bump to v0.27

We were saying unknown instead of vulnerable when the count of lfence opcodes was low
This was not impacting batch mode or the final decision, just the human-readable output of the script.

README.md

@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
 Spectre & Meltdown Checker
 ==========================
 
-A simple shell script to tell if your Linux installation is vulnerable against the 3 "speculative execution" CVEs.
+A simple shell script to tell if your Linux installation is vulnerable against the 3 "speculative execution" CVEs that were made public early 2018.
 
-Without options, it'll inspect you currently running kernel. 
+Without options, it'll inspect your currently running kernel. 
 You can also specify a kernel image on the command line, if you'd like to inspect a kernel you're not running.
 
 The script will do its best to detect mitigations, including backported non-vanilla patches, regardless of the advertised kernel version number.
 
+## Example of script output
+
+![checker](https://framapic.org/6O4v4AAwMenv/M6J4CFWwsB3z.png)
+
 ## Quick summary of the CVEs
 
 **CVE-2017-5753** bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1)
@@ -29,68 +33,13 @@ The script will do its best to detect mitigations, including backported non-vani
    - Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough
    - Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium
 
-## Example of script output
+## Disclaimer
 
-### Ubuntu LTS (before official patches)
+This tool does its best to determine whether your system is immune (or has proper mitigations in place) for the collectively named "speculative execution" vulnerabilities. It doesn't attempt to run any kind of exploit, and can't guarantee that your system is secure, but rather helps you verifying whether your system has the known correct mitigations in place.
+However, some mitigations could also exist in your kernel that this script doesn't know (yet) how to detect, or it might falsely detect mitigations that in the end don't work as expected (for example, on backported or modified kernels).
 
-```
+Your system exposure also depends on your CPU. As of now, AMD and ARM processors are marked as immune to some or all of these vulnerabilities (except some specific ARM models). All Intel processors manufactured since circa 1995 are thought to be vulnerable. Whatever processor one uses, one might seek more information from the manufacturer of that processor and/or of the device in which it runs.
-$ sudo ./spectre-and-meltdown.sh
-Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.16
 
-Checking for vulnerabilities against live running kernel Linux 4.4.0-104-generic #127-Ubuntu SMP Mon Dec 11 12:16:42 UTC 2017 x86_64
+The nature of the discovered vulnerabilities being quite new, the landscape of vulnerable processors can be expected to change over time, which is why this script makes the assumption that all CPUs are vulnerable, except if the manufacturer explicitely stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement.
-Will use vmlinux image /boot/vmlinuz-4.4.0-104-generic
-Will use kconfig /boot/config-4.4.0-104-generic
-Will use System.map file /boot/System.map-4.4.0-104-generic
 
-CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
+This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to conclusions about your security.
-* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places:  NO  (only 38 opcodes found, should be >= 70)
-> STATUS:  VULNERABLE 
-
-CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
-* Mitigation 1
-*   Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation:  NO 
-*   Kernel support for IBRS:  NO 
-*   IBRS enabled for Kernel space:  NO 
-*   IBRS enabled for User space:  NO 
-* Mitigation 2
-*   Kernel compiled with retpoline option:  NO 
-*   Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler:  NO 
-> STATUS:  VULNERABLE  (IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
-
-CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
-* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI):  NO 
-* PTI enabled and active:  NO 
-> STATUS:  VULNERABLE  (PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
-```
-
-### First patched kernel of RHEL6
-
-```
-$ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --kernel /tmp/vmlinuz-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64 --config /tmp/config-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64 --map /tmp/System.map-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
-Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.16
-
-Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel
-Will use vmlinux image /tmp/vmlinuz-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
-Will use kconfig /tmp/config-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
-Will use System.map file /tmp/System.map-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
-
-CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
-* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places:  YES  (84 opcodes found, which is >= 70)
-> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE 
-
-CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
-* Mitigation 1
-*   Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation:  NO 
-*   Kernel support for IBRS:  YES 
-*   IBRS enabled for Kernel space:  N/A  (not testable in offline mode)
-*   IBRS enabled for User space:  N/A  (not testable in offline mode)
-* Mitigation 2
-*   Kernel compiled with retpoline option:  NO 
-*   Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler:  NO 
-> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime)
-
-CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
-* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI):  YES 
-* PTI enabled and active:  N/A  (can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode)
-> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime)
-```

spectre-meltdown-checker.sh

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 #
 # Stephane Lesimple
 #
-VERSION=0.21
+VERSION=0.27
 
 # Script configuration
 show_usage()
@@ -33,8 +33,13 @@ show_usage()
 
 	Options:
 		--no-color			Don't use color codes
-		-v, --verbose			Increase verbosity level
+		--verbose, -v			Increase verbosity level
-		--batch				Produce machine readable output
+		--no-sysfs			Don't use the /sys interface even if present
+		--batch text			Produce machine readable output, this is the default if --batch is specified alone
+		--batch json			Produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef...
+		--batch nrpe			Produce machine readable output formatted for NRPE
+		--variant [1,2,3]		Specify which variant you'd like to check, by default all variants are checked
+						Can be specified multiple times (e.g. --variant 2 --variant 3)
 
 	IMPORTANT:
 	A false sense of security is worse than no security at all.
@@ -76,19 +81,29 @@ opt_live_explicit=0
 opt_live=1
 opt_no_color=0
 opt_batch=0
+opt_batch_format="text"
 opt_verbose=1
+opt_variant1=0
+opt_variant2=0
+opt_variant3=0
+opt_allvariants=1
+opt_no_sysfs=0
+
+nrpe_critical=0
+nrpe_unknown=0
+nrpe_vuln=""
 
 __echo()
 {
 	opt="$1"
 	shift
-	msg="$@"
+	_msg="$@"
 	if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ] ; then
 		# strip ANSI color codes
-		msg=$(/bin/echo -e  "$msg" | sed -r "s/\x1B\[([0-9]{1,2}(;[0-9]{1,2})?)?[m|K]//g")
+		_msg=$(/bin/echo -e  "$_msg" | sed -r "s/\x1B\[([0-9]{1,2}(;[0-9]{1,2})?)?[m|K]//g")
 	fi
 	# explicitely call /bin/echo to avoid shell builtins that might not take options
-	/bin/echo $opt -e "$msg"
+	/bin/echo $opt -e "$_msg"
 }
 
 _echo()
@@ -109,7 +124,7 @@ _echo_nol()
 
 _warn()
 {
-	_echo 0 "\033[31m${@}\033[0m"
+	_echo 0 "\033[31m${@}\033[0m" >&2
 }
 
 _info()
@@ -127,6 +142,11 @@ _verbose()
 	_echo 2 "$@"
 }
 
+_debug()
+{
+	_echo 3 "(debug) $@"
+}
+
 is_cpu_vulnerable()
 {
 	# param: 1, 2 or 3 (variant)
@@ -201,7 +221,7 @@ parse_opt_file()
 		show_header
 		echo "$0: error: $option_value is not a file" >&2
 		exit 1
-	elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then
+	elif [ ! -r "$option_value" ]; then
 		show_header
 		echo "$0: error: couldn't read $option_value (are you root?)" >&2
 		exit 1
@@ -232,13 +252,40 @@ while [ -n "$1" ]; do
 	elif [ "$1" = "--no-color" ]; then
 		opt_no_color=1
 		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--no-sysfs" ]; then
+		opt_no_sysfs=1
+		shift
 	elif [ "$1" = "--batch" ]; then
 		opt_batch=1
 		opt_verbose=0
 		shift
+		case "$1" in
+			text|nrpe|json) opt_batch_format="$1"; shift;;
+			--*) ;;    # allow subsequent flags
+			'') ;;     # allow nothing at all
+			*)
+				echo "$0: error: unknown batch format '$1'"
+				echo "$0: error: --batch expects a format from: text, nrpe, json"
+				exit 1 >&2
+				;;
+		esac
 	elif [ "$1" = "-v" -o "$1" = "--verbose" ]; then
 		opt_verbose=$(expr $opt_verbose + 1)
 		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--variant" ]; then
+		if [ -z "$2" ]; then
+			echo "$0: error: option --variant expects a parameter (1, 2 or 3)" >&2
+			exit 1
+		fi
+		case "$2" in
+			1) opt_variant1=1; opt_allvariants=0;;
+			2) opt_variant2=1; opt_allvariants=0;;
+			3) opt_variant3=1; opt_allvariants=0;;
+			*)
+				echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, expected either 1, 2 or 3" >&2;
+				exit 1;;
+		esac
+		shift 2
 	elif [ "$1" = "-h" -o "$1" = "--help" ]; then
 		show_header
 		show_usage
@@ -280,7 +327,31 @@ pstatus()
 # Arguments are: CVE UNK/OK/VULN description
 pvulnstatus()
 {
-	[ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && _echo 0 "$1: $2 ($3)"
+	if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ]; then
+                case "$opt_batch_format" in
+                        text) _echo 0 "$1: $2 ($3)";;
+                        nrpe)
+                              case "$2" in
+                                       UKN) nrpe_unknown="1";;
+                                       VULN) nrpe_critical="1"; nrpe_vuln="$nrpe_vuln $1";;
+                              esac
+                              ;;
+                        json)
+                              case "$1" in
+                                       CVE-2017-5753) aka="SPECTRE VARIANT 1";;
+                                       CVE-2017-5715) aka="SPECTRE VARIANT 2";;
+                                       CVE-2017-5754) aka="MELTDOWN";;
+                              esac
+                              case "$2" in
+                                       UKN)  is_vuln="unknown";;
+                                       VULN) is_vuln="true";;
+                                       OK)   is_vuln="false";;
+                              esac
+                              json_output="${json_output:-[}{\"NAME\":\""$aka"\",\"CVE\":\""$1"\",\"VULNERABLE\":$is_vuln,\"INFOS\":\""$3"\"},"
+                              ;;
+		esac
+	fi
+
 	_info_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
 	vulnstatus="$2"
 	shift 2
@@ -312,7 +383,7 @@ vmlinux=''
 vmlinux_err=''
 check_vmlinux()
 {
-	readelf -h $1 > /dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
+	readelf -h "$1" > /dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
 	return 0
 }
 
@@ -322,15 +393,22 @@ try_decompress()
 	# "grep" that report the byte offset of the line instead of the pattern.
 
 	# Try to find the header ($1) and decompress from here
-	for     pos in `tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$5" | grep -abo "^$2"`
+	for     pos in `tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$6" | grep -abo "^$2"`
 	do
-		if ! which $3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		_debug "try_decompress: magic for $3 found at offset $pos"
-			vmlinux_err="missing '$3' tool, please install it, usually it's in the '$4' package"
+		if ! which "$3" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+			vmlinux_err="missing '$3' tool, please install it, usually it's in the '$5' package"
 			return 0
 		fi
 		pos=${pos%%:*}
-		tail -c+$pos "$5" | $3 > $vmlinuxtmp 2> /dev/null
+		tail -c+$pos "$6" 2>/dev/null | $3 $4 > $vmlinuxtmp 2>/dev/null
-		check_vmlinux "$vmlinuxtmp" && vmlinux=$vmlinuxtmp && return 0
+		if check_vmlinux "$vmlinuxtmp"; then
+			vmlinux="$vmlinuxtmp"
+			_debug "try_decompress: decompressed with $3 successfully!"
+			return 0
+		else
+			_debug "try_decompress: decompression with $3 did not work"
+		fi
 	done
 	return 1
 }
@@ -350,11 +428,12 @@ extract_vmlinux()
 	fi
 
 	# That didn't work, so retry after decompression.
-	try_decompress '\037\213\010' xy    gunzip     gunzip	"$1" && return 0
+	try_decompress '\037\213\010'     xy    gunzip  ''      gunzip      "$1" && return 0
-	try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000' abcde unxz       xz-utils	"$1" && return 0
+	try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000'     abcde unxz    ''      xz-utils    "$1" && return 0
-	try_decompress 'BZh'          xy    bunzip2    bzip2	"$1" && return 0
+	try_decompress 'BZh'              xy    bunzip2 ''      bzip2       "$1" && return 0
-	try_decompress '\135\0\0\0'   xxx   unlzma     xz-utils	"$1" && return 0
+	try_decompress '\135\0\0\0'       xxx   unlzma  ''      xz-utils    "$1" && return 0
-	try_decompress '\211\114\132' xy    'lzop -d'  lzop	"$1" && return 0
+	try_decompress '\211\114\132'     xy    'lzop'  '-d'    lzop        "$1" && return 0
+	try_decompress '\002\041\114\030' xyy   'lz4'   '-d -l' liblz4-tool "$1" && return 0
 	return 1
 }
 
@@ -381,12 +460,25 @@ if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
 	_info "Checking for vulnerabilities against live running kernel \033[35m"$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)"\033[0m"
 
 	# try to find the image of the current running kernel
-	[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux       ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-linux
+	# first, look for the BOOT_IMAGE hint in the kernel cmdline
-	[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre
+	if [ -r /proc/cmdline ] && grep -q 'BOOT_IMAGE=' /proc/cmdline; then
-	[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)
+		opt_kernel=$(grep -Eo 'BOOT_IMAGE=[^ ]+' /proc/cmdline | cut -d= -f2)
-	[ -e /boot/kernel-$( uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)
+		_debug "found opt_kernel=$opt_kernel in /proc/cmdline"
-	[ -e /boot/bzImage-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)
+		# if we have a dedicated /boot partition, our bootloader might have just called it /
-	[ -e /boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)
+		# so try to prepend /boot and see if we find anything
+		[ -e "/boot/$opt_kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/$opt_kernel"
+		_debug "opt_kernel is now $opt_kernel"
+		# else, the full path is already there (most probably /boot/something)
+	fi
+	# if we didn't find a kernel, default to guessing
+	if [ ! -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then
+		[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux       ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-linux
+		[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre
+		[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)
+		[ -e /boot/kernel-$( uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)
+		[ -e /boot/bzImage-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)
+		[ -e /boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)
+	fi
 
 	# system.map
 	if [ -e /proc/kallsyms ] ; then
@@ -440,288 +532,420 @@ fi
 
 _info
 
-###########
+# end of header stuff
-# SPECTRE 1
-_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m"
-_info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: "
 
-status=0
+# now we define some util functions and the check_*() funcs, as
-if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
+# the user can choose to execute only some of those
-	pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$vmlinux_err"
-else
-	if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
-	else
-		# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurences of the LFENCE opcode
-		# in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
-		# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+)
-		# v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches,
-		# so let's push the threshold to 70.
-		# TODO LKML patch is starting to dump LFENCE in favor of the PAUSE opcode, we might need to check that (patch not stabilized yet)
-		nb_lfence=$(objdump -D "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence)
-		if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 70 ]; then
-			pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 70"
-			status=1
-		else
-			pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 70"
-			status=2
-		fi
-	fi
-fi
 
-if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then
+mount_debugfs()
-	pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+{
-else
-	case "$status" in
-		0) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 UNK "impossible to check ${vmlinux}";;
-		1) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 VULN 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';;
-		2) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';;
-	esac
-fi
-
-###########
-# VARIANT 2
-_info
-_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m"
-_info "* Mitigation 1"
-_info_nol "*   Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: "
-if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
-	# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
-	modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1
-fi
-if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
-	pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
-else
-	# the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48
-	# here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x48' but without needing the rdmsr tool
-	# if we get a read error, the MSR is not there
-	dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 skip=9 2>/dev/null
-	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
-		pstatus green YES
-	else
-		pstatus red NO
-	fi
-fi
-
-if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then
-	# if we used modprobe ourselves, rmmod the module
-	rmmod msr 2>/dev/null
-fi
-
-_info_nol "*   Kernel support for IBRS: "
-if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
 	if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then
 		# try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards
 		mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1
 	fi
-	if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ]; then
+}
-		# if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in
+
-		pstatus green YES
+umount_debugfs()
-		ibrs_supported=1
+{
-		ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
+	if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then
-	elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled ]; then
+		# umount debugfs if we did mount it ourselves
-		# RedHat uses a different path (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301)
+		umount /sys/kernel/debug
-		pstatus green YES
-		ibrs_supported=1
-		ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
 	fi
-fi
+}
-if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
-	if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then
-		pstatus green YES
-		ibrs_supported=1
-	fi
-fi
-if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then
-	pstatus red NO
-fi
 
-_info_nol "*   IBRS enabled for Kernel space: "
+sys_interface_check()
-if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+{
-	# 0 means disabled
+	[ "$opt_live" = 1 -a "$opt_no_sysfs" = 0 -a -r "$1" ] || return 1
-	# 1 is enabled only for kernel space
+	_info_nol "* Checking wheter we're safe according to the /sys interface: "
-	# 2 is enabled for kernel and user space
+	if grep -qi '^not affected' "$1"; then
-	case "$ibrs_enabled" in
+		# Not affected
-		"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
+		status=OK
-		0)     pstatus red NO;;
+		pstatus green YES "kernel confirms that your CPU is unaffected"
-		1 | 2) pstatus green YES;;
+	elif grep -qi '^mitigation' "$1"; then
-		*)     pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
+		# Mitigation: PTI
-	esac
+		status=OK
-else
+		pstatus green YES "kernel confirms that the mitigation is active"
-	pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
+	elif grep -qi '^vulnerable' "$1"; then
-fi
+		# Vulnerable
-
+		status=VULN
-_info_nol "*   IBRS enabled for User space: "
+		pstatus red NO "kernel confirms your system is vulnerable"
-if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
-	case "$ibrs_enabled" in
-		"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
-		0 | 1) pstatus red NO;;
-		2) pstatus green YES;;
-		*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
-	esac
-else
-	pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
-fi
-
-_info "* Mitigation 2"
-_info_nol "*   Kernel compiled with retpoline option: "
-# We check the RETPOLINE kernel options
-if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
-	if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then
-		pstatus green YES
-		retpoline=1
 	else
-		pstatus red NO
+		status=UNK
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "unknown value reported by kernel"
 	fi
-else
+	msg=$(cat "$1")
-	pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration"
+	return 0
-fi
+}
 
-_info_nol "*   Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: "
+###################
-# Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm
+# SPECTRE VARIANT 1
-# For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles)
+check_variant1()
-# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79
+{
-# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set
+	_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m"
-# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol
+
-if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+	status=UNK
-	# look for the symbol
+	sys_interface_available=0
-	if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then
+	msg=''
-		retpoline_compiler=1
+	if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1"; then
-		pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map"
+		# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
+		sys_interface_available=1
 	else
-		pstatus red NO
+		# no /sys interface (or offline mode), fallback to our own ways
-	fi
+		_info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: "
-elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
+		if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
-	# look for the symbol
+			msg="couldn't check ($vmlinux_err)"
-	if which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+			status=UNK
-		# the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
-		if nm "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then
-			retpoline_compiler=1
-			pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux symbols"
 		else
+			if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+				msg="missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+				status=UNK
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+			else
+				# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurences of the LFENCE opcode
+				# in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
+				# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+)
+				# v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches,
+				# so let's push the threshold to 70.
+				nb_lfence=$(objdump -d "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence)
+				if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 70 ]; then
+					msg="only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 70, heuristic to be improved when official patches become available"
+					status=VULN
+					pstatus red NO
+				else
+					msg="$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 70, heuristic to be improved when official patches become available"
+					status=OK
+					pstatus green YES
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	# if we have the /sys interface, don't even check is_cpu_vulnerable ourselves, the kernel already does it
+	if [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ] && ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		msg="your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+		status=OK
+	fi
+
+	# report status
+	pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 "$status" "$msg"
+}
+
+###################
+# SPECTRE VARIANT 2
+check_variant2()
+{
+	_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m"
+
+	status=UNK
+	sys_interface_available=0
+	msg=''
+	if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2"; then
+		# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
+		sys_interface_available=1
+	else
+		_info "* Mitigation 1"
+		_info_nol "*   Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: "
+		if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
+			# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
+			modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1
+		fi
+		if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
+		else
+			# the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48
+			# here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x48' but without needing the rdmsr tool
+			# if we get a read error, the MSR is not there
+			dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 skip=9 2>/dev/null
+			if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+				pstatus green YES
+			else
+				pstatus red NO
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then
+			# if we used modprobe ourselves, rmmod the module
+			rmmod msr 2>/dev/null
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "*   Kernel support for IBRS: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			mount_debugfs
+			for ibrs_file in \
+				/sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled \
+				/sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled \
+				/proc/sys/kernel/ibrs_enabled; do
+				if [ -e "$ibrs_file" ]; then
+					# if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in
+					# /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled: vanilla
+					# /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled: RedHat (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301)
+					# /proc/sys/kernel/ibrs_enabled: OpenSUSE tumbleweed
+					pstatus green YES
+					ibrs_supported=1
+					ibrs_enabled=$(cat "$ibrs_file" 2>/dev/null)
+					break
+				fi
+			done
+		fi
+		if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+			if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then
+				pstatus green YES
+				ibrs_supported=1
+			fi
+		fi
+		if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then
 			pstatus red NO
 		fi
-	elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then
-		# if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have
-		# any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary
-		retpoline_compiler=1
-		pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux"
-	else
-		pstatus red NO
-	fi
-else
-	pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map"
-fi
 
-if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then
+		_info_nol "*   IBRS enabled for Kernel space: "
-	pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
-elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
+			# 0 means disabled
-	pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "retpoline mitigate the vulnerability"
+			# 1 is enabled only for kernel space
-elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			# 2 is enabled for kernel and user space
-	if [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then
+			case "$ibrs_enabled" in
-		pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability"
+				"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
-	else
+				0)     pstatus red NO;;
-		pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+				1 | 2) pstatus green YES;;
-	fi
+				*)     pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
-else
+			esac
-	if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
+		else
-		pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
+			pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
-	else
+		fi
-		pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
-	fi
-fi
 
-##########
+		_info_nol "*   IBRS enabled for User space: "
-# MELTDOWN
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
-_info
+			case "$ibrs_enabled" in
-_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m"
+				"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
-_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
+				0 | 1) pstatus red NO;;
-kpti_support=0
+				2) pstatus green YES;;
-kpti_can_tell=0
+				*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
-if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
+			esac
-	kpti_can_tell=1
+		else
-	if grep -Eq '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config"; then
+			pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
-		kpti_support=1
+		fi
-	fi
+
-fi
+		_info "* Mitigation 2"
-if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+		_info_nol "*   Kernel compiled with retpoline option: "
-	# it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch
+		# We check the RETPOLINE kernel options
-	# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
+		if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
-	kpti_can_tell=1
+			if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then
-	if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then
+				pstatus green YES
-		kpti_support=1
+				retpoline=1
-	fi
+			else
-fi
+				pstatus red NO
-if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
+			fi
-	# same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the
+		else
-	# nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option)
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration"
-	kpti_can_tell=1
+		fi
-	if ! which strings >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+
-		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+		_info_nol "*   Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: "
-	else
+		# Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm
-		if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then
+		# For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles)
-			kpti_support=1
+		# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79
+		# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set
+		# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol
+		if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+			# look for the symbol
+			if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then
+				retpoline_compiler=1
+				pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map"
+			else
+				pstatus red NO
+			fi
+		elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
+			# look for the symbol
+			if which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+				# the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol
+				if nm "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then
+					retpoline_compiler=1
+					pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux symbols"
+				else
+					pstatus red NO
+				fi
+			elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then
+				# if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have
+				# any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary
+				retpoline_compiler=1
+				pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux"
+			else
+				pstatus red NO
+			fi
+		else
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map"
 		fi
 	fi
-fi
 
-if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
+	# if we have the /sys interface, don't even check is_cpu_vulnerable ourselves, the kernel already does it
-	pstatus green YES
+	if [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ] && ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then
-elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
-	pstatus red NO
+		pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
-else
+	elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
-	pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file"
+		# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
-fi
+		if [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
-
+			pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "retpoline mitigate the vulnerability"
-_info_nol "* PTI enabled and active: "
+		elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
-if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			if [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then
-	if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then
+				pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability"
-		# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
+			else
-		kpti_enabled=1
+				pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
-	elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then
+			fi
-		# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
+		else
-		kpti_enabled=1
+			if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
-	elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then
+				pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
-		# RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
+			else
-		kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)
+				pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
-	elif dmesg | grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled'; then
+			fi
-		# if we can't find the flag, grep in dmesg
+		fi
-		kpti_enabled=1
 	else
-		kpti_enabled=0
+		pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 "$status" "$msg"
 	fi
-	if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+}
-		pstatus green YES
+
+########################
+# MELTDOWN aka VARIANT 3
+check_variant3()
+{
+	_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m"
+
+	status=UNK
+	sys_interface_available=0
+	msg=''
+	if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown"; then
+		# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
+		sys_interface_available=1
 	else
-		pstatus red NO
+		_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
+		kpti_support=0
+		kpti_can_tell=0
+		if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
+			kpti_can_tell=1
+			if grep -Eq '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config"; then
+				kpti_support=1
+			fi
+		fi
+		if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+			# it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch
+			# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
+			kpti_can_tell=1
+			if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then
+				kpti_support=1
+			fi
+		fi
+		if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
+			# same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the
+			# nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option)
+			kpti_can_tell=1
+			if ! which strings >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+			else
+				if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then
+					kpti_support=1
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES
+		elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
+			pstatus red NO
+		else
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file"
+		fi
+
+		mount_debugfs
+		_info_nol "* PTI enabled and active: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			dmesg_grep="Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled"
+			dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|Kernel page table isolation enabled"
+			dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|x86/pti: Unmapping kernel while in userspace"
+			if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then
+				# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
+				kpti_enabled=1
+			elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then
+				# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
+				kpti_enabled=1
+			elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then
+				# RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
+				kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)
+			elif dmesg | grep -Eq "$dmesg_grep"; then
+				# if we can't find the flag, grep dmesg output
+				kpti_enabled=1
+			elif [ -r /var/log/dmesg ] && grep -Eq "$dmesg_grep" /var/log/dmesg; then
+				# if we can't find the flag in dmesg output, grep in /var/log/dmesg when readable
+				kpti_enabled=1
+			else
+				kpti_enabled=0
+			fi
+			if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+				pstatus green YES
+			else
+				pstatus red NO
+			fi
+		else
+			pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode"
+		fi
 	fi
-else
+
-	pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode"
+	# if we have the /sys interface, don't even check is_cpu_vulnerable ourselves, the kernel already does it
+	cve='CVE-2017-5754'
+	if [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ] && ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
+		# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
+			else
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+			fi
+		else
+			if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
+			else
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+			fi
+		fi
+	else
+		pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
+	fi
+}
+
+# now run the checks the user asked for
+if [ "$opt_variant1" = 1 -o "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then
+	check_variant1
+	_info
+fi
+if [ "$opt_variant2" = 1 -o "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then
+	check_variant2
+	_info
+fi
+if [ "$opt_variant3" = 1 -o "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then
+	check_variant3
+	_info
 fi
 
-if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then
+_info "A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer"
-	# umount debugfs if we did mount it ourselves
-	umount /sys/kernel/debug
-fi
 
-if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then
+# this'll umount only if we mounted debugfs ourselves
-	pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+umount_debugfs
-elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
-	if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
-		pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
-	else
-		pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
-	fi
-else
-	if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
-		pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
-	else
-		pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
-	fi
-fi
-
-_info
-
-_info "A false sense of security is worst than no security at all, see --disclaimer"
 
+# cleanup the temp decompressed config
 [ -n "$dumped_config" ] && rm -f "$dumped_config"
+
+if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 -a "$opt_batch_format" = "nrpe" ]; then
+	if [ ! -z "$nrpe_vuln" ]; then
+		echo "Vulnerable:$nrpe_vuln"
+	else
+		echo "OK"
+	fi
+	[ "$nrpe_critical" = 1 ] && exit 2  # critical
+	[ "$nrpe_unknown" = 1 ] && exit 3  # unknown
+	exit 0  # ok
+fi
+
+if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 -a "$opt_batch_format" = "json" ]; then
+	_echo 0 ${json_output%?}]
+fi