9 Commits
v0.27 ... v0.29

Author SHA1 Message Date
b47d505689 AMD now vuln to variant2 (as per their stmt) 2018-01-13 13:35:31 +01:00
4a2d051285 minor is_cpu_vulnerable() changes (#71)
* correct is_cpu_vulnerable() comment

As far as I can tell, the function and usage are correct for the comment
to be inverted.

Add a clarifying note as to why the value choice makes sense.

* exit on invalid varient

If this happens, it's a bug in the script. None of the calling code
checks for status 255, so don't let a scripting bug cause a false
negative.

* no need to set vulnerable CPUs

According to comment above this code:
'by default, everything is vulnerable, we work in a "whitelist" logic here.'
2018-01-13 13:16:37 +01:00
f3551b9734 Only show the name of the script, not the full path (#72) 2018-01-13 13:14:19 +01:00
45b98e125f fix some typos (#73) 2018-01-13 13:13:40 +01:00
dce917bfbb add --version, bump to v0.28 2018-01-12 19:10:44 +01:00
8f18f53aba add cpu model in output 2018-01-12 19:08:12 +01:00
d3f102b3b3 Typofix in readme (#61) 2018-01-12 13:58:04 +01:00
8bd093173d Fixed a few spelling errors (#60) 2018-01-12 11:46:36 +01:00
bfe5a3b840 add some debug 2018-01-12 10:53:19 +01:00
2 changed files with 45 additions and 22 deletions

View File

@ -40,6 +40,6 @@ However, some mitigations could also exist in your kernel that this script doesn
Your system exposure also depends on your CPU. As of now, AMD and ARM processors are marked as immune to some or all of these vulnerabilities (except some specific ARM models). All Intel processors manufactured since circa 1995 are thought to be vulnerable. Whatever processor one uses, one might seek more information from the manufacturer of that processor and/or of the device in which it runs.
The nature of the discovered vulnerabilities being quite new, the landscape of vulnerable processors can be expected to change over time, which is why this script makes the assumption that all CPUs are vulnerable, except if the manufacturer explicitely stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement.
The nature of the discovered vulnerabilities being quite new, the landscape of vulnerable processors can be expected to change over time, which is why this script makes the assumption that all CPUs are vulnerable, except if the manufacturer explicitly stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement.
This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to conclusions about your security.

