22 Commits
v0.20 ... v0.22

Author SHA1 Message Date
74bc7ba637 add --variant to specify what check we want to run 2018-01-10 15:22:30 +01:00
5389ac6844 Merge pull request #41 from bang-communications/master
NRPE mode
2018-01-10 15:11:45 +01:00
36fb83215a Merge pull request #42 from simon-vasseur/style
added some style (screenshot in readme)
2018-01-10 15:07:34 +01:00
59fe8c2ad8 Error on unknown batch format 2018-01-10 13:57:10 +00:00
b8d28e7f61 added some style 2018-01-10 14:55:58 +01:00
7c11d07865 Stray tab 2018-01-10 11:59:33 +00:00
7c5cfbb8c3 batch nrpe 2018-01-10 11:57:45 +00:00
381038eceb NRPE mode 2018-01-10 11:18:45 +00:00
d6e4aa43f0 Merge pull request #37 from deufrai/better-dmesg-support
Improve PTI detection
2018-01-09 19:52:45 +01:00
e5e09384f0 typofix 2018-01-09 18:54:35 +01:00
7222367f04 add disclaimer and bump to 0.21 2018-01-09 18:52:21 +01:00
ab512687cf Merge pull request #38 from Alkorin/fixARM
Fix ARM checks
2018-01-09 18:47:25 +01:00
a5aaa790a0 Merge pull request #39 from Alkorin/typo
Fix small typo in error message
2018-01-09 18:45:58 +01:00
335439dee0 Fix small typo in error message 2018-01-09 18:44:15 +01:00
45297b6f7d Fix ARM checks 2018-01-09 18:41:48 +01:00
a7b14306d5 Improve PTI detection even more
when PTI detection relies on dmesg, dmesg output is checked first
then /var/log/dmesg if dmesg output lacks boot time messages
2018-01-09 18:26:32 +01:00
608952ff71 Improve PTI detection
In case of a busy or misconfigured server, kernel message buffer loop
can be filled with messages broadcasted later than boot time. So dmesg
command wont return boot time messages.

Grepping /var/log/dmesg fixes it and this log file location semms pretty
standard across many common distros
2018-01-09 18:17:39 +01:00
1c3d349667 Merge pull request #31 from Feandil/batch
Add a "batch" and "verbose" mode
2018-01-09 18:12:39 +01:00
b93b13263d fix(pti): remove escapes since we use grep -E now 2018-01-09 16:01:44 +01:00
ad342cab06 Introduce "verbose" and "batch" modes
Rewrite the way the output is processed:
- Define verbosity level (currently warn, info (default) & verbose)
- Add a batch mode, for simple machine parsing
2018-01-09 15:58:13 +01:00
5fd85e288b No-color: interpret string (-e) to be able to mach \x1B 2018-01-09 15:57:10 +01:00
b6bfcdbd45 Move configuration at the beginning of the script 2018-01-09 14:18:02 +01:00
2 changed files with 633 additions and 498 deletions

View File

@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ You can also specify a kernel image on the command line, if you'd like to inspec
The script will do its best to detect mitigations, including backported non-vanilla patches, regardless of the advertised kernel version number. The script will do its best to detect mitigations, including backported non-vanilla patches, regardless of the advertised kernel version number.
## Example of script output
![checker](https://framapic.org/FjroIZximyoM/EO5msoSMKb6L.png)
## Quick summary of the CVEs ## Quick summary of the CVEs
**CVE-2017-5753** bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1) **CVE-2017-5753** bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1)
@ -28,69 +32,3 @@ The script will do its best to detect mitigations, including backported non-vani
- Impact: Kernel - Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough - Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough
- Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium - Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium
## Example of script output
### Ubuntu LTS (before official patches)
```
$ sudo ./spectre-and-meltdown.sh
Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.16
Checking for vulnerabilities against live running kernel Linux 4.4.0-104-generic #127-Ubuntu SMP Mon Dec 11 12:16:42 UTC 2017 x86_64
Will use vmlinux image /boot/vmlinuz-4.4.0-104-generic
Will use kconfig /boot/config-4.4.0-104-generic
Will use System.map file /boot/System.map-4.4.0-104-generic
CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: NO (only 38 opcodes found, should be >= 70)
> STATUS: VULNERABLE
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
* Mitigation 1
* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO
* Kernel support for IBRS: NO
* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: NO
* IBRS enabled for User space: NO
* Mitigation 2
* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: NO
* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: NO
> STATUS: VULNERABLE (IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): NO
* PTI enabled and active: NO
> STATUS: VULNERABLE (PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
```
### First patched kernel of RHEL6
```
$ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --kernel /tmp/vmlinuz-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64 --config /tmp/config-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64 --map /tmp/System.map-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.16
Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel
Will use vmlinux image /tmp/vmlinuz-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
Will use kconfig /tmp/config-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
Will use System.map file /tmp/System.map-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: YES (84 opcodes found, which is >= 70)
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
* Mitigation 1
* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO
* Kernel support for IBRS: YES
* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: N/A (not testable in offline mode)
* IBRS enabled for User space: N/A (not testable in offline mode)
* Mitigation 2
* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: NO
* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: NO
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime)
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
* PTI enabled and active: N/A (can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode)
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime)
```

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