26 Commits
v0.19 ... v0.23

Author SHA1 Message Date
ffc542eb82 bump to v0.23 to reflect changes 2018-01-10 15:25:55 +01:00
74bc7ba637 add --variant to specify what check we want to run 2018-01-10 15:22:30 +01:00
5389ac6844 Merge pull request #41 from bang-communications/master
NRPE mode
2018-01-10 15:11:45 +01:00
36fb83215a Merge pull request #42 from simon-vasseur/style
added some style (screenshot in readme)
2018-01-10 15:07:34 +01:00
59fe8c2ad8 Error on unknown batch format 2018-01-10 13:57:10 +00:00
b8d28e7f61 added some style 2018-01-10 14:55:58 +01:00
7c11d07865 Stray tab 2018-01-10 11:59:33 +00:00
7c5cfbb8c3 batch nrpe 2018-01-10 11:57:45 +00:00
381038eceb NRPE mode 2018-01-10 11:18:45 +00:00
d6e4aa43f0 Merge pull request #37 from deufrai/better-dmesg-support
Improve PTI detection
2018-01-09 19:52:45 +01:00
e5e09384f0 typofix 2018-01-09 18:54:35 +01:00
7222367f04 add disclaimer and bump to 0.21 2018-01-09 18:52:21 +01:00
ab512687cf Merge pull request #38 from Alkorin/fixARM
Fix ARM checks
2018-01-09 18:47:25 +01:00
a5aaa790a0 Merge pull request #39 from Alkorin/typo
Fix small typo in error message
2018-01-09 18:45:58 +01:00
335439dee0 Fix small typo in error message 2018-01-09 18:44:15 +01:00
45297b6f7d Fix ARM checks 2018-01-09 18:41:48 +01:00
a7b14306d5 Improve PTI detection even more
when PTI detection relies on dmesg, dmesg output is checked first
then /var/log/dmesg if dmesg output lacks boot time messages
2018-01-09 18:26:32 +01:00
608952ff71 Improve PTI detection
In case of a busy or misconfigured server, kernel message buffer loop
can be filled with messages broadcasted later than boot time. So dmesg
command wont return boot time messages.

Grepping /var/log/dmesg fixes it and this log file location semms pretty
standard across many common distros
2018-01-09 18:17:39 +01:00
1c3d349667 Merge pull request #31 from Feandil/batch
Add a "batch" and "verbose" mode
2018-01-09 18:12:39 +01:00
b93b13263d fix(pti): remove escapes since we use grep -E now 2018-01-09 16:01:44 +01:00
ad342cab06 Introduce "verbose" and "batch" modes
Rewrite the way the output is processed:
- Define verbosity level (currently warn, info (default) & verbose)
- Add a batch mode, for simple machine parsing
2018-01-09 15:58:13 +01:00
5fd85e288b No-color: interpret string (-e) to be able to mach \x1B 2018-01-09 15:57:10 +01:00
322f4efc8f fix broken logic of 68961f9, increment version to 0.20 2018-01-09 14:55:12 +01:00
b6bfcdbd45 Move configuration at the beginning of the script 2018-01-09 14:18:02 +01:00
19b01078c2 Merge pull request #32 from speed47/arm
adding known non-vulnerable ARM chips
2018-01-09 13:57:27 +01:00
68961f98c2 adding known non-vulnerable ARM chips 2018-01-09 13:11:48 +01:00
2 changed files with 633 additions and 444 deletions

View File

@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ You can also specify a kernel image on the command line, if you'd like to inspec
The script will do its best to detect mitigations, including backported non-vanilla patches, regardless of the advertised kernel version number.
## Example of script output
![checker](https://framapic.org/FjroIZximyoM/EO5msoSMKb6L.png)
## Quick summary of the CVEs
**CVE-2017-5753** bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1)
@ -28,69 +32,3 @@ The script will do its best to detect mitigations, including backported non-vani
- Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough
- Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium
## Example of script output
### Ubuntu LTS (before official patches)
```
$ sudo ./spectre-and-meltdown.sh
Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.16
Checking for vulnerabilities against live running kernel Linux 4.4.0-104-generic #127-Ubuntu SMP Mon Dec 11 12:16:42 UTC 2017 x86_64
Will use vmlinux image /boot/vmlinuz-4.4.0-104-generic
Will use kconfig /boot/config-4.4.0-104-generic
Will use System.map file /boot/System.map-4.4.0-104-generic
CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: NO (only 38 opcodes found, should be >= 70)
> STATUS: VULNERABLE
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
* Mitigation 1
* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO
* Kernel support for IBRS: NO
* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: NO
* IBRS enabled for User space: NO
* Mitigation 2
* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: NO
* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: NO
> STATUS: VULNERABLE (IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): NO
* PTI enabled and active: NO
> STATUS: VULNERABLE (PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
```
### First patched kernel of RHEL6
```
$ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --kernel /tmp/vmlinuz-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64 --config /tmp/config-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64 --map /tmp/System.map-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.16
Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel
Will use vmlinux image /tmp/vmlinuz-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
Will use kconfig /tmp/config-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
Will use System.map file /tmp/System.map-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: YES (84 opcodes found, which is >= 70)
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
* Mitigation 1
* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO
* Kernel support for IBRS: YES
* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: N/A (not testable in offline mode)
* IBRS enabled for User space: N/A (not testable in offline mode)
* Mitigation 2
* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: NO
* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: NO
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime)
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
* PTI enabled and active: N/A (can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode)
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime)
```

View File

@ -8,13 +8,296 @@
#
# Stephane Lesimple
#
VERSION=0.19
VERSION=0.23
# Script configuration
show_usage()
{
cat <<EOF
Usage:
Live mode: $0 [options] [--live]
Offline mode: $0 [options] [--kernel <vmlinux_file>] [--config <kernel_config>] [--map <kernel_map_file>]
Modes:
Two modes are available.
First mode is the "live" mode (default), it does its best to find information about the currently running kernel.
To run under this mode, just start the script without any option (you can also use --live explicitely)
Second mode is the "offline" mode, where you can inspect a non-running kernel.
You'll need to specify the location of the vmlinux file, and if possible, the corresponding config and System.map files:
--kernel vmlinux_file Specify a (possibly compressed) vmlinux file
--config kernel_config Specify a kernel config file
--map kernel_map_file Specify a kernel System.map file
Options:
--no-color Don't use color codes
-v, --verbose Increase verbosity level
--batch text Produce machine readable output, this is the default if --batch is specified alone
--batch nrpe Produce machine readable output formatted for NRPE
--variant [1,2,3] Specify which variant you'd like to check, by default all variants are checked
Can be specified multiple times (e.g. --variant 2 --variant 3)
IMPORTANT:
A false sense of security is worse than no security at all.
Please use the --disclaimer option to understand exactly what this script does.
EOF
}
show_disclaimer()
{
cat <<EOF
Disclaimer:
This tool does its best to determine whether your system is immune (or has proper mitigations in place) for the
collectively named "speculative execution" vulnerabilities. It doesn't attempt to run any kind of exploit, and can't guarantee
that your system is secure, but rather helps you verifying whether your system has the known correct mitigations in place.
However, some mitigations could also exist in your kernel that this script doesn't know (yet) how to detect, or it might
falsely detect mitigations that in the end don't work as expected (for example, on backported or modified kernels).
Your system exposure also depends on your CPU. As of now, AMD and ARM processors are marked as immune to some or all of these
vulnerabilities (except some specific ARM models). All Intel processors manufactured since circa 1995 are thought to be vulnerable.
Whatever processor one uses, one might seek more information from the manufacturer of that processor and/or of the device
in which it runs.
The nature of the discovered vulnerabilities being quite new, the landscape of vulnerable processors can be expected
to change over time, which is why this script makes the assumption that all CPUs are vulnerable, except if the manufacturer
explicitely stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement.
This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to conclusions about your security.
EOF
}
# parse options
opt_kernel=''
opt_config=''
opt_map=''
opt_live_explicit=0
opt_live=1
opt_no_color=0
opt_batch=0
opt_batch_format="text"
opt_verbose=1
opt_variant1=0
opt_variant2=0
opt_variant3=0
opt_allvariants=1
nrpe_critical=0
nrpe_unknown=0
nrpe_vuln=""
__echo()
{
opt="$1"
shift
msg="$@"
if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ] ; then
# strip ANSI color codes
msg=$(/bin/echo -e "$msg" | sed -r "s/\x1B\[([0-9]{1,2}(;[0-9]{1,2})?)?[m|K]//g")
fi
# explicitely call /bin/echo to avoid shell builtins that might not take options
/bin/echo $opt -e "$msg"
}
_echo()
{
if [ $opt_verbose -ge $1 ]; then
shift
__echo '' "$@"
fi
}
_echo_nol()
{
if [ $opt_verbose -ge $1 ]; then
shift
__echo -n "$@"
fi
}
_warn()
{
_echo 0 "\033[31m${@}\033[0m"
}
_info()
{
_echo 1 "$@"
}
_info_nol()
{
_echo_nol 1 "$@"
}
_verbose()
{
_echo 2 "$@"
}
is_cpu_vulnerable()
