61 Commits
v0.05 ... v0.20

Author SHA1 Message Date
322f4efc8f fix broken logic of 68961f9, increment version to 0.20 2018-01-09 14:55:12 +01:00
19b01078c2 Merge pull request #32 from speed47/arm
adding known non-vulnerable ARM chips
2018-01-09 13:57:27 +01:00
68961f98c2 adding known non-vulnerable ARM chips 2018-01-09 13:11:48 +01:00
f0f2ea9b11 v0.19: introduce --no-color 2018-01-09 10:32:51 +01:00
6f1bdba1d9 bump to v0.18 to reflect changes 2018-01-09 09:21:42 +01:00
7b05105a54 Merge pull request #25 from Feandil/proc_config
When using /proc/config.gz, indicate it more clearly
2018-01-09 09:19:36 +01:00
8aed2d4086 Merge pull request #26 from Feandil/proc_kallsym
Use /proc/kallsyms to get symbols, if available
2018-01-09 09:17:18 +01:00
f4140a992a Use /proc/kallsyms to get symbols, if available 2018-01-09 08:58:09 +01:00
2c51b00a90 When using /proc/config.gz, indicate it more clearly 2018-01-09 08:54:07 +01:00
2d94514c07 adding mention of heuristic for variant 1 check 2018-01-09 08:43:52 +01:00
0e8f97afbc Merge pull request #24 from angus-p/Remove-extra-space
remove superfluous space from test line 315
2018-01-09 08:34:10 +01:00
70323a30da Merge pull request #23 from mradcliffe/issue-22
Increases tmp directory uniqueness to 6 characters to support Slackware
2018-01-09 08:33:32 +01:00
cc0b325383 remove superfluous space from test line 315
Extra space was causing non-existent variable to be tested resulting in 'YES' if running in live mode and IBRS compiled in
2018-01-09 03:47:25 +00:00
4454f03136 Increases tmp directory uniqueness to 6 characters to support Slackware 2018-01-08 22:28:55 -05:00
949f316f89 missed version bump + README typofix 2018-01-08 23:15:42 +01:00
5082afae61 Merge pull request #19 from speed47/offline_mode
implement offline mode and help
2018-01-08 23:13:19 +01:00
d73a24cb5b implement offline mode and help 2018-01-08 23:09:17 +01:00
75332e6e0f Merge pull request #18 from GrimKriegor/linux-libre_support
Linux-libre support
2018-01-08 23:07:41 +01:00
2d33a4369e Linux-libre support 2018-01-08 21:56:11 +00:00
8d4d295309 bump to v0.16 to reflect changes 2018-01-08 17:48:20 +01:00
1ff437edbb Merge pull request #16 from Alkorin/fixes
Fixes
2018-01-08 17:45:59 +01:00
34656827f5 detect retpoline-compliant compiler from latest LKML patches 2018-01-08 17:32:19 +01:00
8c8a8d35fd Detect if 'readelf' is present 2018-01-08 16:52:09 +01:00
debd10b517 Detect if 'strings' is present 2018-01-08 16:51:20 +01:00
21f81ff5c9 Detect if uncompress binaries are present 2018-01-08 16:51:14 +01:00
206e4b7fbc add detection of retpoline-aware compiler 2018-01-08 16:28:00 +01:00
1a14483c98 Use 'readelf' instead of 'file' to detect kernel 2018-01-08 15:56:19 +01:00
26564206db Do not execute checks if we already found that PTI is enabled 2018-01-08 15:56:19 +01:00
207168e097 detect if the used compiler supports retpoline (WIP) 2018-01-08 15:45:09 +01:00
f8ca11e56a Merge pull request #12 from sebastianw/fix-double-print
Remove superfluous 'YES' output when checking cpuinfo
2018-01-08 15:05:15 +01:00
c88acdd31d Remove superfluous 'YES' output when checking cpuinfo 2018-01-08 14:50:59 +01:00
88df48f4a7 Merge pull request #11 from sebastianw/kaiser-cpu-flag
Recognize 'kaiser' flag in /proc/cpuinfo
2018-01-08 14:45:40 +01:00
124ce8e27a Recognize 'kaiser' flag in /proc/cpuinfo 2018-01-08 14:38:43 +01:00
7bbcfe0df7 Merge pull request #7 from Feandil/redhat
Redhat support
2018-01-08 14:17:33 +01:00
a792348928 RedHat uses a different configuration name 2018-01-08 12:59:12 +01:00
