fix: mmio stale data: EOL Intel CPUs may be vulnerable (#437)

This commit is contained in:
Stéphane Lesimple
2026-04-20 22:42:04 +02:00
parent 8a417e5579
commit 03b1787d69
3 changed files with 114 additions and 47 deletions

View File

@@ -187,58 +187,76 @@ is_cpu_srbds_free() {
}
# Check whether the CPU is architecturally immune to MMIO Stale Data
# Mirrors the kernel's arch_cap_mmio_immune() helper: ALL THREE ARCH_CAP bits must be set:
# ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO (bit 13), ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO (bit 14), ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO (bit 15)
# Returns: 0 if immune, 1 otherwise
is_arch_cap_mmio_immune() {
[ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_fbsdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_psdp_no" = 1 ]
}
# Check whether the CPU is known to be unaffected by MMIO Stale Data (CVE-2022-21123/21125/21166)
# Matches the kernel's NO_MMIO whitelist plus arch_cap_mmio_immune().
# Model inventory and kernel-commit history are documented in check_mmio_linux().
# Returns: 0 if MMIO-free, 1 if affected or unknown
is_cpu_mmio_free() {
# source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
#
# CPU affection logic from kernel (51802186158c, v5.19):
# Bug is set when: cpu_matches(blacklist, MMIO) AND NOT arch_cap_mmio_immune()
# arch_cap_mmio_immune() requires ALL THREE bits set:
# ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO (bit 14) AND ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO (bit 15) AND ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO (bit 13)
#
# Intel Family 6 model blacklist (unchanged since v5.19):
# HASWELL_X (0x3F)
# BROADWELL_D (0x56), BROADWELL_X (0x4F)
# SKYLAKE_X (0x55), SKYLAKE_L (0x4E), SKYLAKE (0x5E)
# KABYLAKE_L (0x8E), KABYLAKE (0x9E)
# ICELAKE_L (0x7E), ICELAKE_D (0x6C), ICELAKE_X (0x6A)
# COMETLAKE (0xA5), COMETLAKE_L (0xA6)
# LAKEFIELD (0x8A)
# ROCKETLAKE (0xA7)
# ATOM_TREMONT (0x96), ATOM_TREMONT_D (0x86), ATOM_TREMONT_L (0x9C)
#
# Vendor scope: Intel only. Non-Intel CPUs are not affected.
parse_cpu_details
# ARCH_CAP immunity: all three bits must be set
if [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_fbsdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_psdp_no" = 1 ]; then
is_arch_cap_mmio_immune && return 0
# Non-Intel x86 vendors the kernel unconditionally whitelists (AMD/Hygon all
# families; Centaur/Zhaoxin fam 7 only).
if is_amd || is_hygon; then
return 0
fi
if is_intel; then
if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_L" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_D" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_X" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_LAKEFIELD" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ROCKETLAKE" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_D" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_L" ]; then
return 1
fi
if { [ "$cpu_vendor" = "CentaurHauls" ] || [ "$cpu_vendor" = "Shanghai" ]; } && [ "$cpu_family" = 7 ]; then
return 0
fi
# Intel NO_MMIO whitelist
if is_intel && [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE_L" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE_L" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS" ]; then
return 0
fi
fi
return 1
}
# Check whether the CPU's MMIO Stale Data status is unknown ("out of servicing period")
# Matches the kernel's X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN: Intel CPU not MMIO-free and not in the
# MMIO blacklist. The kernel reports "Unknown: No mitigations" for such CPUs.
# Callers: check_mmio_linux, check_mmio_bsd
# Returns: 0 if unknown, 1 if known (either affected or not affected)
is_cpu_mmio_unknown() {
parse_cpu_details
# Only Intel can reach the unknown bucket — other x86 vendors are whitelisted by vendor-id.
is_intel || return 1
is_cpu_mmio_free && return 1
if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_L" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_D" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_X" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_LAKEFIELD" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ROCKETLAKE" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_D" ] ||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_L" ]; then
return 1
fi
fi
return 0
}

View File

@@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ check_cpu() {
pr_info_nol " * CPU explicitly indicates not being affected by MMIO Stale Data (FBSDP_NO & PSDP_NO & SBDR_SSDP_NO): "
if [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = -1 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read MSR"
elif [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_fbsdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_psdp_no" = 1 ]; then
elif is_arch_cap_mmio_immune; then
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus yellow NO

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,30 @@
# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
# MMIO Stale Data (Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities) - BSD mitigation check
check_mmio_bsd() {
# No BSD (FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, DragonFlyBSD) has implemented an OS-level
# MMIO Stale Data mitigation. All four stopped at MDS/TAA. Microcode update is
# the only partial defense available, and without OS-level VERW invocation it
# cannot close the vulnerability.
local unk
unk="your CPU's MMIO Stale Data status is unknown (Intel never officially assessed this CPU, its servicing period has ended)"
if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif is_cpu_mmio_unknown; then
if [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "$unk, and no BSD mitigation exists"
explain "There is no known mitigation for this CPU model. Even with up-to-date microcode, BSD kernels do not invoke VERW for MMIO Stale Data clearing. Only a hardware replacement can fully address this."
else
pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "$unk; no BSD mitigation exists in any case"
fi
else
pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "your CPU is affected, but mitigation detection has not yet been implemented for BSD in this script"
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "your CPU is affected and no BSD has implemented an MMIO Stale Data mitigation"
explain "No BSD kernel currently implements an MMIO Stale Data mitigation (which would require invoking VERW at context switches and VM-entries). Updating CPU microcode alone does not mitigate this vulnerability without OS cooperation."
fi
}
# MMIO Stale Data (Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities) - Linux mitigation check
check_mmio_linux() {
local status sys_interface_available msg kernel_mmio kernel_mmio_can_tell mmio_mitigated mmio_smt_mitigated mystatus mymsg
local status sys_interface_available msg kernel_mmio kernel_mmio_can_tell mmio_mitigated mmio_smt_mitigated mystatus mymsg unk
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
@@ -112,9 +126,33 @@ check_mmio_linux() {
#
# No models have been added to or removed from the MMIO blacklist since v5.19.
#
# 7df548840c49 (v6.0, NO_MMIO whitelist added, Pawan Gupta 2022-08-03):
# Intel Family 6:
# TIGERLAKE (0x8D), TIGERLAKE_L (0x8C)
# ALDERLAKE (0x97), ALDERLAKE_L (0x9A)
# ATOM_GOLDMONT (0x5C), ATOM_GOLDMONT_D (0x5F), ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS (0x7A)
# AMD: fam 0x0f-0x12 + X86_FAMILY_ANY (all families)
# Hygon: all families
# Centaur fam 7, Zhaoxin fam 7
#
# Kernel logic (v6.0+):
# if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) {
# if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO))
# setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
# else if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MMIO))
# setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
# }
# => Intel CPUs that are neither blacklisted nor whitelisted (e.g. Ivy Bridge,
# Haswell client, Broadwell client, Sandy Bridge, pre-Goldmont Atom, etc.) get
# X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN and report "Unknown: No mitigations" in sysfs. Intel
# never published an affected-processor evaluation for these models because
# their servicing period had already ended.
# => is_cpu_mmio_unknown() matches this set so the script can report UNK (or
# VULN under --paranoid) rather than the misleading "not affected" that
# a plain blacklist check would produce.
#
# immunity: ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO (bit 13) AND ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO (bit 14) AND ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO (bit 15)
# All three must be set. Checked via arch_cap_mmio_immune() in common.c.
# Bug is set only when: cpu_matches(blacklist, MMIO) AND NOT arch_cap_mmio_immune().
#
# microcode mitigation: ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR (bit 17) -- VERW clears fill buffers.
# Alternative: MD_CLEAR CPUID + FLUSH_L1D CPUID when MDS_NO is not set (legacy path).
@@ -193,6 +231,17 @@ check_mmio_linux() {
if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ] && is_cpu_mmio_unknown; then
# Bypass the normal sysfs reconciliation: sysfs reports "Unknown: No mitigations"
# only on v6.0-v6.15. On earlier and on v6.16+ kernels it wrongly says "Not affected"
# for these CPUs (which predate FB_CLEAR microcode and Intel's affected-processor list).
unk="your CPU's MMIO Stale Data status is unknown (Intel never officially assessed this CPU, its servicing period has ended)"
if [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "$unk, and no mitigation is available"
explain "There is no known mitigation for this CPU model. Intel ended its servicing period without evaluating whether it is affected by MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities, so no FB_CLEAR-capable microcode was released. Consider replacing affected hardware."
else
pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "$unk; no mitigation is available in any case"
fi
else
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
# compute mystatus and mymsg from our own logic