{
# param: 1, 2 or 3 (variant)
# returns 1 if vulnerable, 0 if not vulnerable, 255 on error
# by default, everything is vulnerable, we work in a "whitelist" logic here.
# usage: is_cpu_vulnerable 2 && do something if vulnerable
variant1=0
variant2=0
variant3=0
if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then
variant1=0
variant2=1
variant3=1
elif grep -qi 'CPU implementer\s*:\s*0x41' /proc/cpuinfo; then
# ARM
# reference: https://developer.arm.com/support/security-update
cpupart=$(awk '/CPU part/ {print $4;exit}' /proc/cpuinfo)
cpuarch=$(awk '/CPU architecture/ {print $3;exit}' /proc/cpuinfo)
if [ -n "$cpupart" -a -n "$cpuarch" ]; then
# Cortex-R7 and Cortex-R8 are real-time and only used in medical devices or such
# I can't find their CPU part number, but it's probably not that useful anyway
# model R7 R8 A9 A15 A17 A57 A72 A73 A75
# part ? ? 0xc09 0xc0f 0xc0e 0xd07 0xd08 0xd09 0xd0a
# arch 7? 7? 7 7 7 8 8 8 8
if [ "$cpuarch" = 7 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(c09|c0f|c0e)$'; then
# armv7 vulnerable chips
variant1=0
variant2=0
elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(d07|d08|d09|d0a)$'; then
# armv8 vulnerable chips
variant1=0
variant2=0
else
variant1=1
variant2=1
fi
# for variant3, only A75 is vulnerable
if [ "$cpuarch" = 8 -a "$cpupart" = 0xd0a ]; then
variant3=0
else
variant3=1
fi
fi
fi
[ "$1" = 1 ] && return $variant1
[ "$1" = 2 ] && return $variant2
[ "$1" = 3 ] && return $variant3
return 255
}
show_header()
{
_info "\033[1;34mSpectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION\033[0m"
_info
}
parse_opt_file()
{
# parse_opt_file option_name option_value
option_name="$1"
option_value="$2"
if [ -z "$option_value" ]; then
show_header
show_usage
echo "$0: error: --$option_name expects one parameter (a file)" >&2
exit 1
elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then
show_header
echo "$0: error: couldn't find file $option_value" >&2
exit 1
elif [ ! -f "$option_value" ]; then
show_header
echo "$0: error: $option_value is not a file" >&2
exit 1
elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then
show_header
echo "$0: error: couldn't read $option_value (are you root?)" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "$option_value"
exit 0
}
while [ -n "$1" ]; do
if [ "$1" = "--kernel" ]; then
opt_kernel=$(parse_opt_file kernel "$2")
[ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $?
shift 2
opt_live=0
elif [ "$1" = "--config" ]; then
opt_config=$(parse_opt_file config "$2")
[ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $?
shift 2
opt_live=0
elif [ "$1" = "--map" ]; then
opt_map=$(parse_opt_file map "$2")
[ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $?
shift 2
opt_live=0
elif [ "$1" = "--live" ]; then
opt_live_explicit=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--no-color" ]; then
opt_no_color=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--batch" ]; then
opt_batch=1
opt_verbose=0
shift
case "$1" in
text|nrpe) opt_batch_format="$1"; shift;;
--*) ;; # allow subsequent flags
'') ;; # allow nothing at all
*)
echo "$0: error: unknown batch format '$1'"
echo "$0: error: --batch expects a format from: text, nrpe"
exit 1 >&2
;;
esac
elif [ "$1" = "-v" -o "$1" = "--verbose" ]; then
opt_verbose=$(expr $opt_verbose + 1)
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--variant" ]; then
if [ -z "$2" ]; then
echo "$0: error: option --variant expects a parameter (1, 2 or 3)" >&2
exit 1
fi
case "$2" in
1) opt_variant1=1; opt_allvariants=0;;
2) opt_variant2=1; opt_allvariants=0;;
3) opt_variant3=1; opt_allvariants=0;;
*)
echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, expected either 1, 2 or 3" >&2;
exit 1;;
esac
shift 2
elif [ "$1" = "-h" -o "$1" = "--help" ]; then
show_header
show_usage
exit 0
elif [ "$1" = "--disclaimer" ]; then
show_header
show_disclaimer
exit 0
else
show_header
show_usage
echo "$0: error: unknown option '$1'"
exit 1
fi
done
show_header
# print status function
pstatus()
{
if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ]; then
_echo_nol "$2"
_info_nol "$2"
else
case "$1" in
red) col="\033[101m\033[30m";;
@ -23,12 +306,39 @@ pstatus()
blue) col="\033[104m\033[30m";;
*) col="";;
esac
_echo_nol "$col $2 \033[0m"
_info_nol "$col $2 \033[0m"
fi
[ -n "$3" ] && _echo_nol " ($3)"
_echo
[ -n "$3" ] && _info_nol " ($3)"
_info
}
# Print the final status of a vulnerability (incl. batch mode)
# Arguments are: CVE UNK/OK/VULN description
pvulnstatus()
{
if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ]; then
case "$opt_batch_format" in
text) _echo 0 "$1: $2 ($3)";;
nrpe)
case "$2" in
UKN) nrpe_unknown="1";;
VULN) nrpe_critical="1"; nrpe_vuln="$nrpe_vuln $1";;
esac
;;
esac
fi
_info_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
vulnstatus="$2"
shift 2
case "$vulnstatus" in
UNK) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$@";;
VULN) pstatus red 'VULNERABLE' "$@";;
OK) pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE' "$@";;
esac
}
# The 3 below functions are taken from the extract-linux script, available here:
# https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/scripts/extract-vmlinux
# The functions have been modified for better integration to this script
@ -97,121 +407,6 @@ extract_vmlinux()
# end of extract-vmlinux functions
show_usage()
{
cat <<EOF
Usage:
Live mode: $0 [options] [--live]
Offline mode: $0 [options] [--kernel <vmlinux_file>] [--config <kernel_config>] [--map <kernel_map_file>]
Modes:
Two modes are available.
First mode is the "live" mode (default), it does its best to find information about the currently running kernel.
To run under this mode, just start the script without any option (you can also use --live explicitely)
Second mode is the "offline" mode, where you can inspect a non-running kernel.
You'll need to specify the location of the vmlinux file, and if possible, the corresponding config and System.map files:
--kernel vmlinux_file Specify a (possibly compressed) vmlinux file
--config kernel_config Specify a kernel config file
--map kernel_map_file Specify a kernel System.map file
Options:
--no-color Don't use color codes
EOF
}
__echo()
{
opt="$1"
shift
msg="$@"
if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ] ; then
# strip ANSI color codes
msg=$(echo "$msg" | sed -r "s/\x1B\[([0-9]{1,2}(;[0-9]{1,2})?)?[m|K]//g")
fi
# explicitely call /bin/echo to avoid shell builtins that might not take options
/bin/echo $opt -e "$msg"
}
_echo()
{
__echo '' "$@"
}
_echo_nol()
{
__echo -n "$@"
}
_echo "\033[1;34mSpectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION\033[0m"
_echo
# parse options
opt_kernel=''
opt_config=''
opt_map=''
opt_live_explicit=0
opt_live=1
opt_no_color=0
parse_opt_file()
{
# parse_opt_file option_name option_value
option_name="$1"
option_value="$2"
if [ -z "$option_value" ]; then
show_usage
echo "$0: error: --$option_name expects one parameter (a file)" >&2
exit 1
elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then
echo "$0: error: couldn't find file $option_value" >&2
exit 1
elif [ ! -f "$option_value" ]; then
echo "$0: error: $option_value is not a file" >&2
exit 1
elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then
echo "$0: error: couldn't read $option_value (are you root?)" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "$option_value"
exit 0
}
while [ -n "$1" ]; do
if [ "$1" = "--kernel" ]; then
opt_kernel=$(parse_opt_file kernel "$2")
[ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $?
shift 2
opt_live=0
elif [ "$1" = "--config" ]; then
opt_config=$(parse_opt_file config "$2")
[ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $?
shift 2
opt_live=0
elif [ "$1" = "--map" ]; then
opt_map=$(parse_opt_file map "$2")
[ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $?
shift 2
opt_live=0
elif [ "$1" = "--live" ]; then
opt_live_explicit=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--no-color" ]; then
opt_no_color=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "-h" -o "$1" = "--help" ]; then
show_usage
exit 0
else
show_usage
echo "$0: error: unknown option '$1'"
exit 1
fi
done
# check for mode selection inconsistency
if [ "$opt_live_explicit" = 1 ]; then
if [ -n "$opt_kernel" -o -n "$opt_config" -o -n "$opt_map" ]; then
@ -225,12 +420,12 @@ fi
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
_echo "\033[31mNote that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information.\033[0m"
_echo "\033[31mWe'll proceed but you might see permission denied errors.\033[0m"
_echo "\033[31mTo run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0\033[0m"
_echo
_warn "Note that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information."
