chore: don't include src/ generated files in build

built from commit a77cf8264f
 dated 2026-04-02 23:49:40 +0200
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)

.github/workflows/autoupdate.yml

@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ on:
   schedule:
     - cron: '42 9 * * *'
 
+permissions:
+  pull-requests: write
+
 jobs:
   autoupdate:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -25,7 +28,6 @@ jobs:
         if: steps.diff.outputs.nbdiff != '0'
         uses: peter-evans/create-pull-request@v7
         with:
-          token: ${{ secrets.SMC_PR_PAT }}
           branch: autoupdate-fwdb
           commit-message: "update: fwdb from ${{ steps.diff.outputs.change }}, ${{ steps.diff.outputs.nbdiff }} microcode changes"
           title: "[Auto] Update fwdb from ${{ steps.diff.outputs.change }}"

.github/workflows/build.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+name: build
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches:
+      - test
+      - source
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      with:
+        persist-credentials: true
+    - name: install prerequisites
+      run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y shellcheck shfmt jq sqlite3 iucode-tool make
+    - name: update Intel model list
+      run: ./scripts/update_intel_models.sh
+    - name: build and check
+      run: |
+        make build fmt-check shellcheck
+        mv spectre-meltdown-checker.sh dist/
+    - name: check direct execution
+      run: |
+        expected=$(cat .github/workflows/expected_cve_count)
+        cd dist
+        nb=$(sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
+        if [ "$nb" -ne "$expected" ]; then
+          echo "Invalid number of CVEs reported: $nb instead of $expected"
+          exit 1
+        else
+          echo "OK $nb CVEs reported"
+        fi
+    - name: check docker compose run execution
+      run: |
+        expected=$(cat .github/workflows/expected_cve_count)
+        cd dist
+        docker compose build
+        nb=$(docker compose run --rm spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
+        if [ "$nb" -ne "$expected" ]; then
+          echo "Invalid number of CVEs reported: $nb instead of $expected"
+          exit 1
+        else
+          echo "OK $nb CVEs reported"
+        fi
+    - name: check docker run execution
+      run: |
+        expected=$(cat .github/workflows/expected_cve_count)
+        cd dist
+        docker build -t spectre-meltdown-checker .
+        nb=$(docker run --rm --privileged -v /boot:/boot:ro -v /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu:ro -v /lib/modules:/lib/modules:ro spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
+        if [ "$nb" -ne "$expected" ]; then
+          echo "Invalid number of CVEs reported: $nb instead of $expected"
+          exit 1
+        else
+          echo "OK $nb CVEs reported"
+        fi
+    - name: check fwdb update (separated)
+      run: |
+        cd dist
+        nbtmp1=$(find /tmp 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
+        ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --update-fwdb; ret=$?
+        if [ "$ret" != 0 ]; then
+          echo "Non-zero return value: $ret"
+          exit 1
+        fi
+        nbtmp2=$(find /tmp 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
+        if [ "$nbtmp1" != "$nbtmp2" ]; then
+          echo "Left temporary files!"
+          exit 1
+        fi
+        if ! [ -e ~/.mcedb ]; then
+          echo "No .mcedb file found after updating fwdb"
+          exit 1
+        fi
+    - name: check fwdb update (builtin)
+      run: |
+        cd dist
+        nbtmp1=$(find /tmp 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
+        ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --update-builtin-fwdb; ret=$?
+        if [ "$ret" != 0 ]; then
+          echo "Non-zero return value: $ret"
+          exit 1
+        fi
+        nbtmp2=$(find /tmp 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
+        if [ "$nbtmp1" != "$nbtmp2" ]; then
+          echo "Left temporary files!"
+          exit 1
+        fi
+    - name: create a pull request to ${{ github.ref_name }}-build
+      run: |
+        tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
+        mv ./dist/* .github $tmpdir/
+        rm -rf ./dist
+        git fetch origin ${{ github.ref_name }}-build
+        git checkout -f ${{ github.ref_name }}-build
+        mv $tmpdir/* .
+        rm -rf src/
+        mkdir -p .github
+        rsync -vaP --delete $tmpdir/.github/ .github/
+        git add --all
+        echo =#=#= DIFF CACHED
+        git diff --cached
+        echo =#=#= STATUS
+        git status
+        echo =#=#= COMMIT
+        git config --global user.name "github-actions[bot]"
+        git config --global user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
+        git log ${{ github.ref }} -1 --format=format:'%s%n%n built from commit %H%n dated %ai%n by %an (%ae)%n%n %b'
+        git log ${{ github.ref }} -1 --format=format:'%s%n%n built from commit %H%n dated %ai%n by %an (%ae)%n%n %b' | git commit -F -
+        git push

.github/workflows/expected_cve_count

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+23

.github/workflows/stale.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+name: 'Manage stale issues and PRs'
+
+on:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '37 7 * * *'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      action:
+        description: "dry-run"
+        required: true
+        default: "dryrun"
+        type: choice
+        options:
+          - dryrun
+          - apply
+
+permissions:
+  issues: write
+  pull-requests: write
+
+jobs:
+  stale:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/stale@v10
+        with:
+          any-of-labels: 'needs-more-info,answered'
+          labels-to-remove-when-unstale: 'needs-more-info,answered'
+          days-before-stale: 30
+          days-before-close: 7
+          stale-issue-label: stale
+          remove-stale-when-updated: true
+          debug-only: ${{ case(inputs.action == 'apply', false, true) }}