66f7708095 Refactor RedHat support:
- Isolate file check to different elif (allowing to add more)
- Do the PTI debugfs check first (faster and supposed to be dynamic)
- If pti_enable is 0, don't trust dmesg (supposed to be dynamic)
2018-01-08 12:59:03 +01:00
34ef5ef21b Delay umount (for RedHat access to pti_enable) 2018-01-08 12:58:22 +01:00
edbdf0da1f push the lfence opcodes threshold to 70 2018-01-08 12:49:23 +01:00
68adbfdf14 Merge pull request #10 from Alkorin/permissionDenied
Avoid 'cat: /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled: Permission denied'
2018-01-08 12:44:09 +01:00
47c30babf1 Avoid 'cat: /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled: Permission denied' 2018-01-08 12:41:28 +01:00
ef7a5c4cf6 adding uname -v to get potential additional vendor information 2018-01-08 12:22:56 +01:00
4406910bea Merge pull request #8 from Feandil/debugfs
Fix debugfs mount check
2018-01-08 12:19:23 +01:00
b7197d6f54 Fix debugfs mount check 2018-01-08 12:15:51 +01:00
c792fa35bf add kernel version information to the output 2018-01-08 12:14:12 +01:00
d1498fe03f Merge pull request #5 from fccagou/centos
fix(centos): check according to redhat patch.
2018-01-08 12:10:07 +01:00
12bdd0e412 root check is now more visible 2018-01-08 11:31:19 +01:00
89f9bef577 Merge pull request #4 from dguglielmi/add-genkernel-support
Add support for Gentoo genkernel image path
2018-01-08 11:24:07 +01:00
0f50e04dab fix(centos): check according to redhat patch. https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301 2018-01-08 11:14:22 +01:00
bf056ae73d Add support for Gentoo genkernel image path 2018-01-08 11:08:53 +01:00
623e180ae1 Merge pull request #3 from TheHendla/arch_boot_img
add arch linux bootimage path
2018-01-08 10:51:59 +01:00
40a9d43c44 add arch linux bootimage path 2018-01-08 10:36:29 +01:00
c1004d5171 fix extract-vmlinux for non-gzip 2018-01-08 09:56:29 +01:00
fa0850466e add some comments, enhance pti detection 2018-01-08 09:37:54 +01:00
5c14384e15 Merge pull request #1 from t-nelis/root-check
Improve "running as root" check
2018-01-08 08:58:21 +01:00
1aaca63dcf Improve "running as root" check
Small issue with the USER environment variable:

  $ echo $USER
  thib
  $ sudo sh -c 'echo $USER'
  thib
  $ sudo -i sh -c 'echo $USER'
  root

Rather than recommending users to use sudo --login / -i, use the (very
widespread/portable) id program to retrieve the effective user ID
instead and don't change the recommendation.

  $ id -u
  1000
  $ sudo id -u
  0
  $ sudo -i id -u
  0
2018-01-08 01:22:14 +01:00
96dfa03c00 fix for uncompressed vmlinux case 2018-01-08 00:45:12 +01:00
05c79425ab detect kpti directly in vmlinux if option is not there 2018-01-07 22:47:41 +01:00
9def0c949a update readme 2018-01-07 20:13:10 +01:00
64eb1d005c add couple missing elses 2018-01-07 18:49:15 +01:00
bffda8b3e7 remove dependency on rdmsr 2018-01-07 18:36:56 +01:00
13f2133a97 cosmetic fix 2018-01-07 18:14:08 +01:00
2 changed files with 614 additions and 200 deletions

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@ -1,51 +1,96 @@
Spectre & Meltdown Checker Spectre & Meltdown Checker
========================== ==========================
A simple shell script to tell if your Linux installation is vulnerable A simple shell script to tell if your Linux installation is vulnerable against the 3 "speculative execution" CVEs.
against the 3 "speculative execution" CVEs:
CVE-2017-5753 bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1) Without options, it'll inspect you currently running kernel.
You can also specify a kernel image on the command line, if you'd like to inspect a kernel you're not running.
The script will do its best to detect mitigations, including backported non-vanilla patches, regardless of the advertised kernel version number.
## Quick summary of the CVEs
**CVE-2017-5753** bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1)
- Impact: Kernel & all software - Impact: Kernel & all software
- Mitigation: recompile software *and* kernel with a modified compiler that introduces the LFENCE opcode at the proper positions in the resulting code - Mitigation: recompile software *and* kernel with a modified compiler that introduces the LFENCE opcode at the proper positions in the resulting code
- Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible - Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible
CVE-2017-5715: branch target injection (Spectre Variant 2) **CVE-2017-5715** branch target injection (Spectre Variant 2)
- Impact: Kernel - Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation 1: new opcode via microcode update that should be used by up to date compilers to protect the BTB (by flushing indirect branch predictors) - Mitigation 1: new opcode via microcode update that should be used by up to date compilers to protect the BTB (by flushing indirect branch predictors)
- Mitigation 2: introducing "retpoline" into compilers, and recompile software/OS with it - Mitigation 2: introducing "retpoline" into compilers, and recompile software/OS with it
- Performance impact of the mitigation: high for mitigation 1, medium for mitigation 2, depending on your CPU - Performance impact of the mitigation: high for mitigation 1, medium for mitigation 2, depending on your CPU
CVE-2017-5754: rogue data cache load (Meltdown) **CVE-2017-5754** rogue data cache load (Meltdown)
- Impact: Kernel - Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough - Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough
- Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium - Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium
Example of the output of the script: ## Example of script output
### Ubuntu LTS (before official patches)
``` ```
$ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh $ sudo ./spectre-and-meltdown.sh
Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.02 Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.16
Checking for vulnerabilities against live running kernel Linux 4.4.0-104-generic #127-Ubuntu SMP Mon Dec 11 12:16:42 UTC 2017 x86_64
Will use vmlinux image /boot/vmlinuz-4.4.0-104-generic
Will use kconfig /boot/config-4.4.0-104-generic
Will use System.map file /boot/System.map-4.4.0-104-generic
CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1' CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: NO (only 38 opcodes found, should be >= 60) * Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: NO (only 38 opcodes found, should be >= 70)
> STATUS: VULNERABLE > STATUS: VULNERABLE
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2' CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
* Mitigation 1 * Mitigation 1
* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO * Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO
* Kernel support for IBRS: NO * Kernel support for IBRS: NO
* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: NO * IBRS enabled for Kernel space: NO
* IBRS enabled for User space: NO * IBRS enabled for User space: NO
* Mitigation 2 * Mitigation 2
* Kernel recompiled with retpolines: UNKNOWN (check not yet implemented) * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: NO
> STATUS: VULNERABLE (IBRS hardware + kernel support OR retpolines-compiled kernel are needed to mitigate the vulnerability) * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: NO
> STATUS: VULNERABLE (IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3' CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES * Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): NO
* PTI enabled and active: YES * PTI enabled and active: NO
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (PTI mitigates the vulnerability) > STATUS: VULNERABLE (PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
```
### First patched kernel of RHEL6
```
$ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --kernel /tmp/vmlinuz-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64 --config /tmp/config-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64 --map /tmp/System.map-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.16
Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel
Will use vmlinux image /tmp/vmlinuz-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
Will use kconfig /tmp/config-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
Will use System.map file /tmp/System.map-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: YES (84 opcodes found, which is >= 70)
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
* Mitigation 1
* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO
* Kernel support for IBRS: YES
* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: N/A (not testable in offline mode)
* IBRS enabled for User space: N/A (not testable in offline mode)
* Mitigation 2
* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: NO
* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: NO
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime)
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
* PTI enabled and active: N/A (can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode)
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime)
``` ```

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@ -1,21 +1,39 @@
#! /bin/sh #! /bin/sh
# Spectre & Meltdown checker # Spectre & Meltdown checker
#
# Check for the latest version at:
# https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker
# git clone https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker.git
# or wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/master/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
#
# Stephane Lesimple # Stephane Lesimple
VERSION=0.05 #
VERSION=0.20
# print status function
pstatus() pstatus()
{ {
case "$1" in if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ]; then
red) col="\033[101m\033[30m";; _echo_nol "$2"
green) col="\033[102m\033[30m";; else
yellow) col="\033[103m\033[30m";; case "$1" in
*) col="";; red) col="\033[101m\033[30m";;
esac green) col="\033[102m\033[30m";;
/bin/echo -ne "$col $2 \033[0m" yellow) col="\033[103m\033[30m";;
[ -n "$3" ] && /bin/echo -n " ($3)" blue) col="\033[104m\033[30m";;
/bin/echo *) col="";;
esac
_echo_nol "$col $2 \033[0m"
fi
[ -n "$3" ] && _echo_nol " ($3)"
_echo
} }
# The 3 below functions are taken from the extract-linux script, available here:
# https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/scripts/extract-vmlinux
# The functions have been modified for better integration to this script
# The original header of the file has been retained below
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------- # ----------------------------------------------------------------------
# extract-vmlinux - Extract uncompressed vmlinux from a kernel image # extract-vmlinux - Extract uncompressed vmlinux from a kernel image
# #
@ -27,233 +45,584 @@ pstatus()
# Licensed under the GNU General Public License, version 2 (GPLv2). # Licensed under the GNU General Public License, version 2 (GPLv2).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------- # ----------------------------------------------------------------------
vmlinux=''
vmlinux_err=''
check_vmlinux() check_vmlinux()
{ {
file "$1" 2>/dev/null | grep -q ELF || return 1 readelf -h $1 > /dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
return 0 return 0
} }
try_decompress() try_decompress()
{ {
# The obscure use of the "tr" filter is to work around older versions of # The obscure use of the "tr" filter is to work around older versions of
# "grep" that report the byte offset of the line instead of the pattern. # "grep" that report the byte offset of the line instead of the pattern.
# Try to find the header ($1) and decompress from here # Try to find the header ($1) and decompress from here
for pos in `tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$img" | grep -abo "^$2"` for pos in `tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$5" | grep -abo "^$2"`
do do
pos=${pos%%:*} if ! which $3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
tail -c+$pos "$img" | $3 > $vmlinuxtmp 2> /dev/null vmlinux_err="missing '$3' tool, please install it, usually it's in the '$4' package"
check_vmlinux $vmlinuxtmp && echo $vmlinuxtmp || rm -f $vmlinuxtmp return 0
done fi
pos=${pos%%:*}
tail -c+$pos "$5" | $3 > $vmlinuxtmp 2> /dev/null
check_vmlinux "$vmlinuxtmp" && vmlinux=$vmlinuxtmp && return 0
done
return 1
} }
extract_vmlinux() extract_vmlinux()
{ {
img="$1" [ -n "$1" ] || return 1
# Prepare temp files: # Prepare temp files:
vmlinuxtmp=$(mktemp /tmp/vmlinux-XXX) vmlinuxtmp="$(mktemp /tmp/vmlinux-XXXXXX)"
trap "rm -f $vmlinuxtmp" EXIT
# Initial attempt for uncompressed images or objects: # Initial attempt for uncompressed images or objects:
check_vmlinux $img if check_vmlinux "$1"; then
cat "$1" > "$vmlinuxtmp"
vmlinux=$vmlinuxtmp
return 0
fi
# That didn't work, so retry after decompression. # That didn't work, so retry after decompression.
try_decompress '\037\213\010' xy gunzip || \ try_decompress '\037\213\010' xy gunzip gunzip "$1" && return 0
try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000' abcde unxz || \ try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000' abcde unxz xz-utils "$1" && return 0
try_decompress 'BZh' xy bunzip2 || \ try_decompress 'BZh' xy bunzip2 bzip2 "$1" && return 0
try_decompress '\135\0\0\0' xxx unlzma || \ try_decompress '\135\0\0\0' xxx unlzma xz-utils "$1" && return 0
try_decompress '\211\114\132' xy 'lzop -d' try_decompress '\211\114\132' xy 'lzop -d' lzop "$1" && return 0
return 1
} }
# end of extract-vmlinux functions
/bin/echo "Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION" show_usage()
/bin/echo {
cat <<EOF
Usage:
Live mode: $0 [options] [--live]
Offline mode: $0 [options] [--kernel <vmlinux_file>] [--config <kernel_config>] [--map <kernel_map_file>]
# SPECTRE 1 Modes:
/bin/echo -e "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m" Two modes are available.
/bin/echo -n "* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: "
status=0 First mode is the "live" mode (default), it does its best to find information about the currently running kernel.
img='' To run under this mode, just start the script without any option (you can also use --live explicitely)
[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r) ] && img=/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)
[ -e /boot/vmlinux-$(uname -r) ] && img=/boot/vmlinux-$(uname -r) Second mode is the "offline" mode, where you can inspect a non-running kernel.
[ -e /boot/bzImage-$(uname -r) ] && img=/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r) You'll need to specify the location of the vmlinux file, and if possible, the corresponding config and System.map files:
if [ -z "$img" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image in /boot" --kernel vmlinux_file Specify a (possibly compressed) vmlinux file
else --config kernel_config Specify a kernel config file
vmlinux=$(extract_vmlinux $img) --map kernel_map_file Specify a kernel System.map file
if [ -z "$vmlinux" -o ! -r "$vmlinux" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't extract your kernel" Options:
elif ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then --no-color Don't use color codes
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
else EOF
nb_lfence=$(objdump -D "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence) }
if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 60 ]; then
pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 60" __echo()
status=1 {
else opt="$1"
pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 60" shift
status=2 msg="$@"
if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ] ; then
# strip ANSI color codes
msg=$(echo "$msg" | sed -r "s/\x1B\[([0-9]{1,2}(;[0-9]{1,2})?)?[m|K]//g")
fi
# explicitely call /bin/echo to avoid shell builtins that might not take options
/bin/echo $opt -e "$msg"
}
_echo()
{
__echo '' "$@"
}
_echo_nol()
{
__echo -n "$@"
}
is_cpu_vulnerable()