_warn "We'll proceed but you might see permission denied errors."
_warn "To run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0"
_warn
fi
_echo "Checking for vulnerabilities against live running kernel \033[35m"$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)"\033[0m"
_info "Checking for vulnerabilities against live running kernel \033[35m"$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)"\033[0m"
# try to find the image of the current running kernel
[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-linux
@ -257,24 +452,24 @@ if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
opt_config=/boot/config-$(uname -r)
fi
else
_echo "Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel"
_info "Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel"
fi
if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ]; then
_echo "Will use vmlinux image \033[35m$opt_kernel\033[0m"
_verbose "Will use vmlinux image \033[35m$opt_kernel\033[0m"
else
_echo "Will use no vmlinux image (accuracy might be reduced)"
_verbose "Will use no vmlinux image (accuracy might be reduced)"
fi
if [ -n "$dumped_config" ]; then
_echo "Will use kconfig \033[35m/proc/config.gz\033[0m"
_verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m/proc/config.gz\033[0m"
elif [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
_echo "Will use kconfig \033[35m$opt_config\033[0m"
_verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m$opt_config\033[0m"
else
_echo "Will use no kconfig (accuracy might be reduced)"
_verbose "Will use no kconfig (accuracy might be reduced)"
fi
if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
_echo "Will use System.map file \033[35m$opt_map\033[0m"
_verbose "Will use System.map file \033[35m$opt_map\033[0m"
else
_echo "Will use no System.map file (accuracy might be reduced)"
_verbose "Will use no System.map file (accuracy might be reduced)"
fi
if [ -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then
@ -284,23 +479,46 @@ if [ -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then
extract_vmlinux "$opt_kernel"
fi
else
vmlinux_err="couldn't find your kernel image in /boot, if you used neboot, this is normal"
vmlinux_err="couldn't find your kernel image in /boot, if you used netboot, this is normal"
fi
if [ -z "$vmlinux" -o ! -r "$vmlinux" ]; then
[ -z "$vmlinux_err" ] && vmlinux_err="couldn't extract your kernel from $opt_kernel"
fi
_echo
_info
###########
# SPECTRE 1
_echo "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m"
_echo_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: "
# end of header stuff
status=0
if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
# now we define some util functions and the check_*() funcs, as
# the user can choose to execute only some of those
mount_debugfs()
{
if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then
# try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards
mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1
fi
}
umount_debugfs()
{
if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then
# umount debugfs if we did mount it ourselves
umount /sys/kernel/debug
fi
}
###################
# SPECTRE VARIANT 1
check_variant1()
{
_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m"
_info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: "
status=0
if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$vmlinux_err"
else
else
if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
else
@ -319,26 +537,33 @@ else
status=2
fi
fi
fi
fi
_echo_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
[ "$status" = 0 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
[ "$status" = 1 ] && pstatus red 'VULNERABLE' 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available'
[ "$status" = 2 ] && pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE' 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available'
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
else
case "$status" in
0) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 UNK "impossible to check ${vmlinux}";;
1) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 VULN 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';;
2) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';;
esac
fi
}
###########
# VARIANT 2
_echo
_echo "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m"
_echo "* Mitigation 1"
_echo_nol "* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: "
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
###################
# SPECTRE VARIANT 2
check_variant2()
{
_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m"
_info "* Mitigation 1"
_info_nol "* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: "
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1
fi
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
fi
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
else
else
# the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48
# here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x48' but without needing the rdmsr tool
# if we get a read error, the MSR is not there
@ -348,19 +573,16 @@ else
else
pstatus red NO
fi
fi
fi
if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then
# if we used modprobe ourselves, rmmod the module
rmmod msr 2>/dev/null
fi
_echo_nol "* Kernel support for IBRS: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then
# try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards
mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1
fi
_info_nol "* Kernel support for IBRS: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
mount_debugfs
if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ]; then
# if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in
pstatus green YES
@ -372,19 +594,19 @@ if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
ibrs_supported=1
ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
fi
fi
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
fi
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then
pstatus green YES
ibrs_supported=1
fi
fi
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then
fi
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then
pstatus red NO
fi
fi
_echo_nol "* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
_info_nol "* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# 0 means disabled
# 1 is enabled only for kernel space
# 2 is enabled for kernel and user space
@ -394,43 +616,43 @@ if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
1 | 2) pstatus green YES;;
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
esac
else
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
fi
_echo_nol "* IBRS enabled for User space: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