README.md

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ CVE | Name | Aliases
 [CVE-2019-11135](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11135) | TSX Asynchronous Abort | TAA, ZombieLoad V2
 [CVE-2018-12207](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-12207) | Machine Check Exception on Page Size Changes | iTLB Multihit, No eXcuses
 [CVE-2020-0543](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-0543) | Special Register Buffer Data Sampling | SRBDS, CROSSTalk
+[CVE-2022-29900](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-29900) | Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions | Retbleed (AMD)
+[CVE-2022-29901](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-29901) | Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions | Retbleed (Intel), RSBA
 [CVE-2022-40982](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-40982) | Gather Data Sampling | Downfall, GDS
 [CVE-2023-20569](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-20569) | Return Address Security | Inception, SRSO
 [CVE-2023-20593](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-20593) | Cross-Process Information Leak | Zenbleed
@@ -51,6 +53,8 @@ CVE-2019-11091 (MDSUM, RIDL) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + k
 CVE-2019-11135 (TAA, ZombieLoad V2) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + kernel update
 CVE-2018-12207 (iTLB Multihit, No eXcuses) | ✅ | ✅ | ☠️ | ✅ | Hypervisor update (or disable hugepages)
 CVE-2020-0543 (SRBDS, CROSSTalk) | 💥 (2) | 💥 (2) | 💥 (2) | 💥 (2) | Microcode + kernel update
+CVE-2022-29900 (Retbleed AMD) | 💥 | ✅ | 💥 | ✅ | Kernel update (+ microcode for IBPB)
+CVE-2022-29901 (Retbleed Intel, RSBA) | 💥 | ✅ | 💥 | ✅ | Microcode + kernel update (eIBRS or IBRS)
 CVE-2022-40982 (Downfall, GDS) | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | Microcode update (or disable AVX)
 CVE-2023-20569 (Inception, SRSO) | 💥 | ✅ | 💥 | ✅ | Microcode + kernel update
 CVE-2023-20593 (Zenbleed) | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | Microcode update (or kernel workaround)
@@ -129,6 +133,14 @@ A malicious guest VM can trigger a machine check exception (MCE) — crashing th
 
 Certain special CPU instructions (RDRAND, RDSEED, EGETKEY) read data through a shared staging buffer that is accessible across all cores via speculative execution. An attacker running code on any core can observe the output of these instructions from a victim on a different core, including extracting cryptographic keys from SGX enclaves (a complete ECDSA key was demonstrated). This is notable as one of the first cross-core speculative execution attacks. Mitigation requires a microcode update that serializes access to the staging buffer, plus a kernel update to manage the mitigation. Performance impact is low, mainly affecting workloads that heavily use RDRAND/RDSEED.
 
+**CVE-2022-29900 — Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions (Retbleed AMD)**
+
+On AMD processors from families 0x15 through 0x17 (Bulldozer through Zen 2) and Hygon family 0x18, an attacker can exploit return instructions to redirect speculative execution and leak kernel memory, bypassing retpoline mitigations that were effective against Spectre V2. Unlike Spectre V2 which targets indirect jumps and calls, Retbleed specifically targets return instructions, which were previously considered safe. Mitigation requires a kernel update providing either the untrained return thunk (safe RET) or IBPB-on-entry mechanism, plus a microcode update providing IBPB support on Zen 1/2. On Zen 1/2, SMT should be disabled for full protection when using IBPB-based mitigation. Performance impact is medium.
+
+**CVE-2022-29901 — Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions (Retbleed Intel, RSBA)**
+
+On Intel Skylake through Rocket Lake processors with RSB Alternate Behavior (RSBA), return instructions can be speculatively redirected via the Branch Target Buffer when the Return Stack Buffer underflows, bypassing retpoline mitigations. Mitigation requires either Enhanced IBRS (eIBRS, via microcode update) or a kernel compiled with IBRS-on-entry support (Linux 5.19+). Call depth tracking (stuffing) is an alternative mitigation available from Linux 6.2+. Plain retpoline does NOT mitigate this vulnerability on RSBA-capable CPUs. Performance impact is medium to high.
+
 **CVE-2022-40982 — Gather Data Sampling (GDS, Downfall)**
 
 The AVX GATHER instructions can leak data from previously used vector registers across privilege boundaries through the shared gather data buffer. This affects any software using AVX2 or AVX-512 on vulnerable Intel processors. Mitigation is provided by a microcode update that clears the gather buffer, or alternatively by disabling the AVX feature entirely. Performance impact is negligible for most workloads but can be significant (up to 50%) for AVX-heavy applications such as HPC and AI inference.
@@ -155,6 +167,13 @@ On AMD Zen 3 and Zen 4 processors, the CPU's transient scheduler may speculative
 
 </details>
 
+## Unsupported CVEs
+
+Several transient execution CVEs are not covered by this tool, for various reasons (duplicates, only
+affecting non-supported hardware or OS, theoretical with no known exploitation, etc.).
+The complete list along with the reason for each exclusion is available in the
+[UNSUPPORTED_CVE_LIST.md](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/blob/source/UNSUPPORTED_CVE_LIST.md) file.
+
 ## Scope
 
 Supported operating systems: