fix: cap_rdcl_no, cap_gds_no, cap_tsa_*_no were not setting the current CPU status as immune for their respective vulns

built from commit 278989d550
 dated 2026-04-01 00:47:41 +0200
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)

.github/workflows/autoupdate.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+name: autoupdate
+
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '42 9 * * *'
+
+jobs:
+  autoupdate:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: Install prerequisites
+        run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends iucode-tool sqlite3 unzip
+      - name: Update microcode versions
+        run: ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --update-builtin-fwdb
+      - name: Check git diff
+        id: diff
+        run: |
+          echo change="$(git diff spectre-meltdown-checker.sh | awk '/MCEDB/ { if(V) { print V" to "$4; exit } else { V=$4 } }')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          echo nbdiff="$(git diff spectre-meltdown-checker.sh | grep -cE -- '^\+# [AI],')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          git diff
+          cat "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+      - name: Create Pull Request if needed
+        if: steps.diff.outputs.nbdiff != '0'
+        uses: peter-evans/create-pull-request@v7
+        with:
+          token: ${{ secrets.SMC_PR_PAT }}
+          branch: autoupdate-fwdb
+          commit-message: "update: fwdb from ${{ steps.diff.outputs.change }}, ${{ steps.diff.outputs.nbdiff }} microcode changes"
+          title: "[Auto] Update fwdb from ${{ steps.diff.outputs.change }}"
+          body: |
+            Automated PR to update fwdb from ${{ steps.diff.outputs.change }}
+            Detected ${{ steps.diff.outputs.nbdiff }} microcode changes

.github/workflows/check.yml

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
         fi
     - name: check direct execution
       run: |
-        expected=15
+        expected=19
         nb=$(sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
         if [ "$nb" -ne "$expected" ]; then
           echo "Invalid number of CVEs reported: $nb instead of $expected"
@@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ jobs:
         else
           echo "OK $nb CVEs reported"
         fi
-    - name: check docker-compose run execution
+    - name: check docker compose run execution
       run: |
-        expected=15
+        expected=19
-        docker-compose build
+        docker compose build
-        nb=$(docker-compose run --rm spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
+        nb=$(docker compose run --rm spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
         if [ "$nb" -ne "$expected" ]; then
           echo "Invalid number of CVEs reported: $nb instead of $expected"
           exit 1
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ jobs:
         fi
     - name: check docker run execution
       run: |
-        expected=15
+        expected=19
         docker build -t spectre-meltdown-checker .
         nb=$(docker run --rm --privileged -v /boot:/boot:ro -v /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu:ro -v /lib/modules:/lib/modules:ro spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
         if [ "$nb" -ne "$expected" ]; then

Dockerfile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-FROM alpine:3.7
+FROM alpine:latest
 
-RUN apk --update --no-cache add kmod binutils grep perl
+RUN apk --update --no-cache add kmod binutils grep perl zstd wget sharutils unzip sqlite procps coreutils iucode-tool gzip xz bzip2 lz4
 
-COPY . /check
+COPY spectre-meltdown-checker.sh /
 
-ENTRYPOINT ["/check/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh"]
+ENTRYPOINT ["/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh"]

