87 Commits
v0.04 ... v0.23

Author SHA1 Message Date
ffc542eb82 bump to v0.23 to reflect changes 2018-01-10 15:25:55 +01:00
74bc7ba637 add --variant to specify what check we want to run 2018-01-10 15:22:30 +01:00
5389ac6844 Merge pull request #41 from bang-communications/master
NRPE mode
2018-01-10 15:11:45 +01:00
36fb83215a Merge pull request #42 from simon-vasseur/style
added some style (screenshot in readme)
2018-01-10 15:07:34 +01:00
59fe8c2ad8 Error on unknown batch format 2018-01-10 13:57:10 +00:00
b8d28e7f61 added some style 2018-01-10 14:55:58 +01:00
7c11d07865 Stray tab 2018-01-10 11:59:33 +00:00
7c5cfbb8c3 batch nrpe 2018-01-10 11:57:45 +00:00
381038eceb NRPE mode 2018-01-10 11:18:45 +00:00
d6e4aa43f0 Merge pull request #37 from deufrai/better-dmesg-support
Improve PTI detection
2018-01-09 19:52:45 +01:00
e5e09384f0 typofix 2018-01-09 18:54:35 +01:00
7222367f04 add disclaimer and bump to 0.21 2018-01-09 18:52:21 +01:00
ab512687cf Merge pull request #38 from Alkorin/fixARM
Fix ARM checks
2018-01-09 18:47:25 +01:00
a5aaa790a0 Merge pull request #39 from Alkorin/typo
Fix small typo in error message
2018-01-09 18:45:58 +01:00
335439dee0 Fix small typo in error message 2018-01-09 18:44:15 +01:00
45297b6f7d Fix ARM checks 2018-01-09 18:41:48 +01:00
a7b14306d5 Improve PTI detection even more
when PTI detection relies on dmesg, dmesg output is checked first
then /var/log/dmesg if dmesg output lacks boot time messages
2018-01-09 18:26:32 +01:00
608952ff71 Improve PTI detection
In case of a busy or misconfigured server, kernel message buffer loop
can be filled with messages broadcasted later than boot time. So dmesg
command wont return boot time messages.

Grepping /var/log/dmesg fixes it and this log file location semms pretty
standard across many common distros
2018-01-09 18:17:39 +01:00
1c3d349667 Merge pull request #31 from Feandil/batch
Add a "batch" and "verbose" mode
2018-01-09 18:12:39 +01:00
b93b13263d fix(pti): remove escapes since we use grep -E now 2018-01-09 16:01:44 +01:00
ad342cab06 Introduce "verbose" and "batch" modes
Rewrite the way the output is processed:
- Define verbosity level (currently warn, info (default) & verbose)
- Add a batch mode, for simple machine parsing
2018-01-09 15:58:13 +01:00
5fd85e288b No-color: interpret string (-e) to be able to mach \x1B 2018-01-09 15:57:10 +01:00
322f4efc8f fix broken logic of 68961f9, increment version to 0.20 2018-01-09 14:55:12 +01:00
b6bfcdbd45 Move configuration at the beginning of the script 2018-01-09 14:18:02 +01:00
19b01078c2 Merge pull request #32 from speed47/arm
adding known non-vulnerable ARM chips
2018-01-09 13:57:27 +01:00
68961f98c2 adding known non-vulnerable ARM chips 2018-01-09 13:11:48 +01:00
f0f2ea9b11 v0.19: introduce --no-color 2018-01-09 10:32:51 +01:00
6f1bdba1d9 bump to v0.18 to reflect changes 2018-01-09 09:21:42 +01:00
7b05105a54 Merge pull request #25 from Feandil/proc_config
When using /proc/config.gz, indicate it more clearly
2018-01-09 09:19:36 +01:00
8aed2d4086 Merge pull request #26 from Feandil/proc_kallsym
Use /proc/kallsyms to get symbols, if available
2018-01-09 09:17:18 +01:00
f4140a992a Use /proc/kallsyms to get symbols, if available 2018-01-09 08:58:09 +01:00
2c51b00a90 When using /proc/config.gz, indicate it more clearly 2018-01-09 08:54:07 +01:00
2d94514c07 adding mention of heuristic for variant 1 check 2018-01-09 08:43:52 +01:00
0e8f97afbc Merge pull request #24 from angus-p/Remove-extra-space
remove superfluous space from test line 315
2018-01-09 08:34:10 +01:00
70323a30da Merge pull request #23 from mradcliffe/issue-22
Increases tmp directory uniqueness to 6 characters to support Slackware
2018-01-09 08:33:32 +01:00
cc0b325383 remove superfluous space from test line 315
Extra space was causing non-existent variable to be tested resulting in 'YES' if running in live mode and IBRS compiled in
2018-01-09 03:47:25 +00:00
4454f03136 Increases tmp directory uniqueness to 6 characters to support Slackware 2018-01-08 22:28:55 -05:00
949f316f89 missed version bump + README typofix 2018-01-08 23:15:42 +01:00
5082afae61 Merge pull request #19 from speed47/offline_mode
implement offline mode and help
2018-01-08 23:13:19 +01:00
d73a24cb5b implement offline mode and help 2018-01-08 23:09:17 +01:00
75332e6e0f Merge pull request #18 from GrimKriegor/linux-libre_support
Linux-libre support
2018-01-08 23:07:41 +01:00
2d33a4369e Linux-libre support 2018-01-08 21:56:11 +00:00
8d4d295309 bump to v0.16 to reflect changes 2018-01-08 17:48:20 +01:00
1ff437edbb Merge pull request #16 from Alkorin/fixes
Fixes
2018-01-08 17:45:59 +01:00
34656827f5 detect retpoline-compliant compiler from latest LKML patches 2018-01-08 17:32:19 +01:00
8c8a8d35fd Detect if 'readelf' is present 2018-01-08 16:52:09 +01:00
debd10b517 Detect if 'strings' is present 2018-01-08 16:51:20 +01:00
21f81ff5c9 Detect if uncompress binaries are present 2018-01-08 16:51:14 +01:00
206e4b7fbc add detection of retpoline-aware compiler 2018-01-08 16:28:00 +01:00
1a14483c98 Use 'readelf' instead of 'file' to detect kernel 2018-01-08 15:56:19 +01:00
26564206db Do not execute checks if we already found that PTI is enabled 2018-01-08 15:56:19 +01:00
207168e097 detect if the used compiler supports retpoline (WIP) 2018-01-08 15:45:09 +01:00
f8ca11e56a Merge pull request #12 from sebastianw/fix-double-print
Remove superfluous 'YES' output when checking cpuinfo
2018-01-08 15:05:15 +01:00
c88acdd31d Remove superfluous 'YES' output when checking cpuinfo 2018-01-08 14:50:59 +01:00
88df48f4a7 Merge pull request #11 from sebastianw/kaiser-cpu-flag
Recognize 'kaiser' flag in /proc/cpuinfo
2018-01-08 14:45:40 +01:00
124ce8e27a Recognize 'kaiser' flag in /proc/cpuinfo 2018-01-08 14:38:43 +01:00
7bbcfe0df7 Merge pull request #7 from Feandil/redhat
Redhat support
2018-01-08 14:17:33 +01:00
a792348928 RedHat uses a different configuration name 2018-01-08 12:59:12 +01:00
66f7708095 Refactor RedHat support:
- Isolate file check to different elif (allowing to add more)
- Do the PTI debugfs check first (faster and supposed to be dynamic)
- If pti_enable is 0, don't trust dmesg (supposed to be dynamic)
2018-01-08 12:59:03 +01:00
34ef5ef21b Delay umount (for RedHat access to pti_enable) 2018-01-08 12:58:22 +01:00
edbdf0da1f push the lfence opcodes threshold to 70 2018-01-08 12:49:23 +01:00
68adbfdf14 Merge pull request #10 from Alkorin/permissionDenied
Avoid 'cat: /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled: Permission denied'
2018-01-08 12:44:09 +01:00
47c30babf1 Avoid 'cat: /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled: Permission denied' 2018-01-08 12:41:28 +01:00
ef7a5c4cf6 adding uname -v to get potential additional vendor information 2018-01-08 12:22:56 +01:00
4406910bea Merge pull request #8 from Feandil/debugfs
Fix debugfs mount check
2018-01-08 12:19:23 +01:00
b7197d6f54 Fix debugfs mount check 2018-01-08 12:15:51 +01:00
c792fa35bf add kernel version information to the output 2018-01-08 12:14:12 +01:00
d1498fe03f Merge pull request #5 from fccagou/centos
fix(centos): check according to redhat patch.
2018-01-08 12:10:07 +01:00
12bdd0e412 root check is now more visible 2018-01-08 11:31:19 +01:00
89f9bef577 Merge pull request #4 from dguglielmi/add-genkernel-support
Add support for Gentoo genkernel image path
2018-01-08 11:24:07 +01:00
0f50e04dab fix(centos): check according to redhat patch. https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301 2018-01-08 11:14:22 +01:00
bf056ae73d Add support for Gentoo genkernel image path 2018-01-08 11:08:53 +01:00
623e180ae1 Merge pull request #3 from TheHendla/arch_boot_img
add arch linux bootimage path
2018-01-08 10:51:59 +01:00
40a9d43c44 add arch linux bootimage path 2018-01-08 10:36:29 +01:00
c1004d5171 fix extract-vmlinux for non-gzip 2018-01-08 09:56:29 +01:00
fa0850466e add some comments, enhance pti detection 2018-01-08 09:37:54 +01:00
5c14384e15 Merge pull request #1 from t-nelis/root-check
Improve "running as root" check
2018-01-08 08:58:21 +01:00
1aaca63dcf Improve "running as root" check
Small issue with the USER environment variable:

  $ echo $USER
  thib
  $ sudo sh -c 'echo $USER'
  thib
  $ sudo -i sh -c 'echo $USER'
  root

Rather than recommending users to use sudo --login / -i, use the (very
widespread/portable) id program to retrieve the effective user ID
instead and don't change the recommendation.

  $ id -u
  1000
  $ sudo id -u
  0
  $ sudo -i id -u
  0
2018-01-08 01:22:14 +01:00
96dfa03c00 fix for uncompressed vmlinux case 2018-01-08 00:45:12 +01:00
05c79425ab detect kpti directly in vmlinux if option is not there 2018-01-07 22:47:41 +01:00
9def0c949a update readme 2018-01-07 20:13:10 +01:00
64eb1d005c add couple missing elses 2018-01-07 18:49:15 +01:00
bffda8b3e7 remove dependency on rdmsr 2018-01-07 18:36:56 +01:00
13f2133a97 cosmetic fix 2018-01-07 18:14:08 +01:00
8c2fd0f0bb fix MSR reading, need rdmsr for now 2018-01-07 18:13:25 +01:00
761c2b80e4 cosmetic fix 2018-01-07 17:19:37 +01:00
d6977928e5 msg fix 2018-01-07 17:15:08 +01:00
2 changed files with 775 additions and 217 deletions

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Spectre & Meltdown Checker Spectre & Meltdown Checker
========================== ==========================
A simple shell script to tell if your Linux installation is vulnerable A simple shell script to tell if your Linux installation is vulnerable against the 3 "speculative execution" CVEs.
against the 3 "speculative execution" CVEs:
CVE-2017-5753 bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1) Without options, it'll inspect you currently running kernel.
You can also specify a kernel image on the command line, if you'd like to inspect a kernel you're not running.
The script will do its best to detect mitigations, including backported non-vanilla patches, regardless of the advertised kernel version number.
## Example of script output
![checker](https://framapic.org/FjroIZximyoM/EO5msoSMKb6L.png)
## Quick summary of the CVEs
**CVE-2017-5753** bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1)
- Impact: Kernel & all software - Impact: Kernel & all software
- Mitigation: recompile software *and* kernel with a modified compiler that introduces the LFENCE opcode at the proper positions in the resulting code - Mitigation: recompile software *and* kernel with a modified compiler that introduces the LFENCE opcode at the proper positions in the resulting code
- Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible - Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible
CVE-2017-5715: branch target injection (Spectre Variant 2) **CVE-2017-5715** branch target injection (Spectre Variant 2)
- Impact: Kernel - Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation 1: new opcode via microcode update that should be used by up to date compilers to protect the BTB (by flushing indirect branch predictors) - Mitigation 1: new opcode via microcode update that should be used by up to date compilers to protect the BTB (by flushing indirect branch predictors)
- Mitigation 2: introducing "retpoline" into compilers, and recompile software/OS with it - Mitigation 2: introducing "retpoline" into compilers, and recompile software/OS with it
- Performance impact of the mitigation: high for mitigation 1, medium for mitigation 2, depending on your CPU - Performance impact of the mitigation: high for mitigation 1, medium for mitigation 2, depending on your CPU
CVE-2017-5754: rogue data cache load (Meltdown) **CVE-2017-5754** rogue data cache load (Meltdown)
- Impact: Kernel - Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough - Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough
- Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium - Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium
Example of the output of the script:
```
$ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.02
CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: NO (only 38 opcodes found, should be >= 60)
> STATUS: VULNERABLE
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
* Mitigation 1
* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO
* Kernel support for IBRS: NO
* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: NO
* IBRS enabled for User space: NO
* Mitigation 2
* Kernel recompiled with retpolines: UNKNOWN (check not yet implemented)
> STATUS: VULNERABLE (IBRS hardware + kernel support OR retpolines-compiled kernel are needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
* PTI enabled and active: YES
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (PTI mitigates the vulnerability)
```

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