{
# param: 1, 2 or 3 (variant)
# returns 1 if vulnerable, 0 if not vulnerable, 255 on error
# by default, everything is vulnerable, we work in a "whitelist" logic here.
# usage: is_cpu_vulnerable 2 && do something if vulnerable
variant1=0
variant2=0
variant3=0
if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then
variant1=0
variant2=1
variant3=1
elif grep -qi 'CPU implementer : 0x41' /proc/cpuinfo; then
# ARM
# reference: https://developer.arm.com/support/security-update
cpupart=$(awk '/CPU part :/ {print $4;exit}' /proc/cpuinfo)
cpuarch=$(awk '/CPU architecture:/ {print $3;exit}' /proc/cpuinfo)
if [ -n "$cpupart" -a -n "$cpuarch" ]; then
# Cortex-R7 and Cortex-R8 are real-time and only used in medical devices or such
# I can't find their CPU part number, but it's probably not that useful anyway
# model R7 R8 A9 A15 A17 A57 A72 A73 A75
# part ? ? 0xc09 0xc0f 0xc0e 0xd07 0xd08 0xd09 0xd0a
# arch 7? 7? 7 7 7 8 8 8 8
if [ "$cpuarch" = 7 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(c09|c0f|c0e)$'; then
# armv7 vulnerable chips
variant1=0
variant2=0
elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(d07|d08|d09|d0a)$'; then
# armv8 vulnerable chips
variant1=0
variant2=0
else
variant1=1
variant2=1
fi
# for variant3, only A75 is vulnerable
if [ "$cpuarch" = 8 -a "$cpupart" = 0xd0a ]; then
variant3=0
else
variant3=1
fi
fi fi
rm -f $vmlinux fi
[ "$1" = 1 ] && return $variant1
[ "$1" = 2 ] && return $variant2
[ "$1" = 3 ] && return $variant3
return 255
}
_echo "\033[1;34mSpectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION\033[0m"
_echo
# parse options
opt_kernel=''
opt_config=''
opt_map=''
opt_live_explicit=0
opt_live=1
opt_no_color=0
parse_opt_file()
{
# parse_opt_file option_name option_value
option_name="$1"
option_value="$2"
if [ -z "$option_value" ]; then
show_usage
echo "$0: error: --$option_name expects one parameter (a file)" >&2
exit 1
elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then
echo "$0: error: couldn't find file $option_value" >&2
exit 1
elif [ ! -f "$option_value" ]; then
echo "$0: error: $option_value is not a file" >&2
exit 1
elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then
echo "$0: error: couldn't read $option_value (are you root?)" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "$option_value"
exit 0
}
while [ -n "$1" ]; do
if [ "$1" = "--kernel" ]; then
opt_kernel=$(parse_opt_file kernel "$2")
[ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $?
shift 2
opt_live=0
elif [ "$1" = "--config" ]; then
opt_config=$(parse_opt_file config "$2")
[ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $?
shift 2
opt_live=0
elif [ "$1" = "--map" ]; then
opt_map=$(parse_opt_file map "$2")
[ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $?
shift 2
opt_live=0
elif [ "$1" = "--live" ]; then
opt_live_explicit=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--no-color" ]; then
opt_no_color=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "-h" -o "$1" = "--help" ]; then
show_usage
exit 0
else
show_usage
echo "$0: error: unknown option '$1'"
exit 1
fi
done
# check for mode selection inconsistency
if [ "$opt_live_explicit" = 1 ]; then
if [ -n "$opt_kernel" -o -n "$opt_config" -o -n "$opt_map" ]; then
show_usage
echo "$0: error: incompatible modes specified, use either --live or --kernel/--config/--map"
exit 1
fi fi
fi fi
/bin/echo -ne "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m " # root check (only for live mode, for offline mode, we already checked if we could read the files)
[ "$status" = 0 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
[ "$status" = 1 ] && pstatus red VULNERABLE
[ "$status" = 2 ] && pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE'
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
_echo "\033[31mNote that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information.\033[0m"
_echo "\033[31mWe'll proceed but you might see permission denied errors.\033[0m"
_echo "\033[31mTo run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0\033[0m"
_echo
fi
_echo "Checking for vulnerabilities against live running kernel \033[35m"$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)"\033[0m"
# try to find the image of the current running kernel
[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-linux
[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre
[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)
[ -e /boot/kernel-$( uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)
[ -e /boot/bzImage-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)
[ -e /boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)
# system.map
if [ -e /proc/kallsyms ] ; then
opt_map="/proc/kallsyms"
elif [ -e /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) ] ; then
opt_map=/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)
fi
# config
if [ -e /proc/config.gz ] ; then
dumped_config="$(mktemp /tmp/config-XXXXXX)"
gunzip -c /proc/config.gz > $dumped_config
# dumped_config will be deleted at the end of the script
opt_config=$dumped_config
elif [ -e /boot/config-$(uname -r) ]; then
opt_config=/boot/config-$(uname -r)
fi
else
_echo "Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel"
fi
if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ]; then
_echo "Will use vmlinux image \033[35m$opt_kernel\033[0m"
else
_echo "Will use no vmlinux image (accuracy might be reduced)"
fi
if [ -n "$dumped_config" ]; then
_echo "Will use kconfig \033[35m/proc/config.gz\033[0m"
elif [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
_echo "Will use kconfig \033[35m$opt_config\033[0m"
else
_echo "Will use no kconfig (accuracy might be reduced)"
fi
if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
_echo "Will use System.map file \033[35m$opt_map\033[0m"
else
_echo "Will use no System.map file (accuracy might be reduced)"
fi
if [ -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then
if ! which readelf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
vmlinux_err="missing 'readelf' tool, please install it, usually it's in the 'binutils' package"
else
extract_vmlinux "$opt_kernel"
fi
else
vmlinux_err="couldn't find your kernel image in /boot, if you used neboot, this is normal"
fi
if [ -z "$vmlinux" -o ! -r "$vmlinux" ]; then
[ -z "$vmlinux_err" ] && vmlinux_err="couldn't extract your kernel from $opt_kernel"
fi
_echo
###########
# SPECTRE 1
_echo "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m"
_echo_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: "
status=0
if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$vmlinux_err"
else
if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
else
# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurences of the LFENCE opcode
# in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+)
# v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches,
# so let's push the threshold to 70.
# TODO LKML patch is starting to dump LFENCE in favor of the PAUSE opcode, we might need to check that (patch not stabilized yet)
nb_lfence=$(objdump -D "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence)
if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 70 ]; then
pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 70"
status=1
else
pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 70"
status=2
fi
fi
fi
_echo_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then
pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE' "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
else
[ "$status" = 0 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
[ "$status" = 1 ] && pstatus red 'VULNERABLE' 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available'
[ "$status" = 2 ] && pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE' 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available'
fi
###########
# VARIANT 2 # VARIANT 2
/bin/echo _echo
/bin/echo -e "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m" _echo "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m"
/bin/echo "* Mitigation 1" _echo "* Mitigation 1"
/bin/echo -n "* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: " _echo_nol "* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: "
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1 modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1
fi fi
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?" pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
else else
if which rdmsr >/dev/null 2>&1; then # the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48
rdmsr 0x48 >/dev/null 2>&1 # here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x48' but without needing the rdmsr tool
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then # if we get a read error, the MSR is not there
pstatus green YES dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 skip=9 2>/dev/null
else if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
pstatus red NO pstatus green YES
fi
else else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'rdmsr' tool, please install it, usually it's in the msr-tools package" pstatus red NO
# doesn't work:
#dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=1 count=8 skip=72 2>/dev/null
#if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
# pstatus green YES
#else
# pstatus red NO
#fi
fi fi
fi fi
if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then
# if we used modprobe ourselves, rmmod the module
rmmod msr 2>/dev/null rmmod msr 2>/dev/null
fi fi
/bin/echo -n "* Kernel support for IBRS: " _echo_nol "* Kernel support for IBRS: "
if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1 if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then
# try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards
mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1
fi
if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ]; then
# if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in
pstatus green YES
ibrs_supported=1
ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled ]; then
# RedHat uses a different path (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301)
pstatus green YES
ibrs_supported=1
ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
fi
fi fi
if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ]; then if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
pstatus green YES if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then
ibrs_supported=1 pstatus green YES
else ibrs_supported=1
fi
fi
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then
pstatus red NO pstatus red NO
fi fi
ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null) _echo_nol "* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: "
/bin/echo -n "* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: " if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
case "$ibrs_enabled" in # 0 means disabled
"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;; # 1 is enabled only for kernel space
0) pstatus red NO;; # 2 is enabled for kernel and user space
1 | 2) pstatus green YES;; case "$ibrs_enabled" in
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;; "") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
esac 0) pstatus red NO;;
1 | 2) pstatus green YES;;
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
esac
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
/bin/echo -n "* IBRS enabled for User space: " _echo_nol "* IBRS enabled for User space: "
case "$ibrs_enabled" in if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;; case "$ibrs_enabled" in
0 | 1) pstatus red NO;; "") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
2) pstatus green YES;; 0 | 1) pstatus red NO;;
*) pstatus yellow unknown;; 2) pstatus green YES;;
esac *) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
esac
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
_echo "* Mitigation 2"
_echo_nol "* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: "
# We check the RETPOLINE kernel options
if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then
pstatus green YES
retpoline=1
else
pstatus red NO
fi
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration"
fi
_echo_nol "* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: "
# Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm
# For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles)
# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79
# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set
# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol
if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
# look for the symbol
if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then
retpoline_compiler=1
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map"
else
pstatus red NO
fi
elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
# look for the symbol
if which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol
if nm "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then
retpoline_compiler=1
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux symbols"
else
pstatus red NO
fi
elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then
# if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have
# any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary
retpoline_compiler=1
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux"
else
pstatus red NO
fi
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map"
fi
_echo_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then
pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE' "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "retpoline mitigate the vulnerability"
elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability"
else
pstatus red VULNERABLE "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
else
if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
else
pstatus red VULNERABLE "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
fi
##########
# MELTDOWN
_echo
_echo "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m"
_echo_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
kpti_support=0
kpti_can_tell=0
if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
kpti_can_tell=1
if grep -Eq '^\(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION\|CONFIG_KAISER\)=y' "$opt_config"; then
kpti_support=1
fi
fi
if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
# it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch
# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
kpti_can_tell=1
if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then
kpti_support=1
fi
fi
if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
# same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the
# nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option)
kpti_can_tell=1
if ! which strings >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
else
if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then
kpti_support=1
fi
fi
fi
if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
pstatus red NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file"
fi
_echo_nol "* PTI enabled and active: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then
# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
kpti_enabled=1
elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then
# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
kpti_enabled=1
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then
# RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)
elif dmesg | grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled'; then
# if we can't find the flag, grep in dmesg
kpti_enabled=1
else
kpti_enabled=0
fi
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus red NO
fi
else
pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode"
fi
if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then
# umount debugfs if we did mount it ourselves
umount /sys/kernel/debug umount /sys/kernel/debug
fi fi
/bin/echo "* Mitigation 2" _echo_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
/bin/echo -n "* Kernel recompiled with retpolines: " if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then
# XXX this doesn't mean the kernel has been compiled with a retpoline-aware gcc pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE' "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
if [ -e /proc/config.gz ]; then elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if zgrep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' /proc/config.gz; then if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
retpoline=1
else else
pstatus red NO pstatus red "VULNERABLE" "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
elif [ -e /boot/config-$(uname -r) ]; then
if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' /boot/config-$(uname -r); then
pstatus green YES
retpoline=1
else
pstatus red NO
fi
fi
/bin/echo -ne "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "your CPU is not vulnerable as per the vendor"
elif [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability"
elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "retpolines mitigate the vulnerability"
else
pstatus red VULNERABLE "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpolines are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
# MELTDOWN
/bin/echo
/bin/echo -e "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m"
/bin/echo -n "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
if [ -e /proc/config.gz ]; then
if zgrep -q '^CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y' /proc/config.gz; then
pstatus green YES
kpti_support=1
else
pstatus red NO
fi
elif [ -e /boot/config-$(uname -r) ]; then
if grep -q '^CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y' /boot/config-$(uname -r); then
pstatus green YES
kpti_support=1
else
pstatus red NO
fi
elif [ -e /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) ]; then
if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled /boot/System.map-$(uname -r); then
pstatus green YES
kpti_support=1
else
pstatus red NO
fi fi
else else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
else
pstatus red "VULNERABLE" "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
fi fi
/bin/echo -n "* PTI enabled and active: " _echo
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then
pstatus green YES
kpti_enabled=1
elif dmesg | grep -q 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled'; then
pstatus green YES
kpti_enabled=1
else
pstatus red NO
fi
/bin/echo -ne "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "your CPU is not vulnerable as per the vendor"
elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
else
pstatus red "VULNERABLE" "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
/bin/echo
if [ "$USER" != root ]; then
/bin/echo "Note that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information"
/bin/echo "You can try the following command: sudo $0"
fi
[ -n "$dumped_config" ] && rm -f "$dumped_config"