View File

@ -8,21 +8,21 @@
#
# Stephane Lesimple
#
VERSION=0.27
VERSION=0.29
# Script configuration
show_usage()
{
cat <<EOF
Usage:
Live mode: $0 [options] [--live]
Offline mode: $0 [options] [--kernel <vmlinux_file>] [--config <kernel_config>] [--map <kernel_map_file>]
Live mode: `basename $0` [options] [--live]
Offline mode: `basename $0` [options] [--kernel <vmlinux_file>] [--config <kernel_config>] [--map <kernel_map_file>]
Modes:
Two modes are available.
First mode is the "live" mode (default), it does its best to find information about the currently running kernel.
To run under this mode, just start the script without any option (you can also use --live explicitely)
To run under this mode, just start the script without any option (you can also use --live explicitly)
Second mode is the "offline" mode, where you can inspect a non-running kernel.
You'll need to specify the location of the vmlinux file, and if possible, the corresponding config and System.map files:
@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show_usage()
--variant [1,2,3] Specify which variant you'd like to check, by default all variants are checked
Can be specified multiple times (e.g. --variant 2 --variant 3)
IMPORTANT:
A false sense of security is worse than no security at all.
Please use the --disclaimer option to understand exactly what this script does.
@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ in which it runs.
The nature of the discovered vulnerabilities being quite new, the landscape of vulnerable processors can be expected
to change over time, which is why this script makes the assumption that all CPUs are vulnerable, except if the manufacturer
explicitely stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement.
explicitly stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement.
This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to conclusions about your security.
@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ __echo()
# strip ANSI color codes
_msg=$(/bin/echo -e "$_msg" | sed -r "s/\x1B\[([0-9]{1,2}(;[0-9]{1,2})?)?[m|K]//g")
fi
# explicitely call /bin/echo to avoid shell builtins that might not take options
# explicitly call /bin/echo to avoid shell builtins that might not take options
/bin/echo $opt -e "$_msg"
}
@ -144,21 +145,23 @@ _verbose()
_debug()
{
_echo 3 "(debug) $@"
_echo 3 "\033[34m(debug) $@\033[0m"
}
is_cpu_vulnerable()
{
# param: 1, 2 or 3 (variant)
# returns 1 if vulnerable, 0 if not vulnerable, 255 on error
# returns 0 if vulnerable, 1 if not vulnerable
# (note that in shell, a return of 0 is success)
# by default, everything is vulnerable, we work in a "whitelist" logic here.
# usage: is_cpu_vulnerable 2 && do something if vulnerable
variant1=0
variant2=0
variant3=0
if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then
variant1=0
variant2=1
# AMD revised their statement about variant2 => vulnerable
# https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/speculative-execution
variant3=1
elif grep -qi 'CPU implementer\s*:\s*0x41' /proc/cpuinfo; then
# ARM
@ -173,28 +176,26 @@ is_cpu_vulnerable()
# arch 7? 7? 7 7 7 8 8 8 8
if [ "$cpuarch" = 7 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(c09|c0f|c0e)$'; then
# armv7 vulnerable chips
variant1=0
variant2=0
:
elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(d07|d08|d09|d0a)$'; then
# armv8 vulnerable chips
variant1=0
variant2=0
:
else
variant1=1
variant2=1
fi
# for variant3, only A75 is vulnerable
if [ "$cpuarch" = 8 -a "$cpupart" = 0xd0a ]; then
variant3=0
else
if ! [ "$cpuarch" = 8 -a "$cpupart" = 0xd0a ]; then
variant3=1
fi
fi
fi
[ "$1" = 1 ] && return $variant1
[ "$1" = 2 ] && return $variant2
[ "$1" = 3 ] && return $variant3
return 255
echo "$0: error: invalid variant '$1' passed to is_cpu_vulnerable()" >&2
exit 1
}
show_header()
@ -290,6 +291,10 @@ while [ -n "$1" ]; do
show_header
show_usage
exit 0
elif [ "$1" = "--version" ]; then
opt_no_color=1
show_header
exit 1
elif [ "$1" = "--disclaimer" ]; then
show_header
show_disclaimer
@ -457,7 +462,8 @@ if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
_warn "To run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0"
_warn
fi
_info "Checking for vulnerabilities against live running kernel \033[35m"$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)"\033[0m"
_info "Checking for vulnerabilities against running kernel \033[35m"$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)"\033[0m"
_info "CPU is\033[35m"$(grep '^model name' /proc/cpuinfo | cut -d: -f2 | head -1)"\033[0m"
# try to find the image of the current running kernel
# first, look for the BOOT_IMAGE hint in the kernel cmdline
@ -556,7 +562,7 @@ umount_debugfs()
sys_interface_check()
{
[ "$opt_live" = 1 -a "$opt_no_sysfs" = 0 -a -r "$1" ] || return 1
_info_nol "* Checking wheter we're safe according to the /sys interface: "
_info_nol "* Checking whether we're safe according to the /sys interface: "
if grep -qi '^not affected' "$1"; then
# Not affected
status=OK
@ -574,6 +580,7 @@ sys_interface_check()
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "unknown value reported by kernel"
fi
msg=$(cat "$1")
_debug "sys_interface_check: $1=$msg"
return 0
}
@ -602,7 +609,7 @@ check_variant1()
status=UNK
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
else
# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurences of the LFENCE opcode
# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurrences of the LFENCE opcode
# in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+)
# v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches,
@ -650,6 +657,7 @@ check_variant2()
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1
_debug "attempted to load module msr, ret=$insmod_msr"
fi
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
@ -668,6 +676,7 @@ check_variant2()
if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then
# if we used modprobe ourselves, rmmod the module
rmmod msr 2>/dev/null
_debug "attempted to unload module msr, ret=$?"
fi
_info_nol "* Kernel support for IBRS: "
@ -685,7 +694,10 @@ check_variant2()
pstatus green YES
ibrs_supported=1
ibrs_enabled=$(cat "$ibrs_file" 2>/dev/null)
_debug "ibrs: found $ibrs_file=$ibrs_enabled"
break
else
_debug "ibrs: file $ibrs_file doesn't exist"
fi
done
fi
@ -693,6 +705,7 @@ check_variant2()
if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then
pstatus green YES
ibrs_supported=1
_debug "ibrs: found '*spec_ctrl*' symbol in $opt_map"
fi
fi
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then
@ -733,6 +746,7 @@ check_variant2()
if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then
pstatus green YES
retpoline=1
_debug "retpoline: found "$(grep '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE' "$opt_config")" in $opt_config"
else
pstatus red NO
fi
@ -822,6 +836,7 @@ check_variant3()
if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
kpti_can_tell=1
if grep -Eq '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config"; then
_debug "kpti_support: found option "$(grep -E '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config")" in $opt_config"
kpti_support=1
fi
fi
@ -830,6 +845,7 @@ check_variant3()
# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
kpti_can_tell=1
if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then
_debug "kpti_support: found kpti_force_enabled in $opt_map"
kpti_support=1
fi
fi
@ -841,6 +857,7 @@ check_variant3()
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
else
if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then
_debug "kpti_support: found nopti string in $vmlinux"
kpti_support=1
fi
fi
@ -862,20 +879,26 @@ check_variant3()
dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|x86/pti: Unmapping kernel while in userspace"
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then
# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
_debug "kpti_enabled: found 'pti' flag in /proc/cpuinfo"
kpti_enabled=1
elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then
# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
_debug "kpti_enabled: found 'kaiser' flag in /proc/cpuinfo"
kpti_enabled=1
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then
# RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)
_debug "kpti_enabled: file /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled exists and says: $kpti_enabled"
elif dmesg | grep -Eq "$dmesg_grep"; then
# if we can't find the flag, grep dmesg output
_debug "kpti_enabled: found hint in dmesg: "$(dmesg | grep -E "$dmesg_grep")
kpti_enabled=1
elif [ -r /var/log/dmesg ] && grep -Eq "$dmesg_grep" /var/log/dmesg; then
# if we can't find the flag in dmesg output, grep in /var/log/dmesg when readable
_debug "kpti_enabled: found hint in /var/log/dmesg: "$(grep -E "$dmesg_grep" /var/log/dmesg)
kpti_enabled=1
else
_debug "kpti_enabled: couldn't find any hint that PTI is enabled"
kpti_enabled=0
fi
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then