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https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker.git
synced 2025-07-15 07:11:22 +02:00
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11 Commits
Author | SHA1 | Date | |
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34656827f5 | |||
206e4b7fbc | |||
207168e097 | |||
f8ca11e56a | |||
c88acdd31d | |||
88df48f4a7 | |||
124ce8e27a | |||
7bbcfe0df7 | |||
a792348928 | |||
66f7708095 | |||
34ef5ef21b |
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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#! /bin/sh
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# Spectre & Meltdown checker
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# Stephane Lesimple
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VERSION=0.13
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VERSION=0.15
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# print status function
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pstatus()
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@ -171,15 +171,20 @@ if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then
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# try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards
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mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1
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fi
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if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled -o -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled ]; then
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if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ]; then
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# if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in
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pstatus green YES
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ibrs_supported=1
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ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
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elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled ]; then
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# RedHat uses a different path (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301)
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pstatus green YES
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ibrs_supported=1
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ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
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else
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pstatus red NO
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fi
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[ -f /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ] && ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null) || ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
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/bin/echo -n "* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: "
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# 0 means disabled
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# 1 is enabled only for kernel space
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@ -196,19 +201,12 @@ case "$ibrs_enabled" in
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"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
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0 | 1) pstatus red NO;;
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2) pstatus green YES;;
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*) pstatus yellow unknown;;
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*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
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esac
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if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then
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# umount debugfs if we did mount it ourselves
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umount /sys/kernel/debug
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fi
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/bin/echo "* Mitigation 2"
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/bin/echo -n "* Kernel compiled with retpolines: "
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/bin/echo -n "* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: "
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# We check the RETPOLINE kernel options
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# XXX this doesn't mean the kernel has been compiled with a retpoline-aware gcc
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# still looking for a way do detect that ...
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if [ -e /proc/config.gz ]; then
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# either the running kernel exports his own config
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if zgrep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' /proc/config.gz; then
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@ -229,15 +227,48 @@ else
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration"
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fi
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/bin/echo -n "* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: "
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# Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm
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# For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles)
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# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79
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# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set
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# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol
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if [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
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# look for the symbol
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if [ -e /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) ]; then
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if grep -qw noretpoline_setup /boot/System.map-$(uname -r); then
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retpoline_compiler=1
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pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map"
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fi
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elif which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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# the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol
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if nm "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then
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retpoline_compiler=1
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pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in vmlinux"
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fi
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elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then
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# if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have
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# any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary
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retpoline_compiler=1
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pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in vmlinux"
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fi
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if [ "$retpoline_compiler" != 1 ]; then
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pstatus red NO
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fi
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else
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image"
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fi
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/bin/echo -ne "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
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if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then
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pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "your CPU is not vulnerable as per the vendor"
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elif [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then
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pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability"
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elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
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pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "retpolines mitigate the vulnerability"
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elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
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pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "retpoline mitigate the vulnerability"
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else
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pstatus red VULNERABLE "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpolines are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
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pstatus red VULNERABLE "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
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fi
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##########
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@ -250,13 +281,13 @@ kpti_can_tell=0
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if [ -e /proc/config.gz ]; then
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# either the running kernel exports his own config
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kpti_can_tell=1
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if zgrep -q '^CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y' /proc/config.gz; then
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if zgrep -q '^\(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y\|CONFIG_KAISER=y\)' /proc/config.gz; then
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kpti_support=1
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fi
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elif [ -e /boot/config-$(uname -r) ]; then
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# or we can find a config file in /root with the kernel release name
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kpti_can_tell=1
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if grep -q '^CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y' /boot/config-$(uname -r); then
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if grep -q '^\(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y\|CONFIG_KAISER=y\)' /boot/config-$(uname -r); then
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kpti_support=1
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fi
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fi
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@ -288,19 +319,30 @@ fi
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/bin/echo -n "* PTI enabled and active: "
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if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then
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# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
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pstatus green YES
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kpti_enabled=1
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elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then
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# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
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kpti_enabled=1
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elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then
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# RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
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kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)
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elif dmesg | grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled'; then
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# if we can't find the flag, grep in dmesg
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pstatus green YES
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kpti_enabled=1
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elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled -a "$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)" = 1 ]; then
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pstatus green YES
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kpti_enabled=1
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else
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kpti_enabled=0
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fi
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if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
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pstatus green YES
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else
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pstatus red NO
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fi
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if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then
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# umount debugfs if we did mount it ourselves
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umount /sys/kernel/debug
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fi
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/bin/echo -ne "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
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if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then
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pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "your CPU is not vulnerable as per the vendor"
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