FAQ.md

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+# Questions
+
+- [What to expect from this tool?](#what-to-expect-from-this-tool)
+- [Why was this script written in the first place?](#why-was-this-script-written-in-the-first-place)
+- [Why are those vulnerabilities so different than regular CVEs?](#why-are-those-vulnerabilities-so-different-than-regular-cves)
+- [What do "affected", "vulnerable" and "mitigated" mean exactly?](#what-do-affected-vulnerable-and-mitigated-mean-exactly)
+- [What are the main design decisions regarding this script?](#what-are-the-main-design-decisions-regarding-this-script)
+- [Everything is indicated in `sysfs` now, is this script still useful?](#everything-is-indicated-in-sysfs-now-is-this-script-still-useful)
+- [How does this script work?](#how-does-this-script-work)
+- [Which BSD OSes are supported?](#which-bsd-oses-are-supported)
+- [Why is my OS not supported?](#why-is-my-os-not-supported)
+- [The tool says there is an updated microcode for my CPU, but I don't have it!](#the-tool-says-there-is-an-updated-microcode-for-my-cpu-but-i-dont-have-it)
+- [The tool says that I need a more up-to-date microcode, but I have the more recent version!](#the-tool-says-that-i-need-a-more-up-to-date-microcode-but-i-have-the-more-recent-version)
+- [Which rules are governing the support of a CVE in this tool?](#which-rules-are-governing-the-support-of-a-cve-in-this-tool)
+
+# Answers
+
+## What to expect from this tool?
+
+This tool does its best to determine where your system stands on each of the collectively named [transient execution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transient_execution_CPU_vulnerability) vulnerabilities (also sometimes called "speculative execution" vulnerabilities) that were made public since early 2018. It doesn't attempt to run any kind of exploit, and can't guarantee that your system is secure, but rather helps you verifying if your system is affected, and if it is, checks whether it has the known mitigations in place to avoid being vulnerable.
+Some mitigations could also exist in your kernel that this script doesn't know (yet) how to detect, or it might falsely detect mitigations that in the end don't work as expected (for example, on backported or modified kernels).
+
+Please also note that for Spectre vulnerabilities, all software can possibly be exploited, this tool only verifies that the kernel (which is the core of the system) you're using has the proper protections in place. Verifying all the other software is out of the scope of this tool. As a general measure, ensure you always have the most up to date stable versions of all the software you use, especially for those who are exposed to the world, such as network daemons and browsers.
+
+This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to definitive conclusions about your security: hardware vulnerabilities are [complex beasts](#why-are-those-vulnerabilities-so-different-than-regular-cves), and collective understanding of each vulnerability is evolving with time.
+
+## Why was this script written in the first place?
+
+The first commit of this script is dated *2018-01-07*, only 4 days after the world first heard about the Meltdown and the Spectre attacks. With those attacks disclosure, a _whole new range of vulnerabilities_ that were previously thought to be mostly theoretical and only possible in very controlled environments (labs) - hence of little interest for most except researchers - suddenly became completely mainstream and apparently trivial to conduct on an immensely large number of systems.
+
+On the few hours and days after that date, the whole industry went crazy. Proper, verified information about these vulnerabilities was incredibly hard to find, because before this, even the CPU vendors never had to deal with managing security vulnerabilities at scale, as software vendors do since decades. There were a lot of FUD, and the apparent silence of the vendors was enough for most to fear the worst. The whole industry had everything to learn about this new type of vulnerabilities. However, most systems administrators had a few simple questions:
+
+- Am **I** vulnerable? And if yes,
+- What do I have to do to mitigate these vulnerabilities on **my** system?
+
+Unfortunately, answering those questions was very difficult (and still is to some extent), even if the safe answer to the first question was "you probably are". This script was written to try to give simple answers to those simple questions, and was made to evolve as the information about these vulnerabilities became available. On the first few days, there was several new versions published **per day**.
+
+## Why are those vulnerabilities so different than regular CVEs?
+
+Those are hardware vulnerabilities, while most of the CVEs we see everyday are software vulnerabilities. A quick comparison would be:
+
+Software vulnerability:
+- Can be fixed? Yes.
+- How to fix? Update the software (or uninstall it!)
+
+Hardware vulnerability:
+- Can be fixed? No, only mitigated (or buy new hardware!)
+- How to ~~fix~~ mitigate? In the worst case scenario, 5 "layers" need to be updated: the microcode/firmware, the host OS kernel, the hypervisor, the VM OS kernel, and possibly all the software running on the machine. Sometimes only a subset of those layers need to be updated. In yet other cases, there can be several possible mitigations for the same vulnerability, implying different layers. Yes, it can get horribly complicated.
+
+A more detailed video explanation is available here: https://youtu.be/2gB9U1EcCss?t=425
+
+## What do "affected", "vulnerable" and "mitigated" mean exactly?
+
+- **Affected** means that your CPU's hardware, as it went out of the factory, is known to be concerned by a specific vulnerability, i.e. the vulnerability applies to your hardware model. Note that it says nothing about whether a given vulnerability can actually be used to exploit your system. However, an unaffected CPU will never be vulnerable, and doesn't need to have mitigations in place.
+- **Vulnerable** implies that you're using an **affected** CPU, and means that a given vulnerability can be exploited on your system, because no (or insufficient) mitigations are in place.
+- **Mitigated** implies that a previously **vulnerable** system has followed all the steps (updated all the required layers) to ensure a given vulnerability cannot be exploited. About what "layers" mean, see [the previous question](#why-are-those-vulnerabilities-so-different-than-regular-cves).
+
+## What are the main design decisions regarding this script?
+
+There are a few rules that govern how this tool is written.
+
+1) It should be okay to run this script in a production environment. This implies, but is not limited to:
+
+   * 1a. Never modify the system it's running on, and if it needs to e.g. load a kernel module it requires, that wasn't loaded before it was launched, it'll take care to unload it on exit
+   * 1b. Never attempt to "fix" or "mitigate" any vulnerability, or modify any configuration. It just reports what it thinks is the status of your system. It leaves all decisions to the sysadmin.
+   * 1c. Never attempt to run any kind of exploit to tell whether a vulnerability is mitigated, because it would violate 1a), could lead to unpredictable system behavior, and might even lead to wrong conclusions, as some PoC must be compiled with specific options and prerequisites, otherwise giving wrong information (especially for Spectre). If you want to run PoCs, do it yourself, but please read carefully about the PoC and the vulnerability. PoCs about a hardware vulnerability are way more complicated and prone to false conclusions than PoCs for software vulnerabilities.
+
+2) Never look at the kernel version to tell whether it supports mitigation for a given vulnerability. This implies never hardcoding version numbers in the script. This would defeat the purpose: this script should be able to detect mitigations in unknown kernels, with possibly backported or forward-ported patches. Also, don't believe what `sysfs` says, when possible. See the next question about this.
+
+3) Never look at the microcode version to tell whether it has the proper mechanisms in place to support mitigation for a given vulnerability. This implies never hardcoding version numbers in the script. Instead, look for said mechanisms, as the kernel would do.
+
+4) When a CPU is not known to be explicitly unaffected by a vulnerability, make the assumption that it is. This strong design choice has it roots in the early speculative execution vulnerability days (see [this answer](#why-was-this-script-written-in-the-first-place)), and is still a good approach as of today.
+
+## Everything is indicated in `sysfs` now, is this script still useful?
+
+A lot as changed since 2018. Nowadays, the industry adapted and this range of vulnerabilities is almost "business as usual", as software vulnerabilities are. However, due to their complexity, it's still not as easy as just checking a version number to ensure a vulnerability is closed.
+
+Granted, we now have a standard way under Linux to check whether our system is affected, vulnerable, mitigated against most of these vulnerabilities. By having a look at the `sysfs` hierarchy, and more precisely the `/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/` folder, one can have a pretty good insight about its system state for each of the listed vulnerabilities. Note that the output can be a little different with some vendors (e.g. Red Hat has some slightly different output than the vanilla kernel for some vulnerabilities), but it's still a gigantic leap forward, given where we were in 2018 when this script was started, and it's very good news. The kernel is the proper place to have this because the kernel knows everything about itself (the mitigations it might have), and the CPU (its model, and microcode features that are exposed). Note however that some vulnerabilities are not reported through this file hierarchy at all, such as Zenbleed.
+
+However I see a few reasons why this script might still be useful to you, and that's why its development has not halted when the `sysfs` hierarchy came out:
+
+- A given version of the kernel doesn't have knowledge about the future. To put it in another way: a given version of the kernel only has the understanding of a vulnerability available at the time it was compiled. Let me explain this: when a new vulnerability comes out, new versions of the microcode and kernels are released, with mitigations in place. With such a kernel, a new `sysfs` entry will appear. However, after a few weeks or months, corner cases can be discovered, previously-thought unaffected CPUs can turn out to be affected in the end, and sometimes mitigations can end up being insufficient.  Of course, if you're always running the latest kernel version from kernel.org, this issue might be limited for you. The spectre-meltdown-checker script doesn't depend on a kernel's knowledge and understanding of a vulnerability to compute its output. That is, unless you tell it to (using the `--sysfs-only` option).
+
+- Mitigating a vulnerability completely can sometimes be tricky, and have a lot of complicated prerequisites, depending on your kernel version, CPU vendor, model and even sometimes stepping, CPU microcode, hypervisor support, etc. The script gives a very detailed insight about each of the prerequisites of mitigation for every vulnerability, step by step, hence pointing out what is missing on your system as a whole to completely mitigate an issue.
+
+- The script can be pointed at a kernel image, and will deep dive into it, telling you if this kernel will mitigate vulnerabilities that might be present on your system. This is a good way to verify before booting a new kernel, that it'll mitigate the vulnerabilities you expect it to, especially if you modified a few config options around these topics.
+
+- The script will also work regardless of the custom patches that might be integrated in the kernel you're running (or you're pointing it to, in offline mode), and completely ignores the advertised kernel version, to tell whether a given kernel mitigates vulnerabilities. This is especially useful for non-vanilla kernel, where patches might be backported, sometimes silently (this has already happened, too).
+
+- Educational purposes: the script gives interesting insights about a vulnerability, and how the different parts of the system work together to mitigate it.
+
+There are probably other reasons, but that are the main ones that come to mind. In the end, of course, only you can tell whether it's useful for your use case ;)
+
+## How does this script work?
+
+On one hand, the script gathers information about your CPU, and the features exposed by its microcode. To do this, it uses the low-level CPUID instruction (through the `cpuid` kernel module under Linux, and the `cpucontrol` tool under BSD), and queries to the MSR registers of your CPU (through the `msr` kernel module under Linux, and the `cpucontrol` tool under BSD).
+
+On another hand, the script looks into the kernel image your system is running on, for clues about the mitigations it supports. Of course, this is very specific for each operating system, even if the implemented mitigation is functionally the same, the actual code is completely specific. As you can imagine, the Linux kernel code has a few in common with a BSD kernel code, for example. Under Linux, the script supports looking into the kernel image, and possibly the System.map and kernel config file, if these are available. Under BSD, it looks into the kernel file only.
+
+Then, for each vulnerability it knows about, the script decides whether your system is [affected, vulnerable, and mitigated](#what-do-affected-vulnerable-and-mitigated-mean-exactly) against it, using the information it gathered about your hardware and your kernel.
+
+## Which BSD OSes are supported?
+
+For the BSD range of operating systems, the script will work as long as the BSD you're using supports `cpuctl` and `linprocfs`. This is not the case for OpenBSD for example. Known BSD flavors having proper support are: FreeBSD, NetBSD, DragonflyBSD. Derivatives of those should also work. To know why other BSDs will likely never be supported, see [why is my OS not supported?](#why-is-my-os-not-supported).
+
+## Why is my OS not supported?
+
+This tool only supports Linux, and [some flavors of BSD](#which-bsd-oses-are-supported). Other OSes will most likely never be supported, due to [how this script works](#how-does-this-script-work). It would require implementing these OSes specific way of querying the CPU. It would also require to get documentation (if available) about how this OS mitigates each vulnerability, down to this OS kernel code, and if documentation is not available, reverse-engineer the difference between a known old version of a kernel, and a kernel that mitigates a new vulnerability. This means that all the effort has to be duplicated times the number of supported OSes, as everything is specific, by construction. It also implies having a deep understanding of every OS, which takes years to develop. However, if/when other tools appear for other OSes, that share the same goal of this one, they might be listed here as a convenience.
+
+## The tool says there is an updated microcode for my CPU, but I don't have it!
+
+Even if your operating system is fully up to date, the tool might still tell you that there is a more recent microcode version for your CPU. Currently, it uses (and merges) information from 4 sources:
+
+- The official [Intel microcode repository](https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files)
+- The awesome platomav's [MCExtractor database](https://github.com/platomav/MCExtractor) for non-Intel CPUs
+- The official [linux-firmware](https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/firmware/linux-firmware.git) repository for AMD
+- Specific Linux kernel commits that sometimes hardcode microcode versions, such as for [Zenbleed](https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=522b1d69219d8f083173819fde04f994aa051a98) or for the bad [Spectre](https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c#n141) microcodes
+
+Generally, it means a more recent version of the microcode has been seen in the wild. However, fully public availability of this microcode might be limited yet, or your OS vendor might have chosen not to ship this new version (yet), maybe because it's currently being tested, or for other reasons. This tool can't tell you when or if this will be the case. You should ask your vendor about it. Technically, you can still go and upgrade your microcode yourself, and use this tool to confirm whether you did it successfully. Updating the microcode for you is out of the scope of this tool, as this would violate [rule 1b](#what-are-the-main-design-decisions-regarding-this-script).
+
+## The tool says that I need a more up-to-date microcode, but I have the more recent version!
+
+This can happen for a few reasons:
+
+- Your CPU is no longer supported by the vendor. In that case, new versions of the microcode will never be published, and vulnerabilities requiring microcode features will never be fixed. On most of these vulnerabilities, you'll have no way to mitigate the issue on a vulnerable system, appart from buying a more recent CPU. Sometimes, you might be able to mitigate the issue by disabling a CPU feature instead (often at the cost of speed). When this is the case, the script will list this as one of the possible mitigations for the vulnerability.
+
+- The vulnerability is recent, and your CPU has not yet received a microcode update for the vendor. Often, these updates come in batches, and it can take several batches to cover all the supported CPUs.
+
+In both cases, you can contact your vendor to know whether there'll be an update or not, and if yes, when. For Intel, at the time this FAQ entry was written, such guidance was [available here](https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/topics/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html).
+
+## Which rules are governing the support of a CVE in this tool?
+
+On the early days, it was easy: just Spectre and Meltdown (hence the tool name), because that's all we had. Now that this range of vulnerability is seeing a bunch of newcomers every year, this question is legitimate.
+
+To stick with this tool's goal, a good indication as to why a CVE should be supported, is when mitigating it requires either kernel modifications, microcode modifications, or both.
+
+Counter-examples include (non-exhaustive list):
+
+- [CVE-2019-14615](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/340), mitigating this issue is done by updating the Intel driver. This is out of the scope of this tool.
+- [CVE-2019-15902](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/304), this CVE is due to a bad backport in the stable kernel. If the faulty backport was part of the mitigation of another supported CVE, and this bad backport was detectable (without hardcoding kernel versions, see [rule 2](#why-are-those-vulnerabilities-so-different-than-regular-cves)), it might have been added as a bullet point in the concerned CVE's section in the tool. However, this wasn't the case.
+- The "[Take A Way](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/344)" vulnerability, AMD said that they believe this is not a new attack, hence there were no microcode and no kernel modification made. As there is nothing to look for, this is out of the scope of this tool.
+- [CVE-2020-0550](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/347), the vendor thinks this is hardly exploitable in the wild, and as mitigations would be too performance impacting, as a whole the industry decided to not address it. As there is nothing to check for, this is out of the scope of this tool.
+- [CVE-2020-0551](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/348), the industry decided to not address it, as it is believed mitigations for other CVEs render this attack practically hard to make, Intel just released an updated SDK for SGX to help mitigate the issue, but this is out of the scope of this tool.
+
+Look for the [information](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+label%3Ainformation) tag in the issues list for more examples.

README.md

@@ -1,38 +1,185 @@
 Spectre & Meltdown Checker
 ==========================
 
-A shell script to tell if your system is vulnerable against the several "speculative execution" CVEs that were made public since 2018.
+A self-contained shell script to assess your system's resilience against the several [transient execution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transient_execution_CPU_vulnerability) CVEs that were published since early 2018, and give you guidance as to how to mitigate them.
-- CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
+
-- CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
+## CVE list
-- CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
+
-- CVE-2018-3640 [rogue system register read] aka 'Variant 3a'
+CVE | Name | Aliases
-- CVE-2018-3639 [speculative store bypass] aka 'Variant 4'
+--- | ---- | -------
-- CVE-2018-3615 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow (SGX)'
+[CVE-2017-5753](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5753) | Bounds Check Bypass | Spectre V1
-- CVE-2018-3620 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow-NG (OS)'
+[CVE-2017-5715](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5715) | Branch Target Injection | Spectre V2
-- CVE-2018-3646 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow-NG (VMM)'
+[CVE-2017-5754](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5754) | Rogue Data Cache Load | Meltdown
-- CVE-2018-12126 [microarchitectural store buffer data sampling (MSBDS)] aka 'Fallout'
+[CVE-2018-3640](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-3640) | Rogue System Register Read | Variant 3a
-- CVE-2018-12130 [microarchitectural fill buffer data sampling (MFBDS)] aka 'ZombieLoad'
+[CVE-2018-3639](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-3639) | Speculative Store Bypass | Variant 4, SSB
-- CVE-2018-12127 [microarchitectural load port data sampling (MLPDS)] aka 'RIDL'
+[CVE-2018-3615](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-3615) | L1 Terminal Fault | Foreshadow (SGX)
-- CVE-2019-11091 [microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable memory (MDSUM)] aka 'RIDL'
+[CVE-2018-3620](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-3620) | L1 Terminal Fault | Foreshadow-NG (OS/SMM)
-- CVE-2019-11135 [TSX asynchronous abort] aka 'TAA' aka 'ZombieLoad V2'
+[CVE-2018-3646](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-3646) | L1 Terminal Fault | Foreshadow-NG (VMM)
-- CVE-2018-12207 [machine check exception on page size changes (MCEPSC)] aka 'No eXcuses' aka 'iTLB Multihit'
+[CVE-2018-12126](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-12126) | Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling | MSBDS, Fallout
-- CVE-2020-0543 [Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)]
+[CVE-2018-12130](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-12130) | Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling | MFBDS, ZombieLoad
+[CVE-2018-12127](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-12127) | Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling | MLPDS, RIDL
+[CVE-2019-11091](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11091) | Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory | MDSUM, RIDL
+[CVE-2019-11135](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11135) | TSX Asynchronous Abort | TAA, ZombieLoad V2
+[CVE-2018-12207](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-12207) | Machine Check Exception on Page Size Changes | iTLB Multihit, No eXcuses
+[CVE-2020-0543](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-0543) | Special Register Buffer Data Sampling | SRBDS, CROSSTalk
+[CVE-2022-40982](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-40982) | Gather Data Sampling | Downfall, GDS
+[CVE-2023-20569](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-20569) | Return Address Security | Inception, SRSO
+[CVE-2023-20593](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-20593) | Cross-Process Information Leak | Zenbleed
+[CVE-2023-23583](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-23583) | Redundant Prefix Issue | Reptar
+[CVE-2024-36350](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-36350) | Transient Scheduler Attack, Store Queue | TSA-SQ
+[CVE-2024-36357](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-36357) | Transient Scheduler Attack, L1 | TSA-L1
+
+## Am I at risk?
+
+Depending on your situation, the table below answers whether an attacker in a given position can extract data from a given target.
+The "Userland → Kernel" column also applies within a VM (VM userland vs. VM kernel), since the same CPU mechanisms are at play regardless of virtualization.
+
+Vulnerability | Userland → Kernel | Userland → Userland | VM → Host | VM → VM | Mitigation
+------------ | :---------------: | :-----------------: | :-------: | :-----: | ----------
+CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre V1) | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | Recompile everything with LFENCE
+CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre V2) | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | Microcode + kernel update (or retpoline)
+CVE-2017-5754 (Meltdown) | 💥 | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | Kernel update
+CVE-2018-3640 (Variant 3a) | 💥 | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | Microcode update
+CVE-2018-3639 (Variant 4, SSB) | ✅ | 💥 | ✅ | ✅ | Microcode + kernel update
+CVE-2018-3615 (Foreshadow, SGX) | ✅ (3) | ✅ (3) | ✅ (3) | ✅ (3) | Microcode update
+CVE-2018-3620 (Foreshadow-NG, OS/SMM) | 💥 | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | Kernel update
+CVE-2018-3646 (Foreshadow-NG, VMM) | ✅ | ✅ | 💥 | 💥 | Kernel update (or disable EPT/SMT)
+CVE-2018-12126 (MSBDS, Fallout) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + kernel update
+CVE-2018-12130 (MFBDS, ZombieLoad) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + kernel update
+CVE-2018-12127 (MLPDS, RIDL) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + kernel update
+CVE-2019-11091 (MDSUM, RIDL) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + kernel update
+CVE-2019-11135 (TAA, ZombieLoad V2) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + kernel update
+CVE-2018-12207 (iTLB Multihit, No eXcuses) | ✅ | ✅ | ☠️ | ✅ | Hypervisor update (or disable hugepages)
