34 Commits
v0.13 ... v0.19

Author SHA1 Message Date
f0f2ea9b11 v0.19: introduce --no-color 2018-01-09 10:32:51 +01:00
6f1bdba1d9 bump to v0.18 to reflect changes 2018-01-09 09:21:42 +01:00
7b05105a54 Merge pull request #25 from Feandil/proc_config
When using /proc/config.gz, indicate it more clearly
2018-01-09 09:19:36 +01:00
8aed2d4086 Merge pull request #26 from Feandil/proc_kallsym
Use /proc/kallsyms to get symbols, if available
2018-01-09 09:17:18 +01:00
f4140a992a Use /proc/kallsyms to get symbols, if available 2018-01-09 08:58:09 +01:00
2c51b00a90 When using /proc/config.gz, indicate it more clearly 2018-01-09 08:54:07 +01:00
2d94514c07 adding mention of heuristic for variant 1 check 2018-01-09 08:43:52 +01:00
0e8f97afbc Merge pull request #24 from angus-p/Remove-extra-space
remove superfluous space from test line 315
2018-01-09 08:34:10 +01:00
70323a30da Merge pull request #23 from mradcliffe/issue-22
Increases tmp directory uniqueness to 6 characters to support Slackware
2018-01-09 08:33:32 +01:00
cc0b325383 remove superfluous space from test line 315
Extra space was causing non-existent variable to be tested resulting in 'YES' if running in live mode and IBRS compiled in
2018-01-09 03:47:25 +00:00
4454f03136 Increases tmp directory uniqueness to 6 characters to support Slackware 2018-01-08 22:28:55 -05:00
949f316f89 missed version bump + README typofix 2018-01-08 23:15:42 +01:00
5082afae61 Merge pull request #19 from speed47/offline_mode
implement offline mode and help
2018-01-08 23:13:19 +01:00
d73a24cb5b implement offline mode and help 2018-01-08 23:09:17 +01:00
75332e6e0f Merge pull request #18 from GrimKriegor/linux-libre_support
Linux-libre support
2018-01-08 23:07:41 +01:00
2d33a4369e Linux-libre support 2018-01-08 21:56:11 +00:00
8d4d295309 bump to v0.16 to reflect changes 2018-01-08 17:48:20 +01:00
1ff437edbb Merge pull request #16 from Alkorin/fixes
Fixes
2018-01-08 17:45:59 +01:00
34656827f5 detect retpoline-compliant compiler from latest LKML patches 2018-01-08 17:32:19 +01:00
8c8a8d35fd Detect if 'readelf' is present 2018-01-08 16:52:09 +01:00
debd10b517 Detect if 'strings' is present 2018-01-08 16:51:20 +01:00
21f81ff5c9 Detect if uncompress binaries are present 2018-01-08 16:51:14 +01:00
206e4b7fbc add detection of retpoline-aware compiler 2018-01-08 16:28:00 +01:00
1a14483c98 Use 'readelf' instead of 'file' to detect kernel 2018-01-08 15:56:19 +01:00
26564206db Do not execute checks if we already found that PTI is enabled 2018-01-08 15:56:19 +01:00
207168e097 detect if the used compiler supports retpoline (WIP) 2018-01-08 15:45:09 +01:00
f8ca11e56a Merge pull request #12 from sebastianw/fix-double-print
Remove superfluous 'YES' output when checking cpuinfo
2018-01-08 15:05:15 +01:00
c88acdd31d Remove superfluous 'YES' output when checking cpuinfo 2018-01-08 14:50:59 +01:00
88df48f4a7 Merge pull request #11 from sebastianw/kaiser-cpu-flag
Recognize 'kaiser' flag in /proc/cpuinfo
2018-01-08 14:45:40 +01:00
124ce8e27a Recognize 'kaiser' flag in /proc/cpuinfo 2018-01-08 14:38:43 +01:00
7bbcfe0df7 Merge pull request #7 from Feandil/redhat
Redhat support
2018-01-08 14:17:33 +01:00
a792348928 RedHat uses a different configuration name 2018-01-08 12:59:12 +01:00
66f7708095 Refactor RedHat support:
- Isolate file check to different elif (allowing to add more)
- Do the PTI debugfs check first (faster and supposed to be dynamic)
- If pti_enable is 0, don't trust dmesg (supposed to be dynamic)
2018-01-08 12:59:03 +01:00
34ef5ef21b Delay umount (for RedHat access to pti_enable) 2018-01-08 12:58:22 +01:00
2 changed files with 472 additions and 168 deletions

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@ -1,37 +1,49 @@
Spectre & Meltdown Checker Spectre & Meltdown Checker
========================== ==========================
A simple shell script to tell if your Linux installation is vulnerable A simple shell script to tell if your Linux installation is vulnerable against the 3 "speculative execution" CVEs.
against the 3 "speculative execution" CVEs:
CVE-2017-5753 bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1) Without options, it'll inspect you currently running kernel.
You can also specify a kernel image on the command line, if you'd like to inspect a kernel you're not running.
The script will do its best to detect mitigations, including backported non-vanilla patches, regardless of the advertised kernel version number.
## Quick summary of the CVEs
**CVE-2017-5753** bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1)
- Impact: Kernel & all software - Impact: Kernel & all software
- Mitigation: recompile software *and* kernel with a modified compiler that introduces the LFENCE opcode at the proper positions in the resulting code - Mitigation: recompile software *and* kernel with a modified compiler that introduces the LFENCE opcode at the proper positions in the resulting code
- Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible - Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible
CVE-2017-5715: branch target injection (Spectre Variant 2) **CVE-2017-5715** branch target injection (Spectre Variant 2)
- Impact: Kernel - Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation 1: new opcode via microcode update that should be used by up to date compilers to protect the BTB (by flushing indirect branch predictors) - Mitigation 1: new opcode via microcode update that should be used by up to date compilers to protect the BTB (by flushing indirect branch predictors)
- Mitigation 2: introducing "retpoline" into compilers, and recompile software/OS with it - Mitigation 2: introducing "retpoline" into compilers, and recompile software/OS with it
- Performance impact of the mitigation: high for mitigation 1, medium for mitigation 2, depending on your CPU - Performance impact of the mitigation: high for mitigation 1, medium for mitigation 2, depending on your CPU
CVE-2017-5754: rogue data cache load (Meltdown) **CVE-2017-5754** rogue data cache load (Meltdown)
- Impact: Kernel - Impact: Kernel
- Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough - Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough
- Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium - Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium
Example of the output of the script: ## Example of script output
### Ubuntu LTS (before official patches)
``` ```
$ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh $ sudo ./spectre-and-meltdown.sh
Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.07 Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.16
Checking for vulnerabilities against live running kernel Linux 4.4.0-104-generic #127-Ubuntu SMP Mon Dec 11 12:16:42 UTC 2017 x86_64
Will use vmlinux image /boot/vmlinuz-4.4.0-104-generic
Will use kconfig /boot/config-4.4.0-104-generic
Will use System.map file /boot/System.map-4.4.0-104-generic
CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1' CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: NO (only 38 opcodes found, should be >= 60) * Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: NO (only 38 opcodes found, should be >= 70)
> STATUS: VULNERABLE > STATUS: VULNERABLE
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2' CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
@ -41,11 +53,44 @@ CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: NO * IBRS enabled for Kernel space: NO
* IBRS enabled for User space: NO * IBRS enabled for User space: NO
* Mitigation 2 * Mitigation 2
* Kernel compiled with retpolines: NO * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: NO
> STATUS: VULNERABLE (IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpolines are needed to mitigate the vulnerability) * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: NO
> STATUS: VULNERABLE (IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): NO
* PTI enabled and active: NO
> STATUS: VULNERABLE (PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
```
### First patched kernel of RHEL6
```
$ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --kernel /tmp/vmlinuz-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64 --config /tmp/config-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64 --map /tmp/System.map-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.16
Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel
Will use vmlinux image /tmp/vmlinuz-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
Will use kconfig /tmp/config-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
Will use System.map file /tmp/System.map-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: YES (84 opcodes found, which is >= 70)
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
* Mitigation 1
* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO
* Kernel support for IBRS: YES
* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: N/A (not testable in offline mode)
* IBRS enabled for User space: N/A (not testable in offline mode)
* Mitigation 2
* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: NO
* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: NO
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime)
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3' CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES * Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
* PTI enabled and active: YES * PTI enabled and active: N/A (can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode)
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (PTI mitigates the vulnerability) > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime)
``` ```

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@ -1,20 +1,32 @@
#! /bin/sh #! /bin/sh
# Spectre & Meltdown checker # Spectre & Meltdown checker
#
# Check for the latest version at:
# https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker
# git clone https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker.git
# or wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/master/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
#
# Stephane Lesimple # Stephane Lesimple
VERSION=0.13 #
VERSION=0.19
# print status function # print status function
pstatus() pstatus()
{ {
if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ]; then
_echo_nol "$2"
else
case "$1" in case "$1" in
red) col="\033[101m\033[30m";; red) col="\033[101m\033[30m";;
green) col="\033[102m\033[30m";; green) col="\033[102m\033[30m";;
yellow) col="\033[103m\033[30m";; yellow) col="\033[103m\033[30m";;
blue) col="\033[104m\033[30m";;
*) col="";; *) col="";;
esac esac
/bin/echo -ne "$col $2 \033[0m" _echo_nol "$col $2 \033[0m"
[ -n "$3" ] && /bin/echo -n " ($3)" fi
/bin/echo [ -n "$3" ] && _echo_nol " ($3)"
_echo
} }
# The 3 below functions are taken from the extract-linux script, available here: # The 3 below functions are taken from the extract-linux script, available here:
@ -33,9 +45,11 @@ pstatus()
# Licensed under the GNU General Public License, version 2 (GPLv2). # Licensed under the GNU General Public License, version 2 (GPLv2).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------- # ----------------------------------------------------------------------
vmlinux=''
vmlinux_err=''
check_vmlinux() check_vmlinux()
{ {
file "$1" 2>/dev/null | grep -q ELF || return 1 readelf -h $1 > /dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
return 0 return 0
} }
@ -45,11 +59,15 @@ try_decompress()
# "grep" that report the byte offset of the line instead of the pattern. # "grep" that report the byte offset of the line instead of the pattern.
# Try to find the header ($1) and decompress from here # Try to find the header ($1) and decompress from here
for pos in `tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$4" | grep -abo "^$2"` for pos in `tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$5" | grep -abo "^$2"`
do do
if ! which $3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
vmlinux_err="missing '$3' tool, please install it, usually it's in the '$4' package"
return 0
fi
pos=${pos%%:*} pos=${pos%%:*}
tail -c+$pos "$4" | $3 > $vmlinuxtmp 2> /dev/null tail -c+$pos "$5" | $3 > $vmlinuxtmp 2> /dev/null
check_vmlinux "$vmlinuxtmp" && echo "$vmlinuxtmp" && return 0 check_vmlinux "$vmlinuxtmp" && vmlinux=$vmlinuxtmp && return 0
done done
return 1 return 1
} }
@ -58,61 +76,232 @@ extract_vmlinux()
{ {
[ -n "$1" ] || return 1 [ -n "$1" ] || return 1
# Prepare temp files: # Prepare temp files:
vmlinuxtmp="$(mktemp /tmp/vmlinux-XXX)" vmlinuxtmp="$(mktemp /tmp/vmlinux-XXXXXX)"
trap "rm -f $vmlinuxtmp" EXIT
# Initial attempt for uncompressed images or objects: # Initial attempt for uncompressed images or objects:
if check_vmlinux "$1"; then if check_vmlinux "$1"; then
cat "$1" > "$vmlinuxtmp" cat "$1" > "$vmlinuxtmp"
echo "$vmlinuxtmp" vmlinux=$vmlinuxtmp
return 0 return 0
fi fi
# That didn't work, so retry after decompression. # That didn't work, so retry after decompression.
try_decompress '\037\213\010' xy gunzip "$1" && return 0 try_decompress '\037\213\010' xy gunzip gunzip "$1" && return 0
try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000' abcde unxz "$1" && return 0 try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000' abcde unxz xz-utils "$1" && return 0
try_decompress 'BZh' xy bunzip2 "$1" && return 0 try_decompress 'BZh' xy bunzip2 bzip2 "$1" && return 0
try_decompress '\135\0\0\0' xxx unlzma "$1" && return 0 try_decompress '\135\0\0\0' xxx unlzma xz-utils "$1" && return 0
try_decompress '\211\114\132' xy 'lzop -d' "$1" && return 0 try_decompress '\211\114\132' xy 'lzop -d' lzop "$1" && return 0
return 1 return 1
} }
# end of extract-vmlinux functions # end of extract-vmlinux functions
/bin/echo -e "\033[1;34mSpectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION\033[0m" show_usage()
/bin/echo {
cat <<EOF
Usage:
Live mode: $0 [options] [--live]
Offline mode: $0 [options] [--kernel <vmlinux_file>] [--config <kernel_config>] [--map <kernel_map_file>]
# root check Modes:
Two modes are available.
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then First mode is the "live" mode (default), it does its best to find information about the currently running kernel.
/bin/echo -e "\033[31mNote that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information.\033[0m" To run under this mode, just start the script without any option (you can also use --live explicitely)
/bin/echo -e "\033[31mWe'll proceed but you might see permission denied errors.\033[0m"
/bin/echo -e "\033[31mTo run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0\033[0m" Second mode is the "offline" mode, where you can inspect a non-running kernel.
/bin/echo You'll need to specify the location of the vmlinux file, and if possible, the corresponding config and System.map files:
--kernel vmlinux_file Specify a (possibly compressed) vmlinux file
--config kernel_config Specify a kernel config file
--map kernel_map_file Specify a kernel System.map file
Options:
--no-color Don't use color codes
EOF
}
__echo()
{
opt="$1"
shift
msg="$@"
if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ] ; then
# strip ANSI color codes
msg=$(echo "$msg" | sed -r "s/\x1B\[([0-9]{1,2}(;[0-9]{1,2})?)?[m|K]//g")
fi
# explicitely call /bin/echo to avoid shell builtins that might not take options
/bin/echo $opt -e "$msg"
}
_echo()
{
__echo '' "$@"
}
_echo_nol()
{
__echo -n "$@"
}
_echo "\033[1;34mSpectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION\033[0m"
_echo
# parse options
opt_kernel=''
opt_config=''
opt_map=''
opt_live_explicit=0
opt_live=1
opt_no_color=0
parse_opt_file()
{
# parse_opt_file option_name option_value
option_name="$1"
option_value="$2"
if [ -z "$option_value" ]; then
show_usage
echo "$0: error: --$option_name expects one parameter (a file)" >&2
exit 1
elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then
echo "$0: error: couldn't find file $option_value" >&2
exit 1
elif [ ! -f "$option_value" ]; then
echo "$0: error: $option_value is not a file" >&2
exit 1
elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then
echo "$0: error: couldn't read $option_value (are you root?)" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "$option_value"
exit 0
}
while [ -n "$1" ]; do
if [ "$1" = "--kernel" ]; then
opt_kernel=$(parse_opt_file kernel "$2")
[ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $?
shift 2
opt_live=0
elif [ "$1" = "--config" ]; then
opt_config=$(parse_opt_file config "$2")
[ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $?
shift 2
opt_live=0
elif [ "$1" = "--map" ]; then
opt_map=$(parse_opt_file map "$2")
[ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $?
shift 2
opt_live=0
elif [ "$1" = "--live" ]; then
opt_live_explicit=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--no-color" ]; then
opt_no_color=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "-h" -o "$1" = "--help" ]; then
show_usage
exit 0
else
show_usage
echo "$0: error: unknown option '$1'"
exit 1
fi
done
# check for mode selection inconsistency
if [ "$opt_live_explicit" = 1 ]; then
if [ -n "$opt_kernel" -o -n "$opt_config" -o -n "$opt_map" ]; then
show_usage
echo "$0: error: incompatible modes specified, use either --live or --kernel/--config/--map"
exit 1
fi
fi fi
/bin/echo -e "Checking vulnerabilities against \033[35m"$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)"\033[0m" # root check (only for live mode, for offline mode, we already checked if we could read the files)
/bin/echo
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
_echo "\033[31mNote that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information.\033[0m"
_echo "\033[31mWe'll proceed but you might see permission denied errors.\033[0m"
_echo "\033[31mTo run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0\033[0m"
_echo
fi
_echo "Checking for vulnerabilities against live running kernel \033[35m"$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)"\033[0m"
# try to find the image of the current running kernel
[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-linux
[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre
[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)
[ -e /boot/kernel-$( uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)
[ -e /boot/bzImage-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)
[ -e /boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)
# system.map
if [ -e /proc/kallsyms ] ; then
opt_map="/proc/kallsyms"
elif [ -e /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) ] ; then
opt_map=/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)
fi
# config
if [ -e /proc/config.gz ] ; then
dumped_config="$(mktemp /tmp/config-XXXXXX)"
gunzip -c /proc/config.gz > $dumped_config
# dumped_config will be deleted at the end of the script
opt_config=$dumped_config
elif [ -e /boot/config-$(uname -r) ]; then
opt_config=/boot/config-$(uname -r)
fi
else
_echo "Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel"
fi
if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ]; then
_echo "Will use vmlinux image \033[35m$opt_kernel\033[0m"
else
_echo "Will use no vmlinux image (accuracy might be reduced)"
fi
if [ -n "$dumped_config" ]; then
_echo "Will use kconfig \033[35m/proc/config.gz\033[0m"
elif [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
_echo "Will use kconfig \033[35m$opt_config\033[0m"
else
_echo "Will use no kconfig (accuracy might be reduced)"
fi
if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
_echo "Will use System.map file \033[35m$opt_map\033[0m"
else
_echo "Will use no System.map file (accuracy might be reduced)"
fi
if [ -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then
if ! which readelf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
vmlinux_err="missing 'readelf' tool, please install it, usually it's in the 'binutils' package"
else
extract_vmlinux "$opt_kernel"
fi
else
vmlinux_err="couldn't find your kernel image in /boot, if you used neboot, this is normal"
fi
if [ -z "$vmlinux" -o ! -r "$vmlinux" ]; then
[ -z "$vmlinux_err" ] && vmlinux_err="couldn't extract your kernel from $opt_kernel"
fi
_echo
########### ###########
# SPECTRE 1 # SPECTRE 1
/bin/echo -e "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m" _echo "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m"
/bin/echo -n "* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: " _echo_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: "
status=0 status=0
img='' if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
# try to find the image of the current running kernel pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$vmlinux_err"
[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux ] && img=/boot/vmlinuz-linux
[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r) ] && img=/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)
[ -e /boot/kernel-$( uname -r) ] && img=/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)
[ -e /boot/bzImage-$(uname -r) ] && img=/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)
[ -e /boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r) ] && img=/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)
if [ -z "$img" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image in /boot, if you used netboot, this is normal"
else else
vmlinux=$(extract_vmlinux $img) if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if [ -z "$vmlinux" -o ! -r "$vmlinux" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't extract your kernel from $img"
elif ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package" pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
else else
# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurences of the LFENCE opcode # here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurences of the LFENCE opcode
@ -132,17 +321,17 @@ else
fi fi
fi fi
/bin/echo -ne "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m " _echo_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
[ "$status" = 0 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN [ "$status" = 0 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
[ "$status" = 1 ] && pstatus red VULNERABLE [ "$status" = 1 ] && pstatus red 'VULNERABLE' 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available'
[ "$status" = 2 ] && pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE' [ "$status" = 2 ] && pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE' 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available'
########### ###########
# VARIANT 2 # VARIANT 2
/bin/echo _echo
/bin/echo -e "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m" _echo "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m"
/bin/echo "* Mitigation 1" _echo "* Mitigation 1"
/bin/echo -n "* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: " _echo_nol "* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: "
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards) # try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1 modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1
@ -166,60 +355,66 @@ if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then
rmmod msr 2>/dev/null rmmod msr 2>/dev/null
fi fi
/bin/echo -n "* Kernel support for IBRS: " _echo_nol "* Kernel support for IBRS: "
if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then
# try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards # try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards
mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1 mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1
fi fi
if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled -o -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled ]; then if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ]; then
# if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in # if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in
pstatus green YES pstatus green YES
ibrs_supported=1 ibrs_supported=1
else ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled ]; then
# RedHat uses a different path (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301)
pstatus green YES
ibrs_supported=1
ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
fi
fi
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then
pstatus green YES
ibrs_supported=1
fi
fi
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then
pstatus red NO pstatus red NO
fi fi
[ -f /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ] && ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null) || ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null) _echo_nol "* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: "
/bin/echo -n "* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: " if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# 0 means disabled # 0 means disabled
# 1 is enabled only for kernel space # 1 is enabled only for kernel space
# 2 is enabled for kernel and user space # 2 is enabled for kernel and user space
case "$ibrs_enabled" in case "$ibrs_enabled" in
"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;; "") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
0) pstatus red NO;; 0) pstatus red NO;;
1 | 2) pstatus green YES;; 1 | 2) pstatus green YES;;
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;; *) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
esac esac
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
/bin/echo -n "* IBRS enabled for User space: " _echo_nol "* IBRS enabled for User space: "
case "$ibrs_enabled" in if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
case "$ibrs_enabled" in
"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;; "") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
0 | 1) pstatus red NO;; 0 | 1) pstatus red NO;;
2) pstatus green YES;; 2) pstatus green YES;;
*) pstatus yellow unknown;; *) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
esac esac
else
if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
# umount debugfs if we did mount it ourselves
umount /sys/kernel/debug
fi fi
/bin/echo "* Mitigation 2" _echo "* Mitigation 2"
/bin/echo -n "* Kernel compiled with retpolines: " _echo_nol "* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: "
# We check the RETPOLINE kernel options # We check the RETPOLINE kernel options
# XXX this doesn't mean the kernel has been compiled with a retpoline-aware gcc if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
# still looking for a way do detect that ... if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then
if [ -e /proc/config.gz ]; then
# either the running kernel exports his own config
if zgrep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' /proc/config.gz; then
pstatus green YES
retpoline=1
else
pstatus red NO
fi
elif [ -e /boot/config-$(uname -r) ]; then
# or we can find a config file in /root with the kernel release name
if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' /boot/config-$(uname -r); then
pstatus green YES pstatus green YES
retpoline=1 retpoline=1
else else
@ -229,52 +424,93 @@ else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration" pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration"
fi fi
/bin/echo -ne "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m " _echo_nol "* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: "
# Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm
# For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles)
# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79
# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set
# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol
if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
# look for the symbol
if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then
retpoline_compiler=1
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map"
else
pstatus red NO
fi
elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
# look for the symbol
if which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol
if nm "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then
retpoline_compiler=1
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux symbols"
else
pstatus red NO
fi
elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then
# if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have
# any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary
retpoline_compiler=1
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux"
else
pstatus red NO
fi
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map"
fi
_echo_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "your CPU is not vulnerable as per the vendor" pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "your CPU is not vulnerable as per the vendor"
elif [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "retpoline mitigate the vulnerability"
elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability" pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability"
elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then else
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "retpolines mitigate the vulnerability" pstatus red VULNERABLE "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
else else
pstatus red VULNERABLE "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpolines are needed to mitigate the vulnerability" if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
else
pstatus red VULNERABLE "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
fi fi
########## ##########
# MELTDOWN # MELTDOWN
/bin/echo _echo
/bin/echo -e "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m" _echo "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m"
/bin/echo -n "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): " _echo_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
kpti_support=0 kpti_support=0
kpti_can_tell=0 kpti_can_tell=0
if [ -e /proc/config.gz ]; then if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
# either the running kernel exports his own config
kpti_can_tell=1 kpti_can_tell=1
if zgrep -q '^CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y' /proc/config.gz; then if grep -Eq '^\(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION\|CONFIG_KAISER\)=y' "$opt_config"; then
kpti_support=1
fi
elif [ -e /boot/config-$(uname -r) ]; then
# or we can find a config file in /root with the kernel release name
kpti_can_tell=1
if grep -q '^CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y' /boot/config-$(uname -r); then
kpti_support=1 kpti_support=1
fi fi
fi fi
if [ -e /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) ]; then if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
# it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch # it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch
# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map # so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
kpti_can_tell=1 kpti_can_tell=1
if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled /boot/System.map-$(uname -r); then if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then
kpti_support=1 kpti_support=1
fi fi
fi fi
if [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
# same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the # same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the
# nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option) # nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option)
kpti_can_tell=1 kpti_can_tell=1
if ! which strings >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
else
if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then
kpti_support=1 kpti_support=1
fi fi
fi
fi fi
if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
@ -282,34 +518,57 @@ if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
pstatus red NO pstatus red NO
else else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration" pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file"
fi fi
/bin/echo -n "* PTI enabled and active: " _echo_nol "* PTI enabled and active: "
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then
# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo # vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
pstatus green YES
kpti_enabled=1 kpti_enabled=1
elif dmesg | grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled'; then elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then
# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
kpti_enabled=1
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then
# RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)
elif dmesg | grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled'; then
# if we can't find the flag, grep in dmesg # if we can't find the flag, grep in dmesg
pstatus green YES
kpti_enabled=1 kpti_enabled=1
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled -a "$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)" = 1 ]; then else
kpti_enabled=0
fi
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES pstatus green YES
kpti_enabled=1 else
else
pstatus red NO pstatus red NO
fi
else
pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode"
fi fi
/bin/echo -ne "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m " if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then
# umount debugfs if we did mount it ourselves
umount /sys/kernel/debug
fi
_echo_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "your CPU is not vulnerable as per the vendor" pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "your CPU is not vulnerable as per the vendor"
elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "PTI mitigates the vulnerability" pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
else else
pstatus red "VULNERABLE" "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability" pstatus red "VULNERABLE" "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
else
if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
else
pstatus red "VULNERABLE" "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
fi fi
/bin/echo _echo
[ -n "$vmlinux" -a -f "$vmlinux" ] && rm -f "$vmlinux" [ -n "$dumped_config" ] && rm -f "$dumped_config"