feat: hide CVE checks that arebirrelevant for current arch

built from commit 7329c1fd2f
 dated 2026-04-21 08:53:08 +0200
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)

 CVE_REGISTRY gains an optional fifth field that tags checks as x86-only or
arm-only, untagged entries apply everywhere. The main CVE dispatcher and the
affectedness summary both skip gated entries in default "all CVEs" runs,
removing the noise of arm64 errata on x86 hosts and of x86 CVEs on ARM hosts
across text, json, nrpe and prometheus outputs. Explicit --cve/--variant/--errata
selection bypasses the gate so manual queries still run anywhere.
The gate honours no-hw mode by ignoring the host CPU and keying off the
inspected kernel's architecture only, which handles cross-arch offline
analysis driven by --kernel/--config/--map.

.github/workflows/autoupdate.yml

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-name: autoupdate
-
-on:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-  schedule:
-    - cron: '42 9 * * *'
-
-permissions:
-  pull-requests: write
-
-jobs:
-  autoupdate:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-      - name: Install prerequisites
-        run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends iucode-tool sqlite3 unzip
-      - name: Update microcode versions
-        run: ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --update-builtin-fwdb
-      - name: Check git diff
-        id: diff
-        run: |
-          echo change="$(git diff spectre-meltdown-checker.sh | awk '/MCEDB/ { if(V) { print V" to "$4; exit } else { V=$4 } }')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          echo nbdiff="$(git diff spectre-meltdown-checker.sh | grep -cE -- '^\+# [AI],')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          git diff
-          cat "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-      - name: Create Pull Request if needed
-        if: steps.diff.outputs.nbdiff != '0'
-        uses: peter-evans/create-pull-request@v7
-        with:
-          branch: autoupdate-fwdb
-          commit-message: "update: fwdb from ${{ steps.diff.outputs.change }}, ${{ steps.diff.outputs.nbdiff }} microcode changes"
-          title: "[Auto] Update fwdb from ${{ steps.diff.outputs.change }}"
-          body: |
-            Automated PR to update fwdb from ${{ steps.diff.outputs.change }}
-            Detected ${{ steps.diff.outputs.nbdiff }} microcode changes

.github/workflows/build.yml

@@ -25,21 +25,81 @@ jobs:
         mv spectre-meltdown-checker.sh dist/
     - name: check direct execution
       run: |
+        set -x
         expected=$(cat .github/workflows/expected_cve_count)
         cd dist
-        nb=$(sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
+
+        json=$(sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch json || true)
+
+        # Validate JSON is well-formed (and show it if not)
+        echo "$json" | jq . >/dev/null || {
+          echo "Invalid JSON produced by spectre-meltdown-checker.sh"
+          echo "$json"
+          exit 1
+        }
+
+        # Validate required keys exist
+        for key in meta system cpu cpu_microcode vulnerabilities; do
+          echo "$json" | jq -e ".$key" >/dev/null || {
+            echo "Missing top-level key: $key"
+            echo "$json" | jq .
+            exit 1
+          }
+        done
+
+        # Use -r to get raw scalars (no quotes)
+        fmtver=$(echo "$json" | jq -r '.meta.format_version // empty')
+        if [ "$fmtver" != "1" ]; then
+          echo "Unexpected format_version: $fmtver"
+          echo "$json" | jq .
+          exit 1
+        fi
+
+        run_as_root=$(echo "$json" | jq -r '.meta.run_as_root // empty')
+        if [ "$run_as_root" != "true" ]; then
+          echo "Expected run_as_root=true, got: $run_as_root"
+          echo "$json" | jq .
+          exit 1
+        fi
+
+        mocked=$(echo "$json" | jq -r '.meta.mocked // "false"')
+        if [ "$mocked" = "true" ]; then
+          echo "mocked=true must never appear in production"
+          echo "$json" | jq .
+          exit 1
+        fi
+
+        # Count CVEs robustly (as a number)
+        nb=$(echo "$json" | jq -r '[.vulnerabilities[].cve] | length')
         if [ "$nb" -ne "$expected" ]; then
           echo "Invalid number of CVEs reported: $nb instead of $expected"
+          echo "$json" | jq '.vulnerabilities[].cve'
           exit 1
         else
           echo "OK $nb CVEs reported"
         fi
+
+        # Validate json-terse backward compatibility
+        nb_terse=$(sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch json-terse | jq -r 'map(.CVE) | length')
+        if [ "$nb_terse" -ne "$expected" ]; then
+          echo "json-terse backward compat broken: $nb_terse CVEs instead of $expected"
+          exit 1
+        else
+          echo "OK json-terse backward compat: $nb_terse CVEs"
+        fi
     - name: check docker compose run execution
       run: |
         expected=$(cat .github/workflows/expected_cve_count)
         cd dist
         docker compose build
-        nb=$(docker compose run --rm spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
+        json=$(docker compose run --rm spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json || true)
+        echo "$json" | jq . > /dev/null
+        fmtver=$(echo "$json" | jq '.meta.format_version')
+        if [ "$fmtver" != "1" ]; then
+          echo "Unexpected format_version: $fmtver"
+          exit 1
+        fi
+        nb=$(echo "$json" | jq '.vulnerabilities[].cve' | wc -l)
         if [ "$nb" -ne "$expected" ]; then
           echo "Invalid number of CVEs reported: $nb instead of $expected"
           exit 1
@@ -51,7 +111,14 @@ jobs:
         expected=$(cat .github/workflows/expected_cve_count)
         cd dist
         docker build -t spectre-meltdown-checker .
-        nb=$(docker run --rm --privileged -v /boot:/boot:ro -v /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu:ro -v /lib/modules:/lib/modules:ro spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
+        json=$(docker run --rm --privileged -v /boot:/boot:ro -v /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu:ro -v /lib/modules:/lib/modules:ro spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json || true)
+        echo "$json" | jq . > /dev/null
+        fmtver=$(echo "$json" | jq '.meta.format_version')
+        if [ "$fmtver" != "1" ]; then
+          echo "Unexpected format_version: $fmtver"
+          exit 1
+        fi
+        nb=$(echo "$json" | jq '.vulnerabilities[].cve' | wc -l)
         if [ "$nb" -ne "$expected" ]; then
           echo "Invalid number of CVEs reported: $nb instead of $expected"
           exit 1
@@ -92,15 +159,19 @@ jobs:
         fi
     - name: create a pull request to ${{ github.ref_name }}-build
       run: |
+        # all the files in dist/* and .github/* must be moved as is to the -build branch root, move them out for now:
         tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
         mv ./dist/* .github $tmpdir/
         rm -rf ./dist
+
         git fetch origin ${{ github.ref_name }}-build
         git checkout -f ${{ github.ref_name }}-build
+        rm -rf doc/
         mv $tmpdir/* .
-        rm -rf src/
+        rm -rf src/ scripts/ img/
         mkdir -p .github
         rsync -vaP --delete $tmpdir/.github/ .github/
+
         git add --all
         echo =#=#= DIFF CACHED
         git diff --cached

.github/workflows/expected_cve_count

@@ -1 +1 @@
-26
+32

.github/workflows/stale.yml

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-name: 'Manage stale issues and PRs'
-
-on:
-  schedule:
-    - cron: '37 7 * * *'
-  workflow_dispatch:
-    inputs:
-      action:
-        description: "dry-run"
-        required: true
-        default: "dryrun"
-        type: choice
-        options:
-          - dryrun
-          - apply
-
-permissions:
-  issues: write
-  pull-requests: write
-
-jobs:
-  stale:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/stale@v10
-        with:
-          any-of-labels: 'needs-more-info,answered'
-          labels-to-remove-when-unstale: 'needs-more-info,answered'
-          days-before-stale: 30
-          days-before-close: 7
-          stale-issue-label: stale
-          remove-stale-when-updated: true
-          debug-only: ${{ case(inputs.action == 'dryrun', true, false) }}

.github/workflows/vuln-watch.yml

@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
-name: Online search for vulns
-
-on:
-  schedule:
-    - cron: '42 8 * * *'
-  workflow_dispatch:
-    inputs:
-      model:
-        description: 'Claude model to use (cron runs default to Sonnet)'
-        required: false
-        type: choice
-        default: claude-sonnet-4-6
-        options:
-          - claude-sonnet-4-6
-          - claude-opus-4-7
-          - claude-haiku-4-5-20251001
-      window_hours:
-        description: 'Lookback window in hours (cron runs use 25)'
-        required: false
-        type: string
-        default: '25'
-      reconsider_age_days:
-        description: 'Only reconsider backlog entries last reviewed ≥ N days ago (0 = all, default 7)'
-        required: false
-        type: string
-        default: '7'
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-  actions: read           # needed to list/download previous run artifacts
-  id-token: write         # needed by claude-code-action for OIDC auth
-
-concurrency:
-  group: vuln-watch
-  cancel-in-progress: true
-
-jobs:
-  watch:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 20
-
-    steps:
-      # The scripts driving this workflow live on the `vuln-watch` branch so
-      # they don't clutter master (which is what ships to production). The
-      # workflow file itself MUST stay on the default branch, as GitHub only
-      # honors `schedule:` triggers on the default branch.
-      - name: Checkout vuln-watch branch (scripts + prompt)
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
-        with:
-          ref: vuln-watch
-          fetch-depth: 1
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Python
-        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
-        with:
-          python-version: '3.12'
-
-      - name: Install Python dependencies
-        run: python -m pip install --quiet feedparser
-
-      # ---- Load previous state ---------------------------------------------
-      # Find the most recent successful run of THIS workflow (other than the
-      # current one) and pull its `vuln-watch-state` artifact. On the very
-      # first run there will be none — that's fine, we start empty.
-      - name: Find previous successful run id
-        id: prev
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-        run: |
-          set -e
-          run_id=$(gh run list \
-            --workflow="${{ github.workflow }}" \
-            --status=success \
-            --limit 1 \
-            --json databaseId \
-            --jq '.[0].databaseId // empty')
-          echo "run_id=${run_id}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          if [ -n "$run_id" ]; then
-            echo "Found previous successful run: $run_id"
-          else
-            echo "No previous successful run — starting from empty state."
-          fi
-
-      - name: Download previous state artifact
-        if: steps.prev.outputs.run_id != ''
-        uses: actions/download-artifact@v5
-        continue-on-error: true   # tolerate retention expiry
-        with:
-          name: vuln-watch-state
-          path: state/
-          run-id: ${{ steps.prev.outputs.run_id }}
-          github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-
-      # ---- Fetch + diff (token-free; runs every time) ---------------------
-      # Performs conditional GETs (ETag / If-Modified-Since) against every
-      # source, parses RSS/Atom/HTML, dedups against state.seen + state.aliases,
-      # applies the time-window filter, and emits new_items.json.
-      # Updates state.sources (HTTP cache metadata + per-source high-water
-      # marks) in place so the cache survives even when Claude doesn't run.
-      - name: Fetch + diff all sources
-        id: diff
-        env:
-          SCAN_DATE: ${{ github.run_started_at }}
-          # Cron runs have no `inputs` context, so the fallback kicks in.
-          WINDOW_HOURS:         ${{ inputs.window_hours || '25' }}
-          RECONSIDER_AGE_DAYS:  ${{ inputs.reconsider_age_days || '7' }}
-        run: python -m scripts.vuln_watch.fetch_and_diff
-
-      # ---- Fetch checker code so Claude can grep it for coverage ---------
-      # The orphan vuln-watch branch has none of the actual checker code,
-      # so we pull the `test` branch (the dev branch where coded-but-
-      # unreleased CVE checks live) into ./checker/. The prompt tells
-      # Claude this is the canonical source of truth for "is CVE-X already
-      # implemented?". Only fetched on days with something to classify.
-      - name: Checkout checker code (test branch) for coverage grep
-        if: steps.diff.outputs.new_count != '0' || steps.diff.outputs.reconsider_count != '0'
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
-        with:
-          ref: test
-          path: checker
-          fetch-depth: 1
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      # ---- Classify new items with Claude (skipped when nothing is new) ---
-      # Model selection: a manual workflow_dispatch run picks from a dropdown
-      # (defaulting to Sonnet). Scheduled cron runs have no `inputs` context,
-      # so the `|| 'claude-sonnet-4-6'` fallback kicks in — cron always uses
-      # Sonnet to keep the daily cost floor low.
-      - name: Run classifier with Claude
-        id: classify
-        if: steps.diff.outputs.new_count != '0' || steps.diff.outputs.reconsider_count != '0'
-        uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
-        env:
-          SCAN_DATE: ${{ github.run_started_at }}
-        with:
-          prompt: |
-            Read the full task instructions from scripts/daily_vuln_watch_prompt.md
-            and execute them end-to-end. Your input is new_items.json (already
-            deduped, windowed, and pre-filtered — do NOT re-fetch sources).
-            Write the three watch_${TODAY}_*.md files and classifications.json.
-            Use $SCAN_DATE as the canonical timestamp.
-          claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
-          # model + tool allowlist pass through claude_args (v1 dropped the
-          # dedicated `model:` and `allowed_tools:` inputs). Job-level
-          # `timeout-minutes: 20` above bounds total runtime.
-          claude_args: |
-            --model ${{ inputs.model || 'claude-sonnet-4-6' }}
-            --allowedTools "Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Grep,Glob,WebFetch"
-
-      - name: Upload Claude execution log
-        if: ${{ always() && steps.classify.outputs.execution_file != '' }}
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5
-        with:
-          name: claude-execution-log-${{ github.run_id }}
-          path: ${{ steps.classify.outputs.execution_file }}
-          retention-days: 30
-          if-no-files-found: warn
-
-      # ---- Merge classifications back into state --------------------------
-      # Also writes stub watch_*.md files if the classify step was skipped, so
-      # the report artifact is consistent across runs.
-      - name: Merge classifications into state
-        if: always()
-        env:
-          SCAN_DATE: ${{ github.run_started_at }}
-        run: python -m scripts.vuln_watch.merge_state
-
-      - name: Upload new state artifact
-        if: always()
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5
-        with:
-          name: vuln-watch-state
-          path: state/seen.json
-          retention-days: 90
-          if-no-files-found: error
-
-      - name: Upload daily report
-        if: always()
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5
-        with:
-          name: vuln-watch-report-${{ github.run_id }}
-          path: |
-            watch_*.md
-            current_toimplement.md
-            current_tocheck.md
-            new_items.json
-            classifications.json
-          retention-days: 90
-          if-no-files-found: warn

README.md

@@ -40,6 +40,14 @@ CVE | Name | Aliases
 [CVE-2024-45332](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-45332) | Branch Privilege Injection | BPI
 [CVE-2025-54505](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-54505) | AMD Zen1 Floating-Point Divider Stale Data Leak | FPDSS
 
+The following entries are ARM64 silicon errata that the kernel actively works around. They have no assigned CVE; they are tracked only by ARM's erratum numbers. Select them with `--errata <number>` or the associated `--variant` mnemonic.
+
+ID | Name | Affected cores
+-- | ---- | --------------
+CVE-0001-0001 | Speculative AT TLB corruption (errata 1165522, 1319367, 1319537, 1530923) | Cortex-A55/A57/A72/A76
+CVE-0001-0002 | Speculative unprivileged load (errata 2966298, 3117295) | Cortex-A510/A520
+CVE-0001-0003 | MSR SSBS not self-synchronizing (erratum 3194386 + siblings) | Cortex-A76/A77/A78/A78C/A710/A715/A720/A720AE/A725, X1/X1C/X2/X3/X4/X925, Neoverse-N1/N2/N3/V1/V2/V3/V3AE
+
 ## Am I at risk?
 
 Depending on your situation, the table below answers whether an attacker in a given position can extract data from a given target.
@@ -272,23 +280,23 @@ In **Hardware-only** mode, the script only reports CPU information and per-CVE h
 
 - Get the latest version of the script using `curl` *or* `wget`
 
-```bash
-curl -L https://meltdown.ovh -o spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
-wget https://meltdown.ovh -O spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
-```
+    ```bash
+    curl -L https://meltdown.ovh -o spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+    wget https://meltdown.ovh -O spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+    ```
 
 - Inspect the script. You never blindly run scripts you downloaded from the Internet, do you?
 
-```bash
-vim spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
-```
+    ```bash
+    vim spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+    ```
 
 - When you're ready, run the script as root
 
-```bash
-chmod +x spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
-sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
-```
+    ```bash
+    chmod +x spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+    sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+    ```
 
 ### Using a docker container
 

doc/UNSUPPORTED_CVE_LIST.md

@@ -307,3 +307,13 @@ A weakness in AMD's microcode signature verification (AES-CMAC hash) allows load
 Exploits a synchronization failure in the AMD stack engine via an undocumented MSR bit, targeting AMD SEV-SNP confidential VMs. Requires hypervisor-level (ring 0) access.
 
 **Why out of scope:** Not a transient/speculative execution side channel. This is an architectural attack on AMD SEV-SNP confidential computing that requires hypervisor access, which is outside the threat model of this tool.
+
+## No CVE — Jump Conditional Code (JCC) Erratum
+
+- **Issue:** [#329](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/329)
+- **Intel whitepaper:** [Mitigations for Jump Conditional Code Erratum](https://www.intel.com/content/dam/support/us/en/documents/processors/mitigations-jump-conditional-code-erratum.pdf)
+- **Affected CPUs:** Intel 6th through 10th generation Core and Xeon processors (Skylake through Cascade Lake)
+
+A microarchitectural correctness erratum where a conditional jump instruction that straddles or ends at a 64-byte instruction fetch boundary can corrupt the branch predictor state, potentially causing incorrect execution. Intel addressed this in a November 2019 microcode update. Compilers and assemblers (GCC, LLVM, binutils) also introduced alignment options (`-mbranch-alignment`, `-x86-branches-within-32B-boundaries`) to pad jump instructions away from boundary conditions, preserving performance on CPUs with updated microcode.
+
+**Why out of scope:** The JCC erratum is a microarchitectural correctness bug, not a transient or speculative execution side-channel vulnerability. No CVE was ever assigned. Red Hat noted that privilege escalation "has not been ruled out" but made no definitive security finding, and no exploit has been demonstrated. There is no Linux sysfs entry, no CPUID bit, and no MSR flag exposing the mitigation status. The microcode fix introduces no detectable hardware indicator, so checking for it would require maintaining a per-CPU-stepping minimum microcode version table (the design principle 3 exception) — costly to maintain without a CVE anchor or confirmed exploitability to justify the ongoing work. The kernel compiler mitigation is a build-time-only change (instruction alignment) with no observable runtime state.

spectre-meltdown-checker.sh

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 #
 # Stephane Lesimple
 #
-VERSION='26.33.0420460'
+VERSION='26.36.0421288'
 
 # --- Common paths and basedirs ---
 readonly VULN_SYSFS_BASE="/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities"
@@ -79,6 +79,9 @@ show_usage() {
 					can be used multiple times (e.g. --variant 3a --variant l1tf). For a list use 'help'.
 		--cve CVE		specify which CVE you'd like to check, by default all supported CVEs are checked
 					can be used multiple times (e.g. --cve CVE-2017-5753 --cve CVE-2020-0543)
+		--errata NUMBER		specify a vendor-numbered erratum (e.g. ARM64 erratum 1530923) that has no CVE
+					assigned. Maps the erratum to the corresponding check. For a list use 'help'.
+					Can be used multiple times (e.g. --errata 1530923 --errata 3194386).
 
 	Check scope:
 		--no-sysfs		don't use the /sys interface even if present [Linux]
@@ -207,47 +210,61 @@ g_smc_system_info_line=''
 g_smc_cpu_info_line=''
 
 # CVE Registry: single source of truth for all CVE metadata.
-# Fields: cve_id|json_key_name|affected_var_suffix|complete_name_and_aliases
+# Fields: cve_id|json_key_name|affected_var_suffix|complete_name_and_aliases|arch
 #
-# Two ranges of placeholder IDs are reserved when no real CVE applies:
+# The optional `arch` field gates whether the check is run at all, based on the
+# host CPU architecture and the inspected kernel architecture. Values:
+#   x86      - only relevant when host CPU or inspected kernel is x86/amd64
+#   arm      - only relevant when host CPU or inspected kernel is ARM/ARM64
+#   (empty)  - always relevant (shared logic across architectures, e.g. Spectre V1-V4)
+# The gate only applies to default "all CVEs" runs; explicit --cve/--variant/--errata
+# selection bypasses it (if the user asks for it, they get it regardless of arch).
+#
+# Three ranges of placeholder IDs are reserved when no real CVE applies:
 #   CVE-0000-NNNN: permanent placeholder for supplementary checks (--extra only)
 #                  that will never receive a real CVE (e.g. SLS, compile-time hardening).
+#   CVE-0001-NNNN: permanent placeholder for vendor-numbered errata that will never
+#                  receive a CVE (e.g. ARM64 silicon errata tracked only by erratum ID).
+#                  Selectable via --errata <number>.
 #   CVE-9999-NNNN: temporary placeholder for real vulnerabilities awaiting CVE
 #                  assignment. Rename across the codebase once the real CVE is issued.
 readonly CVE_REGISTRY='
-CVE-2017-5753|SPECTRE VARIANT 1|variant1|Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass
-CVE-2017-5715|SPECTRE VARIANT 2|variant2|Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection
-CVE-2017-5754|MELTDOWN|variant3|Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load
-CVE-2018-3640|VARIANT 3A|variant3a|Variant 3a, rogue system register read
-CVE-2018-3639|VARIANT 4|variant4|Variant 4, speculative store bypass
-CVE-2018-3615|L1TF SGX|variantl1tf_sgx|Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault
-CVE-2018-3620|L1TF OS|variantl1tf|Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault
-CVE-2018-3646|L1TF VMM|variantl1tf|Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault
-CVE-2018-12126|MSBDS|msbds|Fallout, microarchitectural store buffer data sampling (MSBDS)
-CVE-2018-12130|MFBDS|mfbds|ZombieLoad, microarchitectural fill buffer data sampling (MFBDS)
-CVE-2018-12127|MLPDS|mlpds|RIDL, microarchitectural load port data sampling (MLPDS)
-CVE-2019-11091|MDSUM|mdsum|RIDL, microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable memory (MDSUM)
-CVE-2019-11135|TAA|taa|ZombieLoad V2, TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA)
-CVE-2018-12207|ITLBMH|itlbmh|No eXcuses, iTLB Multihit, machine check exception on page size changes (MCEPSC)
-CVE-2020-0543|SRBDS|srbds|Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)
-CVE-2022-21123|SBDR|mmio|Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR), MMIO Stale Data
-CVE-2022-21125|SBDS|mmio|Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), MMIO Stale Data
-CVE-2022-21166|DRPW|mmio|Device Register Partial Write (DRPW), MMIO Stale Data
-CVE-2023-20588|DIV0|div0|Division by Zero, AMD Zen1 speculative data leak
-CVE-2023-20593|ZENBLEED|zenbleed|Zenbleed, cross-process information leak
-CVE-2022-40982|DOWNFALL|downfall|Downfall, gather data sampling (GDS)
-CVE-2022-29900|RETBLEED AMD|retbleed|Retbleed, arbitrary speculative code execution with return instructions (AMD)
-CVE-2022-29901|RETBLEED INTEL|retbleed|Retbleed, arbitrary speculative code execution with return instructions (Intel)
-CVE-2023-20569|INCEPTION|inception|Inception, return address security (RAS)
-CVE-2023-23583|REPTAR|reptar|Reptar, redundant prefix issue
-CVE-2024-36350|TSA_SQ|tsa|Transient Scheduler Attack - Store Queue (TSA-SQ)
-CVE-2024-36357|TSA_L1|tsa|Transient Scheduler Attack - L1 (TSA-L1)
-CVE-2024-28956|ITS|its|Indirect Target Selection (ITS)
-CVE-2025-40300|VMSCAPE|vmscape|VMScape, VM-exit stale branch prediction
-CVE-2023-28746|RFDS|rfds|Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)
-CVE-2024-45332|BPI|bpi|Branch Privilege Injection (BPI)
-CVE-0000-0001|SLS|sls|Straight-Line Speculation (SLS)
-CVE-2025-54505|FPDSS|fpdss|FPDSS, AMD Zen1 Floating-Point Divider Stale Data Leak
+CVE-2017-5753|SPECTRE VARIANT 1|variant1|Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass|
+CVE-2017-5715|SPECTRE VARIANT 2|variant2|Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection|
+CVE-2017-5754|MELTDOWN|variant3|Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load|
+CVE-2018-3640|VARIANT 3A|variant3a|Variant 3a, rogue system register read|
+CVE-2018-3639|VARIANT 4|variant4|Variant 4, speculative store bypass|
+CVE-2018-3615|L1TF SGX|variantl1tf_sgx|Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault|x86
+CVE-2018-3620|L1TF OS|variantl1tf|Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault|x86
+CVE-2018-3646|L1TF VMM|variantl1tf|Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault|x86
+CVE-2018-12126|MSBDS|msbds|Fallout, microarchitectural store buffer data sampling (MSBDS)|x86
+CVE-2018-12130|MFBDS|mfbds|ZombieLoad, microarchitectural fill buffer data sampling (MFBDS)|x86
+CVE-2018-12127|MLPDS|mlpds|RIDL, microarchitectural load port data sampling (MLPDS)|x86
+CVE-2019-11091|MDSUM|mdsum|RIDL, microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable memory (MDSUM)|x86
+CVE-2019-11135|TAA|taa|ZombieLoad V2, TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA)|x86
+CVE-2018-12207|ITLBMH|itlbmh|No eXcuses, iTLB Multihit, machine check exception on page size changes (MCEPSC)|x86
+CVE-2020-0543|SRBDS|srbds|Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)|x86
+CVE-2022-21123|SBDR|mmio|Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR), MMIO Stale Data|x86
+CVE-2022-21125|SBDS|mmio|Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), MMIO Stale Data|x86
+CVE-2022-21166|DRPW|mmio|Device Register Partial Write (DRPW), MMIO Stale Data|x86
+CVE-2023-20588|DIV0|div0|Division by Zero, AMD Zen1 speculative data leak|x86
+CVE-2023-20593|ZENBLEED|zenbleed|Zenbleed, cross-process information leak|x86
+CVE-2022-40982|DOWNFALL|downfall|Downfall, gather data sampling (GDS)|x86
+CVE-2022-29900|RETBLEED AMD|retbleed|Retbleed, arbitrary speculative code execution with return instructions (AMD)|x86
+CVE-2022-29901|RETBLEED INTEL|retbleed|Retbleed, arbitrary speculative code execution with return instructions (Intel)|x86
+CVE-2023-20569|INCEPTION|inception|Inception, return address security (RAS)|x86
+CVE-2023-23583|REPTAR|reptar|Reptar, redundant prefix issue|x86
+CVE-2024-36350|TSA_SQ|tsa|Transient Scheduler Attack - Store Queue (TSA-SQ)|x86
+CVE-2024-36357|TSA_L1|tsa|Transient Scheduler Attack - L1 (TSA-L1)|x86
+CVE-2024-28956|ITS|its|Indirect Target Selection (ITS)|x86
+CVE-2025-40300|VMSCAPE|vmscape|VMScape, VM-exit stale branch prediction|x86
+CVE-2023-28746|RFDS|rfds|Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)|x86
+CVE-2024-45332|BPI|bpi|Branch Privilege Injection (BPI)|x86
+CVE-0000-0001|SLS|sls|Straight-Line Speculation (SLS)|
+CVE-2025-54505|FPDSS|fpdss|FPDSS, AMD Zen1 Floating-Point Divider Stale Data Leak|x86
+CVE-0001-0001|ARM SPEC AT|arm_spec_at|ARM64 errata 1165522/1319367/1319537/1530923, Speculative AT TLB corruption|arm
+CVE-0001-0002|ARM SPEC UNPRIV LOAD|arm_spec_unpriv_load|ARM64 errata 2966298/3117295, Speculative unprivileged load|arm
+CVE-0001-0003|ARM SSBS NOSYNC|arm_ssbs_nosync|ARM64 erratum 3194386, MSR SSBS not self-synchronizing|arm
 '
 
 # Derive the supported CVE list from the registry
@@ -666,6 +683,36 @@ _infer_immune() { eval "[ -z \"\$affected_$1\" ] && affected_$1=1 || :"; }
 # Use for: family-level catch-all fallbacks (Intel L1TF non-whitelist, itlbmh non-whitelist).
 _infer_vuln() { eval "[ -z \"\$affected_$1\" ] && affected_$1=0 || :"; }
 
+# Return 0 (true) if a CVE's arch tag matches the current context (host CPU
+# and/or target kernel), so the check is worth running. Untagged CVEs are
+# always relevant.
+# - In no-hw mode the host CPU is ignored: gate only on target kernel arch.
+# - Otherwise a match on either the host CPU or the target kernel is enough
+#   (they normally agree in live mode; if they disagree, check_kernel_cpu_arch_mismatch
+#    has already forced no-hw, handled by the branch above).
+# Args: $1=cve_id
+# Callers: src/main.sh (CVE dispatch loop), check_cpu_vulnerabilities
+_is_cve_relevant_arch() {
+    local arch
+    arch=$(_cve_registry_field "$1" 5)
+    # Untagged CVE: always relevant
+    [ -z "$arch" ] && return 0
+    case "$arch" in
+        x86)
+            [ "$g_mode" != no-hw ] && is_x86_cpu && return 0
+            is_x86_kernel && return 0
+            return 1
+            ;;
+        arm)
+            [ "$g_mode" != no-hw ] && is_arm_cpu && return 0
+            is_arm_kernel && return 0
+            return 1
+            ;;
+    esac
+    # Unknown tag value: don't gate (fail open)
+    return 0
+}
+
 # Return the cached affected_* status for a given CVE
 # Args: $1=cve_id
 # Returns: 0 if affected, 1 if not affected
@@ -745,6 +792,10 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
     affected_srbds=''
     affected_mmio=''
     affected_sls=''
+    # ARM64 speculation-related errata (ARM Ltd, implementer 0x41); non-ARM systems are immune below.
+    affected_arm_spec_at=''
+    affected_arm_spec_unpriv_load=''
+    affected_arm_ssbs_nosync=''
     # DIV0, FPDSS, Zenbleed and Inception are all AMD specific, look for "is_amd" below:
     _set_immune div0
     _set_immune fpdss
@@ -1466,6 +1517,77 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
         _infer_immune sls
     fi
 
+    # ARM64 silicon errata (speculation/security-relevant, no CVE assignments).
+    # References: arch/arm64/Kconfig (ARM64_ERRATUM_*), arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c MIDR lists.
+    # Iterates per-core (impl, part, variant, revision) tuples. Implementers currently handled:
+    #   0x41 ARM Ltd; 0x51 Qualcomm (Kryo4xx Silver for erratum 1530923).
+    # Revision ranges mirror the kernel's MIDR_RANGE/MIDR_REV_RANGE/MIDR_REV macros. A variant
+    # 'v' and revision 'p' are packed as (v<<4)|p for range compares — equivalent to the kernel's
+    # layout (MIDR_VARIANT_SHIFT=20, MIDR_REVISION_MASK=0xf) under the same order semantics.
+    # Unknown variant/revision ⇒ treat as in range (whitelist principle, DEVELOPMENT.md rule 5).
+    if [ -n "$cpu_part_list" ]; then
+        i=0
+        for cpupart in $cpu_part_list; do
+            i=$((i + 1))
+            # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+            cpuimpl=$(echo $cpu_impl_list | awk '{print $'$i'}')
+            # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+            cpuvar=$(echo $cpu_variant_list | awk '{print $'$i'}')
+            # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+            cpurev=$(echo $cpu_revision_list | awk '{print $'$i'}')
+            packed=''
+            [ -n "$cpuvar" ] && [ -n "$cpurev" ] && packed=$(((cpuvar << 4) | cpurev))
+
+            # Speculative AT TLB corruption (errata 1165522, 1319367, 1319537, 1530923)
+            if [ "$cpuimpl" = 0x41 ]; then
+                if echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xd07 -e 0xd08; then
+                    # Cortex-A57 (0xd07) / A72 (0xd08): all revisions
+                    _set_vuln arm_spec_at
+                elif echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xd05 -e 0xd0b; then
+                    # Cortex-A55 (0xd05) / A76 (0xd0b): r0p0..r2p0  (packed 0..32)
+                    if [ -z "$packed" ] || [ "$packed" -le 32 ]; then
+                        _set_vuln arm_spec_at
+                    fi
+                fi
+            elif [ "$cpuimpl" = 0x51 ] && [ "$cpupart" = 0x805 ]; then
+                # Qualcomm Kryo4xx Silver: kernel matches MIDR_REV(var 0xd, rev 0xe) only — packed 0xde = 222
+                if [ -z "$packed" ] || [ "$packed" = 222 ]; then
+                    _set_vuln arm_spec_at
+                fi
+            fi
+
+            # Speculative unprivileged load (errata 2966298 A520, 3117295 A510) — ARM Ltd only
+            if [ "$cpuimpl" = 0x41 ]; then
+                if [ "$cpupart" = 0xd46 ]; then
+                    # Cortex-A510: all revisions
+                    _set_vuln arm_spec_unpriv_load
+                elif [ "$cpupart" = 0xd80 ]; then
+                    # Cortex-A520: r0p0..r0p1  (packed 0..1)
+                    if [ -z "$packed" ] || [ "$packed" -le 1 ]; then
+                        _set_vuln arm_spec_unpriv_load
+                    fi
+                fi
+            fi
+
+            # MSR SSBS not self-synchronizing (erratum 3194386 + siblings) — ARM Ltd only, all revisions.
+            # A76/A77/A78/A78C/A710/A715/A720/A720AE/A725, X1/X1C/X2/X3/X4/X925, N1/N2/N3, V1/V2/V3/V3AE
+            if [ "$cpuimpl" = 0x41 ]; then
+                if echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w \
+                    -e 0xd0b -e 0xd0d -e 0xd41 -e 0xd4b \
+                    -e 0xd47 -e 0xd4d -e 0xd81 -e 0xd89 -e 0xd87 \
+                    -e 0xd44 -e 0xd4c -e 0xd48 -e 0xd4e -e 0xd82 -e 0xd85 \
+                    -e 0xd0c -e 0xd49 -e 0xd8e \
+                    -e 0xd40 -e 0xd4f -e 0xd84 -e 0xd83; then
+                    _set_vuln arm_ssbs_nosync
+                fi
+            fi
+        done
+    fi
+    # Default everything else to immune (covers non-ARM, and ARM cores not in the affected lists)
+    _infer_immune arm_spec_at
+    _infer_immune arm_spec_unpriv_load
+    _infer_immune arm_ssbs_nosync
+
     # shellcheck disable=SC2154
     {
         pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: variant1=$affected_variant1 variant2=$affected_variant2 variant3=$affected_variant3 variant3a=$affected_variant3a"
@@ -1473,6 +1595,7 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
         pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: mlpds=$affected_mlpds mdsum=$affected_mdsum taa=$affected_taa itlbmh=$affected_itlbmh srbds=$affected_srbds"
         pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: div0=$affected_div0 fpdss=$affected_fpdss zenbleed=$affected_zenbleed inception=$affected_inception retbleed=$affected_retbleed tsa=$affected_tsa downfall=$affected_downfall reptar=$affected_reptar rfds=$affected_rfds its=$affected_its"
         pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: vmscape=$affected_vmscape bpi=$affected_bpi sls=$affected_sls mmio=$affected_mmio"
+        pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: arm_spec_at=$affected_arm_spec_at arm_spec_unpriv_load=$affected_arm_spec_unpriv_load arm_ssbs_nosync=$affected_arm_ssbs_nosync"
     }
     affected_variantl1tf_sgx="$affected_variantl1tf"
     # even if we are affected to L1TF, if there's no SGX, we're not affected to the original foreshadow
@@ -1674,58 +1797,76 @@ is_cpu_srbds_free() {
 
 }
 
+# Check whether the CPU is architecturally immune to MMIO Stale Data
+# Mirrors the kernel's arch_cap_mmio_immune() helper: ALL THREE ARCH_CAP bits must be set:
+#   ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO (bit 13), ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO (bit 14), ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO (bit 15)
+# Returns: 0 if immune, 1 otherwise
+is_arch_cap_mmio_immune() {
+    [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_fbsdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_psdp_no" = 1 ]
+}
+
 # Check whether the CPU is known to be unaffected by MMIO Stale Data (CVE-2022-21123/21125/21166)
+# Matches the kernel's NO_MMIO whitelist plus arch_cap_mmio_immune().
+# Model inventory and kernel-commit history are documented in check_mmio_linux().
 # Returns: 0 if MMIO-free, 1 if affected or unknown
 is_cpu_mmio_free() {
-    # source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
-    #
-    # CPU affection logic from kernel (51802186158c, v5.19):
-    #   Bug is set when: cpu_matches(blacklist, MMIO) AND NOT arch_cap_mmio_immune()
-    #   arch_cap_mmio_immune() requires ALL THREE bits set:
-    #     ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO (bit 14) AND ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO (bit 15) AND ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO (bit 13)
-    #
-    # Intel Family 6 model blacklist (unchanged since v5.19):
-    #   HASWELL_X (0x3F)
-    #   BROADWELL_D (0x56), BROADWELL_X (0x4F)
-    #   SKYLAKE_X (0x55), SKYLAKE_L (0x4E), SKYLAKE (0x5E)
-    #   KABYLAKE_L (0x8E), KABYLAKE (0x9E)
-    #   ICELAKE_L (0x7E), ICELAKE_D (0x6C), ICELAKE_X (0x6A)
-    #   COMETLAKE (0xA5), COMETLAKE_L (0xA6)
-    #   LAKEFIELD (0x8A)
-    #   ROCKETLAKE (0xA7)
-    #   ATOM_TREMONT (0x96), ATOM_TREMONT_D (0x86), ATOM_TREMONT_L (0x9C)
-    #
-    # Vendor scope: Intel only. Non-Intel CPUs are not affected.
     parse_cpu_details
-    # ARCH_CAP immunity: all three bits must be set
-    if [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_fbsdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_psdp_no" = 1 ]; then
+    is_arch_cap_mmio_immune && return 0
+    # Non-Intel x86 vendors the kernel unconditionally whitelists (AMD/Hygon all
+    # families; Centaur/Zhaoxin fam 7 only).
+    if is_amd || is_hygon; then
         return 0
     fi
-    if is_intel; then
-        if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
-            if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_L" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_D" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_X" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_LAKEFIELD" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ROCKETLAKE" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_D" ] ||
-                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_L" ]; then
-                return 1
-            fi
+    if { [ "$cpu_vendor" = "CentaurHauls" ] || [ "$cpu_vendor" = "Shanghai" ]; } && [ "$cpu_family" = 7 ]; then
+        return 0
+    fi
+    # Intel NO_MMIO whitelist
+    if is_intel && [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
+        if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE_L" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE_L" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS" ]; then
+            return 0
         fi
     fi
+    return 1
+}
 
+# Check whether the CPU's MMIO Stale Data status is unknown ("out of servicing period")
+# Matches the kernel's X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN: Intel CPU not MMIO-free and not in the
+# MMIO blacklist. The kernel reports "Unknown: No mitigations" for such CPUs.
+# Callers: check_mmio_linux, check_mmio_bsd
+# Returns: 0 if unknown, 1 if known (either affected or not affected)
+is_cpu_mmio_unknown() {
+    parse_cpu_details
+    # Only Intel can reach the unknown bucket — other x86 vendors are whitelisted by vendor-id.
+    is_intel || return 1
+    is_cpu_mmio_free && return 1
+    if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
+        if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_L" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_D" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_X" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_LAKEFIELD" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ROCKETLAKE" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_D" ] ||
+            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_L" ]; then
+            return 1
+        fi
+    fi
     return 0
 }
 
@@ -2167,7 +2308,7 @@ while [ -n "${1:-}" ]; do
         case "$2" in
             help)
                 echo "The following parameters are supported for --variant (can be used multiple times):"
-                echo "1, 2, 3, 3a, 4, msbds, mfbds, mlpds, mdsum, l1tf, taa, mcepsc, srbds, mmio, sbdr, sbds, drpw, div0, fpdss, zenbleed, downfall, retbleed, inception, reptar, rfds, tsa, tsa-sq, tsa-l1, its, vmscape, bpi, sls"
+                echo "1, 2, 3, 3a, 4, msbds, mfbds, mlpds, mdsum, l1tf, taa, mcepsc, srbds, mmio, sbdr, sbds, drpw, div0, fpdss, zenbleed, downfall, retbleed, inception, reptar, rfds, tsa, tsa-sq, tsa-l1, its, vmscape, bpi, sls, arm-spec-at, arm-spec-unpriv-load, arm-ssbs-nosync"
                 exit 0
                 ;;
             1)
@@ -2298,12 +2439,60 @@ while [ -n "${1:-}" ]; do
                 opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-0000-0001"
                 opt_cve_all=0
                 ;;
+            arm-spec-at)
+                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-0001-0001"
+                opt_cve_all=0
+                ;;
+            arm-spec-unpriv-load)
+                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-0001-0002"
+                opt_cve_all=0
+                ;;
+            arm-ssbs-nosync)
+                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-0001-0003"
+                opt_cve_all=0
+                ;;
             *)
                 echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, see --variant help for a list" >&2
                 exit 255
                 ;;
         esac
         shift 2
+    elif [ "$1" = "--errata" ]; then
+        # Vendor-numbered errata selector (currently ARM64). Maps an erratum number
+        # (e.g. 1530923) to the CVE-0001-NNNN check that covers it.
+        if [ -z "$2" ]; then
+            echo "$0: error: option --errata expects a parameter (an erratum number, e.g. 1530923, or 'help')" >&2
+            exit 255
+        fi
+        case "$2" in
+            help)
+                echo "The following erratum numbers are supported for --errata (can be used multiple times):"
+                echo "  Speculative AT TLB corruption:       1165522, 1319367, 1319537, 1530923"
+                echo "  Speculative unprivileged load:       2966298, 3117295"
+                echo "  MSR SSBS not self-synchronizing:     3194386 (and siblings: 3312417, 3324334, 3324335,"
+                echo "                                       3324336, 3324338, 3324339, 3324341, 3324344, 3324346,"
+                echo "                                       3324347, 3324348, 3324349, 3456084, 3456091, 3456106,"
+                echo "                                       3456111)"
+                exit 0
+                ;;
+            1165522 | 1319367 | 1319537 | 1530923)
+                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-0001-0001"
+                opt_cve_all=0
+                ;;
+            2966298 | 3117295)
+                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-0001-0002"
+                opt_cve_all=0
+                ;;
+            3194386 | 3312417 | 3324334 | 3324335 | 3324336 | 3324338 | 3324339 | 3324341 | 3324344 | 3324346 | 3324347 | 3324348 | 3324349 | 3456084 | 3456091 | 3456106 | 3456111)
+                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-0001-0003"
+                opt_cve_all=0
+                ;;
+            *)
+                echo "$0: error: unsupported erratum number '$2' for --errata, see --errata help for a list" >&2
+                exit 255
+                ;;
+        esac
+        shift 2
     elif [ "$1" = "-h" ] || [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then
         show_header
         show_usage
@@ -3738,13 +3927,22 @@ parse_cpu_details() {
         if grep -qw avx512 "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" 2>/dev/null; then cap_avx512=1; fi
         cpu_vendor=$(grep '^vendor_id' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | awk '{print $3}' | head -n1)
         cpu_friendly_name=$(grep '^model name' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | cut -d: -f2- | head -n1 | sed -e 's/^ *//')
-        # special case for ARM follows
-        if grep -qi 'CPU implementer[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*0x41' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo"; then
-            cpu_vendor='ARM'
-            # some devices (phones or other) have several ARMs and as such different part numbers,
-            # an example is "bigLITTLE", so we need to store the whole list, this is needed for is_cpu_affected
+        # ARM-style cpuinfo: parse per-core implementer/part/arch/variant/revision lists
+        # (big.LITTLE / heterogeneous systems have different values per core).
+        # cpu_variant_list and cpu_revision_list are consumed by ARM64 errata affection checks
+        # that need to match a specific revision range.
+        if grep -q 'CPU implementer' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo"; then
+            cpu_impl_list=$(awk '/CPU implementer/ {print $4}' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo")
             cpu_part_list=$(awk '/CPU part/         {print $4}' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo")
             cpu_arch_list=$(awk '/CPU architecture/ {print $3}' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo")
+            cpu_variant_list=$(awk '/CPU variant/   {print $4}' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo")
+            cpu_revision_list=$(awk '/CPU revision/ {print $4}' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo")
+        fi
+        # Map first-seen implementer to cpu_vendor; note that heterogeneous systems
+        # (e.g. DynamIQ with ARM+Kryo cores) would all map to one vendor here, but
+        # per-core vendor decisions are made via cpu_impl_list where needed.
+        if grep -qi 'CPU implementer[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*0x41' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo"; then
+            cpu_vendor='ARM'
             # take the first one to fill the friendly name, do NOT quote the vars below
             # shellcheck disable=SC2086
             arch=$(echo $cpu_arch_list | awk '{ print $1 }')
@@ -5540,7 +5738,7 @@ check_cpu() {
         pr_info_nol "  * CPU explicitly indicates not being affected by MMIO Stale Data (FBSDP_NO & PSDP_NO & SBDR_SSDP_NO): "
         if [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = -1 ]; then
             pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read MSR"
-        elif [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_fbsdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_psdp_no" = 1 ]; then
+        elif is_arch_cap_mmio_immune; then
             pstatus green YES
         else
             pstatus yellow NO
@@ -5814,11 +6012,19 @@ check_cpu() {
     fi
 }
 
-# Display per-CVE CPU vulnerability status based on CPU model/family
+# Display per-CVE CPU vulnerability status based on CPU model/family.
+# Mirrors the main dispatch gate: under a default "all CVEs" run, skip CVEs
+# whose arch tag doesn't match this system. Explicit selection via
+# --cve/--variant/--errata bypasses the gate.
 check_cpu_vulnerabilities() {
     local cve
     pr_info "* CPU vulnerability to the speculative execution attack variants"
     for cve in $g_supported_cve_list; do
+        if [ "$opt_cve_all" = 1 ]; then
+            _is_cve_relevant_arch "$cve" || continue
+        elif ! echo "$opt_cve_list" | grep -qw "$cve"; then
+            continue
+        fi
         pr_info_nol "  * Affected by $cve ($(cve2name "$cve")): "
         if is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
             pstatus yellow YES
@@ -6230,16 +6436,30 @@ check_mds_linux() {
 # vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
 # MMIO Stale Data (Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities) - BSD mitigation check
 check_mmio_bsd() {
+    # No BSD (FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, DragonFlyBSD) has implemented an OS-level
+    # MMIO Stale Data mitigation. All four stopped at MDS/TAA. Microcode update is
+    # the only partial defense available, and without OS-level VERW invocation it
+    # cannot close the vulnerability.
+    local unk
+    unk="your CPU's MMIO Stale Data status is unknown (Intel never officially assessed this CPU, its servicing period has ended)"
     if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
         pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
+    elif is_cpu_mmio_unknown; then
+        if [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ]; then
+            pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "$unk, and no BSD mitigation exists"
+            explain "There is no known mitigation for this CPU model. Even with up-to-date microcode, BSD kernels do not invoke VERW for MMIO Stale Data clearing. Only a hardware replacement can fully address this."
+        else
+            pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "$unk; no BSD mitigation exists in any case"
+        fi
     else
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "your CPU is affected, but mitigation detection has not yet been implemented for BSD in this script"
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "your CPU is affected and no BSD has implemented an MMIO Stale Data mitigation"
+        explain "No BSD kernel currently implements an MMIO Stale Data mitigation (which would require invoking VERW at context switches and VM-entries). Updating CPU microcode alone does not mitigate this vulnerability without OS cooperation."
     fi
 }
 
 # MMIO Stale Data (Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities) - Linux mitigation check
 check_mmio_linux() {
-    local status sys_interface_available msg kernel_mmio kernel_mmio_can_tell mmio_mitigated mmio_smt_mitigated mystatus mymsg
+    local status sys_interface_available msg kernel_mmio kernel_mmio_can_tell mmio_mitigated mmio_smt_mitigated mystatus mymsg unk
     status=UNK
     sys_interface_available=0
     msg=''
@@ -6341,9 +6561,33 @@ check_mmio_linux() {
         #
         # No models have been added to or removed from the MMIO blacklist since v5.19.
         #
+        # 7df548840c49 (v6.0, NO_MMIO whitelist added, Pawan Gupta 2022-08-03):
+        #   Intel Family 6:
+        #     TIGERLAKE (0x8D), TIGERLAKE_L (0x8C)
+        #     ALDERLAKE (0x97), ALDERLAKE_L (0x9A)
+        #     ATOM_GOLDMONT (0x5C), ATOM_GOLDMONT_D (0x5F), ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS (0x7A)
+        #   AMD: fam 0x0f-0x12 + X86_FAMILY_ANY (all families)
+        #   Hygon: all families
+        #   Centaur fam 7, Zhaoxin fam 7
+        #
+        # Kernel logic (v6.0+):
+        #   if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) {
+        #       if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO))
+        #           setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+        #       else if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MMIO))
+        #           setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
+        #   }
+        #   => Intel CPUs that are neither blacklisted nor whitelisted (e.g. Ivy Bridge,
+        #      Haswell client, Broadwell client, Sandy Bridge, pre-Goldmont Atom, etc.) get
+        #      X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN and report "Unknown: No mitigations" in sysfs. Intel
+        #      never published an affected-processor evaluation for these models because
+        #      their servicing period had already ended.
+        #   => is_cpu_mmio_unknown() matches this set so the script can report UNK (or
+        #      VULN under --paranoid) rather than the misleading "not affected" that
+        #      a plain blacklist check would produce.
+        #
         # immunity: ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO (bit 13) AND ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO (bit 14) AND ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO (bit 15)
         #   All three must be set. Checked via arch_cap_mmio_immune() in common.c.
-        #   Bug is set only when: cpu_matches(blacklist, MMIO) AND NOT arch_cap_mmio_immune().
         #
         # microcode mitigation: ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR (bit 17) -- VERW clears fill buffers.
         #   Alternative: MD_CLEAR CPUID + FLUSH_L1D CPUID when MDS_NO is not set (legacy path).
@@ -6422,6 +6666,17 @@ check_mmio_linux() {
     if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
         # override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
         pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
+    elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ] && is_cpu_mmio_unknown; then
+        # Bypass the normal sysfs reconciliation: sysfs reports "Unknown: No mitigations"
+        # only on v6.0-v6.15. On earlier and on v6.16+ kernels it wrongly says "Not affected"
+        # for these CPUs (which predate FB_CLEAR microcode and Intel's affected-processor list).
+        unk="your CPU's MMIO Stale Data status is unknown (Intel never officially assessed this CPU, its servicing period has ended)"
+        if [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ]; then
+            pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "$unk, and no mitigation is available"
+            explain "There is no known mitigation for this CPU model. Intel ended its servicing period without evaluating whether it is affected by MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities, so no FB_CLEAR-capable microcode was released. Consider replacing affected hardware."
+        else
+            pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "$unk; no mitigation is available in any case"
+        fi
     else
         if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
             # compute mystatus and mymsg from our own logic
@@ -6791,6 +7046,238 @@ check_CVE_0000_0001() {
     check_cve 'CVE-0000-0001'
 }
 
+# >>>>>> vulns/CVE-0001-0001.sh <<<<<<
+
+# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
+###############################
+# CVE-0001-0001, ARM SPEC AT, ARM64 errata 1165522/1319367/1319537/1530923, Speculative AT TLB corruption
+
+check_CVE_0001_0001() {
+    check_cve 'CVE-0001-0001'
+}
+
+# On affected cores, a speculative address translation (AT) instruction issued from the hypervisor
+# using an out-of-context translation regime may poison the TLB, causing a subsequent guest-context
+# request to see an incorrect translation. Relevant mainly to KVM hosts. Kernel workaround:
+# invalidate TLB state across world-switch for affected cores (ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT).
+#   * Cortex-A76 r0p0..r2p0   erratum 1165522   CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1165522
+#   * Cortex-A72 all revs     erratum 1319367   CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1319367
+#   * Cortex-A57 all revs     erratum 1319537   CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1319367 (same kconfig)
+#   * Cortex-A55 r0p0..r2p0   erratum 1530923   CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1530923
+# References:
+#   arch/arm64/Kconfig (ARM64_ERRATUM_{1165522,1319367,1530923})
+#   arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c (erratum_speculative_at_list, "ARM errata 1165522, 1319367, or 1530923")
+#   Cortex-A55 SDEN: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-1301074/latest
+check_CVE_0001_0001_linux() {
+    local cve kernel_mitigated config_found
+    cve='CVE-0001-0001'
+    kernel_mitigated=''
+    config_found=''
+
+    if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ] && is_arm_kernel; then
+        # kconfig: any of the three erratum config options implies the workaround is compiled in
+        if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
+            for erratum in 1165522 1319367 1530923; do
+                if grep -q "^CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_$erratum=y" "$opt_config"; then
+                    config_found="${config_found:+$config_found, }$erratum"
+                fi
+            done
+            [ -n "$config_found" ] && kernel_mitigated="found CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_$config_found=y in kernel config"
+        fi
+        # kernel image: look for the descriptor string the kernel prints at boot
+        if [ -z "$kernel_mitigated" ] && [ -n "$g_kernel" ]; then
+            if "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$g_kernel" 2>/dev/null | grep -qE 'ARM errata 1165522, 1319367'; then
+                kernel_mitigated="found erratum descriptor string in kernel image"
+            fi
+        fi
+        # live mode: dmesg prints the workaround once at boot
+        if [ -z "$kernel_mitigated" ] && [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+            if dmesg 2>/dev/null | grep -qE 'ARM errata 1165522, 1319367'; then
+                kernel_mitigated="erratum workaround reported as applied in dmesg"
+            fi
+        fi
+
+        pr_info_nol "* Kernel has the ARM64 Speculative-AT workaround compiled in: "
+        if [ -n "$kernel_mitigated" ]; then
+            pstatus green YES "$kernel_mitigated"
+        else
+            pstatus yellow NO
+        fi
+    fi
+
+    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU is not affected by this erratum family"
+    elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "no sysfs interface exists for this erratum, own checks have been skipped (--sysfs-only)"
+    elif [ -n "$kernel_mitigated" ]; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your kernel includes the erratum workaround"
+    else
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "your CPU is affected by this erratum family and the kernel does not appear to include the workaround"
+        explain "Run a kernel built with CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1165522=y, CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1319367=y, and/or CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1530923=y (matching your CPU core). These options are 'default y' in mainline and enabled by most distro kernels. Refer to the ARM Software Developers Errata Notice for your core for full details."
+    fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_0001_0001_bsd() {
+    local cve
+    cve='CVE-0001-0001'
+    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU is not affected by this erratum family"
+    else
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "your CPU is affected, but mitigation detection has not yet been implemented for BSD in this script"
+    fi
+}
+
+# >>>>>> vulns/CVE-0001-0002.sh <<<<<<
+
+# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
+###############################
+# CVE-0001-0002, ARM SPEC UNPRIV LOAD, ARM64 errata 2966298/3117295, Speculative unprivileged load
+
+check_CVE_0001_0002() {
+    check_cve 'CVE-0001-0002'
+}
+
+# On affected cores, a speculatively-executed unprivileged load from a page that is mapped as
+# privileged can leak the loaded value into the cache hierarchy, allowing a Spectre-style
+# cache side-channel to expose privileged kernel data to userspace. Kernel workaround:
+# sandwich kernel-exit sequences with an additional speculation barrier/DSB so that
+# speculative unprivileged loads cannot observe privileged state
+# (ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD).
+#   * Cortex-A510 all revs    erratum 3117295   CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3117295
+#   * Cortex-A520 r0p0..r0p1  erratum 2966298   CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_2966298
+# References:
+#   arch/arm64/Kconfig (ARM64_ERRATUM_{2966298,3117295})
+#   arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c (erratum_spec_unpriv_load_list, "ARM errata 2966298, 3117295")
+#   Cortex-A510 SDEN: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-2397239/latest
+check_CVE_0001_0002_linux() {
+    local cve kernel_mitigated config_found erratum
+    cve='CVE-0001-0002'
+    kernel_mitigated=''
+    config_found=''
+
+    if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ] && is_arm_kernel; then
+        if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
+            for erratum in 2966298 3117295; do
+                if grep -q "^CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_$erratum=y" "$opt_config"; then
+                    config_found="${config_found:+$config_found, }$erratum"
+                fi
+            done
+            [ -n "$config_found" ] && kernel_mitigated="found CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_$config_found=y in kernel config"
+        fi
+        if [ -z "$kernel_mitigated" ] && [ -n "$g_kernel" ]; then
+            if "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$g_kernel" 2>/dev/null | grep -qE 'ARM errata 2966298, 3117295'; then
+                kernel_mitigated="found erratum descriptor string in kernel image"
+            fi
+        fi
+        if [ -z "$kernel_mitigated" ] && [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+            if dmesg 2>/dev/null | grep -qE 'ARM errata 2966298, 3117295'; then
+                kernel_mitigated="erratum workaround reported as applied in dmesg"
+            fi
+        fi
+
+        pr_info_nol "* Kernel has the ARM64 Speculative-Unprivileged-Load workaround compiled in: "
+        if [ -n "$kernel_mitigated" ]; then
+            pstatus green YES "$kernel_mitigated"
+        else
+            pstatus yellow NO
+        fi
+    fi
+
+    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU is not affected by this erratum family"
+    elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "no sysfs interface exists for this erratum, own checks have been skipped (--sysfs-only)"
+    elif [ -n "$kernel_mitigated" ]; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your kernel includes the erratum workaround"
+    else
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "your CPU is affected by this erratum family and the kernel does not appear to include the workaround"
+        explain "Run a kernel built with CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_2966298=y (Cortex-A520) and/or CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3117295=y (Cortex-A510). These options are 'default y' in mainline and enabled by most distro kernels. Refer to the ARM Software Developers Errata Notice for your core for full details."
+    fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_0001_0002_bsd() {
+    local cve
+    cve='CVE-0001-0002'
+    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU is not affected by this erratum family"
+    else
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "your CPU is affected, but mitigation detection has not yet been implemented for BSD in this script"
+    fi
+}
+
+# >>>>>> vulns/CVE-0001-0003.sh <<<<<<
+
+# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
+###############################
+# CVE-0001-0003, ARM SSBS NOSYNC, ARM64 erratum 3194386, MSR SSBS not self-synchronizing
+
+check_CVE_0001_0003() {
+    check_cve 'CVE-0001-0003'
+}
+
+# On affected cores, the "MSR SSBS, #x" instruction is not self-synchronizing, so subsequent
+# speculative instructions may execute without observing the new SSBS state. This can permit
+# unintended speculative store bypass (Spectre V4 / CVE-2018-3639) even when software thinks
+# the mitigation is in effect. Kernel workaround (ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_SSBS):
+#   - place a Speculation Barrier (SB) or ISB after every kernel-side SSBS change
+#   - hide SSBS from userspace hwcaps and EL0 reads of ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 so that userspace
+#     routes SSB mitigation changes through the prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) path
+# Affected cores (via ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386, with individual sub-errata numbers):
+#   Cortex-A76/A77/A78/A78C/A710/A715/A720/A720AE/A725, X1/X1C/X2/X3/X4/X925,
+#   Neoverse-N1/N2/N3, Neoverse-V1/V2/V3/V3AE
+# References:
+#   arch/arm64/Kconfig (ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386)
+#   arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c (erratum_spec_ssbs_list, "SSBS not fully self-synchronizing")
+check_CVE_0001_0003_linux() {
+    local cve kernel_mitigated
+    cve='CVE-0001-0003'
+    kernel_mitigated=''
+
+    if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ] && is_arm_kernel; then
+        if [ -n "$opt_config" ] && grep -q '^CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386=y' "$opt_config"; then
+            kernel_mitigated="found CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386=y in kernel config"
+        fi
+        if [ -z "$kernel_mitigated" ] && [ -n "$g_kernel" ]; then
+            if "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$g_kernel" 2>/dev/null | grep -qE 'SSBS not fully self-synchronizing'; then
+                kernel_mitigated="found erratum descriptor string in kernel image"
+            fi
+        fi
+        if [ -z "$kernel_mitigated" ] && [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+            if dmesg 2>/dev/null | grep -qE 'SSBS not fully self-synchronizing'; then
+                kernel_mitigated="erratum workaround reported as applied in dmesg"
+            fi
+        fi
+
+        pr_info_nol "* Kernel has the ARM64 SSBS self-sync workaround compiled in: "
+        if [ -n "$kernel_mitigated" ]; then
+            pstatus green YES "$kernel_mitigated"
+        else
+            pstatus yellow NO
+        fi
+    fi
+
+    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU is not affected by this erratum"
+    elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "no sysfs interface exists for this erratum, own checks have been skipped (--sysfs-only)"
+    elif [ -n "$kernel_mitigated" ]; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your kernel includes the erratum workaround"
+    else
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "your CPU is affected by this erratum and the kernel does not appear to include the workaround; Spectre V4 (CVE-2018-3639) mitigation may be unreliable on this system"
+        explain "Run a kernel built with CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386=y. This option is 'default y' in mainline and enabled by most distro kernels. Without it, the Spectre V4 / speculative-store-bypass mitigation advertised by SSBS is not reliably applied. Userspace should use prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, ...) to request the mitigation rather than rely on the SSBS hwcap."
+    fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_0001_0003_bsd() {
+    local cve
+    cve='CVE-0001-0003'
+    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU is not affected by this erratum"
+    else
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "your CPU is affected, but mitigation detection has not yet been implemented for BSD in this script"
+    fi
+}
+
 # >>>>>> vulns/CVE-2017-5715.sh <<<<<<
 
 # vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
@@ -12214,10 +12701,19 @@ if [ "$g_mode" = hw-only ]; then
     pr_info "Hardware-only mode, skipping vulnerability checks"
 else
     for cve in $g_supported_cve_list; do
-        if [ "$opt_cve_all" = 1 ] || echo "$opt_cve_list" | grep -qw "$cve"; then
-            check_"$(echo "$cve" | tr - _)"
-            pr_info
+        # In a default "all CVEs" run, skip checks whose arch tag doesn't match
+        # the host CPU or the inspected kernel. Explicit --cve/--variant/--errata
+        # selection bypasses the gate.
+        if [ "$opt_cve_all" = 1 ]; then
+            if ! _is_cve_relevant_arch "$cve"; then
+                pr_debug "main: skipping $cve (arch tag not relevant)"
+                continue
+            fi
+        elif ! echo "$opt_cve_list" | grep -qw "$cve"; then
+            continue
         fi
+        check_"$(echo "$cve" | tr - _)"
+        pr_info
     done
 fi # g_mode != hw-only