+CVE-2020-0543 (SRBDS, CROSSTalk) | 💥 (2) | 💥 (2) | 💥 (2) | 💥 (2) | Microcode + kernel update
+CVE-2022-40982 (Downfall, GDS) | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | Microcode update (or disable AVX)
+CVE-2023-20569 (Inception, SRSO) | 💥 | ✅ | 💥 | ✅ | Microcode + kernel update
+CVE-2023-20593 (Zenbleed) | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | Microcode update (or kernel workaround)
+CVE-2023-23583 (Reptar) | ☠️ | ☠️ | ☠️ | ☠️ | Microcode update
+CVE-2024-36350 (TSA-SQ) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + kernel update
+CVE-2024-36357 (TSA-L1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + kernel update
+
+> 💥 Data can be leaked across this boundary.
+
+> ✅ Not affected in this scenario.
+
+> ☠️ Denial of service (system crash or unpredictable behavior), no data leak.
+
+> (1) Cross-process leakage requires SMT (Hyper-Threading) to be active — attacker and victim must share a physical core.
+
+> (2) Only leaks RDRAND/RDSEED output, not arbitrary memory; still allows recovering cryptographic material from any victim.
+
+> (3) CVE-2018-3615 (Foreshadow SGX) inverts the normal trust model: the OS reads SGX enclave data. It is irrelevant unless the system runs SGX enclaves, and the attacker must already have OS-level access.
+
+## Detailed CVE descriptions
+
+<details>
+<summary>Unfold for more detailed CVE descriptions</summary>
+
+**CVE-2017-5753 — Bounds Check Bypass (Spectre Variant 1)**
+
+An attacker can train the branch predictor to mispredict a bounds check, causing the CPU to speculatively access out-of-bounds memory. This affects all software, including the kernel, because any conditional bounds check can potentially be exploited. Mitigation requires recompiling software and the kernel with a compiler that inserts LFENCE instructions (or equivalent speculation barriers like `array_index_nospec`) at the proper positions. The performance impact is negligible because the barriers only apply to specific, targeted code patterns.
+
+**CVE-2017-5715 — Branch Target Injection (Spectre Variant 2)**
+
+An attacker can poison the Branch Target Buffer (BTB) to redirect speculative execution of indirect branches in the kernel, leaking kernel memory. Two mitigation strategies exist: (1) microcode updates providing IBRS (Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation), which flushes branch predictor state on privilege transitions — this has a medium to high performance cost, especially on older hardware; or (2) retpoline, a compiler technique that replaces indirect branches with a construct the speculator cannot exploit — this has a lower performance cost but requires recompiling the kernel and sensitive software.
+
+**CVE-2017-5754 — Rogue Data Cache Load (Meltdown)**
+
+On affected Intel processors, a user process can speculatively read kernel memory despite lacking permission. The CPU eventually raises a fault, but the data leaves observable traces in the cache. Mitigation is entirely kernel-side: Page Table Isolation (PTI/KPTI) unmaps most kernel memory from user-space page tables, so there is nothing to speculatively read. The performance impact is low to medium, mainly from the increased TLB pressure caused by switching page tables on every kernel entry and exit.
+
+**CVE-2018-3640 — Rogue System Register Read (Variant 3a)**
+
+Similar to Meltdown but targeting system registers: an unprivileged process can speculatively read privileged system register values (such as Model-Specific Registers) and exfiltrate them via a side channel. Mitigation requires a microcode update only — no kernel changes are needed. Performance impact is negligible.
+
+**CVE-2018-3639 — Speculative Store Bypass (Variant 4)**
+
+The CPU may speculatively load a value from memory before a preceding store to the same address completes, reading stale data. This primarily affects software using JIT compilation (e.g. JavaScript engines, eBPF), where an attacker can craft code that exploits the store-to-load dependency. No known exploitation against the kernel itself has been demonstrated. Mitigation requires a microcode update (providing the SSBD mechanism) plus a kernel update that allows affected software to opt in to the protection via prctl(). The performance impact is low to medium, depending on how frequently the mitigation is activated.
+
+**CVE-2018-3615 — L1 Terminal Fault (Foreshadow, SGX)**
+
+The original Foreshadow attack targets Intel SGX enclaves. When a page table entry's Present bit is cleared, the CPU may still speculatively use the physical address in the entry to fetch data from the L1 cache, bypassing SGX protections. An attacker can extract secrets (attestation keys, sealed data) from SGX enclaves. Mitigation requires a microcode update that includes modifications to SGX behavior. Performance impact is negligible.
+
+**CVE-2018-3620 — L1 Terminal Fault (Foreshadow-NG, OS/SMM)**
+
+A generalization of Foreshadow beyond SGX: unprivileged user-space code can exploit the same L1TF mechanism to read kernel memory or System Management Mode (SMM) memory. Mitigation requires a kernel update that implements PTE inversion — marking non-present page table entries with invalid physical addresses so the L1 cache cannot contain useful data at those addresses. Performance impact is negligible because PTE inversion is a one-time change to the page table management logic with no runtime overhead.
+
+**CVE-2018-3646 — L1 Terminal Fault (Foreshadow-NG, VMM)**
+
+A guest VM can exploit L1TF to read memory belonging to the host or other guests, because the hypervisor's page tables may have non-present entries pointing to valid host physical addresses still resident in L1. Mitigation options include: flushing the L1 data cache on every VM entry (via a kernel update providing L1d flush support), disabling Extended Page Tables (EPT), or disabling Hyper-Threading (SMT) to prevent a sibling thread from refilling the L1 cache during speculation. The performance impact ranges from low to significant depending on the chosen mitigation, with L1d flushing on VM entry being the most practical but still measurable on VM-heavy workloads.
+
+**CVE-2018-12126 — Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS, Fallout)**
+
+**CVE-2018-12130 — Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS, ZombieLoad)**
+
+**CVE-2018-12127 — Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS, RIDL)**
+
+**CVE-2019-11091 — Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory (MDSUM, RIDL)**
+
+These four CVEs are collectively known as "MDS" (Microarchitectural Data Sampling) vulnerabilities. They exploit different CPU internal buffers — store buffer, fill buffer, load ports, and uncacheable memory paths — that can leak recently accessed data across privilege boundaries during speculative execution. An unprivileged attacker can observe data recently processed by the kernel or other processes. Mitigation requires a microcode update (providing the MD_CLEAR mechanism) plus a kernel update that uses VERW to clear affected buffers on privilege transitions. Disabling Hyper-Threading (SMT) provides additional protection because sibling threads share these buffers. The performance impact is low to significant, depending on the frequency of kernel transitions and whether SMT is disabled.
+
+**CVE-2019-11135 — TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA, ZombieLoad V2)**
+
+On CPUs with Intel TSX, a transactional abort can leave data from the line fill buffers in a state observable through side channels, similar to the MDS vulnerabilities but triggered through TSX. Mitigation requires a microcode update plus kernel support to either clear affected buffers or disable TSX entirely (via the TSX_CTRL MSR). The performance impact is low to significant, similar to MDS, with the option to eliminate the attack surface entirely by disabling TSX at the cost of losing transactional memory support.
+
+**CVE-2018-12207 — Machine Check Exception on Page Size Changes (iTLB Multihit, No eXcuses)**
+
+A malicious guest VM can trigger a machine check exception (MCE) — crashing the entire host — by creating specific conditions in the instruction TLB involving page size changes. This is a denial-of-service vulnerability affecting hypervisors running untrusted guests. Mitigation requires either disabling hugepage use in the hypervisor or updating the hypervisor to avoid the problematic iTLB configurations. The performance impact ranges from low to significant depending on the approach: disabling hugepages can substantially impact memory-intensive workloads.
+
+**CVE-2020-0543 — Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS, CROSSTalk)**
+
+Certain special CPU instructions (RDRAND, RDSEED, EGETKEY) read data through a shared staging buffer that is accessible across all cores via speculative execution. An attacker running code on any core can observe the output of these instructions from a victim on a different core, including extracting cryptographic keys from SGX enclaves (a complete ECDSA key was demonstrated). This is notable as one of the first cross-core speculative execution attacks. Mitigation requires a microcode update that serializes access to the staging buffer, plus a kernel update to manage the mitigation. Performance impact is low, mainly affecting workloads that heavily use RDRAND/RDSEED.
+
+**CVE-2022-40982 — Gather Data Sampling (GDS, Downfall)**
+
+The AVX GATHER instructions can leak data from previously used vector registers across privilege boundaries through the shared gather data buffer. This affects any software using AVX2 or AVX-512 on vulnerable Intel processors. Mitigation is provided by a microcode update that clears the gather buffer, or alternatively by disabling the AVX feature entirely. Performance impact is negligible for most workloads but can be significant (up to 50%) for AVX-heavy applications such as HPC and AI inference.
+
+**CVE-2023-20569 — Return Address Security (Inception, SRSO)**
+
+On AMD Zen 1 through Zen 4 processors, an attacker can manipulate the return address predictor to redirect speculative execution on return instructions, leaking kernel memory. Mitigation requires both a kernel update (providing SRSO safe-return sequences or IBPB-on-entry) and a microcode update (providing SBPB on Zen 3/4, or IBPB support on Zen 1/2 — which additionally requires SMT to be disabled). Performance impact ranges from low to significant depending on the chosen mitigation and CPU generation.
+
+**CVE-2023-20593 — Cross-Process Information Leak (Zenbleed)**
+
+A bug in AMD Zen 2 processors causes the VZEROUPPER instruction to incorrectly zero register files during speculative execution, leaving stale data from other processes observable in vector registers. This can leak data across any privilege boundary, including from the kernel and other processes, at rates up to 30 KB/s per core. Mitigation is available either through a microcode update that fixes the bug, or through a kernel workaround that sets the FP_BACKUP_FIX bit (bit 9) in the DE_CFG MSR, disabling the faulty optimization. Either approach alone is sufficient. Performance impact is negligible.
+
+**CVE-2023-23583 — Redundant Prefix Issue (Reptar)**
+
+A bug in Intel processors causes unexpected behavior when executing instructions with specific redundant REX prefixes. Depending on the circumstances, this can result in a system crash (MCE), unpredictable behavior, or potentially privilege escalation. Any software running on an affected CPU can trigger the bug. Mitigation requires a microcode update. Performance impact is low.
+
+**CVE-2024-36350 — Transient Scheduler Attack, Store Queue (TSA-SQ)**
+
+On AMD Zen 3 and Zen 4 processors, the CPU's transient scheduler may speculatively retrieve stale data from the store queue during certain timing windows, allowing an attacker to infer data from previous store operations across privilege boundaries. The attack can also leak data between SMT sibling threads. Mitigation requires both a microcode update (exposing the VERW_CLEAR capability) and a kernel update (CONFIG_MITIGATION_TSA, Linux 6.16+) that uses the VERW instruction to clear CPU buffers on user/kernel transitions and before VMRUN. The kernel also clears buffers on idle when SMT is active. Performance impact is low to medium.
+
+**CVE-2024-36357 — Transient Scheduler Attack, L1 (TSA-L1)**
+
+On AMD Zen 3 and Zen 4 processors, the CPU's transient scheduler may speculatively retrieve stale data from the L1 data cache during certain timing windows, allowing an attacker to infer data in the L1D cache across privilege boundaries. Mitigation requires the same microcode and kernel updates as TSA-SQ: a microcode update exposing VERW_CLEAR and a kernel update (CONFIG_MITIGATION_TSA, Linux 6.16+) that clears CPU buffers via VERW on privilege transitions. Performance impact is low to medium.
+
+</details>
+
+## Scope
 
 Supported operating systems:
 - Linux (all versions, flavors and distros)
-- BSD (FreeBSD, NetBSD, DragonFlyBSD)
+- FreeBSD, NetBSD, DragonFlyBSD and derivatives (others BSDs are [not supported](FAQ.md#which-bsd-oses-are-supported))
+
+For Linux systems, the tool will detect mitigations, including backported non-vanilla patches, regardless of the advertised kernel version number and the distribution (such as Debian, Ubuntu, CentOS, RHEL, Fedora, openSUSE, Arch, ...), it also works if you've compiled your own kernel. More information [here](FAQ.md#how-does-this-script-work).
+
+Other operating systems such as MacOS, Windows, ESXi, etc. [will never be supported](FAQ.md#why-is-my-os-not-supported).
 
 Supported architectures:
-- x86 (32 bits)
+- `x86` (32 bits)
-- amd64/x86_64 (64 bits)
+- `amd64`/`x86_64` (64 bits)
-- ARM and ARM64
+- `ARM` and `ARM64`
 - other architectures will work, but mitigations (if they exist) might not always be detected
 
-For Linux systems, the script will detect mitigations, including backported non-vanilla patches, regardless of the advertised kernel version number and the distribution (such as Debian, Ubuntu, CentOS, RHEL, Fedora, openSUSE, Arch, ...), it also works if you've compiled your own kernel.
+## Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
 
-For BSD systems, the detection will work as long as the BSD you're using supports `cpuctl` and `linprocfs` (this is not the case of OpenBSD for example).
+What is the purpose of this tool? Why was it written? How can it be useful to me? How does it work? What can I expect from it?
 
-## Easy way to run the script
+All these questions (and more) have detailed answers in the [FAQ](FAQ.md), please have a look!
+
+## Running the script
+
+### Direct way (recommended)
 
 - Get the latest version of the script using `curl` *or* `wget`
 
@@ -54,127 +201,41 @@ chmod +x spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
 sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
 ```
 
-### Run the script in a docker container
+### Using a docker container
 
-#### With docker-compose
+<details>
+<summary>Unfold for instructions</summary>
+
+Using `docker compose`:
 
 ```shell
-docker-compose build
+docker compose build
-docker-compose run --rm spectre-meltdown-checker
+docker compose run --rm spectre-meltdown-checker
 ```
 
-#### Without docker-compose
+Note that on older versions of docker, `docker-compose` is a separate command, so you might
+need to replace the two `docker compose` occurences above by `docker-compose`.
+
+Using `docker build` directly:
 
 ```shell
 docker build -t spectre-meltdown-checker .
 docker run --rm --privileged -v /boot:/boot:ro -v /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu:ro -v /lib/modules:/lib/modules:ro spectre-meltdown-checker
 ```
 
+</details>
+
 ## Example of script output
 
 - Intel Haswell CPU running under Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
 
-![haswell](https://framapic.org/1kWmNwE6ll0p/ayTRX9JRlHJ7.png)
+![haswell](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/218502/108764885-6dcfc380-7553-11eb-81ac-4d19060a3acf.png)
 
 - AMD Ryzen running under OpenSUSE Tumbleweed
 
-![ryzen](https://framapic.org/TkWbuh421YQR/6MAGUP3lL6Ne.png)
+![ryzen](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/218502/108764896-70321d80-7553-11eb-9dd2-fad2a0a1a737.png)
 
 - Batch mode (JSON flavor)
 
-![batch](https://framapic.org/HEcWFPrLewbs/om1LdufspWTJ.png)
+![batch](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/218502/108764902-71634a80-7553-11eb-9678-fd304995fa64.png)
 
-## Quick summary of the CVEs
-
-**CVE-2017-5753** bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1)
-
-   - Impact: Kernel & all software
-   - Mitigation: recompile software *and* kernel with a modified compiler that introduces the LFENCE opcode at the proper positions in the resulting code
-   - Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible
-
-**CVE-2017-5715** branch target injection (Spectre Variant 2)
-
-   - Impact: Kernel
-   - Mitigation 1: new opcode via microcode update that should be used by up to date compilers to protect the BTB (by flushing indirect branch predictors)
-   - Mitigation 2: introducing "retpoline" into compilers, and recompile software/OS with it
-   - Performance impact of the mitigation: high for mitigation 1, medium for mitigation 2, depending on your CPU
-
-**CVE-2017-5754** rogue data cache load (Meltdown)
-
-   - Impact: Kernel
-   - Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough
-   - Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium
-
-**CVE-2018-3640** rogue system register read (Variant 3a)
-
-   - Impact: TBC
-   - Mitigation: microcode update only
-   - Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible
-
-**CVE-2018-3639** speculative store bypass (Variant 4)
-
-   - Impact: software using JIT (no known exploitation against kernel)
-   - Mitigation: microcode update + kernel update making possible for affected software to protect itself
-   - Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium
-
-**CVE-2018-3615** l1 terminal fault (Foreshadow-NG SGX)
-
-   - Impact: Kernel & all software (any physical memory address in the system)
-   - Mitigation: microcode update
-   - Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible
-
-**CVE-2018-3620** l1 terminal fault (Foreshadow-NG SMM)
-
-   - Impact: Kernel & System management mode
-   - Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTE inversion)
-   - Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible
-
-**CVE-2018-3646** l1 terminal fault (Foreshadow-NG VMM)
-
-   - Impact: Virtualization software and Virtual Machine Monitors
-   - Mitigation: disable ept (extended page tables), disable hyper-threading (SMT), or updated kernel (with L1d flush)
-   - Performance impact of the mitigation: low to significant
-
-**CVE-2018-12126** [MSBDS] Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (Fallout)
-
-**CVE-2018-12130** [MFBDS] Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (ZombieLoad)
-
-**CVE-2018-12127** [MLPDS] Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (RIDL)
-
-**CVE-2019-11091** [MDSUM] Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory (RIDL)
-
-   - Note: These 4 CVEs are similar and collectively named "MDS" vulnerabilities, the mitigation is identical for all
-   - Impact: Kernel
-   - Mitigation: microcode update + kernel update making possible to protect various CPU internal buffers from unprivileged speculative access to data
-   - Performance impact of the mitigation: low to significant
-
-**CVE-2019-11135** TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA, ZombieLoad V2)
-
-   - Impact: Kernel
-   - Mitigation: microcode update + kernel update making possible to protect various CPU internal buffers from unprivileged speculative access to data
-   - Performance impact of the mitigation: low to significant
-
-**CVE-2018-12207** machine check exception on page size changes (No eXcuses, iTLB Multihit)
-
-   - Impact: Virtualization software and Virtual Machine Monitors
-   - Mitigation: disable hugepages use in hypervisor, or update hypervisor to benefit from mitigation
-   - Performance impact of the mitigation: low to significant
-
-**CVE-2020-0543** Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)
-
-   - Impact: Kernel
-   - Mitigation: microcode update + kernel update helping to protect various CPU internal buffers from unprivileged speculative access to data
-   - Performance impact of the mitigation: low
-
-## Understanding what this script does and doesn't
-
-This tool does its best to determine whether your system is affected (or has proper mitigations in place) by the collectively named "speculative execution" vulnerabilities. It doesn't attempt to run any kind of exploit, and can't guarantee that your system is secure, but rather helps you verifying whether your system has the known mitigations in place.
-However, some mitigations could also exist in your kernel that this script doesn't know (yet) how to detect, or it might falsely detect mitigations that in the end don't work as expected (for example, on backported or modified kernels).
-
-Your system exposure also depends on your CPU. As of now, AMD and ARM processors are marked as immune to some or all of these vulnerabilities (except some specific ARM models). All Intel processors manufactured since circa 1995 are thought to be vulnerable, except some specific/old models, such as some early Atoms. Whatever processor one uses, one might seek more information from the manufacturer of that processor and/or of the device in which it runs.
-
-The nature of the discovered vulnerabilities being quite new, the landscape of vulnerable processors can be expected to change over time, which is why this script makes the assumption that all CPUs are vulnerable, except if the manufacturer explicitly stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement.
-
-Please also note that for Spectre vulnerabilities, all software can possibly be exploited, this tool only verifies that the kernel (which is the core of the system) you're using has the proper protections in place. Verifying all the other software is out of the scope of this tool. As a general measure, ensure you always have the most up to date stable versions of all the software you use, especially for those who are exposed to the world, such as network daemons and browsers.
-
-This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to conclusions about your security.

docker-compose.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-version: '2'
-
 services:
   spectre-meltdown-checker:
     build: