24 Commits
v0.02 ... v0.12

Author SHA1 Message Date
c792fa35bf add kernel version information to the output 2018-01-08 12:14:12 +01:00
d1498fe03f Merge pull request #5 from fccagou/centos
fix(centos): check according to redhat patch.
2018-01-08 12:10:07 +01:00
12bdd0e412 root check is now more visible 2018-01-08 11:31:19 +01:00
89f9bef577 Merge pull request #4 from dguglielmi/add-genkernel-support
Add support for Gentoo genkernel image path
2018-01-08 11:24:07 +01:00
0f50e04dab fix(centos): check according to redhat patch. https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301 2018-01-08 11:14:22 +01:00
bf056ae73d Add support for Gentoo genkernel image path 2018-01-08 11:08:53 +01:00
623e180ae1 Merge pull request #3 from TheHendla/arch_boot_img
add arch linux bootimage path
2018-01-08 10:51:59 +01:00
40a9d43c44 add arch linux bootimage path 2018-01-08 10:36:29 +01:00
c1004d5171 fix extract-vmlinux for non-gzip 2018-01-08 09:56:29 +01:00
fa0850466e add some comments, enhance pti detection 2018-01-08 09:37:54 +01:00
5c14384e15 Merge pull request #1 from t-nelis/root-check
Improve "running as root" check
2018-01-08 08:58:21 +01:00
1aaca63dcf Improve "running as root" check
Small issue with the USER environment variable:

  $ echo $USER
  thib
  $ sudo sh -c 'echo $USER'
  thib
  $ sudo -i sh -c 'echo $USER'
  root

Rather than recommending users to use sudo --login / -i, use the (very
widespread/portable) id program to retrieve the effective user ID
instead and don't change the recommendation.

  $ id -u
  1000
  $ sudo id -u
  0
  $ sudo -i id -u
  0
2018-01-08 01:22:14 +01:00
96dfa03c00 fix for uncompressed vmlinux case 2018-01-08 00:45:12 +01:00
05c79425ab detect kpti directly in vmlinux if option is not there 2018-01-07 22:47:41 +01:00
9def0c949a update readme 2018-01-07 20:13:10 +01:00
64eb1d005c add couple missing elses 2018-01-07 18:49:15 +01:00
bffda8b3e7 remove dependency on rdmsr 2018-01-07 18:36:56 +01:00
13f2133a97 cosmetic fix 2018-01-07 18:14:08 +01:00
8c2fd0f0bb fix MSR reading, need rdmsr for now 2018-01-07 18:13:25 +01:00
761c2b80e4 cosmetic fix 2018-01-07 17:19:37 +01:00
d6977928e5 msg fix 2018-01-07 17:15:08 +01:00
bd4c74331e add retpolines check 2018-01-07 16:57:14 +01:00
82972f8790 fix status unknown for variant 1 2018-01-07 16:32:34 +01:00
30de4f6336 remove hardcoded kernel image path 2018-01-07 16:25:50 +01:00
2 changed files with 152 additions and 65 deletions

View File

@ -28,24 +28,24 @@ Example of the output of the script:
``` ```
$ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh $ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.02 Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.07
CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1' CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: NO (only 38 opcodes found, should be >= 60) * Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: NO (only 38 opcodes found, should be >= 60)
> STATUS: VULNERABLE > STATUS: VULNERABLE
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2' CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
* Mitigation 1 * Mitigation 1
* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO * Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO
* Kernel support for IBRS: NO * Kernel support for IBRS: NO
* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: NO * IBRS enabled for Kernel space: NO
* IBRS enabled for User space: NO * IBRS enabled for User space: NO
* Mitigation 2 * Mitigation 2
* Kernel recompiled with retpolines: UNKNOWN (check not yet implemented) * Kernel compiled with retpolines: NO
> STATUS: VULNERABLE (IBRS hardware + kernel support OR retpolines-compiled kernel are needed to mitigate the vulnerability) > STATUS: VULNERABLE (IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpolines are needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3' CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES * Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
* PTI enabled and active: YES * PTI enabled and active: YES
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (PTI mitigates the vulnerability) > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (PTI mitigates the vulnerability)
``` ```

View File

@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
#! /bin/sh #! /bin/sh
# Spectre & Meltdown checker # Spectre & Meltdown checker
# Stephane Lesimple # Stephane Lesimple
VERSION=0.02 VERSION=0.12
# print status function
pstatus() pstatus()
{ {
case "$1" in case "$1" in
@ -11,11 +12,16 @@ pstatus()
yellow) col="\033[103m\033[30m";; yellow) col="\033[103m\033[30m";;
*) col="";; *) col="";;
esac esac
/bin/echo -ne "$col$2\033[0m" /bin/echo -ne "$col $2 \033[0m"
[ -n "$3" ] && /bin/echo -n " ($3)" [ -n "$3" ] && /bin/echo -n " ($3)"
/bin/echo /bin/echo
} }
# The 3 below functions are taken from the extract-linux script, available here:
# https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/scripts/extract-vmlinux
# The functions have been modified for better integration to this script
# The original header of the file has been retained below
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------- # ----------------------------------------------------------------------
# extract-vmlinux - Extract uncompressed vmlinux from a kernel image # extract-vmlinux - Extract uncompressed vmlinux from a kernel image
# #
@ -39,56 +45,88 @@ try_decompress()
# "grep" that report the byte offset of the line instead of the pattern. # "grep" that report the byte offset of the line instead of the pattern.
# Try to find the header ($1) and decompress from here # Try to find the header ($1) and decompress from here
for pos in `tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$img" | grep -abo "^$2"` for pos in `tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$4" | grep -abo "^$2"`
do do
pos=${pos%%:*} pos=${pos%%:*}
tail -c+$pos "$img" | $3 > $vmlinuxtmp 2> /dev/null tail -c+$pos "$4" | $3 > $vmlinuxtmp 2> /dev/null
check_vmlinux $vmlinuxtmp && echo $vmlinuxtmp || rm -f $vmlinuxtmp check_vmlinux "$vmlinuxtmp" && echo "$vmlinuxtmp" && return 0
done done
return 1
} }
extract_vmlinux() extract_vmlinux()
{ {
img="$1" [ -n "$1" ] || return 1
# Prepare temp files: # Prepare temp files:
vmlinuxtmp=$(mktemp /tmp/vmlinux-XXX) vmlinuxtmp="$(mktemp /tmp/vmlinux-XXX)"
# Initial attempt for uncompressed images or objects: # Initial attempt for uncompressed images or objects:
check_vmlinux $img if check_vmlinux "$1"; then
cat "$1" > "$vmlinuxtmp"
echo "$vmlinuxtmp"
return 0
fi
# That didn't work, so retry after decompression. # That didn't work, so retry after decompression.
try_decompress '\037\213\010' xy gunzip || \ try_decompress '\037\213\010' xy gunzip "$1" && return 0
try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000' abcde unxz || \ try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000' abcde unxz "$1" && return 0
try_decompress 'BZh' xy bunzip2 || \ try_decompress 'BZh' xy bunzip2 "$1" && return 0
try_decompress '\135\0\0\0' xxx unlzma || \ try_decompress '\135\0\0\0' xxx unlzma "$1" && return 0
try_decompress '\211\114\132' xy 'lzop -d' try_decompress '\211\114\132' xy 'lzop -d' "$1" && return 0
return 1
} }
# end of extract-vmlinux functions
/bin/echo "Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION" /bin/echo -e "\033[1;34mSpectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION\033[0m"
/bin/echo /bin/echo
# root check
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
/bin/echo -e "\033[31mNote that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information.\033[0m"
/bin/echo -e "\033[31mWe'll proceed but you might see permission denied errors.\033[0m"
/bin/echo -e "\033[31mTo run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0\033[0m"
/bin/echo
fi
/bin/echo -e "Checking vulnerabilities against \033[35m"$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -m)"\033[0m"
/bin/echo
###########
# SPECTRE 1 # SPECTRE 1
/bin/echo -e "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m" /bin/echo -e "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m"
/bin/echo -n "* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: " /bin/echo -n "* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: "
vmlinux=$(extract_vmlinux /boot/vmlinuz-4.4.110)
status=0 status=0
if [ -z "$vmlinux" -o ! -r "$vmlinux" ]; then img=''
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't extract your kernel" # try to find the image of the current running kernel
elif ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then [ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux ] && img=/boot/vmlinuz-linux
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package" [ -e /boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r) ] && img=/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)
[ -e /boot/kernel-$( uname -r) ] && img=/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)
[ -e /boot/bzImage-$(uname -r) ] && img=/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)
[ -e /boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r) ] && img=/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)
if [ -z "$img" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image in /boot, if you used netboot, this is normal"
else else
nb_lfence=$(objdump -D "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence) vmlinux=$(extract_vmlinux $img)
if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 60 ]; then if [ -z "$vmlinux" -o ! -r "$vmlinux" ]; then
pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 60" pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't extract your kernel from $img"
status=1 elif ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
else else
pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 60" # here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurences of the LFENCE opcode
status=2 # in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80
nb_lfence=$(objdump -D "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence)
if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 60 ]; then
pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 60"
status=1
else
pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 60"
status=2
fi
fi fi
rm -f $vmlinux
fi fi
/bin/echo -ne "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m " /bin/echo -ne "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
@ -96,45 +134,53 @@ fi
[ "$status" = 1 ] && pstatus red VULNERABLE [ "$status" = 1 ] && pstatus red VULNERABLE
[ "$status" = 2 ] && pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE' [ "$status" = 2 ] && pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE'
###########
# VARIANT 2 # VARIANT 2
/bin/echo /bin/echo
/bin/echo -e "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m" /bin/echo -e "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m"
/bin/echo "* Mitigation 1" /bin/echo "* Mitigation 1"
/bin/echo -n "* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: " /bin/echo -n "* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: "
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1 modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1
fi fi
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?" pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
else else
dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=1 count=8 skip=72 2>/dev/null # the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48
# here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x48' but without needing the rdmsr tool
# if we get a read error, the MSR is not there
dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 skip=9 2>/dev/null
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
pstatus green YES pstatus green YES
else else
pstatus red NO pstatus red NO
fi fi
#dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=1 count=8 skip=73 2>/dev/null
#/bin/echo $?
fi fi
if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then
# if we used modprobe ourselves, rmmod the module
rmmod msr 2>/dev/null rmmod msr 2>/dev/null
fi fi
/bin/echo -n "* Kernel support for IBRS: " /bin/echo -n "* Kernel support for IBRS: "
if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then
# try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards
mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1 mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1
fi fi
if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ]; then if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled -o -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled ]; then
# if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in
pstatus green YES pstatus green YES
ibrs_supported=1 ibrs_supported=1
else else
pstatus red NO pstatus red NO
fi fi
ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null) [ -f /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ] && ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null) || ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
/bin/echo -n "* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: " /bin/echo -n "* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: "
# 0 means disabled
# 1 is enabled only for kernel space
# 2 is enabled for kernel and user space
case "$ibrs_enabled" in case "$ibrs_enabled" in
"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;; "") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
0) pstatus red NO;; 0) pstatus red NO;;
@ -151,56 +197,101 @@ case "$ibrs_enabled" in
esac esac
if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then
# umount debugfs if we did mount it ourselves
umount /sys/kernel/debug umount /sys/kernel/debug
fi fi
/bin/echo "* Mitigation 2" /bin/echo "* Mitigation 2"
/bin/echo -n "* Kernel recompiled with retpolines: " /bin/echo -n "* Kernel compiled with retpolines: "
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "check not yet implemented" # We check the RETPOLINE kernel options
# XXX this doesn't mean the kernel has been compiled with a retpoline-aware gcc
# still looking for a way do detect that ...
if [ -e /proc/config.gz ]; then
# either the running kernel exports his own config
if zgrep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' /proc/config.gz; then
pstatus green YES
retpoline=1
else
pstatus red NO
fi
elif [ -e /boot/config-$(uname -r) ]; then
# or we can find a config file in /root with the kernel release name
if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' /boot/config-$(uname -r); then
pstatus green YES
retpoline=1
else
pstatus red NO
fi
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration"
fi
/bin/echo -ne "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m " /bin/echo -ne "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "your CPU is not vulnerable as per the vendor" pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "your CPU is not vulnerable as per the vendor"
elif [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then elif [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability" pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability"
elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "retpolines mitigate the vulnerability"
else else
pstatus red VULNERABLE "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR retpolines-compiled kernel are needed to mitigate the vulnerability" pstatus red VULNERABLE "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpolines are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi fi
##########
# MELTDOWN # MELTDOWN
/bin/echo /bin/echo
/bin/echo -e "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m" /bin/echo -e "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m"
/bin/echo -n "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): " /bin/echo -n "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
kpti_support=0
kpti_can_tell=0
if [ -e /proc/config.gz ]; then if [ -e /proc/config.gz ]; then
# either the running kernel exports his own config
kpti_can_tell=1
if zgrep -q '^CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y' /proc/config.gz; then if zgrep -q '^CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y' /proc/config.gz; then
pstatus green YES
kpti_support=1 kpti_support=1
else
pstatus red NO
fi fi
elif [ -e /boot/config-$(uname -r) ]; then elif [ -e /boot/config-$(uname -r) ]; then
# or we can find a config file in /root with the kernel release name
kpti_can_tell=1
if grep -q '^CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y' /boot/config-$(uname -r); then if grep -q '^CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y' /boot/config-$(uname -r); then
pstatus green YES
kpti_support=1 kpti_support=1
else
pstatus red NO
fi fi
elif [ -e /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) ]; then fi
if [ -e /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) ]; then
# it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch
# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
kpti_can_tell=1
if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled /boot/System.map-$(uname -r); then if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled /boot/System.map-$(uname -r); then
pstatus green YES
kpti_support=1 kpti_support=1
else
pstatus red NO
fi fi
fi
if [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
# same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the
# nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option)
kpti_can_tell=1
if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then
kpti_support=1
fi
fi
if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
pstatus red NO
else else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration"
fi fi
/bin/echo -n "* PTI enabled and active: " /bin/echo -n "* PTI enabled and active: "
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then
# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
pstatus green YES pstatus green YES
kpti_enabled=1 kpti_enabled=1
elif dmesg | grep -q 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled'; then elif dmesg | grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled'; then
# if we can't find the flag, grep in dmesg
pstatus green YES
kpti_enabled=1
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled -a "$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled)" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES pstatus green YES
kpti_enabled=1 kpti_enabled=1
else else
@ -216,10 +307,6 @@ else
pstatus red "VULNERABLE" "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability" pstatus red "VULNERABLE" "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi fi
/bin/echo /bin/echo
if [ "$USER" != root ]; then
/bin/echo "Note that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information"
/bin/echo "You can try the following command: sudo $0"
fi
[ -n "$vmlinux" -a -f "$vmlinux" ] && rm -f "$vmlinux"