feat: implement CVE-2025-40300 (VMScape) and CVE-2024-45332 (BTI)

built from commit 6273344e62f9a56dc0dd834d1bd977c5af43a98d dated 2026-04-04 14:41:09 +0200 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)
2026-04-07 09:13:20 +02:00 · 2026-04-04 13:08:23 +00:00
parent d7cd9e8b6b
commit b4db134e49
4 changed files with 539 additions and 8 deletions
--- a/.github/workflows/expected_cve_count
+++ b/.github/workflows/expected_cve_count
@@ -1 +1 @@
-23
+26
--- a/.github/workflows/stale.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/stale.yml
@@ -30,4 +30,4 @@ jobs:
          days-before-close: 7
          stale-issue-label: stale
          remove-stale-when-updated: true
-          debug-only: ${{ case(inputs.action == 'apply', false, true) }}
+          debug-only: ${{ case(inputs.action == 'dryrun', true, false) }}
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ CVE | Name | Aliases
 [CVE-2023-23583](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-23583) | Redundant Prefix Issue | Reptar
 [CVE-2024-36350](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-36350) | Transient Scheduler Attack, Store Queue | TSA-SQ
 [CVE-2024-36357](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-36357) | Transient Scheduler Attack, L1 | TSA-L1
+[CVE-2024-28956](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-28956) | Indirect Target Selection | ITS
+[CVE-2025-40300](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-40300) | VM-Exit Stale Branch Prediction | VMScape
+[CVE-2024-45332](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-45332) | Branch Privilege Injection | BPI

 ## Am I at risk?

@@ -61,6 +64,9 @@ CVE-2023-20593 (Zenbleed) | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | Microcode update (or ker
 CVE-2023-23583 (Reptar) | ☠️ | ☠️ | ☠️ | ☠️ | Microcode update
 CVE-2024-36350 (TSA-SQ) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + kernel update
 CVE-2024-36357 (TSA-L1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + kernel update
+CVE-2024-28956 (ITS) | 💥 | ✅ | 💥 (4) | ✅ | Microcode + kernel update
+CVE-2025-40300 (VMScape) | ✅ | ✅ | 💥 | ✅ | Kernel update (IBPB on VM-exit)
+CVE-2024-45332 (BPI) | 💥 | ✅ | 💥 | ✅ | Microcode update

 > 💥 Data can be leaked across this boundary.

@@ -74,6 +80,8 @@ CVE-2024-36357 (TSA-L1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + kernel

 > (3) CVE-2018-3615 (Foreshadow SGX) inverts the normal trust model: the OS reads SGX enclave data. It is irrelevant unless the system runs SGX enclaves, and the attacker must already have OS-level access.

+> (4) VM→Host leakage applies only to certain affected CPU models (Skylake-X, Kaby Lake, Comet Lake). Ice Lake, Tiger Lake, and Rocket Lake are only affected for native (user-to-kernel) attacks, not guest-to-host.
+
 ## Detailed CVE descriptions

 <details>
@@ -165,6 +173,18 @@ On AMD Zen 3 and Zen 4 processors, the CPU's transient scheduler may speculative

 On AMD Zen 3 and Zen 4 processors, the CPU's transient scheduler may speculatively retrieve stale data from the L1 data cache during certain timing windows, allowing an attacker to infer data in the L1D cache across privilege boundaries. Mitigation requires the same microcode and kernel updates as TSA-SQ: a microcode update exposing VERW_CLEAR and a kernel update (CONFIG_MITIGATION_TSA, Linux 6.16+) that clears CPU buffers via VERW on privilege transitions. Performance impact is low to medium.

+**CVE-2024-28956 — Indirect Target Selection (ITS)**
+
+On certain Intel processors (Skylake-X stepping 6+, Kaby Lake, Comet Lake, Ice Lake, Tiger Lake, Rocket Lake), an attacker can train the indirect branch predictor to speculatively execute a targeted gadget in the kernel, bypassing eIBRS protections. The Branch Target Buffer (BTB) uses only partial address bits to index indirect branch targets, allowing user-space code to influence kernel-space speculative execution. Some affected CPUs (Ice Lake, Tiger Lake, Rocket Lake) are only vulnerable to native user-to-kernel attacks, not guest-to-host (VMX) attacks. Mitigation requires both a microcode update (IPU 2025.1 / microcode-20250512+, which fixes IBPB to fully flush indirect branch predictions) and a kernel update (CONFIG_MITIGATION_ITS, Linux 6.15+) that aligns branch/return thunks or uses RSB stuffing. Performance impact is low.
+
+**CVE-2025-40300 — VM-Exit Stale Branch Prediction (VMScape)**
+
+After a guest VM exits to the host, stale branch predictions from the guest can influence host-side speculative execution before the kernel returns to userspace, allowing a local attacker to leak host kernel memory. This affects Intel processors from Sandy Bridge through Arrow Lake/Lunar Lake, AMD Zen 1 through Zen 5 families, and Hygon family 0x18. Only systems running a hypervisor with untrusted guests are at risk. Mitigation requires a kernel update (CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMSCAPE, Linux 6.18+) that issues IBPB before returning to userspace after a VM exit. No specific microcode update is required beyond existing IBPB support. Performance impact is low.
+
+**CVE-2024-45332 — Branch Privilege Injection (BPI)**
+
+A race condition in the branch predictor update mechanism of Intel processors (Coffee Lake through Raptor Lake, plus some server and Atom parts) allows user-space branch predictions to briefly influence kernel-space speculative execution, undermining eIBRS and IBPB protections. This means systems relying solely on eIBRS for Spectre V2 mitigation may not be fully protected without the microcode fix. Mitigation requires a microcode update (intel-microcode 20250512+) that fixes the asynchronous branch predictor update timing so that eIBRS and IBPB work as originally intended. No kernel changes are required. Performance impact is negligible.
+
 </details>

 ## Unsupported CVEs
--- a/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+++ b/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 #
 # Stephane Lesimple
 #
-VERSION='26.23.0404516'
+VERSION='26.26.0404546'

 # --- Common paths and basedirs ---
 readonly VULN_SYSFS_BASE="/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities"
@@ -215,6 +215,9 @@ CVE-2023-20569|INCEPTION|inception|Inception, return address security (RAS)
 CVE-2023-23583|REPTAR|reptar|Reptar, redundant prefix issue
 CVE-2024-36350|TSA_SQ|tsa|Transient Scheduler Attack - Store Queue (TSA-SQ)
 CVE-2024-36357|TSA_L1|tsa|Transient Scheduler Attack - L1 (TSA-L1)
+CVE-2024-28956|ITS|its|Indirect Target Selection (ITS)
+CVE-2025-40300|VMSCAPE|vmscape|VMScape, VM-exit stale branch prediction
+CVE-2024-45332|BPI|bpi|Branch Privilege Injection (BPI)
 '

 # Derive the supported CVE list from the registry
@@ -582,9 +585,13 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
    _set_immune tsa
    # Retbleed: AMD (CVE-2022-29900) and Intel (CVE-2022-29901) specific:
    _set_immune retbleed
-    # Downfall & Reptar are Intel specific, look for "is_intel" below:
+    # Downfall, Reptar, ITS & BPI are Intel specific, look for "is_intel" below:
    _set_immune downfall
    _set_immune reptar
+    _set_immune its
+    _set_immune bpi
+    # VMScape affects Intel, AMD and Hygon — set immune, overridden below:
+    _set_immune vmscape

    if is_cpu_mds_free; then
        _infer_immune msbds
@@ -737,6 +744,32 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
            fi
            set +u
        fi
+        # ITS (Indirect Target Selection, CVE-2024-28956)
+        # kernel vulnerable_to_its() + cpu_vuln_blacklist (159013a7ca18)
+        # immunity: ARCH_CAP_ITS_NO (bit 62 of IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)
+        # immunity: X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL (none of the affected CPUs have this)
+        # vendor scope: Intel only (family 6), with stepping constraints on some models
+        if [ "$cap_its_no" = 1 ]; then
+            pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: its: not affected (ITS_NO)"
+            _set_immune its
+        elif [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
+            set -u
+            if { [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X" ] && [ "$cpu_stepping" -gt 5 ]; } ||
+                { [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L" ] && [ "$cpu_stepping" -gt 11 ]; } ||
+                { [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE" ] && [ "$cpu_stepping" -gt 12 ]; } ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_D" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ROCKETLAKE" ]; then
+                pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: its: affected"
+                _set_vuln its
+            fi
+            set +u
+        fi
        # Reptar
        # the only way to know whether a CPU is vuln, is to check whether there is a known ucode update for it,
        # as the mitigation is only ucode-based and there's no flag exposed by the kernel or by an updated ucode.
@@ -813,6 +846,94 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
            fi
        fi