_info_nol "* IBRS enabled for User space: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
case "$ibrs_enabled" in
"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
0 | 1) pstatus red NO;;
2) pstatus green YES;;
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
esac
else
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
fi
_echo "* Mitigation 2"
_echo_nol "* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: "
# We check the RETPOLINE kernel options
if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
_info "* Mitigation 2"
_info_nol "* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: "
# We check the RETPOLINE kernel options
if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then
pstatus green YES
retpoline=1
else
pstatus red NO
fi
else
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration"
fi
fi
_echo_nol "* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: "
# Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm
# For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles)
# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79
# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set
# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol
if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
_info_nol "* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: "
# Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm
# For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles)
# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79
# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set
# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol
if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
# look for the symbol
if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then
retpoline_compiler=1
@ -438,7 +660,7 @@ if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
else
pstatus red NO
fi
elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
# look for the symbol
if which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol
@ -456,51 +678,52 @@ elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
else
pstatus red NO
fi
else
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map"
fi
fi
_echo_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "your CPU is not vulnerable as per the vendor"
elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "retpoline mitigate the vulnerability"
elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "retpoline mitigate the vulnerability"
elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability"
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability"
else
pstatus red VULNERABLE "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
else
else
if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
else
pstatus red VULNERABLE "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
fi
fi
}
##########
# MELTDOWN
_echo
_echo "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m"
_echo_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
kpti_support=0
kpti_can_tell=0
if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
########################
# MELTDOWN aka VARIANT 3
check_variant3()
{
_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m"
_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
kpti_support=0
kpti_can_tell=0
if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
kpti_can_tell=1
if grep -Eq '^\(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION\|CONFIG_KAISER\)=y' "$opt_config"; then
if grep -Eq '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config"; then
kpti_support=1
fi
fi
if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
fi
if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
# it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch
# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
kpti_can_tell=1
if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then
kpti_support=1
fi
fi
if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
fi
if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
# same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the
# nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option)
kpti_can_tell=1
@ -511,18 +734,19 @@ if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
kpti_support=1
fi
fi
fi
fi
if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
pstatus red NO
else
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file"
fi
fi
_echo_nol "* PTI enabled and active: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
mount_debugfs
_info_nol "* PTI enabled and active: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then
# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
kpti_enabled=1
@ -533,7 +757,10 @@ if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)
elif dmesg | grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled'; then
# if we can't find the flag, grep in dmesg
# if we can't find the flag, grep dmesg output
kpti_enabled=1
elif [ -r /var/log/dmesg ] && grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled' /var/log/dmesg; then
# if we can't find the flag in dmesg output, grep in /var/log/dmesg when readable
kpti_enabled=1
else
kpti_enabled=0
@ -543,32 +770,56 @@ if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
else
pstatus red NO
fi
else
else
pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode"
fi
fi
if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then
# umount debugfs if we did mount it ourselves
umount /sys/kernel/debug
fi
_echo_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "your CPU is not vulnerable as per the vendor"
elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
else
pstatus red "VULNERABLE" "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
else
else
if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
else
pstatus red "VULNERABLE" "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
fi
}
# now run the checks the user asked for
if [ "$opt_variant1" = 1 -o "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then
check_variant1
_info
fi
if [ "$opt_variant2" = 1 -o "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then
check_variant2
_info
fi
if [ "$opt_variant3" = 1 -o "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then
check_variant3
_info
fi
_echo
_info "A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer"
# this'll umount only if we mounted debugfs ourselves
umount_debugfs
# cleanup the temp decompressed config
[ -n "$dumped_config" ] && rm -f "$dumped_config"
if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 -a "$opt_batch_format" = "nrpe" ]; then
if [ ! -z "$nrpe_vuln" ]; then
echo "Vulnerable:$nrpe_vuln"
else
echo "OK"
fi
[ "$nrpe_critical" = 1 ] && exit 2 # critical
[ "$nrpe_unknown" = 1 ] && exit 3 # unknown
exit 0 # ok
fi