +01:00
322f4efc8f fix broken logic of 68961f9, increment version to 0.20 2018-01-09 14:55:12 +01:00
b6bfcdbd45 Move configuration at the beginning of the script 2018-01-09 14:18:02 +01:00
19b01078c2 Merge pull request #32 from speed47/arm
adding known non-vulnerable ARM chips
2018-01-09 13:57:27 +01:00
68961f98c2 adding known non-vulnerable ARM chips 2018-01-09 13:11:48 +01:00
f0f2ea9b11 v0.19: introduce --no-color 2018-01-09 10:32:51 +01:00
6f1bdba1d9 bump to v0.18 to reflect changes 2018-01-09 09:21:42 +01:00
7b05105a54 Merge pull request #25 from Feandil/proc_config
When using /proc/config.gz, indicate it more clearly
2018-01-09 09:19:36 +01:00
8aed2d4086 Merge pull request #26 from Feandil/proc_kallsym
Use /proc/kallsyms to get symbols, if available
2018-01-09 09:17:18 +01:00
f4140a992a Use /proc/kallsyms to get symbols, if available 2018-01-09 08:58:09 +01:00
2c51b00a90 When using /proc/config.gz, indicate it more clearly 2018-01-09 08:54:07 +01:00
2d94514c07 adding mention of heuristic for variant 1 check 2018-01-09 08:43:52 +01:00
0e8f97afbc Merge pull request #24 from angus-p/Remove-extra-space
remove superfluous space from test line 315
2018-01-09 08:34:10 +01:00
70323a30da Merge pull request #23 from mradcliffe/issue-22
Increases tmp directory uniqueness to 6 characters to support Slackware
2018-01-09 08:33:32 +01:00
cc0b325383 remove superfluous space from test line 315
Extra space was causing non-existent variable to be tested resulting in 'YES' if running in live mode and IBRS compiled in
2018-01-09 03:47:25 +00:00
4454f03136 Increases tmp directory uniqueness to 6 characters to support Slackware 2018-01-08 22:28:55 -05:00
949f316f89 missed version bump + README typofix 2018-01-08 23:15:42 +01:00
5082afae61 Merge pull request #19 from speed47/offline_mode
implement offline mode and help
2018-01-08 23:13:19 +01:00
d73a24cb5b implement offline mode and help 2018-01-08 23:09:17 +01:00
75332e6e0f Merge pull request #18 from GrimKriegor/linux-libre_support
Linux-libre support
2018-01-08 23:07:41 +01:00
2d33a4369e Linux-libre support 2018-01-08 21:56:11 +00:00
8d4d295309 bump to v0.16 to reflect changes 2018-01-08 17:48:20 +01:00
1ff437edbb Merge pull request #16 from Alkorin/fixes
Fixes
2018-01-08 17:45:59 +01:00
34656827f5 detect retpoline-compliant compiler from latest LKML patches 2018-01-08 17:32:19 +01:00
8c8a8d35fd Detect if 'readelf' is present 2018-01-08 16:52:09 +01:00
debd10b517 Detect if 'strings' is present 2018-01-08 16:51:20 +01:00
21f81ff5c9 Detect if uncompress binaries are present 2018-01-08 16:51:14 +01:00
1a14483c98 Use 'readelf' instead of 'file' to detect kernel 2018-01-08 15:56:19 +01:00
26564206db Do not execute checks if we already found that PTI is enabled 2018-01-08 15:56:19 +01:00
2 changed files with 986 additions and 323 deletions

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Spectre & Meltdown Checker Spectre & Meltdown Checker
========================== ==========================
A simple shell script to tell if your Linux installation is vulnerable A simple shell script to tell if your Linux installation is vulnerable against the 3 "speculative execution" CVEs that were made public early 2018.
against the 3 "speculative execution" CVEs:
CVE-2017-5753 bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1) Without options, it'll inspect your currently running kernel.
You can also specify a kernel image on the command line, if you'd like to inspect a kernel you're not running.
The script will do its best to detect mitigations, including backported non-vanilla patches, regardless of the advertised kernel version number.
## Example of script output
![checker](https://framapic.org/6O4v4AAwMenv/M6J4CFWwsB3z.png)
## Quick summary of the CVEs
**CVE-2017-5753** bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1)
- Impact: Kernel & all software - Impact: Kernel & all software
- Mitigation: recompile software *and* kernel with a modified compiler that introduces the LFENCE opcode at the proper positions in the resulting code - Mitigation: recompile software *and* kernel with a modified compiler that introduces the LFENCE opcode at the proper positions in the resulting code
- Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible - Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible
CVE-2017-5715: branch target injection (Spectre Variant 2) **CVE-2017-5715** branch target injection (Spectre Variant 2)
- Impact: Kernel - Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation 1: new opcode via microcode update that should be used by up to date compilers to protect the BTB (by flushing indirect branch predictors) - Mitigation 1: new opcode via microcode update that should be used by up to date compilers to protect the BTB (by flushing indirect branch predictors)
- Mitigation 2: introducing "retpoline" into compilers, and recompile software/OS with it - Mitigation 2: introducing "retpoline" into compilers, and recompile software/OS with it
- Performance impact of the mitigation: high for mitigation 1, medium for mitigation 2, depending on your CPU - Performance impact of the mitigation: high for mitigation 1, medium for mitigation 2, depending on your CPU
CVE-2017-5754: rogue data cache load (Meltdown) **CVE-2017-5754** rogue data cache load (Meltdown)
- Impact: Kernel - Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough - Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough
- Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium - Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium
Example of the output of the script: ## Disclaimer
This tool does its best to determine whether your system is immune (or has proper mitigations in place) for the collectively named "speculative execution" vulnerabilities. It doesn't attempt to run any kind of exploit, and can't guarantee that your system is secure, but rather helps you verifying whether your system has the known correct mitigations in place.
However, some mitigations could also exist in your kernel that this script doesn't know (yet) how to detect, or it might falsely detect mitigations that in the end don't work as expected (for example, on backported or modified kernels).
``` Your system exposure also depends on your CPU. As of now, AMD and ARM processors are marked as immune to some or all of these vulnerabilities (except some specific ARM models). All Intel processors manufactured since circa 1995 are thought to be vulnerable. Whatever processor one uses, one might seek more information from the manufacturer of that processor and/or of the device in which it runs.
$ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.07
CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1' The nature of the discovered vulnerabilities being quite new, the landscape of vulnerable processors can be expected to change over time, which is why this script makes the assumption that all CPUs are vulnerable, except if the manufacturer explicitly stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement.
* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: NO (only 38 opcodes found, should be >= 60)
> STATUS: VULNERABLE
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2' This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to conclusions about your security.
* Mitigation 1
* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO
* Kernel support for IBRS: NO
* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: NO
* IBRS enabled for User space: NO
* Mitigation 2
* Kernel compiled with retpolines: NO
> STATUS: VULNERABLE (IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpolines are needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
* PTI enabled and active: YES
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (PTI mitigates the vulnerability)
```

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