+        # VMScape (CVE-2025-40300): Intel model blacklist
+        # kernel cpu_vuln_blacklist VMSCAPE (a508cec6e521 + 8a68d64bb103)
+        # immunity: no ARCH_CAP bits (purely blacklist-based)
+        # note: kernel only sets bug on bare metal (!X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)
+        # vendor scope: Intel + AMD + Hygon (AMD/Hygon handled below)
+        if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
+            set -u
+            if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_G" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_CANNONLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_P" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_S" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_METEORLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ARROWLAKE_H" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ARROWLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ARROWLAKE_U" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_LUNARLAKE_M" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_GRANITERAPIDS_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_EMERALDRAPIDS_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GRACEMONT" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CRESTMONT_X" ]; then
+                pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: vmscape: affected"
+                _set_vuln vmscape
+            fi
+            set +u
+        fi
+
+        # BPI (Branch Privilege Injection, CVE-2024-45332)
+        # microcode-only fix (intel-microcode 20250512+), no kernel X86_BUG flag
+        # Intel affected processor list: Coffee Lake through Arrow Lake/Lunar Lake,
+        # plus some server parts (Cooper Lake, Sapphire/Emerald Rapids, Grand Ridge)
+        # immunity: no ARCH_CAP bits
+        # vendor scope: Intel only (family 6)
+        if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
+            set -u
+            if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ROCKETLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_D" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GRACEMONT" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_P" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_S" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_METEORLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ARROWLAKE_H" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ARROWLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ARROWLAKE_U" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_LUNARLAKE_M" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_EMERALDRAPIDS_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CRESTMONT" ]; then
+                pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: bpi: affected"
+                _set_vuln bpi
+            fi
+            set +u
+        fi
+
    elif is_amd || is_hygon; then
        # AMD revised their statement about affected_variant2 => affected
        # https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/speculative-execution
@@ -854,6 +975,20 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
            _set_vuln retbleed
        fi

+        # VMScape (CVE-2025-40300): AMD families 0x17/0x19/0x1a, Hygon family 0x18
+        # kernel cpu_vuln_blacklist VMSCAPE (a508cec6e521)
+        if is_amd; then
+            if [ "$cpu_family" = $((0x17)) ] || [ "$cpu_family" = $((0x19)) ] || [ "$cpu_family" = $((0x1a)) ]; then
+                pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: vmscape: AMD family $cpu_family affected"
+                _set_vuln vmscape
+            fi
+        elif is_hygon; then
+            if [ "$cpu_family" = $((0x18)) ]; then
+                pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: vmscape: Hygon family $cpu_family affected"
+                _set_vuln vmscape
+            fi
+        fi
+
    elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = CAVIUM ]; then
        _set_immune variant3
        _set_immune variant3a
@@ -996,12 +1131,13 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
        _infer_immune itlbmh
    fi

-    # shellcheck disable=SC2154  # affected_zenbleed/inception/retbleed/tsa/downfall/reptar set via eval (_set_immune)
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2154  # affected_zenbleed/inception/retbleed/tsa/downfall/reptar/its/vmscape/bpi set via eval (_set_immune)
    {
        pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: variant1=$affected_variant1 variant2=$affected_variant2 variant3=$affected_variant3 variant3a=$affected_variant3a"
        pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: variant4=$affected_variant4 variantl1tf=$affected_variantl1tf msbds=$affected_msbds mfbds=$affected_mfbds"
        pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: mlpds=$affected_mlpds mdsum=$affected_mdsum taa=$affected_taa itlbmh=$affected_itlbmh srbds=$affected_srbds"
-        pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: zenbleed=$affected_zenbleed inception=$affected_inception retbleed=$affected_retbleed tsa=$affected_tsa downfall=$affected_downfall reptar=$affected_reptar"
+        pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: zenbleed=$affected_zenbleed inception=$affected_inception retbleed=$affected_retbleed tsa=$affected_tsa downfall=$affected_downfall reptar=$affected_reptar its=$affected_its"
+        pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: vmscape=$affected_vmscape bpi=$affected_bpi"
    }
    affected_variantl1tf_sgx="$affected_variantl1tf"
    # even if we are affected to L1TF, if there's no SGX, we're not affected to the original foreshadow
@@ -1606,7 +1742,7 @@ while [ -n "${1:-}" ]; do
        case "$2" in
            help)
                echo "The following parameters are supported for --variant (can be used multiple times):"
-                echo "1, 2, 3, 3a, 4, msbds, mfbds, mlpds, mdsum, l1tf, taa, mcepsc, srbds, zenbleed, downfall, inception, reptar, tsa, tsa-sq, tsa-l1"
+                echo "1, 2, 3, 3a, 4, msbds, mfbds, mlpds, mdsum, l1tf, taa, mcepsc, srbds, zenbleed, downfall, inception, reptar, tsa, tsa-sq, tsa-l1, its, vmscape, bpi"
                exit 0
                ;;
            1)
@@ -1689,6 +1825,18 @@ while [ -n "${1:-}" ]; do
                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2024-36357"
                opt_cve_all=0
                ;;
+            its)
+                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2024-28956"
+                opt_cve_all=0
+                ;;
+            vmscape)
+                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2025-40300"
+                opt_cve_all=0
+                ;;
+            bpi)
+                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2024-45332"
+                opt_cve_all=0
+                ;;
            *)
                echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, see --variant help for a list" >&2
                exit 255
@@ -3880,6 +4028,7 @@ check_cpu() {
        cap_tsx_ctrl_msr=-1
        cap_gds_ctrl=-1
        cap_gds_no=-1
+        cap_its_no=-1
        if [ "$cap_arch_capabilities" = -1 ]; then
            pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
        elif [ "$cap_arch_capabilities" != 1 ]; then
@@ -3894,6 +4043,7 @@ check_cpu() {
            cap_tsx_ctrl_msr=0
            cap_gds_ctrl=0
            cap_gds_no=0
+            cap_its_no=0
            pstatus yellow NO
        else
            read_msr $MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
@@ -3909,6 +4059,7 @@ check_cpu() {
            cap_tsx_ctrl_msr=0
            cap_gds_ctrl=0
            cap_gds_no=0
+            cap_its_no=0
            if [ $ret = $READ_MSR_RET_OK ]; then
                capabilities=$ret_read_msr_value
                # https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h#n82
@@ -3924,7 +4075,8 @@ check_cpu() {
                [ $((ret_read_msr_value_lo >> 8 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_taa_no=1
                [ $((ret_read_msr_value_lo >> 25 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_gds_ctrl=1
                [ $((ret_read_msr_value_lo >> 26 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_gds_no=1
-                pr_debug "capabilities says rdcl_no=$cap_rdcl_no ibrs_all=$cap_ibrs_all rsba=$cap_rsba l1dflush_no=$cap_l1dflush_no ssb_no=$cap_ssb_no mds_no=$cap_mds_no taa_no=$cap_taa_no pschange_msc_no=$cap_pschange_msc_no"
+                [ $((ret_read_msr_value_hi >> 30 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_its_no=1
+                pr_debug "capabilities says rdcl_no=$cap_rdcl_no ibrs_all=$cap_ibrs_all rsba=$cap_rsba l1dflush_no=$cap_l1dflush_no ssb_no=$cap_ssb_no mds_no=$cap_mds_no taa_no=$cap_taa_no pschange_msc_no=$cap_pschange_msc_no its_no=$cap_its_no"
                if [ "$cap_ibrs_all" = 1 ]; then
                    pstatus green YES
                else
@@ -8660,6 +8812,172 @@ check_CVE_2023_23583_bsd() {
    fi
 }

+# >>>>>> vulns/CVE-2024-28956.sh <<<<<<
+
+# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
+###############################
+# CVE-2024-28956, ITS, Indirect Target Selection
+
+check_CVE_2024_28956() {
+    check_cve 'CVE-2024-28956'
+}
+
+check_CVE_2024_28956_linux() {
+    local status sys_interface_available msg kernel_its kernel_its_err ret
+    status=UNK
+    sys_interface_available=0
+    msg=''
+
+    if sys_interface_check "$VULN_SYSFS_BASE/indirect_target_selection"; then
+        # this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
+        sys_interface_available=1
+        #
+        # Kernel source inventory for indirect_target_selection (ITS)
+        #
+        # --- sysfs messages ---
+        # all versions:
+        #   "Not affected"                                       (cpu_show_common, pre-existing)
+        #
+        # --- mainline ---
+        # f4818881c47f (v6.15-rc2, initial ITS sysfs):
+        #   "Vulnerable"                                         (ITS_MITIGATION_OFF)
+        #   "Mitigation: Aligned branch/return thunks"           (ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS)
+        #   "Mitigation: Retpolines, Stuffing RSB"               (ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF)
+        # 2665281a07e1 (v6.15-rc2, added vmexit option):
+        #   "Mitigation: Vulnerable, KVM: Not affected"          (ITS_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY)
+        # facd226f7e0c (v6.15-rc2, added stuff cmdline option):
+        #   no string changes; added "stuff" boot param value
+        # 61ab72c2c6bf (v6.16-rc1, restructured select/update/apply):
+        #   no string changes; added ITS_MITIGATION_AUTO (internal, resolved before display)
+        #   split into its_select_mitigation() + its_update_mitigation() + its_apply_mitigation()
+        # 0cdd2c4f35cf (v6.18-rc1, attack vector controls):
+        #   no string changes; added per-vector on/off control
+        #
+        # --- stable backports ---
+        # 5.10.y, 5.15.y, 6.1.y: 3 strings only (no VMEXIT_ONLY, no RETPOLINE_STUFF
+        #   in 5.10/5.15/6.1). Uses CONFIG_RETPOLINE/CONFIG_RETHUNK (not CONFIG_MITIGATION_*).
+        # 6.6.y, 6.12.y, 6.14.y, 6.15.y: all 4 strings, full vmexit+stuff support.
+        # 6.16.y+: restructured 3-phase select/update/apply.
+        # Not backported to: 5.4.y, 6.11.y, 6.13.y.
+        #
+        # --- RHEL/CentOS ---
+        # rocky9 (5.14): all 4 strings, restructured 3-phase version.
+        # rocky10 (6.12): all 4 strings, restructured 3-phase version.
+        # Not backported to: centos7, rocky8.
+        #
+        # --- Kconfig symbols ---
+        # f4818881c47f (v6.15-rc2): CONFIG_MITIGATION_ITS (default y)
+        #   depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64 && MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && MITIGATION_RETHUNK
+        # stable 5.10.y, 5.15.y, 6.1.y: CONFIG_MITIGATION_ITS
+        #   depends on CONFIG_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_RETHUNK (pre-rename names)
+        #
+        # --- kernel functions (for $opt_map / System.map) ---
+        # f4818881c47f (v6.15-rc2): its_select_mitigation(), its_parse_cmdline(),
+        #   its_show_state()
+        # 61ab72c2c6bf (v6.16-rc1): split into its_select_mitigation() +
+        #   its_update_mitigation() + its_apply_mitigation()
+        # stable 5.10.y-6.15.y: its_select_mitigation() (no split)
+        # rocky9, rocky10: its_select_mitigation() + its_update_mitigation() +
+        #   its_apply_mitigation()
+        #
+        # --- CPU affection logic (for is_cpu_affected) ---
+        # X86_BUG_ITS is set when ALL conditions are true:
+        #   1. Intel vendor, family 6
+        #   2. CPU matches model blacklist (with stepping constraints)
+        #   3. ARCH_CAP_ITS_NO (bit 62 of IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) is NOT set
+        #   4. X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL is NOT present
+        # 159013a7ca18 (v6.15-rc2, initial model list):
+        #   Intel: SKYLAKE_X (stepping > 5), KABYLAKE_L (stepping > 0xb),
+        #          KABYLAKE (stepping > 0xc), ICELAKE_L, ICELAKE_D, ICELAKE_X,
+        #          COMETLAKE, COMETLAKE_L, TIGERLAKE_L, TIGERLAKE, ROCKETLAKE
+        #          (all steppings unless noted)
+        # ITS_NATIVE_ONLY flag (X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY): set for
+        #   ICELAKE_L, ICELAKE_D, ICELAKE_X, TIGERLAKE_L, TIGERLAKE, ROCKETLAKE
+        #   These CPUs are affected for user-to-kernel but NOT guest-to-host (VMX)
+        # immunity: ARCH_CAP_ITS_NO (bit 62 of IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)
+        # immunity: X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL (none of the affected CPUs have this)
+        # vendor scope: Intel only
+        #
+        # all messages start with either "Not affected", "Vulnerable", or "Mitigation"
+        status=$ret_sys_interface_check_status
+    fi
+
+    if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
+        pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports ITS mitigation: "
+        kernel_its=''
+        kernel_its_err=''
+        if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
+            kernel_its_err="$g_kernel_err"
+        elif grep -q 'indirect_target_selection' "$g_kernel"; then
+            kernel_its="found indirect_target_selection in kernel image"
+        fi
+        if [ -z "$kernel_its" ] && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
+            if grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_ITS=y' "$opt_config"; then
+                kernel_its="ITS mitigation config option found enabled in kernel config"
+            fi
+        fi
+        if [ -z "$kernel_its" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+            if grep -q 'its_select_mitigation' "$opt_map"; then
+                kernel_its="found its_select_mitigation in System.map"
+            fi
+        fi
+        if [ -n "$kernel_its" ]; then
+            pstatus green YES "$kernel_its"
+        elif [ -n "$kernel_its_err" ]; then
+            pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$kernel_its_err"
+        else
+            pstatus yellow NO
+        fi
+
+        pr_info_nol "* CPU explicitly indicates not being affected by ITS (ITS_NO): "
+        if [ "$cap_its_no" = -1 ]; then
+            pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+        elif [ "$cap_its_no" = 1 ]; then
+            pstatus green YES
+        else
+            pstatus yellow NO
+        fi
+
+    elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
+        # we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
+        msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
+        status=UNK
+    fi
+
+    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
+        # override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
+    elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
+        # if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
+        if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
+            if [ "$cap_its_no" = 1 ]; then
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "CPU is not affected (ITS_NO)"
+            elif [ -n "$kernel_its" ]; then
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Kernel mitigates the vulnerability"
+            elif [ -z "$kernel_its" ] && [ -z "$kernel_its_err" ]; then
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your kernel doesn't support ITS mitigation"
+                explain "Update your kernel to a version that includes ITS mitigation (Linux 6.15+, or check\n" \
+                    "if your distro has a backport). Also update your CPU microcode to ensure IBPB fully\n" \
+                    "flushes indirect branch predictions (microcode-20250512+)."
+            else
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "couldn't determine mitigation status: $kernel_its_err"
+            fi
+        else
+            pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg"
+        fi
+    else
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$msg"
+    fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_2024_28956_bsd() {
+    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
+    else
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "your CPU is affected, but mitigation detection has not yet been implemented for BSD in this script"
+    fi
+}
+
 # >>>>>> vulns/CVE-2024-36350.sh <<<<<<

 # vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
@@ -9007,6 +9325,199 @@ check_CVE_2024_36357_bsd() {
    fi
 }

+# >>>>>> vulns/CVE-2024-45332.sh <<<<<<
+
+# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
+###############################
+# CVE-2024-45332, BPI, Branch Privilege Injection
+
+check_CVE_2024_45332() {
+    check_cve 'CVE-2024-45332'
+}
+
+check_CVE_2024_45332_linux() {
+    local status sys_interface_available msg
+    status=UNK
+    sys_interface_available=0
+    msg=''
+
+    # There is no dedicated sysfs file for this vulnerability, and no kernel
+    # mitigation code.  The fix is purely a microcode update (intel-microcode
+    # 20250512+) that corrects the asynchronous branch predictor update timing
+    # so that eIBRS and IBPB work as originally intended.  There is no new
+    # CPUID bit, MSR bit, or ARCH_CAP flag to detect the fix.  The only
+    # reliable indicator is the microcode version, which we cannot check
+    # without violating design principle 3 (never hardcode microcode versions).
+
+    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
+    else
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "the microcode fix for this vulnerability cannot be detected (no CPUID/MSR indicator); ensure you have intel-microcode 20250512 or later installed"
+        explain "CVE-2024-45332 (Branch Privilege Injection) is a race condition in the branch predictor\n" \
+            "that undermines eIBRS and IBPB protections. The fix is a microcode update only (intel-microcode\n" \
+            "20250512+). No kernel changes are required. Verify your microcode version with: grep microcode\n" \
+            "/proc/cpuinfo. Contact your OS vendor to ensure the latest Intel microcode package is installed."
+    fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_2024_45332_bsd() {
+    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
+    else
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "your CPU is affected, but mitigation detection has not yet been implemented for BSD in this script"
+    fi
+}
+
+# >>>>>> vulns/CVE-2025-40300.sh <<<<<<
+
+# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
+###############################
+# CVE-2025-40300, VMScape, VM-Exit Stale Branch Prediction
+
+check_CVE_2025_40300() {
+    check_cve 'CVE-2025-40300'
+}
+
+check_CVE_2025_40300_linux() {
+    local status sys_interface_available msg kernel_vmscape kernel_vmscape_err
+    status=UNK
+    sys_interface_available=0
+    msg=''
+
+    if sys_interface_check "$VULN_SYSFS_BASE/vmscape"; then
+        # this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
+        sys_interface_available=1
+        #
+        # Kernel source inventory for vmscape, traced via git blame:
+        #
+        # --- sysfs messages ---
+        # all versions:
+        #   "Not affected"                              (cpu_show_common, pre-existing)
+        #
+        # --- mainline ---
+        # a508cec6e521 (v6.17-rc6, initial vmscape sysfs):
+        #   "Vulnerable"                                (VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE)
+        #   "Mitigation: IBPB before exit to userspace" (VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER)
+        # 2f8f17341 (v6.17-rc6, vmscape_update_mitigation):
+        #   "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT"                (VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT)
+        #     (when retbleed uses IBPB or srso uses IBPB_ON_VMEXIT)
+        #
+        # --- stable backports ---
+        # 6.16.x (v6.16.7): identical to mainline (d83e6111337f)
+        # 6.12.x (v6.12.47): identical to mainline (7c62c442b6eb)
+        # 6.6.x (v6.6.106): identical to mainline (813cb831439c)
+        # 6.1.x (v6.1.152): identical strings; uses VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS macro,
+        #   missing ARROWLAKE_U, ATOM_CRESTMONT_X, AMD 0x1a.
+        #   Uses ALDERLAKE_N instead of type-specific ALDERLAKE split. (304d1fb275af)
+        #
+        # --- RHEL/CentOS ---
+        # Not yet backported.
+        #
+        # --- Kconfig symbols ---
+        # a508cec6e521 (v6.17-rc6): CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMSCAPE (default y)
+        #   depends on KVM
+        #
+        # --- kernel functions (for $opt_map / System.map) ---
+        # a508cec6e521 (v6.17-rc6): vmscape_select_mitigation(),
+        #   vmscape_update_mitigation(), vmscape_apply_mitigation(),
+        #   vmscape_parse_cmdline(), vmscape_show_state()
+        #
+        # --- CPU affection logic (for is_cpu_affected) ---
+        # X86_BUG_VMSCAPE is set when ALL conditions are true:
+        #   1. CPU matches model blacklist
+        #   2. X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR is NOT set (bare metal only)
+        # a508cec6e521 (v6.17-rc6, initial model list):
+        #   Intel: SKYLAKE_X, SKYLAKE_L, SKYLAKE, KABYLAKE_L, KABYLAKE,
+        #          CANNONLAKE_L, COMETLAKE, COMETLAKE_L, ALDERLAKE,
+        #          ALDERLAKE_L, RAPTORLAKE, RAPTORLAKE_P, RAPTORLAKE_S,
+        #          METEORLAKE_L, ARROWLAKE_H, ARROWLAKE, ARROWLAKE_U,
+        #          LUNARLAKE_M, SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X, GRANITERAPIDS_X,
+        #          EMERALDRAPIDS_X, ATOM_GRACEMONT, ATOM_CRESTMONT_X
+        #   AMD: family 0x17 (Zen 1/+/2), family 0x19 (Zen 3/4),
+        #        family 0x1a (Zen 5)
+        #   Hygon: family 0x18
+        # 8a68d64bb103 (v6.17-rc6, added old Intel CPUs):
+        #   Intel: + SANDYBRIDGE_X, SANDYBRIDGE, IVYBRIDGE_X, IVYBRIDGE,
+        #          HASWELL, HASWELL_L, HASWELL_G, HASWELL_X,
+        #          BROADWELL_D, BROADWELL_X, BROADWELL_G, BROADWELL
+        # Intel NOT affected: ICELAKE_*, TIGERLAKE_*, LAKEFIELD, ROCKETLAKE,
+        #   ATOM_TREMONT_*, ATOM_GOLDMONT_*
+        # immunity: no ARCH_CAP bits — determination is purely via blacklist
+        # note: bare metal only (X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR excludes guests)
+        # vendor scope: Intel + AMD + Hygon
+        #
+        # all messages start with either "Not affected", "Vulnerable", or "Mitigation"
+        status=$ret_sys_interface_check_status
+    fi
+
+    if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
+        check_has_vmm
+        pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports VMScape mitigation: "
+        kernel_vmscape=''
+        kernel_vmscape_err=''
+        if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
+            kernel_vmscape_err="$g_kernel_err"
+        elif grep -q 'vmscape' "$g_kernel"; then
+            kernel_vmscape="found vmscape in kernel image"
+        fi
+        if [ -z "$kernel_vmscape" ] && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
+            if grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMSCAPE=y' "$opt_config"; then
+                kernel_vmscape="VMScape mitigation config option found enabled in kernel config"
+            fi
+        fi
+        if [ -z "$kernel_vmscape" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+            if grep -q 'vmscape_select_mitigation' "$opt_map"; then
+                kernel_vmscape="found vmscape_select_mitigation in System.map"
+            fi
+        fi
+        if [ -n "$kernel_vmscape" ]; then
+            pstatus green YES "$kernel_vmscape"
+        elif [ -n "$kernel_vmscape_err" ]; then
+            pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$kernel_vmscape_err"
+        else
+            pstatus yellow NO
+        fi
+
+    elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
+        # we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
+        msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
+        status=UNK
+    fi
+
+    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
+        # override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
+    elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
+        # if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
+        if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
+            if [ "$g_has_vmm" = 0 ]; then
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "this system is not running a hypervisor"
+            elif [ -n "$kernel_vmscape" ]; then
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Kernel mitigates the vulnerability"
+            elif [ -z "$kernel_vmscape" ] && [ -z "$kernel_vmscape_err" ]; then
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your kernel doesn't support VMScape mitigation"
+                explain "Update your kernel to a version that includes the VMScape mitigation (Linux 6.18+, or check\n" \
+                    "if your distro has a backport). The mitigation issues IBPB before returning to userspace\n" \
+                    "after a VM exit, preventing stale guest branch predictions from leaking host kernel memory."
+            else
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "couldn't determine mitigation status: $kernel_vmscape_err"
+            fi
+        else
+            pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg"
+        fi
+    else
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$msg"
+    fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_2025_40300_bsd() {
+    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
+    else
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "your CPU is affected, but mitigation detection has not yet been implemented for BSD in this script"
+    fi
+}
+
 # >>>>>> main.sh <<<<<<

 # vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et: