enh: when reading CPUID is unavailable (VM?), fallback to cpuinfo where applicable

cap_* variable <= cpuinfo flag

cap_ibrs              <= ibrs
cap_ibpb              <= ibpb
cap_stibp             <= stibp
cap_ssbd              <= ssbd / virt_ssbd
cap_l1df              <= flush_l1d
cap_md_clear          <= md_clear
cap_arch_capabilities <= arch_capabilities

Should fix #288

.github/workflows/autoupdate.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+name: autoupdate
+
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '42 9 * * *'
+
+permissions:
+  pull-requests: write
+
+jobs:
+  autoupdate:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: Install prerequisites
+        run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends iucode-tool sqlite3 unzip
+      - name: Update microcode versions
+        run: ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --update-builtin-fwdb
+      - name: Check git diff
+        id: diff
+        run: |
+          echo change="$(git diff spectre-meltdown-checker.sh | awk '/MCEDB/ { if(V) { print V" to "$4; exit } else { V=$4 } }')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          echo nbdiff="$(git diff spectre-meltdown-checker.sh | grep -cE -- '^\+# [AI],')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          git diff
+          cat "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+      - name: Create Pull Request if needed
+        if: steps.diff.outputs.nbdiff != '0'
+        uses: peter-evans/create-pull-request@v7
+        with:
+          branch: autoupdate-fwdb
+          commit-message: "update: fwdb from ${{ steps.diff.outputs.change }}, ${{ steps.diff.outputs.nbdiff }} microcode changes"
+          title: "[Auto] Update fwdb from ${{ steps.diff.outputs.change }}"
+          body: |
+            Automated PR to update fwdb from ${{ steps.diff.outputs.change }}
+            Detected ${{ steps.diff.outputs.nbdiff }} microcode changes

.github/workflows/build.yml

@@ -25,81 +25,21 @@ jobs:
         mv spectre-meltdown-checker.sh dist/
     - name: check direct execution
       run: |
-        set -x
         expected=$(cat .github/workflows/expected_cve_count)
         cd dist
-
-        json=$(sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch json || true)
-
-        # Validate JSON is well-formed (and show it if not)
-        echo "$json" | jq . >/dev/null || {
-          echo "Invalid JSON produced by spectre-meltdown-checker.sh"
-          echo "$json"
-          exit 1
-        }
-
-        # Validate required keys exist
-        for key in meta system cpu cpu_microcode vulnerabilities; do
-          echo "$json" | jq -e ".$key" >/dev/null || {
-            echo "Missing top-level key: $key"
-            echo "$json" | jq .
-            exit 1
-          }
-        done
-
-        # Use -r to get raw scalars (no quotes)
-        fmtver=$(echo "$json" | jq -r '.meta.format_version // empty')
-        if [ "$fmtver" != "1" ]; then
-          echo "Unexpected format_version: $fmtver"
-          echo "$json" | jq .
-          exit 1
-        fi
-
-        run_as_root=$(echo "$json" | jq -r '.meta.run_as_root // empty')
-        if [ "$run_as_root" != "true" ]; then
-          echo "Expected run_as_root=true, got: $run_as_root"
-          echo "$json" | jq .
-          exit 1
-        fi
-
-        mocked=$(echo "$json" | jq -r '.meta.mocked // "false"')
-        if [ "$mocked" = "true" ]; then
-          echo "mocked=true must never appear in production"
-          echo "$json" | jq .
-          exit 1
-        fi
-
-        # Count CVEs robustly (as a number)
-        nb=$(echo "$json" | jq -r '[.vulnerabilities[].cve] | length')
+        nb=$(sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
         if [ "$nb" -ne "$expected" ]; then
           echo "Invalid number of CVEs reported: $nb instead of $expected"
-          echo "$json" | jq '.vulnerabilities[].cve'
           exit 1
         else
           echo "OK $nb CVEs reported"
         fi
-
-        # Validate json-terse backward compatibility
-        nb_terse=$(sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch json-terse | jq -r 'map(.CVE) | length')
-        if [ "$nb_terse" -ne "$expected" ]; then
-          echo "json-terse backward compat broken: $nb_terse CVEs instead of $expected"
-          exit 1
-        else
-          echo "OK json-terse backward compat: $nb_terse CVEs"
-        fi
     - name: check docker compose run execution
       run: |
         expected=$(cat .github/workflows/expected_cve_count)
         cd dist
         docker compose build
-        json=$(docker compose run --rm spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json || true)
-        echo "$json" | jq . > /dev/null
-        fmtver=$(echo "$json" | jq '.meta.format_version')
-        if [ "$fmtver" != "1" ]; then
-          echo "Unexpected format_version: $fmtver"
-          exit 1
-        fi
-        nb=$(echo "$json" | jq '.vulnerabilities[].cve' | wc -l)
+        nb=$(docker compose run --rm spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
         if [ "$nb" -ne "$expected" ]; then
           echo "Invalid number of CVEs reported: $nb instead of $expected"
           exit 1
@@ -111,14 +51,7 @@ jobs:
         expected=$(cat .github/workflows/expected_cve_count)
         cd dist
         docker build -t spectre-meltdown-checker .
-        json=$(docker run --rm --privileged -v /boot:/boot:ro -v /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu:ro -v /lib/modules:/lib/modules:ro spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json || true)
-        echo "$json" | jq . > /dev/null
-        fmtver=$(echo "$json" | jq '.meta.format_version')
-        if [ "$fmtver" != "1" ]; then
-          echo "Unexpected format_version: $fmtver"
-          exit 1
-        fi
-        nb=$(echo "$json" | jq '.vulnerabilities[].cve' | wc -l)
+        nb=$(docker run --rm --privileged -v /boot:/boot:ro -v /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu:ro -v /lib/modules:/lib/modules:ro spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json | jq '.[]|.CVE' | wc -l)
         if [ "$nb" -ne "$expected" ]; then
           echo "Invalid number of CVEs reported: $nb instead of $expected"
           exit 1
@@ -159,19 +92,15 @@ jobs:
         fi
     - name: create a pull request to ${{ github.ref_name }}-build
       run: |
-        # all the files in dist/* and .github/* must be moved as is to the -build branch root, move them out for now:
         tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
         mv ./dist/* .github $tmpdir/
         rm -rf ./dist
-
         git fetch origin ${{ github.ref_name }}-build
         git checkout -f ${{ github.ref_name }}-build
-        rm -rf doc/
         mv $tmpdir/* .
-        rm -rf src/ scripts/ img/
+        rm -rf src/
         mkdir -p .github
         rsync -vaP --delete $tmpdir/.github/ .github/
-
         git add --all
         echo =#=#= DIFF CACHED
         git diff --cached

.github/workflows/expected_cve_count

@@ -1 +1 @@
-32
+31

.github/workflows/stale.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+name: 'Manage stale issues and PRs'
+
+on:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '37 7 * * *'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      action:
+        description: "dry-run"
+        required: true
+        default: "dryrun"
+        type: choice
+        options:
+          - dryrun
+          - apply
+
+permissions:
+  issues: write
+  pull-requests: write
+
+jobs:
+  stale:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/stale@v10
+        with:
+          any-of-labels: 'needs-more-info,answered'
+          labels-to-remove-when-unstale: 'needs-more-info,answered'
+          days-before-stale: 30
+          days-before-close: 7
+          stale-issue-label: stale
+          remove-stale-when-updated: true
+          debug-only: ${{ case(inputs.action == 'dryrun', true, false) }}

DEVELOPMENT.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Even though the Linux `sysfs` hierarchy (`/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilitie
 
 - **Independent of kernel knowledge**: A given kernel only understands vulnerabilities known at compile time. This script's detection logic is maintained independently, so it can identify gaps a kernel doesn't yet know about.
 - **Detailed prerequisite breakdown**: Mitigating a vulnerability can involve multiple layers (microcode, host kernel, hypervisor, guest kernel, software). The script shows exactly which pieces are in place and which are missing.
-- **No-runtime kernel analysis**: The script can inspect a kernel image before it is booted (`--kernel`, `--config`, `--map`), verifying it carries the expected mitigations.
+- **Offline kernel analysis**: The script can inspect a kernel image before it is booted (`--kernel`, `--config`, `--map`), verifying it carries the expected mitigations.
 - **Backport-aware**: It detects actual capabilities rather than checking version strings, so it works correctly with vendor kernels that silently backport or forward-port patches.
 - **Covers gaps in sysfs**: Some vulnerabilities (e.g. Zenbleed) are not reported through `sysfs` at all.
 
@@ -84,11 +84,8 @@ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --variant l1tf --variant taa
 # Run specific tests that we might have just added (CVE name)
 sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --cve CVE-2018-3640 --cve CVE-2022-40982
 
-# Batch JSON mode (comprehensive output)
-sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch json | python3 -m json.tool
-
-# Batch JSON terse mode (legacy flat array)
-sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch json-terse | python3 -m json.tool
+# Batch JSON mode (CI validates exactly 19 CVEs in output)
+sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch json | jq '.[] | .CVE' | wc -l  # must be 19
 
 # Update microcode firmware database
 sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --update-fwdb
@@ -105,30 +102,10 @@ The entire tool is a single bash script with no external script dependencies. Ke
 
 - **Output/logging functions** (~line 253): `pr_warn`, `pr_info`, `pr_verbose`, `pr_debug`, `explain`, `pstatus`, `pvulnstatus` - verbosity-aware output with color support
 - **CPU detection** (~line 2171): `parse_cpu_details`, `is_intel`/`is_amd`/`is_hygon`, `read_cpuid`, `read_msr`, `is_cpu_smt_enabled` - hardware identification via CPUID/MSR registers
-- **Kernel architecture detection** (`src/libs/365_kernel_arch.sh`): `is_arm_kernel`/`is_x86_kernel` - detects the **target kernel's** architecture (not the host CPU) using kernel artifacts (System.map symbols, kconfig, kernel image), with `cpu_vendor` as a fast path for live mode. Results are cached in `g_kernel_arch`. Use these helpers to guard arch-specific kernel/kconfig/System.map checks and to select the appropriate verdict messages. In no-hw mode, the target kernel may differ from the host CPU architecture.
-- **CPU architecture detection** (`src/libs/360_cpu_smt.sh`): `is_x86_cpu`/`is_arm_cpu` - detects the **host CPU's** architecture via `cpu_vendor`. Use these to gate hardware operations (CPUID, MSR, microcode) that require the physical CPU to be present. Always use positive logic: `if is_x86_cpu` (not `if ! is_arm_cpu`). These two sets of helpers are independent — a vuln check may need both, each guarding different lines.
 - **Microcode database** (embedded): Intel/AMD microcode version lookup via `read_mcedb`/`read_inteldb`; updated automatically via `.github/workflows/autoupdate.yml`
 - **Kernel analysis** (~line 1568): `extract_kernel`, `try_decompress` - extracts and inspects kernel images (handles gzip, bzip2, xz, lz4, zstd compression)
 - **Vulnerability checks**: 19 `check_CVE_<year>_<number>()` functions, each with `_linux()` and `_bsd()` variants. Uses whitelist logic (assumes affected unless proven otherwise)
-- **Batch output emitters** (`src/libs/250_output_emitters.sh`): `_emit_json_full`, `_emit_json_terse`, `_emit_text`, `_emit_nrpe`, `_emit_prometheus`, plus JSON section builders (`_build_json_meta`, `_build_json_system`, `_build_json_cpu`, `_build_json_cpu_microcode`)
-- **Main flow** (~line 6668): Parse options → detect CPU → loop through requested CVEs → output results (text/json/json-terse/nrpe/prometheus) → cleanup
-
-### JSON Batch Output Formats
-
-Two JSON formats are available via `--batch`:
-
-- **`--batch json`** (comprehensive): A top-level object with five sections:
-  - `meta` — script version, format version, timestamp, `mode` (`live`, `no-runtime`, `no-hw`, `hw-only`), run mode flags (`run_as_root`, `reduced_accuracy`, `mocked`, `paranoid`, `sysfs_only`, `extra`)
-  - `system` — kernel release/version/arch/cmdline, CPU count, SMT status, hypervisor host detection
-  - `cpu` — `arch` discriminator (`x86` or `arm`), vendor, friendly name, then an arch-specific sub-object (`cpu.x86` or `cpu.arm`) with identification fields (family/model/stepping/CPUID/codename for x86; part\_list/arch\_list for ARM) and a `capabilities` sub-object containing hardware flags as booleans/nulls
-  - `cpu_microcode` — `installed_version`, `latest_version`, `microcode_up_to_date`, `is_blacklisted`, firmware DB source/info
-  - `vulnerabilities` — array of per-CVE objects: `cve`, `name`, `aliases`, `cpu_affected`, `status`, `vulnerable`, `info`, `sysfs_status`, `sysfs_message`
-
-- **`--batch json-terse`** (legacy): A flat array of objects with four fields: `NAME`, `CVE`, `VULNERABLE` (bool/null), `INFOS`. This is the original format, preserved for backward compatibility.
-
-The comprehensive format is built in two phases: static sections (`meta`, `system`, `cpu`, `cpu_microcode`) are assembled after `check_cpu()` completes, and per-CVE entries are accumulated during the main CVE loop via `_emit_json_full()`. The sysfs data for each CVE is captured by `sys_interface_check()` into `g_json_cve_sysfs_status`/`g_json_cve_sysfs_msg` globals, which are read by the emitter and reset after each CVE to prevent cross-CVE leakage. CPU affection is determined via the already-cached `is_cpu_affected()`.
-
-When adding new `cap_*` variables (for a new CVE or updated hardware support), they must be added to `_build_json_cpu()` in `src/libs/250_output_emitters.sh`. Per-CVE data is handled automatically.
+- **Main flow** (~line 6668): Parse options → detect CPU → loop through requested CVEs → output results (text/json/nrpe/prometheus) → cleanup
 
 ## Key Design Principles
 
@@ -161,7 +138,7 @@ This works because the kernel always has direct access to CPUID (it doesn't need
 **Rules:**
 - This is strictly a fallback: `read_cpuid` via `/dev/cpu/N/cpuid` remains the primary method.
 - Only use it when `read_cpuid` returned `READ_CPUID_RET_ERR` (device unavailable), **never** when it returned `READ_CPUID_RET_KO` (device available but bit is 0 — meaning the CPU/hypervisor explicitly reports the feature as absent).
-- Only in live mode (`$g_mode = live`), since `/proc/cpuinfo` is not available in other modes.
+- Only in live mode (`$opt_live = 1`), since `/proc/cpuinfo` is not available in offline mode.
 - Only for CPUID bits that the kernel exposes as `/proc/cpuinfo` flags. Not all bits have a corresponding flag — only those listed in the kernel's `capflags.c`. If a bit has no `/proc/cpuinfo` flag, no fallback is possible.
 - The fallback depends on the running kernel being recent enough to know about the CPUID bit in question. An older kernel won't expose a flag it doesn't know about, so the fallback will silently not trigger — which is fine (we just stay at UNKNOWN, same as the ERR case without fallback).
 
@@ -184,7 +161,7 @@ read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 $EDX 31 1 1
 ret=$?
 if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
     cap_ssbd='Intel SSBD'
-elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
     # CPUID device unavailable (e.g. in a VM): fall back to /proc/cpuinfo
     if grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw ssbd; then
         cap_ssbd='Intel SSBD (cpuinfo)'
@@ -199,7 +176,7 @@ When the fallback sets a `cap_*` variable, append ` (cpuinfo)` to the value stri
 
 When a CPU is not explicitly known to be unaffected by a vulnerability, assume that it is affected. This conservative default has been the right call since the early Spectre/Meltdown days and remains sound.
 
-### 6. No-runtime mode
+### 6. Offline mode
 
 The script can analyze a non-running kernel via `--kernel`, `--config`, `--map` flags, allowing verification before deployment.
 
@@ -291,12 +268,7 @@ Before writing code, verify the CVE meets the inclusion criteria (see "CVE Inclu
 
 ### Step 1: Create the Vulnerability File
 
-Create `src/vulns/CVE-YYYY-NNNNN.sh`. When no real CVE applies, two placeholder ranges are reserved:
-
-- **`CVE-0000-NNNN`** — permanent placeholder for supplementary `--extra`-only checks that will never receive a real CVE (e.g. SLS / compile-time hardening).
-- **`CVE-9999-NNNN`** — temporary placeholder for real vulnerabilities awaiting CVE assignment. Once the real CVE is issued, rename the file, the registry entry, the `--variant` alias, and the function symbols across the codebase.
-
-The file header must follow this exact format:
+Create `src/vulns/CVE-YYYY-NNNNN.sh`. The file header must follow this exact format:
 
 - **Line 1**: vim modeline (`# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:`)
 - **Line 2**: 31 `#` characters (`###############################`)
@@ -343,8 +315,6 @@ When populating the CPU model list, use the **most recent version** of the Linux
 
 **Important**: Do not confuse hardware immunity bits with *mitigation* capability bits. A hardware immunity bit (e.g. `GDS_NO`, `TSA_SQ_NO`) declares that the CPU design is architecturally free of the vulnerability - it belongs here in `is_cpu_affected()`. A mitigation capability bit (e.g. `VERW_CLEAR`, `MD_CLEAR`) indicates that updated microcode provides a mechanism to work around a vulnerability the CPU *does* have - it belongs in the `check_CVE_YYYY_NNNNN_linux()` function (Phase 2), where it is used to determine whether mitigations are in place.
 
-**JSON output**: If the new CVE introduces new `cap_*` variables in `check_cpu()` (whether immunity bits or mitigation bits), these must also be added to the `_build_json_cpu()` function in `src/libs/250_output_emitters.sh`, inside the `capabilities` sub-object. Use the same name as the shell variable without the `cap_` prefix (e.g. `cap_tsa_sq_no` becomes `"tsa_sq_no"` in JSON), and emit it via `_json_cap`. The per-CVE vulnerability data (affection, status, sysfs) is handled automatically by the existing `_emit_json_full()` function and requires no changes when adding a new CVE.
-
 ### Step 3: Implement the Linux Check
 
 The `_linux()` function follows a standard algorithm with four phases:
@@ -395,44 +365,18 @@ This is where the real detection lives. Check for mitigations at each layer:
     fi
     ```
 
-  Each source may independently be unavailable (no-runtime mode without the file, or stripped kernel), so check all that are present. A match in any one confirms kernel support.
+  Each source may independently be unavailable (offline mode without the file, or stripped kernel), so check all that are present. A match in any one confirms kernel support.
 
-  **Architecture awareness:** Kernel symbols, kconfig options, and kernel-image strings are architecture-specific. An x86 host may be inspecting an ARM kernel (or vice versa) in offline mode, so always use positive-logic arch guards from `src/libs/365_kernel_arch.sh` and `src/libs/360_cpu_smt.sh`. This prevents searching for irrelevant strings (e.g. x86 `spec_store_bypass` in an ARM kernel image) and ensures verdict messages and `explain` text match the target architecture (e.g. "update CPU microcode" for x86 vs "update firmware for SMCCC ARCH_WORKAROUND_2" for ARM).
-
-  Use **positive logic** — always `if is_x86_kernel` (not `if ! is_arm_kernel`) and `if is_x86_cpu` (not `if ! is_arm_cpu`). This ensures unknown architectures (MIPS, RISC-V, PowerPC) are handled safely by defaulting to "skip" rather than "execute."
-
-  Two sets of helpers serve different purposes — in no-hw mode the host CPU and the kernel being inspected can be different architectures, so the correct guard depends on what is being checked:
-  - **`is_x86_kernel`/`is_arm_kernel`**: Gate checks that inspect **kernel artifacts** (kernel image strings, kconfig, System.map). These detect the architecture of the target kernel, not the host, so they work correctly in offline/no-hw mode when analyzing a foreign kernel.
-  - **`is_x86_cpu`/`is_arm_cpu`**: Gate **hardware operations** that require the host CPU to be a given architecture (CPUID, MSR reads, `/proc/cpuinfo` flags, microcode version checks). These always reflect the running host CPU.
-  - Within a single vuln check, you may need **both** guards independently — e.g. `is_x86_cpu` for the microcode/MSR check and `is_x86_kernel` for the kernel image grep, not one wrapping the other.
-
-  Example:
+- **Runtime state** (live mode only): Read MSRs, check cpuinfo flags, parse dmesg, inspect debugfs. All runtime-only checks — including `/proc/cpuinfo` flags — must be guarded by `if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]`, both when collecting the evidence in Phase 2 and when using it in Phase 4. In Phase 4, use explicit live/offline branches so that live-only variables (e.g. cpuinfo flags, MSR values) are never referenced in the offline path.
   ```sh
-  # x86-specific kernel image search
-  if [ -n "$g_kernel" ] && is_x86_kernel; then
-      mitigation=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$g_kernel" | grep x86_specific_string)
-  fi
-  # ARM-specific System.map search
-  if [ -n "$opt_map" ] && is_arm_kernel; then
-      mitigation=$(grep -w arm_mitigation_function "$opt_map")
-  fi
-  # x86-specific hardware read
-  if is_x86_cpu; then
-      read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 "$EDX" 26 1 1
-  fi
-  ```
-  The same applies to Phase 4 verdict messages: when the explanation or remediation advice differs between architectures (e.g. "CPU microcode update" vs "firmware/kernel update"), branch on `is_arm_kernel`/`is_x86_kernel` rather than on `cpu_vendor`, because `cpu_vendor` reflects the host, not the target kernel.
-
-- **Runtime state** (live mode only): Read MSRs, check cpuinfo flags, parse dmesg, inspect debugfs. All runtime-only checks — including `/proc/cpuinfo` flags — must be guarded by `if [ "$g_mode" = live ]`, both when collecting the evidence in Phase 2 and when using it in Phase 4. In Phase 4, use explicit live/non-live branches so that live-only variables (e.g. cpuinfo flags, MSR values) are never referenced in the non-live path.
-  ```sh
-  if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+  if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
       read_msr 0xADDRESS
       ret=$?
       if [ "$ret" = "$READ_MSR_RET_OK" ]; then
           # check specific bits in ret_read_msr_value_lo / ret_read_msr_value_hi
       fi
   else
-      pstatus blue N/A "not testable in non-live mode"
+      pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
   fi
   ```
 
@@ -523,15 +467,15 @@ four categories of information that the script consumes in different modes:
 
 1. **Sysfs messages** — every version of the string the kernel has ever produced for
    `/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/<name>`. Used in live mode to parse the
-   kernel's own assessment, and in no-runtime mode to grep for known strings in `$g_kernel`.
+   kernel's own assessment, and in offline mode to grep for known strings in `$g_kernel`.
 2. **Kconfig option names** — every `CONFIG_*` symbol that enables or controls the
-   mitigation. Used in no-runtime mode to check `$opt_config`. Kconfig names change over
+   mitigation. Used in offline mode to check `$opt_config`. Kconfig names change over
    time (e.g. `CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION` → `CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE` →
    `CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS`), and vendor kernels may use their own names, so all variants
    must be catalogued.
 3. **Kernel function names** — functions introduced specifically for the mitigation (e.g.
    `gds_select_mitigation`, `gds_apply_mitigation`, `l1tf_select_mitigation`). Used in
-   no-runtime mode to check `$opt_map` (System.map): the presence of a mitigation function
+   offline mode to check `$opt_map` (System.map): the presence of a mitigation function
    proves the kernel was compiled with the mitigation code, even if the config file is
    unavailable.
 4. **CPU affection logic** — the complete algorithm the kernel uses to decide whether a
@@ -804,12 +748,8 @@ CVEs that need VMM context should call `check_has_vmm` early in their `_linux()`
 3. **Update `dist/README.md`**: Add the CVE in **both** tables — the "Supported CVEs" reference table at the top (CVE link, description, alias) **and** the "Am I at risk?" matrix (with the correct leak/mitigation indicators per boundary). Also add a detailed description paragraph in the `<details>` section at the bottom.
 4. **Build** the monolithic script with `make`.
 5. **Test live**: Run the built script and confirm your CVE appears in the output and reports a sensible status.
-6. **Test batch JSON**: Run with `--batch json` and pipe through `python3 -m json.tool` to verify:
-   - The output is valid JSON.
-   - The new CVE appears in the `vulnerabilities` array with correct `cve`, `name`, `aliases`, `cpu_affected`, `status`, `vulnerable`, `info`, `sysfs_status`, and `sysfs_message` fields.
-   - If new `cap_*` variables were added in `check_cpu()`, they appear in `cpu.capabilities` (see Step 2 JSON note).
-   - Run with `--batch json-terse` as well to verify backward-compatible output.
-7. **Test no-runtime**: Run with `--kernel`/`--config`/`--map` pointing to a kernel image and verify the no-runtime code path reports correctly.
+6. **Test batch JSON**: Run with `--batch json` and verify the CVE appears in the output.
+7. **Test offline**: Run with `--kernel`/`--config`/`--map` pointing to a kernel image and verify the offline code path reports correctly.
 8. **Test `--variant` and `--cve`**: Run with `--variant <shortname>` and `--cve CVE-YYYY-NNNNN` separately to confirm both selection methods work and produce the same output.
 9. **Lint**: Run `shellcheck` on the monolithic script and fix any warnings.
 
@@ -817,12 +757,10 @@ CVEs that need VMM context should call `check_has_vmm` early in their `_linux()`
 
 - **Never hardcode kernel or microcode versions** - detect capabilities directly (design principles 2 and 3). Exception: when a microcode fix has no detectable indicator, hardcode fixing versions per CPU (see principle 3).
 - **Assume affected by default** - only mark a CPU as unaffected when there is positive evidence (design principle 4).
-- **Always handle both live and non-live modes** — use `$g_mode` to branch (`if [ "$g_mode" = live ]`), and print `N/A "not testable in non-live mode"` for runtime-only checks when not in live mode. Inside CVE checks, `live` is the only mode with runtime access (hw-only skips the CVE loop). Outside CVE checks (e.g. `check_cpu`), use the `has_runtime` helper which returns true for both `live` and `hw-only`.
+- **Always handle both live and offline modes** - use `$opt_live` to branch, and print `N/A "not testable in offline mode"` for runtime-only checks when offline.
 - **Use `explain()`** when reporting VULN to give actionable remediation advice (see "Cross-Cutting Features" above).
 - **Handle `--paranoid` and `--vmm`** when the CVE has stricter mitigation tiers or VMM-specific aspects (see "Cross-Cutting Features" above).
-- **Keep JSON output in sync** - when adding new `cap_*` variables, add them to `_build_json_cpu()` in `src/libs/250_output_emitters.sh` (see Step 2 JSON note above). Per-CVE fields are handled automatically.
 - **All indentation must use 4 spaces** (CI enforces this via `fmt-check`; the vim modeline `et` enables expandtab).
-- **Guard arch-specific checks with positive logic** — use `is_x86_kernel`/`is_arm_kernel` for kernel artifact checks, `is_x86_cpu`/`is_arm_cpu` for hardware operations. Always use positive form (`if is_x86_cpu`, not `if ! is_arm_cpu`) so unknown architectures default to "skip." Never use `cpu_vendor` to branch on architecture in Phase 2/4 — it reflects the host, not the target kernel being inspected.
 - **Stay POSIX-compatible** - no bashisms, no GNU-only flags in portable code paths.
 
 ## Function documentation headers

UNSUPPORTED_CVE_LIST.md

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ ARM processors may speculatively execute instructions past unconditional control
 
 VUSec researchers demonstrated that the original BHI mitigation (disabling unprivileged eBPF) was insufficient: 1,511 native kernel gadgets exist that allow exploiting Branch History Injection without eBPF, leaking arbitrary kernel memory at ~3.5 kB/sec on Intel CPUs.
 
-**Why out of scope:** CVE-2024-2201 is not a new hardware vulnerability — it is the same BHI hardware bug as CVE-2022-0002, but proves that eBPF restriction alone was never sufficient. The required mitigations are identical: `BHI_DIS_S` hardware control (MSR `IA32_SPEC_CTRL` bit 10), software BHB clearing loop at syscall entry and VM exit, or retpoline with RRSBA disabled. These are all already detected by this tool's CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre V2) checks, which parse the `BHI:` suffix from `/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2` and check for `CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI` in no-runtime mode. No new sysfs entry, MSR, kernel config option, or boot parameter was introduced for this CVE.
+**Why out of scope:** CVE-2024-2201 is not a new hardware vulnerability — it is the same BHI hardware bug as CVE-2022-0002, but proves that eBPF restriction alone was never sufficient. The required mitigations are identical: `BHI_DIS_S` hardware control (MSR `IA32_SPEC_CTRL` bit 10), software BHB clearing loop at syscall entry and VM exit, or retpoline with RRSBA disabled. These are all already detected by this tool's CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre V2) checks, which parse the `BHI:` suffix from `/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2` and check for `CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI` in offline mode. No new sysfs entry, MSR, kernel config option, or boot parameter was introduced for this CVE.
 
 ## CVE-2020-0549 — L1D Eviction Sampling (CacheOut)
 
@@ -124,17 +124,6 @@ A branch predictor initialization issue specific to Intel's Lion Cove microarchi
 
 These CVEs are real vulnerabilities, but no kernel or microcode fix has been issued, the mitigation is delegated to individual software, or the fix is not detectable by this tool.
 
-## CVE-2018-3665 — Lazy FP State Restore (LazyFP)
-
-- **Advisory:** [INTEL-SA-00145](https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/lazy-fp-state-restore.html)
-- **Research paper:** [LazyFP: Leaking FPU Register State using Microarchitectural Side-Channels (Stecklina & Prescher, 2018)](https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.07480)
-- **Affected CPUs:** Intel Core family (Sandy Bridge through Kaby Lake) when lazy FPU switching is in use
-- **CVSS:** 4.3 (Medium)
-
-Intel CPUs using lazy FPU state switching may speculatively expose another process's FPU/SSE/AVX register contents (including AES round keys and other cryptographic material) across context switches. The `#NM` (device-not-available) exception normally used to trigger lazy restore is delivered late enough that dependent instructions can transiently execute against the stale FPU state before the fault squashes them.
-
-**Why out of scope:** The Linux mitigation is to use eager FPU save/restore, which was already the default on Intel CPUs with XSAVEOPT well before disclosure, and was then hard-enforced upstream by the removal of all lazy FPU code in Linux 4.14 (Andy Lutomirski's "x86/fpu: Hard-disable lazy FPU mode" cleanup). There is no `/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/` entry, no CPUID flag, no MSR, and no kernel config option that reflects this mitigation — detection on a running kernel would require hardcoding kernel version ranges, which is against this tool's design principles (same rationale as CVE-2019-15902). In practice, any supported kernel today is eager-FPU-only, and CPUs advertising XSAVEOPT/XSAVES cannot enter the vulnerable lazy-switching mode regardless of kernel configuration.
-
 ## CVE-2018-9056 — BranchScope
 
 - **Issue:** [#169](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/169)
@@ -307,13 +296,3 @@ A weakness in AMD's microcode signature verification (AES-CMAC hash) allows load
 Exploits a synchronization failure in the AMD stack engine via an undocumented MSR bit, targeting AMD SEV-SNP confidential VMs. Requires hypervisor-level (ring 0) access.
 
 **Why out of scope:** Not a transient/speculative execution side channel. This is an architectural attack on AMD SEV-SNP confidential computing that requires hypervisor access, which is outside the threat model of this tool.
-
-## No CVE — Jump Conditional Code (JCC) Erratum
-
-- **Issue:** [#329](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/329)
-- **Intel whitepaper:** [Mitigations for Jump Conditional Code Erratum](https://www.intel.com/content/dam/support/us/en/documents/processors/mitigations-jump-conditional-code-erratum.pdf)
-- **Affected CPUs:** Intel 6th through 10th generation Core and Xeon processors (Skylake through Cascade Lake)
-
-A microarchitectural correctness erratum where a conditional jump instruction that straddles or ends at a 64-byte instruction fetch boundary can corrupt the branch predictor state, potentially causing incorrect execution. Intel addressed this in a November 2019 microcode update. Compilers and assemblers (GCC, LLVM, binutils) also introduced alignment options (`-mbranch-alignment`, `-x86-branches-within-32B-boundaries`) to pad jump instructions away from boundary conditions, preserving performance on CPUs with updated microcode.
-
-**Why out of scope:** The JCC erratum is a microarchitectural correctness bug, not a transient or speculative execution side-channel vulnerability. No CVE was ever assigned. Red Hat noted that privilege escalation "has not been ruled out" but made no definitive security finding, and no exploit has been demonstrated. There is no Linux sysfs entry, no CPUID bit, and no MSR flag exposing the mitigation status. The microcode fix introduces no detectable hardware indicator, so checking for it would require maintaining a per-CPU-stepping minimum microcode version table (the design principle 3 exception) — costly to maintain without a CVE anchor or confirmed exploitability to justify the ongoing work. The kernel compiler mitigation is a build-time-only change (instruction alignment) with no observable runtime state.

dist/FAQ.md

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ However I see a few reasons why this script might still be useful to you, and th
 
 - The script can be pointed at a kernel image, and will deep dive into it, telling you if this kernel will mitigate vulnerabilities that might be present on your system. This is a good way to verify before booting a new kernel, that it'll mitigate the vulnerabilities you expect it to, especially if you modified a few config options around these topics.
 
-- The script will also work regardless of the custom patches that might be integrated in the kernel you're running (or you're pointing it to, in no-runtime mode), and completely ignores the advertised kernel version, to tell whether a given kernel mitigates vulnerabilities. This is especially useful for non-vanilla kernel, where patches might be backported, sometimes silently (this has already happened, too).
+- The script will also work regardless of the custom patches that might be integrated in the kernel you're running (or you're pointing it to, in offline mode), and completely ignores the advertised kernel version, to tell whether a given kernel mitigates vulnerabilities. This is especially useful for non-vanilla kernel, where patches might be backported, sometimes silently (this has already happened, too).
 
 - Educational purposes: the script gives interesting insights about a vulnerability, and how the different parts of the system work together to mitigate it.
 

dist/README.md

@@ -38,15 +38,6 @@ CVE | Name | Aliases
 [CVE-2024-36357](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-36357) | Transient Scheduler Attack, L1 | TSA-L1
 [CVE-2025-40300](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-40300) | VM-Exit Stale Branch Prediction | VMScape
 [CVE-2024-45332](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-45332) | Branch Privilege Injection | BPI
-[CVE-2025-54505](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-54505) | AMD Zen1 Floating-Point Divider Stale Data Leak | FPDSS
-
-The following entries are ARM64 silicon errata that the kernel actively works around. They have no assigned CVE; they are tracked only by ARM's erratum numbers. Select them with `--errata <number>` or the associated `--variant` mnemonic.
-
-ID | Name | Affected cores
--- | ---- | --------------
-CVE-0001-0001 | Speculative AT TLB corruption (errata 1165522, 1319367, 1319537, 1530923) | Cortex-A55/A57/A72/A76
-CVE-0001-0002 | Speculative unprivileged load (errata 2966298, 3117295) | Cortex-A510/A520
-CVE-0001-0003 | MSR SSBS not self-synchronizing (erratum 3194386 + siblings) | Cortex-A76/A77/A78/A78C/A710/A715/A720/A720AE/A725, X1/X1C/X2/X3/X4/X925, Neoverse-N1/N2/N3/V1/V2/V3/V3AE
 
 ## Am I at risk?
 
@@ -86,7 +77,6 @@ CVE-2024-36350 (TSA-SQ) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + kernel
 CVE-2024-36357 (TSA-L1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + kernel update
 CVE-2025-40300 (VMScape) | ✅ | ✅ | 💥 | ✅ | Kernel update (IBPB on VM-exit)
 CVE-2024-45332 (BPI) | 💥 | ✅ | 💥 | ✅ | Microcode update
-CVE-2025-54505 (FPDSS) | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | 💥 | Kernel update
 
 > 💥 Data can be leaked across this boundary.
 
@@ -217,10 +207,6 @@ After a guest VM exits to the host, stale branch predictions from the guest can
 
 A race condition in the branch predictor update mechanism of Intel processors (Coffee Lake through Raptor Lake, plus some server and Atom parts) allows user-space branch predictions to briefly influence kernel-space speculative execution, undermining eIBRS and IBPB protections. This means systems relying solely on eIBRS for Spectre V2 mitigation may not be fully protected without the microcode fix. Mitigation requires a microcode update (intel-microcode 20250512+) that fixes the asynchronous branch predictor update timing so that eIBRS and IBPB work as originally intended. No kernel changes are required. Performance impact is negligible.
 
-**CVE-2025-54505 — AMD Zen1 Floating-Point Divider Stale Data Leak (FPDSS)**
-
-On AMD Zen1 and Zen+ processors (EPYC 7001, EPYC Embedded 3000, Athlon 3000 with Radeon, Ryzen 3000 with Radeon, Ryzen PRO 3000 with Radeon Vega), the hardware floating-point divider can retain partial quotient data from previous operations. Under certain circumstances, those results can be leaked to another thread sharing the same divider, crossing any privilege boundary. This was assigned CVE-2025-54505 and published by AMD as AMD-SB-7053 on 2026-04-17. Mitigation requires a kernel update (mainline commit e55d98e77561, "x86/CPU: Fix FPDSS on Zen1", Linux 7.1) that sets bit 9 (ZEN1_DENORM_FIX_BIT) of MSR 0xc0011028 (MSR_AMD64_FP_CFG) unconditionally on every Zen1 CPU at boot, disabling the hardware optimization responsible for the leak. No microcode update is required: the chicken bit is present in Zen1 silicon from the factory and is independent of microcode revision. Performance impact is limited to a small reduction in floating-point divide throughput, which is why AMD does not enable the bit by default in hardware.
-
 </details>
 
 ## Unsupported CVEs
@@ -228,17 +214,17 @@ On AMD Zen1 and Zen+ processors (EPYC 7001, EPYC Embedded 3000, Athlon 3000 with
 Several transient execution CVEs are not covered by this tool, for various reasons (duplicates, only
 affecting non-supported hardware or OS, theoretical with no known exploitation, etc.).
 The complete list along with the reason for each exclusion is available in the
-[UNSUPPORTED_CVE_LIST.md](doc/UNSUPPORTED_CVE_LIST.md) file.
+[UNSUPPORTED_CVE_LIST.md](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/blob/source/UNSUPPORTED_CVE_LIST.md) file.
 
 ## Scope
 
 Supported operating systems:
 - Linux (all versions, flavors and distros)
-- FreeBSD, NetBSD, DragonFlyBSD and derivatives (others BSDs are [not supported](doc/FAQ.md#which-bsd-oses-are-supported))
+- FreeBSD, NetBSD, DragonFlyBSD and derivatives (others BSDs are [not supported](FAQ.md#which-bsd-oses-are-supported))
 
-For Linux systems, the tool will detect mitigations, including backported non-vanilla patches, regardless of the advertised kernel version number and the distribution (such as Debian, Ubuntu, CentOS, RHEL, Fedora, openSUSE, Arch, ...), it also works if you've compiled your own kernel. More information [here](doc/FAQ.md#how-does-this-script-work).
+For Linux systems, the tool will detect mitigations, including backported non-vanilla patches, regardless of the advertised kernel version number and the distribution (such as Debian, Ubuntu, CentOS, RHEL, Fedora, openSUSE, Arch, ...), it also works if you've compiled your own kernel. More information [here](FAQ.md#how-does-this-script-work).
 
-Other operating systems such as MacOS, Windows, ESXi, etc. [will never be supported](doc/FAQ.md#why-is-my-os-not-supported).
+Other operating systems such as MacOS, Windows, ESXi, etc. [will never be supported](FAQ.md#why-is-my-os-not-supported).
 
 Supported architectures:
 - `x86` (32 bits)
@@ -250,29 +236,7 @@ Supported architectures:
 
 What is the purpose of this tool? Why was it written? How can it be useful to me? How does it work? What can I expect from it?
 
-All these questions (and more) have detailed answers in the [FAQ](doc/FAQ.md), please have a look!
-
-## Operating modes
-
-The script supports four operating modes, depending on whether you want to inspect the running kernel, a kernel image, the CPU hardware, or a combination.
-
-| Mode | Flag | CPU hardware | Running kernel | Kernel image | Use case |
-|------|------|:---:|:---:|:---:|----------|
-| **Live** *(default)* | *(none)* | Yes | Yes | auto-detect | Day-to-day auditing of the current system |
-| **No-runtime** | `--no-runtime` | Yes | No | required | Check a different kernel against this CPU (e.g. pre-deployment) |
-| **No-hardware** | `--no-hw` | No | No | required | Pure static analysis of a kernel image for another system or architecture |
-| **Hardware-only** | `--hw-only` | Yes | No | No | Quickly check CPU affectedness without inspecting any kernel |
-
-In **Live** mode (the default), the script inspects both the CPU and the running kernel.
-You can optionally pass `--kernel`, `--config`, or `--map` to point the script at files it couldn't auto-detect.
-
-In **No-runtime** mode, the script still reads the local CPU (CPUID, MSRs, microcode) but skips all running-kernel artifacts (`/sys`, `/proc`, `dmesg`).
-Use this when you have a kernel image from another system but want to evaluate it against the current CPU.
-
-In **No-hardware** mode, both CPU inspection and running-kernel artifacts are skipped entirely.
-This is useful for cross-architecture analysis, for example inspecting an ARM kernel image on an x86 workstation.
-
-In **Hardware-only** mode, the script only reports CPU information and per-CVE hardware affectedness, without inspecting any kernel.
+All these questions (and more) have detailed answers in the [FAQ](FAQ.md), please have a look!
 
 ## Running the script
 
@@ -280,23 +244,23 @@ In **Hardware-only** mode, the script only reports CPU information and per-CVE h
 
 - Get the latest version of the script using `curl` *or* `wget`
 
-    ```bash
-    curl -L https://meltdown.ovh -o spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
-    wget https://meltdown.ovh -O spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
-    ```
+```bash
+curl -L https://meltdown.ovh -o spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+wget https://meltdown.ovh -O spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+```
 
 - Inspect the script. You never blindly run scripts you downloaded from the Internet, do you?
 
-    ```bash
-    vim spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
-    ```
+```bash
+vim spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+```
 
 - When you're ready, run the script as root
 
-    ```bash
-    chmod +x spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
-    sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
-    ```
+```bash
+chmod +x spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+```
 
 ### Using a docker container
 
@@ -324,6 +288,15 @@ docker run --rm --privileged -v /boot:/boot:ro -v /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu:ro -v /lib/m
 
 ## Example of script output
 
-- AMD EPYC-Milan running under Debian Trixie
+- Intel Haswell CPU running under Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
+
+![haswell](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/218502/108764885-6dcfc380-7553-11eb-81ac-4d19060a3acf.png)
+
+- AMD Ryzen running under OpenSUSE Tumbleweed
+
+![ryzen](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/218502/108764896-70321d80-7553-11eb-9dd2-fad2a0a1a737.png)
+
+- Batch mode (JSON flavor)
+
+![batch](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/218502/108764902-71634a80-7553-11eb-9678-fd304995fa64.png)
 
-![alt text](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/refs/heads/test/img/smc_amd_epyc_milan.jpg)

dist/doc/batch_json.md

@@ -1,393 +0,0 @@
-# JSON Output Format
-
-`--batch json` emits a single, self-contained JSON object that describes the
-scan environment and the result of every CVE check. You can feed it to your
-monitoring system, to a SIEM, to a time-series database, you name it.
-
-```sh
-sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch json | jq .
-```
-
-## Top-level schema
-
-```
-{
-  "meta":          { ... },   // Run metadata and flags
-  "system":        { ... },   // Kernel and host context
-  "cpu":           { ... },   // CPU hardware identification
-  "cpu_microcode": { ... },   // Microcode version and status
-  "vulnerabilities": [ ... ]  // One object per checked CVE
-}
-```
-
-`format_version` in `meta` is an integer that will be incremented on
-backward-incompatible schema changes.  The current value is **1**.
-
-## Section reference
-
-### `meta`
-
-Run metadata.  Always present.
-
-| Field | Type | Values | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| `script_version` | string | e.g. `"25.30.0250400123"` | Script version |
-| `format_version` | integer | `1` | JSON schema version; incremented on breaking changes |
-| `timestamp` | string | ISO 8601 UTC, e.g. `"2025-04-07T12:00:00Z"` | When the scan started |
-| `os` | string | e.g. `"Linux"`, `"FreeBSD"` | Output of `uname -s` |
-| `mode` | string | `"live"` / `"no-runtime"` / `"no-hw"` / `"hw-only"` | Operating mode (see [modes](README.md#operating-modes)) |
-| `run_as_root` | boolean | | Whether the script ran as root.  Non-root scans skip MSR reads and may miss mitigations |
-| `reduced_accuracy` | boolean | | Kernel image, config, or System.map was missing; some checks fall back to weaker heuristics |
-| `paranoid` | boolean | | `--paranoid` mode: stricter criteria (e.g. requires SMT disabled, IBPB always-on) |
-| `sysfs_only` | boolean | | `--sysfs-only`: only the kernel's own sysfs report was used, not independent detection |
-| `extra` | boolean | | `--extra`: additional experimental checks were enabled |
-| `mocked` | boolean | | One or more CPU values were overridden for testing.  Results do **not** reflect the real system |
-
-**Example:**
-```json
-"meta": {
-  "script_version": "25.30.025040123",
-  "format_version": 1,
-  "timestamp": "2025-04-07T12:00:00Z",
-  "os": "Linux",
-  "mode": "live",
-  "run_as_root": true,
-  "reduced_accuracy": false,
-  "paranoid": false,
-  "sysfs_only": false,
-  "extra": false,
-  "mocked": false
-}
-```
-
-**Important flags for fleet operators:**
-
-- `run_as_root: false` means the scan was incomplete.  Treat results as lower
-  confidence.  Alert separately: results may be missing or wrong.
-- `sysfs_only: true` means the script trusted the kernel's self-report without
-  independent verification.  Some older kernels misreport their mitigation
-  status.  Do not use `--sysfs-only` for production fleet monitoring.
-- `paranoid: true` raises the bar: only compare `vulnerable` counts across
-  hosts with the same `paranoid` value.
-- `mocked: true` must never appear on a production host.  If it does, every
-  downstream result is fabricated.
-
----
-
-### `system`
-
-Kernel and host environment.  Always present.
-
-| Field | Type | Values | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| `kernel_release` | string \| null | e.g. `"6.1.0-21-amd64"` | Output of `uname -r` (null in no-runtime, no-hw, and hw-only modes) |
-| `kernel_version` | string \| null | e.g. `"#1 SMP Debian …"` | Output of `uname -v` (null in no-runtime, no-hw, and hw-only modes) |
-| `kernel_arch` | string \| null | e.g. `"x86_64"` | Output of `uname -m` (null in no-runtime, no-hw, and hw-only modes) |
-| `kernel_image` | string \| null | e.g. `"/boot/vmlinuz-6.1.0-21-amd64"` | Path passed via `--kernel`, or null if not specified |
-| `kernel_config` | string \| null | | Path passed via `--config`, or null |
-| `kernel_version_string` | string \| null | | Kernel version banner extracted from the image |
-| `kernel_cmdline` | string \| null | | Kernel command line from `/proc/cmdline` (live mode) or the image |
-| `cpu_count` | integer \| null | | Number of logical CPUs detected |
-| `smt_enabled` | boolean \| null | | Whether SMT (HyperThreading) is currently active; null if undeterminable |
-| `hypervisor_host` | boolean \| null | | Whether this machine is detected as a VM host (running KVM, Xen, VMware, etc.) |
-| `hypervisor_host_reason` | string \| null | | Human-readable explanation of why `hypervisor_host` was set |
-
-**`hypervisor_host`** materially changes the risk profile of several CVEs.
-L1TF (CVE-2018-3646) and MDS (CVE-2018-12126/12130/12127) are significantly
-more severe on hypervisor hosts because they can be exploited across VM
-boundaries by a malicious guest.  Prioritise remediation where
-`hypervisor_host: true`.
-
----
-
-### `cpu`
-
-CPU hardware identification.  `null` when `--no-hw` is active, or when
-`--arch-prefix` is set (host CPU info is then suppressed to avoid mixing
-with a different-arch target kernel).
-
-The object uses `arch` as a discriminator: `"x86"` for Intel/AMD/Hygon CPUs,
-`"arm"` for ARM/Cavium/Phytium.  Arch-specific fields live under a matching
-sub-object (`cpu.x86` or `cpu.arm`), so consumers never see irrelevant null
-fields from the other architecture.
-
-#### Common fields
-
-| Field | Type | Values | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| `arch` | string | `"x86"` / `"arm"` | CPU architecture family; determines which sub-object is present |
-| `vendor` | string \| null | e.g. `"GenuineIntel"`, `"ARM"` | CPU vendor string |
-| `friendly_name` | string \| null | e.g. `"Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-9700K CPU @ 3.60GHz"` | Human-readable CPU model |
-
-#### `cpu.x86` (present when `arch == "x86"`)
-
-| Field | Type | Values | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| `family` | integer \| null | | CPU family number |
-| `model` | integer \| null | | CPU model number |
-| `stepping` | integer \| null | | CPU stepping number |
-| `cpuid` | string \| null | hex, e.g. `"0x000906ed"` | Full CPUID leaf 1 EAX value |
-| `platform_id` | integer \| null | | Intel platform ID (from MSR 0x17); null on AMD |
-| `hybrid` | boolean \| null | | Whether this is a hybrid CPU (P-cores + E-cores, e.g. Alder Lake) |
-| `codename` | string \| null | e.g. `"Coffee Lake"` | Intel CPU codename; null on AMD |
-| `capabilities` | object | | CPU feature flags (see below) |
-
-#### `cpu.arm` (present when `arch == "arm"`)
-
-| Field | Type | Values | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| `part_list` | string \| null | e.g. `"0xd0b 0xd05"` | Space-separated ARM part numbers across cores (big.LITTLE may have several) |
-| `arch_list` | string \| null | e.g. `"8 8"` | Space-separated ARM architecture levels across cores |
-| `capabilities` | object | | ARM-specific capability flags (currently empty; reserved for future use) |
-
-#### `cpu.x86.capabilities`
-
-Every capability is a **tri-state**: `true` (present), `false` (absent), or
-`null` (not applicable or could not be read, e.g. when not root or on AMD for
-Intel-specific features).
-
-| Capability | Meaning |
-|---|---|
-| `spec_ctrl` | SPEC_CTRL MSR (Intel: ibrs + ibpb via WRMSR; required for many mitigations) |
-| `ibrs` | Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation |
-| `ibpb` | Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier |
-| `ibpb_ret` | IBPB on return (enhanced form) |
-| `stibp` | Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors |
-| `ssbd` | Speculative Store Bypass Disable |
-| `l1d_flush` | L1D cache flush instruction |
-| `md_clear` | VERW clears CPU buffers (MDS mitigation) |
-| `arch_capabilities` | IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR is present |
-| `rdcl_no` | Not susceptible to RDCL (Meltdown-like attacks) |
-| `ibrs_all` | Enhanced IBRS always-on mode supported |
-| `rsba` | RSB may use return predictions from outside the RSB |
-| `l1dflush_no` | Not susceptible to L1D flush side-channel |
-| `ssb_no` | Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass |
-| `mds_no` | Not susceptible to MDS |
-| `taa_no` | Not susceptible to TSX Asynchronous Abort |
-| `pschange_msc_no` | Page-size-change MSC not susceptible |
-| `tsx_ctrl_msr` | TSX_CTRL MSR is present |
-| `tsx_ctrl_rtm_disable` | RTM disabled via TSX_CTRL |
-| `tsx_ctrl_cpuid_clear` | CPUID HLE/RTM bits cleared via TSX_CTRL |
-| `gds_ctrl` | GDS_CTRL MSR present (GDS mitigation control) |
-| `gds_no` | Not susceptible to Gather Data Sampling |
-| `gds_mitg_dis` | GDS mitigation disabled |
-| `gds_mitg_lock` | GDS mitigation locked |
-| `rfds_no` | Not susceptible to Register File Data Sampling |
-| `rfds_clear` | VERW clears register file stale data |
-| `its_no` | Not susceptible to Indirect Target Selection |
-| `sbdr_ssdp_no` | Not susceptible to SBDR/SSDP |
-| `fbsdp_no` | Not susceptible to FBSDP |
-| `psdp_no` | Not susceptible to PSDP |
-| `fb_clear` | Fill buffer cleared on idle/C6 |
-| `rtm` | Restricted Transactional Memory (TSX RTM) present |
-| `tsx_force_abort` | TSX_FORCE_ABORT MSR present |
-| `tsx_force_abort_rtm_disable` | RTM disabled via TSX_FORCE_ABORT |
-| `tsx_force_abort_cpuid_clear` | CPUID RTM cleared via TSX_FORCE_ABORT |
-| `sgx` | Software Guard Extensions present |
-| `srbds` | SRBDS affected |
-| `srbds_on` | SRBDS mitigation active |
-| `amd_ssb_no` | AMD: not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass |
-| `hygon_ssb_no` | Hygon: not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass |
-| `ipred` | Indirect Predictor Barrier support |
-| `rrsba` | Restricted RSB Alternate (Intel Retbleed mitigation) |
-| `bhi` | Branch History Injection mitigation support |
-| `tsa_sq_no` | Not susceptible to TSA-SQ |
-| `tsa_l1_no` | Not susceptible to TSA-L1 |
-| `verw_clear` | VERW clears CPU buffers |
-| `autoibrs` | AMD AutoIBRS (equivalent to enhanced IBRS on Intel) |
-| `sbpb` | Selective Branch Predictor Barrier (AMD Inception mitigation) |
-| `avx2` | AVX2 supported (relevant to Downfall / GDS) |
-| `avx512` | AVX-512 supported (relevant to Downfall / GDS) |
-
----
-
-### `cpu_microcode`
-
-Microcode version and status.  `null` under the same conditions as `cpu`.
-
-| Field | Type | Values | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| `installed_version` | string \| null | hex, e.g. `"0xf4"` | Currently running microcode revision |
-| `latest_version` | string \| null | hex | Latest known-good version in the firmware database; null if CPU is not in the database |
-| `microcode_up_to_date` | boolean \| null | | Whether `installed_version == latest_version`; null if either is unavailable |
-| `is_blacklisted` | boolean | | Whether the installed microcode is known to cause instability and must be rolled back |
-| `message` | string \| null | | Human-readable note from the firmware database (e.g. changelog excerpt) |
-| `db_source` | string \| null | | Which database was used (e.g. `"Intel-SA"`, `"MCExtractor"`) |
-| `db_info` | string \| null | | Database revision or date |
-
-**`is_blacklisted: true`** means the installed microcode is known to cause
-system instability or incorrect behaviour.  Treat this as a P1 incident: roll
-back to the previous microcode immediately.
-
-**`microcode_up_to_date: false`** means a newer microcode is available.  This
-does not necessarily mean the system is vulnerable (the current microcode may
-still include all required mitigations), but warrants investigation.
-
----
-
-### `vulnerabilities`
-
-Array of CVE check results.  One object per checked CVE, in check order.
-Empty array (`[]`) if no CVEs were checked (unusual; would require `--cve`
-with an unknown CVE ID).
-
-| Field | Type | Values | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| `cve` | string | e.g. `"CVE-2017-5753"` | CVE identifier |
-| `name` | string | e.g. `"SPECTRE VARIANT 1"` | Short key name used in batch formats |
-| `aliases` | string \| null | e.g. `"Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass"` | Full name including all known aliases |
-| `cpu_affected` | boolean | | Whether this CPU's hardware design is affected by this CVE |
-| `status` | string | `"OK"` / `"VULN"` / `"UNK"` | Check outcome (see below) |
-| `vulnerable` | boolean \| null | `false` / `true` / `null` | `false`=OK, `true`=VULN, `null`=UNK |
-| `info` | string | | Human-readable description of the specific mitigation state or reason |
-| `sysfs_status` | string \| null | `"OK"` / `"VULN"` / `"UNK"` / null | Status as reported by the kernel via `/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/`; null if sysfs was not consulted for this CVE, or if the CVE's check read sysfs in silent/quiet mode (raw message is still captured in `sysfs_message`) |
-| `sysfs_message` | string \| null | | Raw text from the sysfs file (e.g. `"Mitigation: PTI"`); null if sysfs was not consulted |
-
-#### Status values
-
-| `status` | `vulnerable` | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|
-| `"OK"` | `false` | CPU is unaffected by design, or all required mitigations are in place |
-| `"VULN"` | `true` | CPU is affected and mitigations are missing or insufficient |
-| `"UNK"` | `null` | The script could not determine the status (missing kernel info, insufficient privileges, or no detection logic for this platform) |
-
-#### `cpu_affected` explained
-
-`cpu_affected: false` with `status: "OK"` means the CPU hardware is
-architecturally immune, no patch was ever needed.
-
-`cpu_affected: true` with `status: "OK"` means the hardware has the weakness
-but all required mitigations (kernel, microcode, or both) are in place.
-
-This distinction matters for fleet auditing: filter on `cpu_affected: true` to
-see only systems where mitigation effort was actually required and confirmed.
-
-#### `sysfs_status` vs `status`
-
-`sysfs_status` is the raw kernel self-report.  `status` is the script's
-independent assessment, which may differ:
-
-- The script may **upgrade** a sysfs `"VULN"` to `"OK"` when it detects a
-  silent backport that the kernel doesn't know about.
-- The script may **downgrade** a sysfs `"OK"` to `"VULN"` when it detects an
-  incomplete mitigation the kernel doesn't flag (e.g. L1TF on a hypervisor
-  host with SMT still enabled, or TSA in `user` mode on a VMM host).
-- `sysfs_status` is `null` when the kernel has no sysfs entry for this CVE
-  (older kernels, or CVEs not yet tracked by the kernel).
-
-Always use `status` / `vulnerable` for alerting.  Use `sysfs_status` for
-diagnostics and audit trails.
-
-**Example:**
-```json
-{
-  "cve": "CVE-2017-5715",
-  "name": "SPECTRE VARIANT 2",
-  "aliases": "Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection",
-  "cpu_affected": true,
-  "status": "OK",
-  "vulnerable": false,
-  "info": "Full generic retpoline is mitigating the vulnerability",
-  "sysfs_status": "OK",
-  "sysfs_message": "Mitigation: Retpolines; IBPB: conditional; IBRS_FW; STIBP: conditional; RSB filling; PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected; BHI: Not affected"
-}
-```
-
----
-
-## Exit codes
-
-The script exits with:
-
-| Code | Meaning |
-|---|---|
-| `0` | All checked CVEs are `OK` |
-| `2` | At least one CVE is `VULN` |
-| `3` | No CVEs are `VULN`, but at least one is `UNK` |
-
-These exit codes are the same in all batch modes and in interactive mode.
-Use them in combination with the JSON body for reliable alerting.
-
----
-
-## Caveats and edge cases
-
-**No-runtime mode (`--no-runtime`)**
-`system.kernel_release`, `kernel_version`, and `kernel_arch` are null (those
-come from `uname`, which reports the running kernel, not the inspected one).
-`meta.mode: "no-runtime"` signals this.  `system.kernel_image` and
-`system.kernel_version_string` carry the inspected image path and banner
-instead.
-
-**No-hardware mode (`--no-hw`)**
-`cpu` and `cpu_microcode` are null.  CVE checks that rely on hardware
-capability detection (`cap_*` flags, MSR reads) will report `status: "UNK"`.
-`cpu_affected` will be `false` for all CVEs (cannot determine affection without
-hardware info).  `meta.mode: "no-hw"` signals this.
-
-**Hardware-only mode (`--hw-only`)**
-Only CPU information and per-CVE affectedness are reported.  No kernel
-inspection is performed, so vulnerability mitigations are not checked.
-`meta.mode: "hw-only"` signals this.
-
-**`--sysfs-only`**
-The script trusts the kernel's sysfs report without running independent
-detection.  `meta.sysfs_only: true` flags this.  Some older kernels misreport
-their status.  Do not use for production fleet monitoring.
-
-**`--paranoid`**
-Enables defense-in-depth checks beyond the security community consensus.
-A `status: "OK"` under `paranoid: true` means a higher bar was met.  Do not
-compare results across hosts with different `paranoid` values.
-
-**`reduced_accuracy`**
-Set when the kernel image, config file, or System.map could not be read.
-Some checks fall back to weaker heuristics and may report `"UNK"` for CVEs
-that are actually mitigated.
-
-**Non-x86 architectures (ARM, ARM64)**
-On ARM, `cpu.arch` is `"arm"` and the `cpu.arm` sub-object carries `part_list`
-and `arch_list`.  The x86-specific sub-object is absent (no null noise).
-`cpu.arm.capabilities` is currently empty; ARM-specific flags will be added
-there as needed.
-
-**`mocked: true`**
-Must never appear on a production host.  If it does, the results are
-fabricated and every downstream alert is unreliable.
-
----
-
-## Schema stability
-
-`meta.format_version` is incremented on backward-incompatible changes (field
-removal or type change).  Additive changes (new fields) do not increment the
-version; consumers must tolerate unknown fields.
-
-Recommended practice: check `format_version == 1` at parse time and reject
-or alert on any other value until you have tested compatibility with the new
-version.
-
----
-
-## Migration from `json-terse`
-
-The legacy `--batch json-terse` format emits a flat array of objects:
-
-```json
-[
-  {"NAME": "SPECTRE VARIANT 1", "CVE": "CVE-2017-5753", "VULNERABLE": false, "INFOS": "..."},
-  ...
-]
-```
-
-It carries no system, CPU, or microcode context.  It has no sysfs data.  It
-uses uppercase field names.
-
-To migrate:
-
-1. Replace `--batch json-terse` with `--batch json`.
-2. The equivalent of the old `VULNERABLE` field is `vulnerabilities[].vulnerable`.
-3. The equivalent of the old `INFOS` field is `vulnerabilities[].info`.
-4. The equivalent of the old `NAME` field is `vulnerabilities[].name`.
-5. The old format is still available as `--batch json-terse` for transition
-   periods.

dist/doc/batch_json.schema.json

@@ -1,382 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
-  "$id": "https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/dist/batch_json.schema.json",
-  "title": "spectre-meltdown-checker --batch json output",
-  "description": "Schema for the comprehensive JSON output produced by spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch json. format_version 1.",
-  "type": "object",
-  "required": ["meta", "system", "cpu", "cpu_microcode", "vulnerabilities"],
-  "additionalProperties": false,
-  "properties": {
-
-    "meta": {
-      "description": "Run metadata and option flags.",
-      "type": "object",
-      "required": [
-        "script_version", "format_version", "timestamp", "os", "mode",
-        "run_as_root", "reduced_accuracy", "paranoid", "sysfs_only",
-        "extra", "mocked"
-      ],
-      "additionalProperties": false,
-      "properties": {
-        "script_version": {
-          "description": "Script version string, e.g. '25.30.0250400123'.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"]
-        },
-        "format_version": {
-          "description": "JSON schema version. Incremented on backward-incompatible changes. Current value: 1.",
-          "type": "integer",
-          "const": 1
-        },
-        "timestamp": {
-          "description": "ISO 8601 UTC timestamp of when the scan started, e.g. '2025-04-07T12:00:00Z'.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"]
-        },
-        "os": {
-          "description": "Operating system name from uname -s, e.g. 'Linux', 'FreeBSD'.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"]
-        },
-        "mode": {
-          "description": "Operating mode: 'live' (default), 'no-runtime' (--no-runtime), 'no-hw' (--no-hw), or 'hw-only' (--hw-only).",
-          "type": "string",
-          "enum": ["live", "no-runtime", "no-hw", "hw-only"]
-        },
-        "run_as_root": {
-          "description": "Whether the script ran as root. Non-root scans skip MSR reads and may produce incomplete or inaccurate results.",
-          "type": "boolean"
-        },
-        "reduced_accuracy": {
-          "description": "True when the kernel image, config, or System.map was missing. Some checks fall back to weaker heuristics.",
-          "type": ["boolean", "null"]
-        },
-        "paranoid": {
-          "description": "True when --paranoid was set: stricter criteria (e.g. requires SMT disabled, IBPB always-on).",
-          "type": "boolean"
-        },
-        "sysfs_only": {
-          "description": "True when --sysfs-only was set: the script trusted the kernel's own sysfs report without independent detection.",
-          "type": "boolean"
-        },
-        "extra": {
-          "description": "True when --extra was set: additional experimental checks were enabled.",
-          "type": "boolean"
-        },
-        "mocked": {
-          "description": "True when one or more CPU values were overridden for testing. Results do NOT reflect the real system.",
-          "type": ["boolean", "null"]
-        }
-      }
-    },
-
-    "system": {
-      "description": "Kernel and host environment context.",
-      "type": ["object", "null"],
-      "required": [
-        "kernel_release", "kernel_version", "kernel_arch",
-        "kernel_image", "kernel_config", "kernel_version_string",
-        "kernel_cmdline", "cpu_count", "smt_enabled",
-        "hypervisor_host", "hypervisor_host_reason"
-      ],
-      "additionalProperties": false,
-      "properties": {
-        "kernel_release": {
-          "description": "Output of uname -r (live mode only), e.g. '6.1.0-21-amd64'. Null in other modes.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"]
-        },
-        "kernel_version": {
-          "description": "Output of uname -v (live mode only), e.g. '#1 SMP Debian …'. Null in other modes.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"]
-        },
-        "kernel_arch": {
-          "description": "Output of uname -m (live mode only), e.g. 'x86_64'. Null in other modes.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"]
-        },
-        "kernel_image": {
-          "description": "Path to the kernel image passed via --kernel. Null in live mode.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"]
-        },
-        "kernel_config": {
-          "description": "Path to the kernel config passed via --config. Null if not provided.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"]
-        },
-        "kernel_version_string": {
-          "description": "Kernel version banner extracted from the image. Null if unavailable.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"]
-        },
-        "kernel_cmdline": {
-          "description": "Kernel command line from /proc/cmdline (live mode) or the image. Null if unavailable.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"]
-        },
-        "cpu_count": {
-          "description": "Number of logical CPUs detected (max core ID + 1). Null if undeterminable.",
-          "type": ["integer", "null"],
-          "minimum": 1
-        },
-        "smt_enabled": {
-          "description": "Whether SMT (HyperThreading) is currently enabled. Null if the script could not determine the state.",
-          "type": ["boolean", "null"]
-        },
-        "hypervisor_host": {
-          "description": "Whether this machine is detected as a VM host (running KVM, Xen, VMware, etc.). Null if undeterminable.",
-          "type": ["boolean", "null"]
-        },
-        "hypervisor_host_reason": {
-          "description": "Human-readable explanation of why hypervisor_host was set. Null if hypervisor_host is false or null.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"]
-        }
-      }
-    },
-
-    "cpu": {
-      "description": "CPU hardware identification. Null when --no-hw is active or when --arch-prefix is set (host CPU info is then suppressed to avoid mixing with a different-arch target kernel). Contains an 'arch' discriminator ('x86' or 'arm') and a matching arch-specific sub-object with identification fields and capabilities.",
-      "oneOf": [
-        { "type": "null" },
-        {
-          "type": "object",
-          "description": "x86 CPU (Intel, AMD, Hygon).",
-          "required": ["arch", "vendor", "friendly_name", "x86"],
-          "additionalProperties": false,
-          "properties": {
-            "arch": { "type": "string", "const": "x86" },
-            "vendor": {
-              "description": "CPU vendor string: 'GenuineIntel', 'AuthenticAMD', or 'HygonGenuine'.",
-              "type": ["string", "null"]
-            },
-            "friendly_name": {
-              "description": "Human-readable CPU model from /proc/cpuinfo, e.g. 'Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-9700K CPU @ 3.60GHz'.",
-              "type": ["string", "null"]
-            },
-            "x86": {
-              "type": "object",
-              "required": ["family", "model", "stepping", "cpuid", "platform_id", "hybrid", "codename", "capabilities"],
-              "additionalProperties": false,
-              "properties": {
-                "family": {
-                  "description": "CPU family number.",
-                  "type": ["integer", "null"]
-                },
-                "model": {
-                  "description": "CPU model number.",
-                  "type": ["integer", "null"]
-                },
-                "stepping": {
-                  "description": "CPU stepping number.",
-                  "type": ["integer", "null"]
-                },
-                "cpuid": {
-                  "description": "Full CPUID leaf 1 EAX value as a hex string, e.g. '0x000906ed'.",
-                  "type": ["string", "null"],
-                  "pattern": "^0x[0-9a-f]+$"
-                },
-                "platform_id": {
-                  "description": "Intel platform ID from MSR 0x17. Null on AMD.",
-                  "type": ["integer", "null"]
-                },
-                "hybrid": {
-                  "description": "Whether this is a hybrid CPU (P-cores + E-cores, e.g. Alder Lake). Null if undeterminable.",
-                  "type": ["boolean", "null"]
-                },
-                "codename": {
-                  "description": "Intel CPU codename, e.g. 'Coffee Lake'. Null on AMD.",
-                  "type": ["string", "null"]
-                },
-                "capabilities": {
-                  "description": "CPU feature flags detected via CPUID and MSR reads. Every value is tri-state: true=present, false=absent, null=not applicable or unreadable.",
-                  "type": "object",
-                  "additionalProperties": false,
-                  "properties": {
-                    "spec_ctrl":                      { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "SPEC_CTRL MSR present (Intel; enables IBRS + IBPB via WRMSR)" },
-                    "ibrs":                           { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "IBRS supported (via SPEC_CTRL, IBRS_SUPPORT, or cpuinfo fallback)" },
-                    "ibpb":                           { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "IBPB supported (via SPEC_CTRL, IBPB_SUPPORT, or cpuinfo fallback)" },
-                    "ibpb_ret":                       { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "IBPB on return (enhanced form)" },
-                    "stibp":                          { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "STIBP supported (Intel/AMD/HYGON or cpuinfo fallback)" },
-                    "ssbd":                           { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "SSBD supported (SPEC_CTRL, VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, non-architectural MSR, or cpuinfo fallback)" },
-                    "l1d_flush":                      { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "L1D cache flush instruction" },
-                    "md_clear":                       { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "VERW clears CPU buffers (MDS mitigation)" },
-                    "arch_capabilities":              { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR is present" },
-                    "rdcl_no":                        { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to RDCL (Meltdown-like attacks)" },
-                    "ibrs_all":                       { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Enhanced IBRS always-on mode supported" },
-                    "rsba":                           { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "RSB may use return predictions from outside the RSB" },
-                    "l1dflush_no":                    { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to L1D flush side-channel" },
-                    "ssb_no":                         { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass" },
-                    "mds_no":                         { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to MDS" },
-                    "taa_no":                         { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to TSX Asynchronous Abort" },
-                    "pschange_msc_no":                { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Page-size-change MSC not susceptible" },
-                    "tsx_ctrl_msr":                   { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "TSX_CTRL MSR is present" },
-                    "tsx_ctrl_rtm_disable":           { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "RTM disabled via TSX_CTRL" },
-                    "tsx_ctrl_cpuid_clear":           { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "CPUID HLE/RTM bits cleared via TSX_CTRL" },
-                    "gds_ctrl":                       { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "GDS_CTRL MSR present" },
-                    "gds_no":                         { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to Gather Data Sampling" },
-                    "gds_mitg_dis":                   { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "GDS mitigation disabled" },
-                    "gds_mitg_lock":                  { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "GDS mitigation locked" },
-                    "rfds_no":                        { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to Register File Data Sampling" },
-                    "rfds_clear":                     { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "VERW clears register file stale data" },
-                    "its_no":                         { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to Indirect Target Selection" },
-                    "sbdr_ssdp_no":                   { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to SBDR/SSDP" },
-                    "fbsdp_no":                       { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to FBSDP" },
-                    "psdp_no":                        { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to PSDP" },
-                    "fb_clear":                       { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Fill buffer cleared on idle/C6" },
-                    "rtm":                            { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Restricted Transactional Memory (TSX RTM) present" },
-                    "tsx_force_abort":                { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "TSX_FORCE_ABORT MSR present" },
-                    "tsx_force_abort_rtm_disable":    { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "RTM disabled via TSX_FORCE_ABORT" },
-                    "tsx_force_abort_cpuid_clear":    { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "CPUID RTM cleared via TSX_FORCE_ABORT" },
-                    "sgx":                            { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Software Guard Extensions present" },
-                    "srbds":                          { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "SRBDS affected" },
-                    "srbds_on":                       { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "SRBDS mitigation active" },
-                    "amd_ssb_no":                     { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "AMD: not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass" },
-                    "hygon_ssb_no":                   { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Hygon: not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass" },
-                    "ipred":                          { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Indirect Predictor Barrier support" },
-                    "rrsba":                          { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Restricted RSB Alternate (Intel Retbleed mitigation)" },
-                    "bhi":                            { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Branch History Injection mitigation support" },
-                    "tsa_sq_no":                      { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to TSA-SQ" },
-                    "tsa_l1_no":                      { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to TSA-L1" },
-                    "verw_clear":                     { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "VERW clears CPU buffers" },
-                    "autoibrs":                       { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "AMD AutoIBRS (equivalent to enhanced IBRS on Intel)" },
-                    "sbpb":                           { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Selective Branch Predictor Barrier (AMD Inception mitigation): true if PRED_CMD MSR SBPB bit write succeeded; false if write failed; null if not verifiable (non-root, CPUID error, or CPU does not report SBPB support)" },
-                    "avx2":                           { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "AVX2 supported (relevant to Downfall / GDS)" },
-                    "avx512":                         { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "AVX-512 supported (relevant to Downfall / GDS)" }
-                  }
-                }
-              }
-            }
-          }
-        },
-        {
-          "type": "object",
-          "description": "ARM CPU (ARM, Cavium, Phytium).",
-          "required": ["arch", "vendor", "friendly_name", "arm"],
-          "additionalProperties": false,
-          "properties": {
-            "arch": { "type": "string", "const": "arm" },
-            "vendor": {
-              "description": "CPU vendor string: 'ARM', 'CAVIUM', or 'PHYTIUM'.",
-              "type": ["string", "null"]
-            },
-            "friendly_name": {
-              "description": "Human-readable CPU model, e.g. 'ARM v8 model 0xd0b'.",
-              "type": ["string", "null"]
-            },
-            "arm": {
-              "type": "object",
-              "required": ["part_list", "arch_list", "capabilities"],
-              "additionalProperties": false,
-              "properties": {
-                "part_list": {
-                  "description": "Space-separated list of ARM part numbers detected across cores, e.g. '0xd0b 0xd05' (big.LITTLE).",
-                  "type": ["string", "null"]
-                },
-                "arch_list": {
-                  "description": "Space-separated list of ARM architecture levels detected across cores, e.g. '8 8'.",
-                  "type": ["string", "null"]
-                },
-                "capabilities": {
-                  "description": "ARM-specific CPU capability flags. Currently empty; reserved for future use.",
-                  "type": "object",
-                  "additionalProperties": false,
-                  "properties": {}
-                }
-              }
-            }
-          }
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-
-    "cpu_microcode": {
-      "description": "Microcode version and firmware database status. Null under the same conditions as cpu.",
-      "type": ["object", "null"],
-      "required": [
-        "installed_version", "latest_version", "microcode_up_to_date",
-        "is_blacklisted", "message", "db_source", "db_info"
-      ],
-      "additionalProperties": false,
-      "properties": {
-        "installed_version": {
-          "description": "Currently running microcode revision as a hex string, e.g. '0xf4'. Null if unreadable.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"],
-          "pattern": "^0x[0-9a-f]+$"
-        },
-        "latest_version": {
-          "description": "Latest known-good microcode version from the firmware database, as a hex string. Null if the CPU is not in the database.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"],
-          "pattern": "^0x[0-9a-f]+$"
-        },
-        "microcode_up_to_date": {
-          "description": "True when installed_version equals latest_version. Null if either is unavailable.",
-          "type": ["boolean", "null"]
-        },
-        "is_blacklisted": {
-          "description": "True when the installed microcode is known to cause instability and must be rolled back immediately.",
-          "type": "boolean"
-        },
-        "message": {
-          "description": "Human-readable note from the firmware database (e.g. changelog excerpt). Null if absent.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"]
-        },
-        "db_source": {
-          "description": "Which firmware database was used, e.g. 'Intel-SA', 'MCExtractor'. Null if unavailable.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"]
-        },
-        "db_info": {
-          "description": "Firmware database revision or date string. Null if unavailable.",
-          "type": ["string", "null"]
-        }
-      }
-    },
-
-    "vulnerabilities": {
-      "description": "Array of CVE check results, one per checked CVE, in check order.",
-      "type": "array",
-      "items": {
-        "type": "object",
-        "required": [
-          "cve", "name", "aliases", "cpu_affected",
-          "status", "vulnerable", "info",
-          "sysfs_status", "sysfs_message"
-        ],
-        "additionalProperties": false,
-        "properties": {
-          "cve": {
-            "description": "CVE identifier, e.g. 'CVE-2017-5753'. May be 'CVE-0000-0001' for non-CVE checks such as SLS.",
-            "type": "string",
-            "pattern": "^CVE-[0-9]{4}-[0-9]+$"
-          },
-          "name": {
-            "description": "Short key name used across batch formats, e.g. 'SPECTRE VARIANT 1'.",
-            "type": "string"
-          },
-          "aliases": {
-            "description": "Full name including all known aliases, e.g. 'Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass'. Null if not in the registry.",
-            "type": ["string", "null"]
-          },
-          "cpu_affected": {
-            "description": "Whether this CPU's hardware design is affected by this CVE. False when hardware is architecturally immune.",
-            "type": "boolean"
-          },
-          "status": {
-            "description": "Check outcome: 'OK'=not vulnerable or unaffected, 'VULN'=vulnerable, 'UNK'=could not determine.",
-            "type": "string",
-            "enum": ["OK", "VULN", "UNK"]
-          },
-          "vulnerable": {
-            "description": "Boolean encoding of status: false=OK, true=VULN, null=UNK.",
-            "type": ["boolean", "null"]
-          },
-          "info": {
-            "description": "Human-readable description of the specific mitigation state or reason for the verdict.",
-            "type": "string"
-          },
-          "sysfs_status": {
-            "description": "Status as reported by the kernel via /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/. Null if sysfs was not consulted for this CVE (older kernels, or CVE not tracked by the kernel).",
-            "type": ["string", "null"],
-            "enum": ["OK", "VULN", "UNK", null]
-          },
-          "sysfs_message": {
-            "description": "Raw text from the sysfs vulnerability file, e.g. 'Mitigation: PTI'. Null if sysfs was not consulted.",
-            "type": ["string", "null"]
-          }
-        }
-      }
-    }
-
-  }
-}

dist/doc/batch_nrpe.md

@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-# NRPE Output Format
-
-`--batch nrpe` produces output that conforms to the
-[Nagios Plugin Development Guidelines](https://nagios-plugins.org/doc/guidelines.html),
-making it directly consumable by Nagios, Icinga, Zabbix (via NRPE), and
-compatible monitoring stacks.
-
-```sh
-sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch nrpe
-```
-
-## Output structure
-
-The plugin emits one mandatory status line followed by optional long output:
-
-```
-STATUS: summary | checked=N vulnerable=N unknown=N
-NOTE: ...          ← context notes (when applicable)
-[CRITICAL] CVE-XXXX-YYYY (NAME): description
-[UNKNOWN]  CVE-XXXX-YYYY (NAME): description
-```
-
-### Line 1 (status line)
-
-Always present.  Parsed by every Nagios-compatible monitoring system.
-
-```
-STATUS: summary | perfdata
-```
-
-| Field | Values | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|
-| `STATUS` | `OK` / `CRITICAL` / `UNKNOWN` | Overall check outcome (see below) |
-| `summary` | human-readable string | Count and CVE IDs of affected checks |
-| `perfdata` | `checked=N vulnerable=N unknown=N` | Machine-readable counters for graphing |
-
-#### Status values
-
-| Status | Exit code | Condition |
-|---|---|---|
-| `OK` | `0` | All CVE checks passed |
-| `CRITICAL` | `2` | At least one CVE is vulnerable |
-| `UNKNOWN` | `3` | No VULN found, but at least one check is inconclusive **or** the script was not run as root and found apparent vulnerabilities (see below) |
-
-#### Summary format
-
-| Condition | Summary |
-|---|---|
-| All OK | `All N CVE checks passed` |
-| VULN only | `N/T CVE(s) vulnerable: CVE-A CVE-B ...` |
-| VULN + UNK | `N/T CVE(s) vulnerable: CVE-A CVE-B ..., M inconclusive` |
-| UNK only | `N/T CVE checks inconclusive` |
-| Non-root + VULN | `N/T CVE(s) appear vulnerable (unconfirmed, not root): CVE-A ...` |
-| Non-root + VULN + UNK | `N/T CVE(s) appear vulnerable (unconfirmed, not root): CVE-A ..., M inconclusive` |
-
-### Lines 2+ (long output)
-
-Shown in the detail/extended info view of most monitoring frontends.
-Never parsed by the monitoring core; safe to add or reorder.
-
-#### Context notes
-
-Printed before per-CVE details when applicable.  Notes are emitted in this
-order when more than one applies:
-
-| Note | Condition |
-|---|---|
-| `NOTE: paranoid mode active, stricter mitigation requirements applied` | `--paranoid` was used |
-| `NOTE: hypervisor host detected (reason); L1TF/MDS severity is elevated` | System is detected as a VM host (KVM, Xen, VMware…) |
-| `NOTE: not a hypervisor host` | System is confirmed not a VM host |
-| `NOTE: not running as root; MSR reads skipped, results may be incomplete` | Script ran without root privileges |
-
-When VMM detection did not run (e.g. `--no-hw`), neither the
-`hypervisor host detected` nor the `not a hypervisor host` note is printed.
-
-#### Per-CVE detail lines
-
-One line per non-OK CVE.  VULN entries (`[CRITICAL]`) appear before UNK
-entries (`[UNKNOWN]`); within each group the order follows the CVE registry.
-
-```
-[CRITICAL] CVE-XXXX-YYYY (SHORT NAME): mitigation status description
-[UNKNOWN]  CVE-XXXX-YYYY (SHORT NAME): reason check was inconclusive
-```
-
-## Exit codes
-
-| Code | Nagios meaning | Condition |
-|---|---|---|
-| `0` | OK | All checked CVEs are mitigated or hardware-unaffected |
-| `2` | CRITICAL | At least one CVE is vulnerable (script ran as root) |
-| `3` | UNKNOWN | At least one check inconclusive, or apparent VULN found without root |
-| `255` | - | Script error (bad arguments, unsupported platform) |
-
-Exit code `1` (WARNING) is not used; there is no "degraded but acceptable"
-state for CPU vulnerability mitigations.
-
-## Non-root behaviour
-
-Running without root privileges skips MSR reads and limits access to some
-kernel interfaces.  When the script finds apparent vulnerabilities without root:
-
-- The status word becomes `UNKNOWN` instead of `CRITICAL`
-- The exit code is `3` instead of `2`
-- The summary says `appear vulnerable (unconfirmed, not root)`
-- A `NOTE: not running as root` line is added to the long output
-
-**Recommendation:** always run with `sudo` for authoritative results.  A
-`CRITICAL` from a root-run scan is a confirmed vulnerability; an `UNKNOWN`
-from a non-root scan is a signal to investigate further.
-
-## Hypervisor hosts
-
-When `NOTE: hypervisor host detected` is present, L1TF (CVE-2018-3646) and
-MDS (CVE-2018-12126/12130/12127) carry significantly higher risk because
-they can be exploited across VM boundaries by a malicious guest.  Prioritise
-remediation on these hosts.
-
-## Examples
-
-**All mitigated (root):**
-```
-OK: All 31 CVE checks passed | checked=31 vulnerable=0 unknown=0
-NOTE: not a hypervisor host
-```
-Exit: `0`
-
-**Two CVEs vulnerable (root):**
-```
-CRITICAL: 2/31 CVE(s) vulnerable: CVE-2018-3615 CVE-2019-11135 | checked=31 vulnerable=2 unknown=0
-NOTE: not a hypervisor host
-[CRITICAL] CVE-2018-3615 (L1TF SGX): your CPU supports SGX and the microcode is not up to date
-[CRITICAL] CVE-2019-11135 (TAA): Your kernel doesn't support TAA mitigation, update it
-```
-Exit: `2`
-
-**Apparent vulnerabilities, non-root scan:**
-```
-UNKNOWN: 2/31 CVE(s) appear vulnerable (unconfirmed, not root): CVE-2018-3615 CVE-2019-11135 | checked=31 vulnerable=2 unknown=0
-NOTE: not a hypervisor host
-NOTE: not running as root; MSR reads skipped, results may be incomplete
-[CRITICAL] CVE-2018-3615 (L1TF SGX): your CPU supports SGX and the microcode is not up to date
-[CRITICAL] CVE-2019-11135 (TAA): Your kernel doesn't support TAA mitigation, update it
-```
-Exit: `3`
-
-**Inconclusive checks, paranoid mode, VMM host:**
-```
-UNKNOWN: 3/31 CVE checks inconclusive | checked=31 vulnerable=0 unknown=3
-NOTE: paranoid mode active, stricter mitigation requirements applied
-NOTE: hypervisor host detected (kvm); L1TF/MDS severity is elevated
-[UNKNOWN]  CVE-2018-3646 (L1TF VMM): SMT is enabled on a hypervisor host, not mitigated under paranoid mode
-```
-Exit: `3`

dist/doc/batch_prometheus.md

@@ -1,413 +0,0 @@
-# Prometheus Batch Mode
-
-`--batch prometheus` emits Prometheus text-format metrics that can be fed into any
-Prometheus-compatible monitoring stack. It is designed for **fleet-scale security
-monitoring**: run the script periodically on every host, push the output to a
-Prometheus Pushgateway (or drop it into a node_exporter textfile directory), then
-alert and dashboard from Prometheus/Grafana like any other infrastructure metric.
-
----
-
-## Quick start
-
-### Pushgateway (recommended for cron/batch fleet scans)
-
-```sh
-#!/bin/sh
-PUSHGATEWAY="http://pushgateway.internal:9091"
-INSTANCE=$(hostname -f)
-
-spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch prometheus \
-  | curl --silent --show-error --data-binary @- \
-    "${PUSHGATEWAY}/metrics/job/smc/instance/${INSTANCE}"
-```
-
-Run this as root via cron or a systemd timer on every host.  The Pushgateway
-retains the last pushed value, so Prometheus scrapes it on its own schedule.
-A stale-data alert (`smc_last_scan_timestamp_seconds`) catches hosts that stopped
-reporting.
-
-### node_exporter textfile collector
-
-```sh
-#!/bin/sh
-TEXTFILE_DIR="/var/lib/node_exporter/textfile_collector"
-TMP="${TEXTFILE_DIR}/smc.prom.$$"
-
-spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --batch prometheus > "$TMP"
-mv "$TMP" "${TEXTFILE_DIR}/smc.prom"
-```
-
-The atomic `mv` prevents node_exporter from reading a partially written file.
-node_exporter must be started with `--collector.textfile.directory` pointing at
-`TEXTFILE_DIR`.
-
----
-
-## Metric reference
-
-All metric names are prefixed `smc_` (spectre-meltdown-checker).  All metrics
-are **gauges**: they represent the state at the time of the scan, not a running
-counter.
-
----
-
-### `smc_build_info`
-
-Script metadata.  Always value `1`; all data is in labels.
-
-| Label | Values | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|
-| `version` | string | Script version (e.g. `25.30.0250400123`) |
-| `mode` | `live` / `no-runtime` / `no-hw` / `hw-only` | Operating mode (see below) |
-| `run_as_root` | `true` / `false` | Whether the script ran as root.  Non-root scans skip MSR reads and may miss mitigations |
-| `paranoid` | `true` / `false` | `--paranoid` mode: stricter criteria (e.g. requires SMT disabled) |
-| `sysfs_only` | `true` / `false` | `--sysfs-only` mode: only the kernel's own sysfs report was used, not independent detection |
-| `reduced_accuracy` | `true` / `false` | Kernel information was incomplete (no kernel image, config, or map); some checks may be less precise |
-| `mocked` | `true` / `false` | Debug/test mode: CPU values were overridden.  Results do **not** reflect the real system |
-
-**Example:**
-```
-smc_build_info{version="25.30.0250400123",mode="live",run_as_root="true",paranoid="false",sysfs_only="false",reduced_accuracy="false",mocked="false"} 1
-```
-
-**Important labels for fleet operators:**
-
-- `run_as_root="false"` means the scan was incomplete.  Treat those results as
-  lower confidence and alert separately.
-- `sysfs_only="true"` means the script trusted the kernel's self-report without
-  independent verification.  The kernel may be wrong about its own mitigation
-  status (known to happen on older kernels).
-- `paranoid="true"` raises the bar: a host with `paranoid="true"` and
-  `vulnerable_count=0` is held to a higher standard than one with `paranoid="false"`.
-  Do not compare counts across hosts with different `paranoid` values.
-- `mocked="true"` must never appear on a production host; if it does, the results
-  are fabricated and every downstream alert is unreliable.
-
----
-
-### `smc_system_info`
-
-Operating system and kernel metadata.  Always value `1`.
-
-Absent entirely when none of `kernel_release`, `kernel_arch`, or
-`hypervisor_host` can be determined (e.g. non-live mode with no VMM detection).
-Each label is emitted only when its value is known; missing labels are
-omitted rather than set to an empty string.
-
-| Label | Values | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|
-| `kernel_release` | string | Output of `uname -r`; emitted only in live mode |
-| `kernel_arch` | string | Output of `uname -m`; emitted only in live mode |
-| `hypervisor_host` | `true` / `false` | Whether this machine is detected as a hypervisor host (running KVM, Xen, VMware, etc.); absent when VMM detection did not run (e.g. `--no-hw`) |
-
-**Example:**
-```
-smc_system_info{kernel_release="5.15.0-100-generic",kernel_arch="x86_64",hypervisor_host="false"} 1
-```
-
-**`hypervisor_host`** materially changes the risk profile of several CVEs.
-L1TF (CVE-2018-3646) and MDS (CVE-2018-12126/12130/12127) are significantly more
-severe on hypervisor hosts because they can be exploited across VM boundaries by
-a malicious guest.  Always prioritise remediation on hosts where
-`hypervisor_host="true"`.
-
----
-
-### `smc_cpu_info`
-
-CPU hardware and microcode metadata.  Always value `1`.  Absent when `--no-hw`
-is used or when `--arch-prefix` is set (host CPU info is suppressed to avoid
-mixing with a different-arch target kernel).
-
-Common labels (always emitted when the data is available):
-
-| Label | Values | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|
-| `vendor` | string | CPU vendor (e.g. `GenuineIntel`, `AuthenticAMD`, `HygonGenuine`, `ARM`) |
-| `model` | string | CPU friendly name from `/proc/cpuinfo` |
-| `arch` | `x86` / `arm` | Architecture family; determines which arch-specific labels follow |
-| `smt` | `true` / `false` | Whether SMT (HyperThreading) is currently enabled; absent if undeterminable |
-| `microcode` | hex string | Installed microcode version (e.g. `0xf4`); absent if unreadable |
-| `microcode_latest` | hex string | Latest known-good microcode version from the firmware database; absent if the CPU is not in the database |
-| `microcode_up_to_date` | `true` / `false` | Whether `microcode == microcode_latest`; absent if either is unavailable |
-| `microcode_blacklisted` | `true` / `false` | Whether the installed microcode is known to cause problems and should be rolled back; emitted whenever `microcode` is emitted |
-
-x86-only labels (emitted when `arch="x86"`):
-
-| Label | Values | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|
-| `family` | integer string | CPU family number |
-| `model_id` | integer string | CPU model number |
-| `stepping` | integer string | CPU stepping number |
-| `cpuid` | hex string | Full CPUID value (e.g. `0x000906ed`) |
-| `codename` | string | Intel CPU codename (e.g. `Coffee Lake`); absent on AMD/Hygon |
-
-ARM-only labels (emitted when `arch="arm"`):
-
-| Label | Values | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|
-| `part_list` | string | Space-separated list of ARM part numbers across cores (e.g. `0xd0b 0xd05` on big.LITTLE) |
-| `arch_list` | string | Space-separated list of ARM architecture levels across cores (e.g. `8 8`) |
-
-**x86 example:**
-```
-smc_cpu_info{vendor="GenuineIntel",model="Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-9700K CPU @ 3.60GHz",arch="x86",family="6",model_id="158",stepping="13",cpuid="0x000906ed",codename="Coffee Lake",smt="true",microcode="0xf4",microcode_latest="0xf4",microcode_up_to_date="true",microcode_blacklisted="false"} 1
-```
-
-**ARM example:**
-```
-smc_cpu_info{vendor="ARM",model="ARM v8 model 0xd0b",arch="arm",part_list="0xd0b 0xd05",arch_list="8 8",smt="false"} 1
-```
-
-**Microcode labels:**
-
-- `microcode_up_to_date="false"` means a newer microcode is available in the
-  firmware database.  This does not necessarily mean the system is vulnerable
-  (the current microcode may still provide all required mitigations), but it
-  warrants investigation.
-- `microcode_blacklisted="true"` means the installed microcode is known to
-  cause system instability or incorrect behaviour and must be rolled back
-  immediately.  Treat this as a P1 incident.
-- `microcode_latest` may be absent if the CPU is not in the firmware database
-  (very new, very old, or exotic CPUs).
-
-**`smt`** affects the risk level of several CVEs (MDS, L1TF).  For those CVEs,
-full mitigation requires disabling SMT in addition to kernel and microcode updates.
-The script accounts for this in its status assessment; use this label to audit
-which hosts still have SMT enabled.
-
----
-
-### `smc_vulnerability_status`
-
-One time series per CVE.  The **numeric value** encodes the check result:
-
-| Value | Meaning |
-|---|---|
-| `0` | Not vulnerable (CPU is unaffected by design, or all required mitigations are in place) |
-| `1` | Vulnerable (mitigations are missing or insufficient) |
-| `2` | Unknown (the script could not determine the status, e.g. due to missing kernel info or insufficient privileges) |
-
-| Label | Values | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|
-| `cve` | CVE ID string | The CVE identifier (e.g. `CVE-2017-5753`) |
-| `name` | string | Human-readable CVE name and aliases (e.g. `Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass`) |
-| `cpu_affected` | `true` / `false` | Whether this CPU's hardware design is concerned by this CVE |
-
-**Example:**
-```
-smc_vulnerability_status{cve="CVE-2017-5753",name="Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass",cpu_affected="true"} 0
-smc_vulnerability_status{cve="CVE-2017-5715",name="Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection",cpu_affected="true"} 1
-smc_vulnerability_status{cve="CVE-2022-29900",name="Retbleed, arbitrary speculative code execution with return instructions (AMD)",cpu_affected="false"} 0
-```
-
-**`cpu_affected` explained:**
-
-A value of `0` with `cpu_affected="false"` means the CPU hardware is architecturally
-immune to this CVE, no patch was needed or applied.
-
-A value of `0` with `cpu_affected="true"` means the CPU has the hardware weakness
-but all required mitigations (kernel, microcode, or both) are in place.
-
-This distinction is important when auditing a fleet: if you need to verify that
-all at-risk systems are patched, filter on `cpu_affected="true"` to exclude
-hardware-immune systems from the analysis.
-
----
-
-### `smc_vulnerable_count`
-
-Number of CVEs with status `1` (vulnerable) in this scan.  Value is `0` when
-no CVEs are vulnerable.
-
----
-
-### `smc_unknown_count`
-
-Number of CVEs with status `2` (unknown) in this scan.  A non-zero value
-typically means the scan lacked sufficient privileges or kernel information.
-Treat unknown the same as vulnerable for alerting purposes.
-
----
-
-### `smc_last_scan_timestamp_seconds`
-
-Unix timestamp (seconds since epoch) when the scan completed.  Use this to
-detect hosts that have stopped reporting.
-
----
-
-## Alerting rules
-
-```yaml
-groups:
-  - name: spectre_meltdown_checker
-    rules:
-
-      # Fire when any CVE is confirmed vulnerable
-      - alert: SMCVulnerable
-        expr: smc_vulnerable_count > 0
-        for: 0m
-        labels:
-          severity: critical
-        annotations:
-          summary: "{{ $labels.instance }} has {{ $value }} vulnerable CVE(s)"
-          description: >
-            Run spectre-meltdown-checker.sh interactively on {{ $labels.instance }}
-            for remediation guidance.
-
-      # Fire when status is unknown (usually means scan ran without root)
-      - alert: SMCUnknown
-        expr: smc_unknown_count > 0
-        for: 0m
-        labels:
-          severity: warning
-        annotations:
-          summary: "{{ $labels.instance }} has {{ $value }} CVE(s) with unknown status"
-          description: >
-            Ensure the checker runs as root on {{ $labels.instance }}.
-
-      # Fire when a host stops reporting (scan not run in 8 days)
-      - alert: SMCScanStale
-        expr: time() - smc_last_scan_timestamp_seconds > 8 * 86400
-        for: 0m
-        labels:
-          severity: warning
-        annotations:
-          summary: "{{ $labels.instance }} has not reported scan results in 8 days"
-
-      # Fire when installed microcode is known-bad
-      - alert: SMCMicrocodeBlacklisted
-        expr: smc_cpu_info{microcode_blacklisted="true"} == 1
-        for: 0m
-        labels:
-          severity: critical
-        annotations:
-          summary: "{{ $labels.instance }} is running blacklisted microcode"
-          description: >
-            The installed microcode ({{ $labels.microcode }}) is known to cause
-            instability.  Roll back to the previous version immediately.
-
-      # Fire when scan ran without root (results may be incomplete)
-      - alert: SMCScanNotRoot
-        expr: smc_build_info{run_as_root="false"} == 1
-        for: 0m
-        labels:
-          severity: warning
-        annotations:
-          summary: "{{ $labels.instance }} scan ran without root privileges"
-
-      # Fire when mocked data is detected on a production host
-      - alert: SMCScanMocked
-        expr: smc_build_info{mocked="true"} == 1
-        for: 0m
-        labels:
-          severity: critical
-        annotations:
-          summary: "{{ $labels.instance }} scan results are mocked and unreliable"
-```
-
----
-
-## Useful PromQL queries
-
-```promql
-# All vulnerable CVEs across the fleet
-smc_vulnerability_status == 1
-
-# Vulnerable CVEs on hosts that are also hypervisor hosts (highest priority)
-smc_vulnerability_status == 1
-  * on(instance) group_left(hypervisor_host)
-  smc_system_info{hypervisor_host="true"}
-
-# Vulnerable CVEs on affected CPUs only (excludes hardware-immune systems)
-smc_vulnerability_status{cpu_affected="true"} == 1
-
-# Fleet-wide: how many hosts are vulnerable to each CVE
-count by (cve, name) (smc_vulnerability_status == 1)
-
-# Hosts with outdated microcode, with CPU model context
-smc_cpu_info{microcode_up_to_date="false"}
-
-# Hosts with SMT still enabled (relevant for MDS/L1TF remediation)
-smc_cpu_info{smt="true"}
-
-# For a specific CVE: hosts affected by hardware but fully mitigated
-smc_vulnerability_status{cve="CVE-2018-3646", cpu_affected="true"} == 0
-
-# Proportion of fleet that is fully clean (no vulnerable, no unknown)
-(
-  count(smc_vulnerable_count == 0 and smc_unknown_count == 0)
-  /
-  count(smc_vulnerable_count >= 0)
-)
-
-# Hosts where scan ran without root, results less reliable
-smc_build_info{run_as_root="false"}
-
-# Hosts with sysfs_only mode, independent detection was skipped
-smc_build_info{sysfs_only="true"}
-
-# Vulnerable CVEs joined with kernel release for patch tracking
-smc_vulnerability_status == 1
-  * on(instance) group_left(kernel_release)
-  smc_system_info
-
-# Vulnerable CVEs joined with CPU model and microcode version
-smc_vulnerability_status == 1
-  * on(instance) group_left(vendor, model, microcode, microcode_up_to_date)
-  smc_cpu_info
-```
-
----
-
-## Caveats and edge cases
-
-**No-runtime mode (`--no-runtime`)**
-`smc_system_info` will have no `kernel_release` or `kernel_arch` labels (those
-come from `uname`, which reports the running kernel, not the inspected one).
-`mode="no-runtime"` in `smc_build_info` signals this.  No-runtime mode is
-primarily useful for pre-deployment auditing, not fleet runtime monitoring.
-
-**No-hardware mode (`--no-hw`)**
-`smc_cpu_info` is not emitted.  CPU and microcode labels are absent from all
-queries.  CVE checks that rely on hardware capability detection (`cap_*` flags,
-MSR reads) will report `unknown` status.  `mode="no-hw"` in `smc_build_info`
-signals this.
-
-**Cross-arch inspection (`--arch-prefix`)**
-When a cross-arch toolchain prefix is passed, the script suppresses the host
-CPU metadata so it does not get mixed with data from a different-arch target
-kernel: `smc_cpu_info` is not emitted, the same as under `--no-hw`.
-
-**Hardware-only mode (`--hw-only`)**
-Only hardware detection is performed; CVE checks are skipped.  `smc_cpu_info`
-is emitted but no `smc_vulnerability_status` metrics appear (and
-`smc_vulnerable_count` / `smc_unknown_count` are `0`).  `mode="hw-only"` in
-`smc_build_info` signals this.
-
-**`--sysfs-only`**
-The script trusts the kernel's sysfs report (`/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/`)
-without running its own independent detection.  Some older kernels are known to
-misreport their mitigation status.  `sysfs_only="true"` in `smc_build_info`
-flags this condition.  Do not use `--sysfs-only` for production fleet monitoring.
-
-**`--paranoid`**
-Enables defense-in-depth checks beyond the security community consensus (e.g.
-requires SMT to be disabled, IBPB always-on).  A host is only `vulnerable_count=0`
-under `paranoid` if it meets this higher bar.  Do not compare `vulnerable_count`
-across hosts with different `paranoid` values.
-
-**`reduced_accuracy`**
-Set when the kernel image, config file, or System.map could not be read.  Some
-checks fall back to weaker heuristics and may report `unknown` for CVEs that are
-actually mitigated.  This typically happens when the script runs without root or
-on a kernel with an inaccessible image.
-
-**Label stability**
-Prometheus identifies time series by their full label set.  If a script upgrade
-adds or renames a label (e.g. a new `smc_cpu_info` label is added for a new CVE),
-Prometheus will create a new time series and the old one will become stale.  Plan
-for this in long-retention dashboards by using `group_left` joins rather than
-hardcoding label matchers.

src/libs/001_core_header.sh

@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ trap 'exit_cleanup' EXIT
 trap 'pr_warn "interrupted, cleaning up..."; exit_cleanup; exit 1' INT
 # Clean up temporary files and undo module/mount side effects on exit
 exit_cleanup() {
-    local saved_ret=$?
+    local saved_ret
+    saved_ret=$?
     # cleanup the temp decompressed config & kernel image
     [ -n "${g_dumped_config:-}" ] && [ -f "$g_dumped_config" ] && rm -f "$g_dumped_config"
     [ -n "${g_kerneltmp:-}" ] && [ -f "$g_kerneltmp" ] && rm -f "$g_kerneltmp"

src/libs/002_core_globals.sh

@@ -3,63 +3,64 @@
 show_usage() {
     # shellcheck disable=SC2086
     cat <<EOF
+	Usage:
+		Live mode (auto):   $(basename $0) [options]
+		Live mode (manual): $(basename $0) [options] <[--kernel <kimage>] [--config <kconfig>] [--map <mapfile>]> --live
+		Offline mode:       $(basename $0) [options] <[--kernel <kimage>] [--config <kconfig>] [--map <mapfile>]>
+
 	Modes:
-		* Live mode:          $(basename $0) [options] [--kernel <kimage>] [--config <kconfig>] [--map <mapfile>]
-			Inspect the currently running kernel within the context of the CPU it's running on.
-			You can optionally specify --kernel, --config, or --map to help the script locate files it couldn't auto-detect
+		Two modes are available.
 
-		* No-runtime mode:    $(basename $0) [options] --no-runtime <--kernel <kimage>> [--config <kconfig>] [--map <mapfile>]
-			Inspect the CPU hardware, but skips all running-kernel artifacts (/sys, /proc, dmesg).
-			Use this when you have a kernel image different from the kernel you're running but want to check it against this CPU.
+		First mode is the "live" mode (default), it does its best to find information about the currently running kernel.
+		To run under this mode, just start the script without any option (you can also use --live explicitly)
 
-		* No-hardware mode:   $(basename $0) [options] --no-hw <--kernel <kimage>> [--config <kconfig>] [--map <mapfile>]
-			Ignore both CPU hardware and running-kernel artifacts. Use this for pure static analysis of a kernel image,
-			for example when inspecting a kernel targeted for another system or CPU.
+		Second mode is the "offline" mode, where you can inspect a non-running kernel.
+		This mode is automatically enabled when you specify the location of the kernel file, config and System.map files:
 
-		* Hardware-only mode: $(basename $0) [options] --hw-only
-			Only inspect the CPU hardware, and report information and affectedness per vulnerability.
+		--kernel kernel_file	specify a (possibly compressed) Linux or BSD kernel file
+		--config kernel_config	specify a kernel config file (Linux only)
+		--map kernel_map_file	specify a kernel System.map file (Linux only)
 
-	Vulnerability selection:
-		--variant VARIANT	specify which variant you'd like to check, by default all variants are checked.
-					can be used multiple times (e.g. --variant 3a --variant l1tf). For a list use 'help'.
-		--cve CVE		specify which CVE you'd like to check, by default all supported CVEs are checked
-					can be used multiple times (e.g. --cve CVE-2017-5753 --cve CVE-2020-0543)
-		--errata NUMBER		specify a vendor-numbered erratum (e.g. ARM64 erratum 1530923) that has no CVE
-					assigned. Maps the erratum to the corresponding check. For a list use 'help'.
-					Can be used multiple times (e.g. --errata 1530923 --errata 3194386).
+		If you want to use live mode while specifying the location of the kernel, config or map file yourself,
+		you can add --live to the above options, to tell the script to run in live mode instead of the offline mode,
+		which is enabled by default when at least one file is specified on the command line.
 
-	Check scope:
-		--no-sysfs		don't use the /sys interface even if present [Linux]
-		--sysfs-only		only use the /sys interface, don't run our own checks [Linux]
-
-	Strictness:
+	Options:
+		--no-color		don't use color codes
+		--verbose, -v		increase verbosity level, possibly several times
+		--explain		produce an additional human-readable explanation of actions to take to mitigate a vulnerability
 		--paranoid		require all mitigations to be enabled to the fullest extent, including those that
 					are not strictly necessary but provide defense in depth (e.g. SMT disabled, IBPB
 					always-on); without this flag, the script follows the security community consensus
 		--extra			run additional checks for issues that don't have a CVE but are still security-relevant,
 					such as compile-time mitigations not enabled by default (e.g. Straight-Line Speculation)
 
-	Hardware and platform:
-		--cpu [#,all]		interact with CPUID and MSR of CPU core number #, or all (default: CPU core 0)
-		--vmm [auto,yes,no]	override the detection of the presence of a hypervisor, default: auto
-		--allow-msr-write	allow probing for write-only MSRs, this might produce kernel logs or be blocked by your system
-		--arch-prefix PREFIX	specify a prefix for cross-inspecting a kernel of a different arch, for example "aarch64-linux-gnu-",
-					so that invoked tools will be prefixed with this (i.e. aarch64-linux-gnu-objdump)
+		--no-sysfs		don't use the /sys interface even if present [Linux]
+		--sysfs-only		only use the /sys interface, don't run our own checks [Linux]
 		--coreos		special mode for CoreOS (use an ephemeral toolbox to inspect kernel) [Linux]
 
-	Output:
-		--batch FORMAT		produce machine readable output; FORMAT is one of:
-					text (default), short, json, json-terse, nrpe, prometheus
-		--no-color		don't use color codes
-		--verbose, -v		increase verbosity level, possibly several times
-		--explain		produce an additional human-readable explanation of actions to take to mitigate a vulnerability
+		--arch-prefix PREFIX	specify a prefix for cross-inspecting a kernel of a different arch, for example "aarch64-linux-gnu-",
+					so that invoked tools will be prefixed with this (i.e. aarch64-linux-gnu-objdump)
+		--batch text		produce machine readable output, this is the default if --batch is specified alone
+		--batch short		produce only one line with the vulnerabilities separated by spaces
+		--batch json		produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef...
+		--batch nrpe		produce machine readable output formatted for NRPE
+		--batch prometheus      produce output for consumption by prometheus-node-exporter
 
-	Firmware database:
+		--variant VARIANT	specify which variant you'd like to check, by default all variants are checked.
+					can be used multiple times (e.g. --variant 3a --variant l1tf)
+					for a list of supported VARIANT parameters, use --variant help
+		--cve CVE		specify which CVE you'd like to check, by default all supported CVEs are checked
+					can be used multiple times (e.g. --cve CVE-2017-5753 --cve CVE-2020-0543)
+		--hw-only		only check for CPU information, don't check for any variant
+		--no-hw			skip CPU information and checks, if you're inspecting a kernel not to be run on this host
+		--vmm [auto,yes,no]	override the detection of the presence of a hypervisor, default: auto
+		--no-intel-db		don't use the builtin Intel DB of affected processors
+		--allow-msr-write	allow probing for write-only MSRs, this might produce kernel logs or be blocked by your system
+		--cpu [#,all]		interact with CPUID and MSR of CPU core number #, or all (default: CPU core 0)
 		--update-fwdb		update our local copy of the CPU microcodes versions database (using the awesome
 					MCExtractor project and the Intel firmwares GitHub repository)
 		--update-builtin-fwdb	same as --update-fwdb but update builtin DB inside the script itself
-
-	Debug:
 		--dump-mock-data	used to mimick a CPU on an other system, mainly used to help debugging this script
 
 	Return codes:
@@ -111,7 +112,7 @@ g_os=$(uname -s)
 opt_kernel=''
 opt_config=''
 opt_map=''
-opt_runtime=1
+opt_live=-1
 opt_no_color=0
 opt_batch=0
 opt_batch_format='text'
@@ -128,88 +129,50 @@ opt_vmm=-1
 opt_allow_msr_write=0
 opt_cpu=0
 opt_explain=0
-# Canonical run mode, set at the end of option parsing.
-# Values: live, no-runtime, no-hw, hw-only
-g_mode='live'
-
-# Return 0 (true) if runtime state is accessible (procfs, sysfs, dmesg, debugfs).
-# True in live and hw-only modes; false in no-runtime and no-hw modes.
-has_runtime() { [ "$g_mode" = live ] || [ "$g_mode" = hw-only ]; }
 opt_paranoid=0
 opt_extra=0
 opt_mock=0
+opt_intel_db=1
 
 g_critical=0
 g_unknown=0
-g_nrpe_total=0
-g_nrpe_vuln_count=0
-g_nrpe_unk_count=0
-g_nrpe_vuln_ids=''
-g_nrpe_vuln_details=''
-g_nrpe_unk_details=''
-g_smc_vuln_output=''
-g_smc_ok_count=0
-g_smc_vuln_count=0
-g_smc_unk_count=0
-g_smc_system_info_line=''
-g_smc_cpu_info_line=''
+g_nrpe_vuln=''
 
 # CVE Registry: single source of truth for all CVE metadata.
-# Fields: cve_id|json_key_name|affected_var_suffix|complete_name_and_aliases|arch
-#
-# The optional `arch` field gates whether the check is run at all, based on the
-# host CPU architecture and the inspected kernel architecture. Values:
-#   x86      - only relevant when host CPU or inspected kernel is x86/amd64
-#   arm      - only relevant when host CPU or inspected kernel is ARM/ARM64
-#   (empty)  - always relevant (shared logic across architectures, e.g. Spectre V1-V4)
-# The gate only applies to default "all CVEs" runs; explicit --cve/--variant/--errata
-# selection bypasses it (if the user asks for it, they get it regardless of arch).
-#
-# Three ranges of placeholder IDs are reserved when no real CVE applies:
-#   CVE-0000-NNNN: permanent placeholder for supplementary checks (--extra only)
-#                  that will never receive a real CVE (e.g. SLS, compile-time hardening).
-#   CVE-0001-NNNN: permanent placeholder for vendor-numbered errata that will never
-#                  receive a CVE (e.g. ARM64 silicon errata tracked only by erratum ID).
-#                  Selectable via --errata <number>.
-#   CVE-9999-NNNN: temporary placeholder for real vulnerabilities awaiting CVE
-#                  assignment. Rename across the codebase once the real CVE is issued.
+# Fields: cve_id|json_key_name|affected_var_suffix|complete_name_and_aliases
 readonly CVE_REGISTRY='
-CVE-2017-5753|SPECTRE VARIANT 1|variant1|Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass|
-CVE-2017-5715|SPECTRE VARIANT 2|variant2|Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection|
-CVE-2017-5754|MELTDOWN|variant3|Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load|
-CVE-2018-3640|VARIANT 3A|variant3a|Variant 3a, rogue system register read|
-CVE-2018-3639|VARIANT 4|variant4|Variant 4, speculative store bypass|
-CVE-2018-3615|L1TF SGX|variantl1tf_sgx|Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault|x86
-CVE-2018-3620|L1TF OS|variantl1tf|Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault|x86
-CVE-2018-3646|L1TF VMM|variantl1tf|Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault|x86
-CVE-2018-12126|MSBDS|msbds|Fallout, microarchitectural store buffer data sampling (MSBDS)|x86
-CVE-2018-12130|MFBDS|mfbds|ZombieLoad, microarchitectural fill buffer data sampling (MFBDS)|x86
-CVE-2018-12127|MLPDS|mlpds|RIDL, microarchitectural load port data sampling (MLPDS)|x86
-CVE-2019-11091|MDSUM|mdsum|RIDL, microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable memory (MDSUM)|x86
-CVE-2019-11135|TAA|taa|ZombieLoad V2, TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA)|x86
-CVE-2018-12207|ITLBMH|itlbmh|No eXcuses, iTLB Multihit, machine check exception on page size changes (MCEPSC)|x86
-CVE-2020-0543|SRBDS|srbds|Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)|x86
-CVE-2022-21123|SBDR|mmio|Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR), MMIO Stale Data|x86
-CVE-2022-21125|SBDS|mmio|Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), MMIO Stale Data|x86
-CVE-2022-21166|DRPW|mmio|Device Register Partial Write (DRPW), MMIO Stale Data|x86
-CVE-2023-20588|DIV0|div0|Division by Zero, AMD Zen1 speculative data leak|x86
-CVE-2023-20593|ZENBLEED|zenbleed|Zenbleed, cross-process information leak|x86
-CVE-2022-40982|DOWNFALL|downfall|Downfall, gather data sampling (GDS)|x86
-CVE-2022-29900|RETBLEED AMD|retbleed|Retbleed, arbitrary speculative code execution with return instructions (AMD)|x86
-CVE-2022-29901|RETBLEED INTEL|retbleed|Retbleed, arbitrary speculative code execution with return instructions (Intel)|x86
-CVE-2023-20569|INCEPTION|inception|Inception, return address security (RAS)|x86
-CVE-2023-23583|REPTAR|reptar|Reptar, redundant prefix issue|x86
-CVE-2024-36350|TSA_SQ|tsa|Transient Scheduler Attack - Store Queue (TSA-SQ)|x86
-CVE-2024-36357|TSA_L1|tsa|Transient Scheduler Attack - L1 (TSA-L1)|x86
-CVE-2024-28956|ITS|its|Indirect Target Selection (ITS)|x86
-CVE-2025-40300|VMSCAPE|vmscape|VMScape, VM-exit stale branch prediction|x86
-CVE-2023-28746|RFDS|rfds|Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)|x86
-CVE-2024-45332|BPI|bpi|Branch Privilege Injection (BPI)|x86
-CVE-0000-0001|SLS|sls|Straight-Line Speculation (SLS)|
-CVE-2025-54505|FPDSS|fpdss|FPDSS, AMD Zen1 Floating-Point Divider Stale Data Leak|x86
-CVE-0001-0001|ARM SPEC AT|arm_spec_at|ARM64 errata 1165522/1319367/1319537/1530923, Speculative AT TLB corruption|arm
-CVE-0001-0002|ARM SPEC UNPRIV LOAD|arm_spec_unpriv_load|ARM64 errata 2966298/3117295, Speculative unprivileged load|arm
-CVE-0001-0003|ARM SSBS NOSYNC|arm_ssbs_nosync|ARM64 erratum 3194386, MSR SSBS not self-synchronizing|arm
+CVE-2017-5753|SPECTRE VARIANT 1|variant1|Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass
+CVE-2017-5715|SPECTRE VARIANT 2|variant2|Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection
+CVE-2017-5754|MELTDOWN|variant3|Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load
+CVE-2018-3640|VARIANT 3A|variant3a|Variant 3a, rogue system register read
+CVE-2018-3639|VARIANT 4|variant4|Variant 4, speculative store bypass
+CVE-2018-3615|L1TF SGX|variantl1tf_sgx|Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault
+CVE-2018-3620|L1TF OS|variantl1tf|Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault
+CVE-2018-3646|L1TF VMM|variantl1tf|Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault
+CVE-2018-12126|MSBDS|msbds|Fallout, microarchitectural store buffer data sampling (MSBDS)
+CVE-2018-12130|MFBDS|mfbds|ZombieLoad, microarchitectural fill buffer data sampling (MFBDS)
+CVE-2018-12127|MLPDS|mlpds|RIDL, microarchitectural load port data sampling (MLPDS)
+CVE-2019-11091|MDSUM|mdsum|RIDL, microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable memory (MDSUM)
+CVE-2019-11135|TAA|taa|ZombieLoad V2, TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA)
+CVE-2018-12207|ITLBMH|itlbmh|No eXcuses, iTLB Multihit, machine check exception on page size changes (MCEPSC)
+CVE-2020-0543|SRBDS|srbds|Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)
+CVE-2022-21123|SBDR|mmio|Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR), MMIO Stale Data
+CVE-2022-21125|SBDS|mmio|Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), MMIO Stale Data
+CVE-2022-21166|DRPW|mmio|Device Register Partial Write (DRPW), MMIO Stale Data
+CVE-2023-20588|DIV0|div0|Division by Zero, AMD Zen1 speculative data leak
+CVE-2023-20593|ZENBLEED|zenbleed|Zenbleed, cross-process information leak
+CVE-2022-40982|DOWNFALL|downfall|Downfall, gather data sampling (GDS)
+CVE-2022-29900|RETBLEED AMD|retbleed|Retbleed, arbitrary speculative code execution with return instructions (AMD)
+CVE-2022-29901|RETBLEED INTEL|retbleed|Retbleed, arbitrary speculative code execution with return instructions (Intel)
+CVE-2023-20569|INCEPTION|inception|Inception, return address security (RAS)
+CVE-2023-23583|REPTAR|reptar|Reptar, redundant prefix issue
+CVE-2024-36350|TSA_SQ|tsa|Transient Scheduler Attack - Store Queue (TSA-SQ)
+CVE-2024-36357|TSA_L1|tsa|Transient Scheduler Attack - L1 (TSA-L1)
+CVE-2024-28956|ITS|its|Indirect Target Selection (ITS)
+CVE-2025-40300|VMSCAPE|vmscape|VMScape, VM-exit stale branch prediction
+CVE-2023-28746|RFDS|rfds|Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)
+CVE-2024-45332|BPI|bpi|Branch Privilege Injection (BPI)
+CVE-0000-0001|SLS|sls|Straight-Line Speculation (SLS)
 '
 
 # Derive the supported CVE list from the registry

src/libs/200_cpu_affected.sh

@@ -27,36 +27,6 @@ _infer_immune() { eval "[ -z \"\$affected_$1\" ] && affected_$1=1 || :"; }
 # Use for: family-level catch-all fallbacks (Intel L1TF non-whitelist, itlbmh non-whitelist).
 _infer_vuln() { eval "[ -z \"\$affected_$1\" ] && affected_$1=0 || :"; }
 
-# Return 0 (true) if a CVE's arch tag matches the current context (host CPU
-# and/or target kernel), so the check is worth running. Untagged CVEs are
-# always relevant.
-# - In no-hw mode the host CPU is ignored: gate only on target kernel arch.
-# - Otherwise a match on either the host CPU or the target kernel is enough
-#   (they normally agree in live mode; if they disagree, check_kernel_cpu_arch_mismatch
-#    has already forced no-hw, handled by the branch above).
-# Args: $1=cve_id
-# Callers: src/main.sh (CVE dispatch loop), check_cpu_vulnerabilities
-_is_cve_relevant_arch() {
-    local arch
-    arch=$(_cve_registry_field "$1" 5)
-    # Untagged CVE: always relevant
-    [ -z "$arch" ] && return 0
-    case "$arch" in
-        x86)
-            [ "$g_mode" != no-hw ] && is_x86_cpu && return 0
-            is_x86_kernel && return 0
-            return 1
-            ;;
-        arm)
-            [ "$g_mode" != no-hw ] && is_arm_cpu && return 0
-            is_arm_kernel && return 0
-            return 1
-            ;;
-    esac
-    # Unknown tag value: don't gate (fail open)
-    return 0
-}
-
 # Return the cached affected_* status for a given CVE
 # Args: $1=cve_id
 # Returns: 0 if affected, 1 if not affected
@@ -136,13 +106,8 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
     affected_srbds=''
     affected_mmio=''
     affected_sls=''
-    # ARM64 speculation-related errata (ARM Ltd, implementer 0x41); non-ARM systems are immune below.
-    affected_arm_spec_at=''
-    affected_arm_spec_unpriv_load=''
-    affected_arm_ssbs_nosync=''
-    # DIV0, FPDSS, Zenbleed and Inception are all AMD specific, look for "is_amd" below:
+    # DIV0, Zenbleed and Inception are all AMD specific, look for "is_amd" below:
     _set_immune div0
-    _set_immune fpdss
     _set_immune zenbleed
     _set_immune inception
     # TSA is AMD specific (Zen 3/4), look for "is_amd" below:
@@ -640,23 +605,13 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
         fi
         _set_immune variantl1tf
 
-        # DIV0 (Zen1/Zen+)
+        # DIV0 (Zen1 only)
         # 77245f1c3c64 (v6.5, initial model list): family 0x17 models 0x00-0x2f, 0x50-0x5f
-        # bfff3c6692ce (v6.8): moved to init_amd_zen1(), unconditional for all ZEN1-flagged CPUs
-        # The kernel's X86_FEATURE_ZEN1 covers family 0x17 models 0x00-0x2f and 0x50-0x5f,
-        # which spans both Zen1 (Summit Ridge, Naples, Raven Ridge, Snowy Owl) and Zen+
-        # (Pinnacle Ridge, Picasso, Dali, Colfax) products -- all using the same divider silicon.
+        # bfff3c6692ce (v6.8): moved to init_amd_zen1(), unconditional for all Zen1
+        # All Zen1 CPUs are family 0x17, models 0x00-0x2f and 0x50-0x5f
         amd_legacy_erratum "$(amd_model_range 0x17 0x00 0x0 0x2f 0xf)" && _set_vuln div0
         amd_legacy_erratum "$(amd_model_range 0x17 0x50 0x0 0x5f 0xf)" && _set_vuln div0
 
-        # FPDSS: same Zen1/Zen+ cohort as DIV0 (both applied unconditionally in init_amd_zen1()).
-        # e55d98e77561 (v7.1): unconditional in init_amd_zen1(); CVE-2025-54505 / AMD-SB-7053.
-        # AMD-SB-7053 only enumerates a subset (EPYC 7001, EPYC Embedded 3000, Athlon/Ryzen 3000
-        # with Radeon, Ryzen PRO 3000 with Radeon Vega), but the kernel mitigates the full
-        # ZEN1 cohort, so we flag all of it to match the kernel's behavior.
-        # shellcheck disable=SC2154
-        [ "$affected_div0" = 0 ] && _set_vuln fpdss
-
         # Zenbleed
         amd_legacy_erratum "$(amd_model_range 0x17 0x30 0x0 0x4f 0xf)" && _set_vuln zenbleed
         amd_legacy_erratum "$(amd_model_range 0x17 0x60 0x0 0x7f 0xf)" && _set_vuln zenbleed
@@ -861,85 +816,13 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
         _infer_immune sls
     fi
 
-    # ARM64 silicon errata (speculation/security-relevant, no CVE assignments).
-    # References: arch/arm64/Kconfig (ARM64_ERRATUM_*), arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c MIDR lists.
-    # Iterates per-core (impl, part, variant, revision) tuples. Implementers currently handled:
-    #   0x41 ARM Ltd; 0x51 Qualcomm (Kryo4xx Silver for erratum 1530923).
-    # Revision ranges mirror the kernel's MIDR_RANGE/MIDR_REV_RANGE/MIDR_REV macros. A variant
-    # 'v' and revision 'p' are packed as (v<<4)|p for range compares — equivalent to the kernel's
-    # layout (MIDR_VARIANT_SHIFT=20, MIDR_REVISION_MASK=0xf) under the same order semantics.
-    # Unknown variant/revision ⇒ treat as in range (whitelist principle, DEVELOPMENT.md rule 5).
-    if [ -n "$cpu_part_list" ]; then
-        i=0
-        for cpupart in $cpu_part_list; do
-            i=$((i + 1))
-            # shellcheck disable=SC2086
-            cpuimpl=$(echo $cpu_impl_list | awk '{print $'$i'}')
-            # shellcheck disable=SC2086
-            cpuvar=$(echo $cpu_variant_list | awk '{print $'$i'}')
-            # shellcheck disable=SC2086
-            cpurev=$(echo $cpu_revision_list | awk '{print $'$i'}')
-            packed=''
-            [ -n "$cpuvar" ] && [ -n "$cpurev" ] && packed=$(((cpuvar << 4) | cpurev))
-
-            # Speculative AT TLB corruption (errata 1165522, 1319367, 1319537, 1530923)
-            if [ "$cpuimpl" = 0x41 ]; then
-                if echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xd07 -e 0xd08; then
-                    # Cortex-A57 (0xd07) / A72 (0xd08): all revisions
-                    _set_vuln arm_spec_at
-                elif echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xd05 -e 0xd0b; then
-                    # Cortex-A55 (0xd05) / A76 (0xd0b): r0p0..r2p0  (packed 0..32)
-                    if [ -z "$packed" ] || [ "$packed" -le 32 ]; then
-                        _set_vuln arm_spec_at
-                    fi
-                fi
-            elif [ "$cpuimpl" = 0x51 ] && [ "$cpupart" = 0x805 ]; then
-                # Qualcomm Kryo4xx Silver: kernel matches MIDR_REV(var 0xd, rev 0xe) only — packed 0xde = 222
-                if [ -z "$packed" ] || [ "$packed" = 222 ]; then
-                    _set_vuln arm_spec_at
-                fi
-            fi
-
-            # Speculative unprivileged load (errata 2966298 A520, 3117295 A510) — ARM Ltd only
-            if [ "$cpuimpl" = 0x41 ]; then
-                if [ "$cpupart" = 0xd46 ]; then
-                    # Cortex-A510: all revisions
-                    _set_vuln arm_spec_unpriv_load
-                elif [ "$cpupart" = 0xd80 ]; then
-                    # Cortex-A520: r0p0..r0p1  (packed 0..1)
-                    if [ -z "$packed" ] || [ "$packed" -le 1 ]; then
-                        _set_vuln arm_spec_unpriv_load
-                    fi
-                fi
-            fi
-
-            # MSR SSBS not self-synchronizing (erratum 3194386 + siblings) — ARM Ltd only, all revisions.
-            # A76/A77/A78/A78C/A710/A715/A720/A720AE/A725, X1/X1C/X2/X3/X4/X925, N1/N2/N3, V1/V2/V3/V3AE
-            if [ "$cpuimpl" = 0x41 ]; then
-                if echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w \
-                    -e 0xd0b -e 0xd0d -e 0xd41 -e 0xd4b \
-                    -e 0xd47 -e 0xd4d -e 0xd81 -e 0xd89 -e 0xd87 \
-                    -e 0xd44 -e 0xd4c -e 0xd48 -e 0xd4e -e 0xd82 -e 0xd85 \
-                    -e 0xd0c -e 0xd49 -e 0xd8e \
-                    -e 0xd40 -e 0xd4f -e 0xd84 -e 0xd83; then
-                    _set_vuln arm_ssbs_nosync
-                fi
-            fi
-        done
-    fi
-    # Default everything else to immune (covers non-ARM, and ARM cores not in the affected lists)
-    _infer_immune arm_spec_at
-    _infer_immune arm_spec_unpriv_load
-    _infer_immune arm_ssbs_nosync
-
     # shellcheck disable=SC2154
     {
         pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: variant1=$affected_variant1 variant2=$affected_variant2 variant3=$affected_variant3 variant3a=$affected_variant3a"
         pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: variant4=$affected_variant4 variantl1tf=$affected_variantl1tf msbds=$affected_msbds mfbds=$affected_mfbds"
         pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: mlpds=$affected_mlpds mdsum=$affected_mdsum taa=$affected_taa itlbmh=$affected_itlbmh srbds=$affected_srbds"
-        pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: div0=$affected_div0 fpdss=$affected_fpdss zenbleed=$affected_zenbleed inception=$affected_inception retbleed=$affected_retbleed tsa=$affected_tsa downfall=$affected_downfall reptar=$affected_reptar rfds=$affected_rfds its=$affected_its"
+        pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: div0=$affected_div0 zenbleed=$affected_zenbleed inception=$affected_inception retbleed=$affected_retbleed tsa=$affected_tsa downfall=$affected_downfall reptar=$affected_reptar rfds=$affected_rfds its=$affected_its"
         pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: vmscape=$affected_vmscape bpi=$affected_bpi sls=$affected_sls mmio=$affected_mmio"
-        pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: arm_spec_at=$affected_arm_spec_at arm_spec_unpriv_load=$affected_arm_spec_unpriv_load arm_ssbs_nosync=$affected_arm_ssbs_nosync"
     }
     affected_variantl1tf_sgx="$affected_variantl1tf"
     # even if we are affected to L1TF, if there's no SGX, we're not affected to the original foreshadow

src/libs/210_cpu_detect.sh

@@ -187,76 +187,58 @@ is_cpu_srbds_free() {
 
 }
 
-# Check whether the CPU is architecturally immune to MMIO Stale Data
-# Mirrors the kernel's arch_cap_mmio_immune() helper: ALL THREE ARCH_CAP bits must be set:
-#   ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO (bit 13), ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO (bit 14), ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO (bit 15)
-# Returns: 0 if immune, 1 otherwise
-is_arch_cap_mmio_immune() {
-    [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_fbsdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_psdp_no" = 1 ]
-}
-
 # Check whether the CPU is known to be unaffected by MMIO Stale Data (CVE-2022-21123/21125/21166)
-# Matches the kernel's NO_MMIO whitelist plus arch_cap_mmio_immune().
-# Model inventory and kernel-commit history are documented in check_mmio_linux().
 # Returns: 0 if MMIO-free, 1 if affected or unknown
 is_cpu_mmio_free() {
+    # source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+    #
+    # CPU affection logic from kernel (51802186158c, v5.19):
+    #   Bug is set when: cpu_matches(blacklist, MMIO) AND NOT arch_cap_mmio_immune()
+    #   arch_cap_mmio_immune() requires ALL THREE bits set:
+    #     ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO (bit 14) AND ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO (bit 15) AND ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO (bit 13)
+    #
+    # Intel Family 6 model blacklist (unchanged since v5.19):
+    #   HASWELL_X (0x3F)
+    #   BROADWELL_D (0x56), BROADWELL_X (0x4F)
+    #   SKYLAKE_X (0x55), SKYLAKE_L (0x4E), SKYLAKE (0x5E)
+    #   KABYLAKE_L (0x8E), KABYLAKE (0x9E)
+    #   ICELAKE_L (0x7E), ICELAKE_D (0x6C), ICELAKE_X (0x6A)
+    #   COMETLAKE (0xA5), COMETLAKE_L (0xA6)
+    #   LAKEFIELD (0x8A)
+    #   ROCKETLAKE (0xA7)
+    #   ATOM_TREMONT (0x96), ATOM_TREMONT_D (0x86), ATOM_TREMONT_L (0x9C)
+    #
+    # Vendor scope: Intel only. Non-Intel CPUs are not affected.
     parse_cpu_details
-    is_arch_cap_mmio_immune && return 0
-    # Non-Intel x86 vendors the kernel unconditionally whitelists (AMD/Hygon all
-    # families; Centaur/Zhaoxin fam 7 only).
-    if is_amd || is_hygon; then
+    # ARCH_CAP immunity: all three bits must be set
+    if [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_fbsdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_psdp_no" = 1 ]; then
         return 0
     fi
-    if { [ "$cpu_vendor" = "CentaurHauls" ] || [ "$cpu_vendor" = "Shanghai" ]; } && [ "$cpu_family" = 7 ]; then
-        return 0
-    fi
-    # Intel NO_MMIO whitelist
-    if is_intel && [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
-        if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE_L" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE_L" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS" ]; then
-            return 0
+    if is_intel; then
+        if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
+            if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_D" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_X" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_LAKEFIELD" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ROCKETLAKE" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_D" ] ||
+                [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_L" ]; then
+                return 1
+            fi
         fi
     fi
-    return 1
-}
 
-# Check whether the CPU's MMIO Stale Data status is unknown ("out of servicing period")
-# Matches the kernel's X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN: Intel CPU not MMIO-free and not in the
-# MMIO blacklist. The kernel reports "Unknown: No mitigations" for such CPUs.
-# Callers: check_mmio_linux, check_mmio_bsd
-# Returns: 0 if unknown, 1 if known (either affected or not affected)
-is_cpu_mmio_unknown() {
-    parse_cpu_details
-    # Only Intel can reach the unknown bucket — other x86 vendors are whitelisted by vendor-id.
-    is_intel || return 1
-    is_cpu_mmio_free && return 1
-    if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
-        if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_L" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_D" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_X" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_LAKEFIELD" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ROCKETLAKE" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_D" ] ||
-            [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_L" ]; then
-            return 1
-        fi
-    fi
     return 0
 }
 

src/libs/230_util_optparse.sh

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ while [ -n "${1:-}" ]; do
         opt_arch_prefix="$2"
         shift 2
     elif [ "$1" = "--live" ]; then
-        # deprecated, kept for backward compatibility (live is now the default)
+        opt_live=1
         shift
     elif [ "$1" = "--no-color" ]; then
         opt_no_color=1
@@ -74,16 +74,15 @@ while [ -n "${1:-}" ]; do
     elif [ "$1" = "--hw-only" ]; then
         opt_hw_only=1
         shift
-    elif [ "$1" = "--no-runtime" ]; then
-        opt_runtime=0
-        shift
     elif [ "$1" = "--no-hw" ]; then
         opt_no_hw=1
-        opt_runtime=0
         shift
     elif [ "$1" = "--allow-msr-write" ]; then
         opt_allow_msr_write=1
         shift
+    elif [ "$1" = "--no-intel-db" ]; then
+        opt_intel_db=0
+        shift
     elif [ "$1" = "--cpu" ]; then
         opt_cpu=$2
         if [ "$opt_cpu" != all ]; then
@@ -117,7 +116,7 @@ while [ -n "${1:-}" ]; do
         opt_no_color=1
         shift
         case "$1" in
-            text | short | nrpe | json | json-terse | prometheus)
+            text | short | nrpe | json | prometheus)
                 opt_batch_format="$1"
                 shift
                 ;;
@@ -125,7 +124,7 @@ while [ -n "${1:-}" ]; do
             '') ;;  # allow nothing at all
             *)
                 echo "$0: error: unknown batch format '$1'" >&2
-                echo "$0: error: --batch expects a format from: text, short, nrpe, json, json-terse, prometheus" >&2
+                echo "$0: error: --batch expects a format from: text, nrpe, json" >&2
                 exit 255
                 ;;
         esac
@@ -170,7 +169,7 @@ while [ -n "${1:-}" ]; do
         case "$2" in
             help)
                 echo "The following parameters are supported for --variant (can be used multiple times):"
-                echo "1, 2, 3, 3a, 4, msbds, mfbds, mlpds, mdsum, l1tf, taa, mcepsc, srbds, mmio, sbdr, sbds, drpw, div0, fpdss, zenbleed, downfall, retbleed, inception, reptar, rfds, tsa, tsa-sq, tsa-l1, its, vmscape, bpi, sls, arm-spec-at, arm-spec-unpriv-load, arm-ssbs-nosync"
+                echo "1, 2, 3, 3a, 4, msbds, mfbds, mlpds, mdsum, l1tf, taa, mcepsc, srbds, mmio, sbdr, sbds, drpw, div0, zenbleed, downfall, retbleed, inception, reptar, rfds, tsa, tsa-sq, tsa-l1, its, vmscape, bpi, sls"
                 exit 0
                 ;;
             1)
@@ -245,10 +244,6 @@ while [ -n "${1:-}" ]; do
                 opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2023-20588"
                 opt_cve_all=0
                 ;;
-            fpdss)
-                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2025-54505"
-                opt_cve_all=0
-                ;;
             zenbleed)
                 opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2023-20593"
                 opt_cve_all=0
@@ -301,60 +296,12 @@ while [ -n "${1:-}" ]; do
                 opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-0000-0001"
                 opt_cve_all=0
                 ;;
-            arm-spec-at)
-                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-0001-0001"
-                opt_cve_all=0
-                ;;
-            arm-spec-unpriv-load)
-                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-0001-0002"
-                opt_cve_all=0
-                ;;
-            arm-ssbs-nosync)
-                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-0001-0003"
-                opt_cve_all=0
-                ;;
             *)
                 echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, see --variant help for a list" >&2
                 exit 255
                 ;;
         esac
         shift 2
-    elif [ "$1" = "--errata" ]; then
-        # Vendor-numbered errata selector (currently ARM64). Maps an erratum number
-        # (e.g. 1530923) to the CVE-0001-NNNN check that covers it.
-        if [ -z "$2" ]; then
-            echo "$0: error: option --errata expects a parameter (an erratum number, e.g. 1530923, or 'help')" >&2
-            exit 255
-        fi
-        case "$2" in
-            help)
-                echo "The following erratum numbers are supported for --errata (can be used multiple times):"
-                echo "  Speculative AT TLB corruption:       1165522, 1319367, 1319537, 1530923"
-                echo "  Speculative unprivileged load:       2966298, 3117295"
-                echo "  MSR SSBS not self-synchronizing:     3194386 (and siblings: 3312417, 3324334, 3324335,"
-                echo "                                       3324336, 3324338, 3324339, 3324341, 3324344, 3324346,"
-                echo "                                       3324347, 3324348, 3324349, 3456084, 3456091, 3456106,"
-                echo "                                       3456111)"
-                exit 0
-                ;;
-            1165522 | 1319367 | 1319537 | 1530923)
-                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-0001-0001"
-                opt_cve_all=0
-                ;;
-            2966298 | 3117295)
-                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-0001-0002"
-                opt_cve_all=0
-                ;;
-            3194386 | 3312417 | 3324334 | 3324335 | 3324336 | 3324338 | 3324339 | 3324341 | 3324344 | 3324346 | 3324347 | 3324348 | 3324349 | 3456084 | 3456091 | 3456106 | 3456111)
-                opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-0001-0003"
-                opt_cve_all=0
-                ;;
-            *)
-                echo "$0: error: unsupported erratum number '$2' for --errata, see --errata help for a list" >&2
-                exit 255
-                ;;
-        esac
-        shift 2
     elif [ "$1" = "-h" ] || [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then
         show_header
         show_usage
@@ -387,25 +334,11 @@ if [ "$opt_no_hw" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_hw_only" = 1 ]; then
     exit 255
 fi
 
-if [ "$opt_runtime" = 0 ] && [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then
-    pr_warn "Incompatible options specified (--no-runtime and --sysfs-only), aborting"
-    exit 255
-fi
-
-if [ "$opt_runtime" = 0 ] && [ -z "$opt_kernel" ] && [ -z "$opt_config" ] && [ -z "$opt_map" ]; then
-    pr_warn "Option --no-runtime requires at least one of --kernel, --config, or --map"
-    exit 255
-fi
-
-# Derive the canonical run mode from the option flags.
-# Modes: live (default), no-runtime (--no-runtime), no-hw (--no-hw), hw-only (--hw-only)
-# shellcheck disable=SC2034
-if [ "$opt_hw_only" = 1 ]; then
-    g_mode='hw-only'
-elif [ "$opt_no_hw" = 1 ]; then
-    g_mode='no-hw'
-elif [ "$opt_runtime" = 0 ]; then
-    g_mode='no-runtime'
-else
-    g_mode='live'
+if [ "$opt_live" = -1 ]; then
+    if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ] || [ -n "$opt_config" ] || [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+        # no --live specified and we have a least one of the kernel/config/map files on the cmdline: offline mode
+        opt_live=0
+    else
+        opt_live=1
+    fi
 fi

src/libs/250_output_emitters.sh

@@ -1,277 +1,4 @@
 # vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
-# --- JSON helper functions ---
-
-# Escape a string for use in a JSON value (handles backslashes, double quotes, newlines, tabs)
-# Args: $1=string
-# Prints: escaped string (without surrounding quotes)
-_json_escape() {
-    printf '%s' "$1" | sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/"/\\"/g' -e 's/	/\\t/g' | tr '\n' ' '
-}
-
-# Escape a string for use as a Prometheus label value (handles backslashes, double quotes, newlines)
-# Args: $1=string
-# Prints: escaped string (without surrounding quotes)
-_prom_escape() {
-    printf '%s' "$1" | sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/"/\\"/g' | tr '\n' ' '
-}
-
-# Convert a shell capability value to a JSON boolean token
-# Args: $1=value (1=true, 0=false, -1/empty=null, any other non-empty string=true)
-# Prints: JSON token (true/false/null)
-# Note: capability variables can be set to arbitrary strings internally to carry
-# detection-path context (e.g. cap_ssbd='Intel SSBD'); for the JSON output those
-# are normalized to true so consumers see a clean boolean | null type.
-_json_cap() {
-    case "${1:-}" in
-        0) printf 'false' ;;
-        -1 | '') printf 'null' ;;
-        *) printf 'true' ;;
-    esac
-}
-
-# Emit a JSON string value or null
-# Args: $1=string (empty=null)
-# Prints: JSON token ("escaped string" or null)
-_json_str() {
-    if [ -n "${1:-}" ]; then
-        printf '"%s"' "$(_json_escape "$1")"
-    else
-        printf 'null'
-    fi
-}
-
-# Emit a JSON number value or null
-# Args: $1=number (empty=null)
-# Prints: JSON token
-_json_num() {
-    if [ -n "${1:-}" ]; then
-        printf '%s' "$1"
-    else
-        printf 'null'
-    fi
-}
-
-# Emit a JSON boolean value or null
-# Args: $1=value (1/0/empty)
-# Prints: JSON token
-_json_bool() {
-    case "${1:-}" in
-        1) printf 'true' ;;
-        0) printf 'false' ;;
-        *) printf 'null' ;;
-    esac
-}
-
-# --- JSON section builders (comprehensive format) ---
-
-# Build the "meta" section of the comprehensive JSON output
-# Sets: g_json_meta
-# shellcheck disable=SC2034
-_build_json_meta() {
-    local timestamp
-    timestamp=$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ' 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")
-    local run_as_root
-    if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-        run_as_root='true'
-    else
-        run_as_root='false'
-    fi
-    g_json_meta=$(printf '{"script_version":%s,"format_version":1,"timestamp":%s,"os":%s,"mode":"%s","run_as_root":%s,"reduced_accuracy":%s,"paranoid":%s,"sysfs_only":%s,"extra":%s}' \
-        "$(_json_str "$VERSION")" \
-        "$(_json_str "$timestamp")" \
-        "$(_json_str "$g_os")" \
-        "$g_mode" \
-        "$run_as_root" \
-        "$(_json_bool "${g_bad_accuracy:-0}")" \
-        "$(_json_bool "$opt_paranoid")" \
-        "$(_json_bool "$opt_sysfs_only")" \
-        "$(_json_bool "$opt_extra")")
-}
-
-# Build the "system" section of the comprehensive JSON output
-# Sets: g_json_system
-# shellcheck disable=SC2034
-_build_json_system() {
-    local kernel_release kernel_version kernel_arch smt_val
-    if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
-        kernel_release=$(uname -r)
-        kernel_version=$(uname -v)
-        kernel_arch=$(uname -m)
-    else
-        kernel_release=''
-        kernel_version=''
-        kernel_arch=''
-    fi
-    # SMT detection
-    is_cpu_smt_enabled
-    smt_val=$?
-    case $smt_val in
-        0) smt_val='true' ;;
-        1) smt_val='false' ;;
-        *) smt_val='null' ;;
-    esac
-    g_json_system=$(printf '{"kernel_release":%s,"kernel_version":%s,"kernel_arch":%s,"kernel_image":%s,"kernel_config":%s,"kernel_version_string":%s,"kernel_cmdline":%s,"cpu_count":%s,"smt_enabled":%s,"hypervisor_host":%s,"hypervisor_host_reason":%s}' \
-        "$(_json_str "$kernel_release")" \
-        "$(_json_str "$kernel_version")" \
-        "$(_json_str "$kernel_arch")" \
-        "$(_json_str "${opt_kernel:-}")" \
-        "$(_json_str "${opt_config:-}")" \
-        "$(_json_str "${g_kernel_version:-}")" \
-        "$(_json_str "${g_kernel_cmdline:-}")" \
-        "$(_json_num "${g_max_core_id:+$((g_max_core_id + 1))}")" \
-        "$smt_val" \
-        "$(_json_bool "${g_has_vmm:-}")" \
-        "$(_json_str "${g_has_vmm_reason:-}")")
-}
-
-# Build the "cpu" section of the comprehensive JSON output
-# Sets: g_json_cpu
-# shellcheck disable=SC2034
-_build_json_cpu() {
-    local cpuid_hex codename caps arch_sub arch_type sbpb_norm
-    if [ -n "${cpu_cpuid:-}" ]; then
-        cpuid_hex=$(printf '0x%08x' "$cpu_cpuid")
-    else
-        cpuid_hex=''
-    fi
-    codename=''
-    if is_intel; then
-        codename=$(get_intel_codename 2>/dev/null || true)
-    fi
-
-    # cap_sbpb uses non-standard encoding (1=YES, 2=NO, 3=UNKNOWN) because the
-    # CVE-2023-20569 check distinguishes the unknown case. Normalize for JSON.
-    case "${cap_sbpb:-}" in
-        1) sbpb_norm=1 ;;
-        2) sbpb_norm=0 ;;
-        3) sbpb_norm=-1 ;;
-        *) sbpb_norm='' ;;
-    esac
-
-    # Determine architecture type and build the arch-specific sub-object
-    case "${cpu_vendor:-}" in
-        GenuineIntel | AuthenticAMD | HygonGenuine)
-            arch_type='x86'
-            # Build x86 capabilities sub-object
-            caps=$(printf '{"spec_ctrl":%s,"ibrs":%s,"ibpb":%s,"ibpb_ret":%s,"stibp":%s,"ssbd":%s,"l1d_flush":%s,"md_clear":%s,"arch_capabilities":%s,"rdcl_no":%s,"ibrs_all":%s,"rsba":%s,"l1dflush_no":%s,"ssb_no":%s,"mds_no":%s,"taa_no":%s,"pschange_msc_no":%s,"tsx_ctrl_msr":%s,"tsx_ctrl_rtm_disable":%s,"tsx_ctrl_cpuid_clear":%s,"gds_ctrl":%s,"gds_no":%s,"gds_mitg_dis":%s,"gds_mitg_lock":%s,"rfds_no":%s,"rfds_clear":%s,"its_no":%s,"sbdr_ssdp_no":%s,"fbsdp_no":%s,"psdp_no":%s,"fb_clear":%s,"rtm":%s,"tsx_force_abort":%s,"tsx_force_abort_rtm_disable":%s,"tsx_force_abort_cpuid_clear":%s,"sgx":%s,"srbds":%s,"srbds_on":%s,"amd_ssb_no":%s,"hygon_ssb_no":%s,"ipred":%s,"rrsba":%s,"bhi":%s,"tsa_sq_no":%s,"tsa_l1_no":%s,"verw_clear":%s,"autoibrs":%s,"sbpb":%s,"avx2":%s,"avx512":%s}' \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_spec_ctrl:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_ibrs:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_ibpb:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_ibpb_ret:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_stibp:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_ssbd:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_l1df:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_md_clear:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_arch_capabilities:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_rdcl_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_ibrs_all:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_rsba:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_l1dflush_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_ssb_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_mds_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_taa_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_pschange_msc_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_tsx_ctrl_msr:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_tsx_ctrl_rtm_disable:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_tsx_ctrl_cpuid_clear:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_gds_ctrl:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_gds_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_gds_mitg_dis:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_gds_mitg_lock:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_rfds_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_rfds_clear:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_its_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_sbdr_ssdp_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_fbsdp_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_psdp_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_fb_clear:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_rtm:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_tsx_force_abort:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_tsx_force_abort_rtm_disable:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_tsx_force_abort_cpuid_clear:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_sgx:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_srbds:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_srbds_on:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_amd_ssb_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_hygon_ssb_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_ipred:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_rrsba:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_bhi:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_tsa_sq_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_tsa_l1_no:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_verw_clear:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_autoibrs:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "$sbpb_norm")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_avx2:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_cap "${cap_avx512:-}")")
-            arch_sub=$(printf '{"family":%s,"model":%s,"stepping":%s,"cpuid":%s,"platform_id":%s,"hybrid":%s,"codename":%s,"capabilities":%s}' \
-                "$(_json_num "${cpu_family:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_num "${cpu_model:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_num "${cpu_stepping:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_str "$cpuid_hex")" \
-                "$(_json_num "${cpu_platformid:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_bool "${cpu_hybrid:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_str "$codename")" \
-                "$caps")
-            ;;
-        ARM | CAVIUM | PHYTIUM)
-            arch_type='arm'
-            arch_sub=$(printf '{"part_list":%s,"arch_list":%s,"capabilities":{}}' \
-                "$(_json_str "${cpu_part_list:-}")" \
-                "$(_json_str "${cpu_arch_list:-}")")
-            ;;
-        *)
-            arch_type=''
-            arch_sub=''
-            ;;
-    esac
-
-    if [ -n "$arch_type" ]; then
-        g_json_cpu=$(printf '{"arch":"%s","vendor":%s,"friendly_name":%s,"%s":%s}' \
-            "$arch_type" \
-            "$(_json_str "${cpu_vendor:-}")" \
-            "$(_json_str "${cpu_friendly_name:-}")" \
-            "$arch_type" \
-            "$arch_sub")
-    else
-        g_json_cpu=$(printf '{"arch":null,"vendor":%s,"friendly_name":%s}' \
-            "$(_json_str "${cpu_vendor:-}")" \
-            "$(_json_str "${cpu_friendly_name:-}")")
-    fi
-}
-
-# Build the "cpu_microcode" section of the comprehensive JSON output
-# Sets: g_json_cpu_microcode
-# shellcheck disable=SC2034
-_build_json_cpu_microcode() {
-    local ucode_uptodate ucode_hex latest_hex blacklisted
-    if [ -n "${cpu_ucode:-}" ]; then
-        ucode_hex=$(printf '0x%x' "$cpu_ucode")
-    else
-        ucode_hex=''
-    fi
-    is_latest_known_ucode
-    case $? in
-        0) ucode_uptodate='true' ;;
-        1) ucode_uptodate='false' ;;
-        *) ucode_uptodate='null' ;;
-    esac
-    if is_ucode_blacklisted; then
-        blacklisted='true'
-    else
-        blacklisted='false'
-    fi
-    latest_hex="${ret_is_latest_known_ucode_version:-}"
-    g_json_cpu_microcode=$(printf '{"installed_version":%s,"latest_version":%s,"microcode_up_to_date":%s,"is_blacklisted":%s,"message":%s,"db_source":%s,"db_info":%s}' \
-        "$(_json_str "$ucode_hex")" \
-        "$(_json_str "$latest_hex")" \
-        "$ucode_uptodate" \
-        "$blacklisted" \
-        "$(_json_str "${ret_is_latest_known_ucode_latest:-}")" \
-        "$(_json_str "${g_mcedb_source:-}")" \
-        "$(_json_str "${g_mcedb_info:-}")")
-}
-
 # --- Format-specific batch emitters ---
 
 # Emit a single CVE result as plain text
@@ -289,206 +16,45 @@ _emit_short() {
     g_short_output="${g_short_output}$1 "
 }
 
-# Append a CVE result as a terse JSON object to the batch output buffer
+# Append a CVE result as a JSON object to the batch output buffer
 # Args: $1=cve $2=aka $3=status(UNK|VULN|OK) $4=description
 # Sets: g_json_output
 # Callers: pvulnstatus
-_emit_json_terse() {
+_emit_json() {
     local is_vuln esc_name esc_infos
     case "$3" in
         UNK) is_vuln="null" ;;
         VULN) is_vuln="true" ;;
         OK) is_vuln="false" ;;
         *)
-            echo "$0: error: unknown status '$3' passed to _emit_json_terse()" >&2
+            echo "$0: error: unknown status '$3' passed to _emit_json()" >&2
             exit 255
             ;;
     esac
-    esc_name=$(_json_escape "$2")
-    esc_infos=$(_json_escape "$4")
+    # escape backslashes and double quotes for valid JSON strings
+    esc_name=$(printf '%s' "$2" | sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/"/\\"/g')
+    esc_infos=$(printf '%s' "$4" | sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/"/\\"/g')
     [ -z "$g_json_output" ] && g_json_output='['
     g_json_output="${g_json_output}{\"NAME\":\"$esc_name\",\"CVE\":\"$1\",\"VULNERABLE\":$is_vuln,\"INFOS\":\"$esc_infos\"},"
 }
 
-# Append a CVE result as a comprehensive JSON object to the batch output buffer
-# Args: $1=cve $2=aka $3=status(UNK|VULN|OK) $4=description
-# Sets: g_json_vulns
-# Callers: pvulnstatus
-_emit_json_full() {
-    local is_vuln esc_name esc_infos aliases cpu_affected sysfs_status sysfs_msg
-    case "$3" in
-        UNK) is_vuln="null" ;;
-        VULN) is_vuln="true" ;;
-        OK) is_vuln="false" ;;
-        *)
-            echo "$0: error: unknown status '$3' passed to _emit_json_full()" >&2
-            exit 255
-            ;;
-    esac
-    esc_name=$(_json_escape "$2")
-    esc_infos=$(_json_escape "$4")
-    aliases=$(_cve_registry_field "$1" 4)
-
-    # CPU affection status (cached, cheap)
-    if is_cpu_affected "$1" 2>/dev/null; then
-        cpu_affected='true'
-    else
-        cpu_affected='false'
-    fi
-
-    # sysfs status: use the value captured by this CVE's check function, then clear it
-    # so it doesn't leak into the next CVE that might not call sys_interface_check
-    sysfs_status="${g_json_cve_sysfs_status:-}"
-    sysfs_msg="${g_json_cve_sysfs_msg:-}"
-
-    : "${g_json_vulns:=}"
-    g_json_vulns="${g_json_vulns}{\"cve\":\"$1\",\"name\":\"$esc_name\",\"aliases\":$(_json_str "$aliases"),\"cpu_affected\":$cpu_affected,\"status\":\"$3\",\"vulnerable\":$is_vuln,\"info\":\"$esc_infos\",\"sysfs_status\":$(_json_str "$sysfs_status"),\"sysfs_message\":$(_json_str "$sysfs_msg")},"
-}
-
-# Accumulate a CVE result into the NRPE output buffers
+# Append vulnerable CVE IDs to the NRPE output buffer
 # Args: $1=cve $2=aka $3=status $4=description
-# Sets: g_nrpe_total, g_nrpe_vuln_count, g_nrpe_unk_count, g_nrpe_vuln_ids, g_nrpe_vuln_details, g_nrpe_unk_details
+# Sets: g_nrpe_vuln
 # Callers: pvulnstatus
 _emit_nrpe() {
-    g_nrpe_total=$((g_nrpe_total + 1))
-    case "$3" in
-        VULN)
-            g_nrpe_vuln_count=$((g_nrpe_vuln_count + 1))
-            g_nrpe_vuln_ids="${g_nrpe_vuln_ids:+$g_nrpe_vuln_ids }$1"
-            g_nrpe_vuln_details="${g_nrpe_vuln_details:+$g_nrpe_vuln_details\n}[CRITICAL] $1 ($2): $4"
-            ;;
-        UNK)
-            g_nrpe_unk_count=$((g_nrpe_unk_count + 1))
-            g_nrpe_unk_details="${g_nrpe_unk_details:+$g_nrpe_unk_details\n}[UNKNOWN]  $1 ($2): $4"
-            ;;
-    esac
+    [ "$3" = VULN ] && g_nrpe_vuln="$g_nrpe_vuln $1"
 }
 
-# Append a CVE result as a Prometheus gauge to the batch output buffer
-# Status is encoded numerically: 0=not_vulnerable, 1=vulnerable, 2=unknown
-# Args: $1=cve $2=aka $3=status(UNK|VULN|OK) $4=description
-# Sets: g_smc_vuln_output, g_smc_ok_count, g_smc_vuln_count, g_smc_unk_count
+# Append a CVE result as a Prometheus metric to the batch output buffer
+# Args: $1=cve $2=aka $3=status $4=description
+# Sets: g_prometheus_output
 # Callers: pvulnstatus
 _emit_prometheus() {
-    local numeric_status cpu_affected full_name esc_name
-    case "$3" in
-        OK)
-            numeric_status=0
-            g_smc_ok_count=$((g_smc_ok_count + 1))
-            ;;
-        VULN)
-            numeric_status=1
-            g_smc_vuln_count=$((g_smc_vuln_count + 1))
-            ;;
-        UNK)
-            numeric_status=2
-            g_smc_unk_count=$((g_smc_unk_count + 1))
-            ;;
-        *)
-            echo "$0: error: unknown status '$3' passed to _emit_prometheus()" >&2
-            exit 255
-            ;;
-    esac
-    if is_cpu_affected "$1" 2>/dev/null; then
-        cpu_affected='true'
-    else
-        cpu_affected='false'
-    fi
-    # use the complete CVE name (field 4) rather than the short aka key (field 2)
-    full_name=$(_cve_registry_field "$1" 4)
-    esc_name=$(_prom_escape "$full_name")
-    g_smc_vuln_output="${g_smc_vuln_output:+$g_smc_vuln_output\n}smc_vulnerability_status{cve=\"$1\",name=\"$esc_name\",cpu_affected=\"$cpu_affected\"} $numeric_status"
-}
-
-# Build the smc_system_info Prometheus metric line
-# Sets: g_smc_system_info_line
-# Callers: src/main.sh (after check_cpu / check_cpu_vulnerabilities)
-# shellcheck disable=SC2034
-_build_prometheus_system_info() {
-    local kernel_release kernel_arch hypervisor_host sys_labels
-    if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
-        kernel_release=$(uname -r 2>/dev/null || true)
-        kernel_arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || true)
-    else
-        kernel_release=''
-        kernel_arch=''
-    fi
-    case "${g_has_vmm:-}" in
-        1) hypervisor_host='true' ;;
-        0) hypervisor_host='false' ;;
-        *) hypervisor_host='' ;;
-    esac
-    sys_labels=''
-    [ -n "$kernel_release" ] && sys_labels="${sys_labels:+$sys_labels,}kernel_release=\"$(_prom_escape "$kernel_release")\""
-    [ -n "$kernel_arch" ] && sys_labels="${sys_labels:+$sys_labels,}kernel_arch=\"$(_prom_escape "$kernel_arch")\""
-    [ -n "$hypervisor_host" ] && sys_labels="${sys_labels:+$sys_labels,}hypervisor_host=\"$hypervisor_host\""
-    [ -n "$sys_labels" ] && g_smc_system_info_line="smc_system_info{$sys_labels} 1"
-}
-
-# Build the smc_cpu_info Prometheus metric line
-# Sets: g_smc_cpu_info_line
-# Callers: src/main.sh (after check_cpu / check_cpu_vulnerabilities)
-# shellcheck disable=SC2034
-_build_prometheus_cpu_info() {
-    local cpuid_hex ucode_hex ucode_latest_hex ucode_uptodate ucode_blacklisted codename smt_val cpu_labels
-    if [ -n "${cpu_cpuid:-}" ]; then
-        cpuid_hex=$(printf '0x%08x' "$cpu_cpuid")
-    else
-        cpuid_hex=''
-    fi
-    if [ -n "${cpu_ucode:-}" ]; then
-        ucode_hex=$(printf '0x%x' "$cpu_ucode")
-    else
-        ucode_hex=''
-    fi
-    is_latest_known_ucode
-    case $? in
-        0) ucode_uptodate='true' ;;
-        1) ucode_uptodate='false' ;;
-        *) ucode_uptodate='' ;;
-    esac
-    ucode_latest_hex="${ret_is_latest_known_ucode_version:-}"
-    if is_ucode_blacklisted; then
-        ucode_blacklisted='true'
-    else
-        ucode_blacklisted='false'
-    fi
-    codename=''
-    if is_intel; then
-        codename=$(get_intel_codename 2>/dev/null || true)
-    fi
-    is_cpu_smt_enabled
-    case $? in
-        0) smt_val='true' ;;
-        1) smt_val='false' ;;
-        *) smt_val='' ;;
-    esac
-    cpu_labels=''
-    [ -n "${cpu_vendor:-}" ] && cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}vendor=\"$(_prom_escape "$cpu_vendor")\""
-    [ -n "${cpu_friendly_name:-}" ] && cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}model=\"$(_prom_escape "$cpu_friendly_name")\""
-    # arch-specific labels
-    case "${cpu_vendor:-}" in
-        GenuineIntel | AuthenticAMD | HygonGenuine)
-            cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}arch=\"x86\""
-            [ -n "${cpu_family:-}" ] && cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}family=\"$cpu_family\""
-            [ -n "${cpu_model:-}" ] && cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}model_id=\"$cpu_model\""
-            [ -n "${cpu_stepping:-}" ] && cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}stepping=\"$cpu_stepping\""
-            [ -n "$cpuid_hex" ] && cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}cpuid=\"$cpuid_hex\""
-            [ -n "$codename" ] && cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}codename=\"$(_prom_escape "$codename")\""
-            ;;
-        ARM | CAVIUM | PHYTIUM)
-            cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}arch=\"arm\""
-            [ -n "${cpu_part_list:-}" ] && cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}part_list=\"$(_prom_escape "$cpu_part_list")\""
-            [ -n "${cpu_arch_list:-}" ] && cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}arch_list=\"$(_prom_escape "$cpu_arch_list")\""
-            ;;
-    esac
-    [ -n "$smt_val" ] && cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}smt=\"$smt_val\""
-    [ -n "$ucode_hex" ] && cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}microcode=\"$ucode_hex\""
-    [ -n "$ucode_latest_hex" ] && cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}microcode_latest=\"$ucode_latest_hex\""
-    [ -n "$ucode_uptodate" ] && cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}microcode_up_to_date=\"$ucode_uptodate\""
-    # always emit microcode_blacklisted when we have microcode info (it's a boolean, never omit)
-    [ -n "$ucode_hex" ] && cpu_labels="${cpu_labels:+$cpu_labels,}microcode_blacklisted=\"$ucode_blacklisted\""
-    [ -n "$cpu_labels" ] && g_smc_cpu_info_line="smc_cpu_info{$cpu_labels} 1"
+    local esc_info
+    # escape backslashes and double quotes for Prometheus label values
+    esc_info=$(printf '%s' "$4" | sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/"/\\"/g')
+    g_prometheus_output="${g_prometheus_output:+$g_prometheus_output\n}specex_vuln_status{name=\"$2\",cve=\"$1\",status=\"$3\",info=\"$esc_info\"} 1"
 }
 
 # Update global state used to determine the program exit code
@@ -519,8 +85,7 @@ pvulnstatus() {
         case "$opt_batch_format" in
             text) _emit_text "$1" "$aka" "$2" "$3" ;;
             short) _emit_short "$1" "$aka" "$2" "$3" ;;
-            json) _emit_json_full "$1" "$aka" "$2" "$3" ;;
-            json-terse) _emit_json_terse "$1" "$aka" "$2" "$3" ;;
+            json) _emit_json "$1" "$aka" "$2" "$3" ;;
             nrpe) _emit_nrpe "$1" "$aka" "$2" "$3" ;;
             prometheus) _emit_prometheus "$1" "$aka" "$2" "$3" ;;
             *)
@@ -528,9 +93,6 @@ pvulnstatus() {
                 exit 255
                 ;;
         esac
-        # reset per-CVE sysfs globals so they don't leak into the next CVE
-        g_json_cve_sysfs_status=''
-        g_json_cve_sysfs_msg=''
     fi
 
     _record_result "$1" "$2"

src/libs/340_cpu_msr.sh

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ write_msr_one_core() {
     core="$1"
     msr_dec=$(($2))
     msr=$(printf "0x%x" "$msr_dec")
-    value_dec=$((${3:-0}))
+    value_dec=$(($3))
     value=$(printf "0x%x" "$value_dec")
 
     ret_write_msr_msg='unknown error'

src/libs/350_cpu_detect2.sh

@@ -24,22 +24,13 @@ parse_cpu_details() {
         if grep -qw avx512 "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" 2>/dev/null; then cap_avx512=1; fi
         cpu_vendor=$(grep '^vendor_id' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | awk '{print $3}' | head -n1)
         cpu_friendly_name=$(grep '^model name' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | cut -d: -f2- | head -n1 | sed -e 's/^ *//')
-        # ARM-style cpuinfo: parse per-core implementer/part/arch/variant/revision lists
-        # (big.LITTLE / heterogeneous systems have different values per core).
-        # cpu_variant_list and cpu_revision_list are consumed by ARM64 errata affection checks
-        # that need to match a specific revision range.
-        if grep -q 'CPU implementer' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo"; then
-            cpu_impl_list=$(awk '/CPU implementer/ {print $4}' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo")
-            cpu_part_list=$(awk '/CPU part/         {print $4}' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo")
-            cpu_arch_list=$(awk '/CPU architecture/ {print $3}' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo")
-            cpu_variant_list=$(awk '/CPU variant/   {print $4}' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo")
-            cpu_revision_list=$(awk '/CPU revision/ {print $4}' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo")
-        fi
-        # Map first-seen implementer to cpu_vendor; note that heterogeneous systems
-        # (e.g. DynamIQ with ARM+Kryo cores) would all map to one vendor here, but
-        # per-core vendor decisions are made via cpu_impl_list where needed.
+        # special case for ARM follows
         if grep -qi 'CPU implementer[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*0x41' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo"; then
             cpu_vendor='ARM'
+            # some devices (phones or other) have several ARMs and as such different part numbers,
+            # an example is "bigLITTLE", so we need to store the whole list, this is needed for is_cpu_affected
+            cpu_part_list=$(awk '/CPU part/         {print $4}' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo")
+            cpu_arch_list=$(awk '/CPU architecture/ {print $3}' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo")
             # take the first one to fill the friendly name, do NOT quote the vars below
             # shellcheck disable=SC2086
             arch=$(echo $cpu_arch_list | awk '{ print $1 }')

src/libs/360_cpu_smt.sh

@@ -21,28 +21,6 @@ is_intel() {
     return 1
 }
 
-# Check whether the host CPU is x86/x86_64.
-# Use this to gate CPUID, MSR, and microcode operations.
-# Returns: 0 if x86, 1 otherwise
-is_x86_cpu() {
-    parse_cpu_details
-    case "$cpu_vendor" in
-        GenuineIntel | AuthenticAMD | HygonGenuine | CentaurHauls | Shanghai) return 0 ;;
-    esac
-    return 1
-}
-
-# Check whether the host CPU is ARM/ARM64.
-# Use this to gate ARM-specific hardware checks.
-# Returns: 0 if ARM, 1 otherwise
-is_arm_cpu() {
-    parse_cpu_details
-    case "$cpu_vendor" in
-        ARM | CAVIUM | PHYTIUM) return 0 ;;
-    esac
-    return 1
-}
-
 # Check whether SMT (HyperThreading) is enabled on the system
 # Returns: 0 if SMT enabled, 1 otherwise
 is_cpu_smt_enabled() {

src/libs/365_kernel_arch.sh

@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
-###############################
-# Kernel architecture detection helpers.
-# Detects the target kernel's architecture regardless of the host system,
-# enabling correct behavior in offline cross-inspection (e.g. x86 host
-# analyzing an ARM kernel image or System.map).
-
-# Global cache; populated by _detect_kernel_arch on first call.
-# Values: 'arm', 'x86', 'unknown'
-g_kernel_arch=''
-
-# Internal: populate g_kernel_arch using all available information sources,
-# in order from most to least reliable.
-_detect_kernel_arch() {
-    # Return immediately if already detected
-    [ -n "$g_kernel_arch" ] && return 0
-
-    # arm64_sys_ is the ARM64 syscall table symbol prefix; present in any
-    # ARM64 System.map (or /proc/kallsyms) and in the kernel image itself.
-    # sys_call_table + vector_swi is the ARM (32-bit) equivalent.
-    if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
-        if grep -q 'arm64_sys_' "$opt_map" 2>/dev/null; then
-            g_kernel_arch='arm'
-            return 0
-        fi
-        if grep -q ' vector_swi$' "$opt_map" 2>/dev/null; then
-            g_kernel_arch='arm'
-            return 0
-        fi
-    fi
-    if [ -n "$g_kernel" ]; then
-        if grep -q 'arm64_sys_' "$g_kernel" 2>/dev/null; then
-            g_kernel_arch='arm'
-            return 0
-        fi
-    fi
-
-    # Kconfig is definitive when available
-    if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
-        if grep -qE '^CONFIG_(ARM64|ARM)=y' "$opt_config" 2>/dev/null; then
-            g_kernel_arch='arm'
-            return 0
-        fi
-        if grep -qE '^CONFIG_X86(_64)?=y' "$opt_config" 2>/dev/null; then
-            g_kernel_arch='x86'
-            return 0
-        fi
-    fi
-
-    # Cross-compilation prefix as a last resort (e.g. --arch-prefix aarch64-linux-gnu-)
-    case "${opt_arch_prefix:-}" in
-        aarch64-* | arm64-* | arm-* | armv*-)
-            g_kernel_arch='arm'
-            return 0
-            ;;
-        x86_64-* | i686-* | i?86-*)
-            g_kernel_arch='x86'
-            return 0
-            ;;
-    esac
-
-    # Last resort: if no artifacts identified the arch, assume the target
-    # kernel matches the host CPU. This covers live mode when no kernel
-    # image, config, or System.map is available.
-    if is_x86_cpu; then
-        g_kernel_arch='x86'
-        return 0
-    fi
-    if is_arm_cpu; then
-        g_kernel_arch='arm'
-        return 0
-    fi
-
-    g_kernel_arch='unknown'
-    return 0
-}
-
-# Return 0 (true) if the target kernel is ARM (32 or 64-bit), 1 otherwise.
-is_arm_kernel() {
-    _detect_kernel_arch
-    [ "$g_kernel_arch" = 'arm' ]
-}
-
-# Return 0 (true) if the target kernel is x86/x86_64, 1 otherwise.
-is_x86_kernel() {
-    _detect_kernel_arch
-    [ "$g_kernel_arch" = 'x86' ]
-}
-
-# Compare the target kernel's architecture against the host CPU.
-# If they differ, hardware reads (CPUID, MSR, sysfs) would reflect the host,
-# not the target kernel — force no-hw mode to avoid misleading results.
-# Sets: g_mode (when mismatch detected)
-# Callers: src/main.sh (after check_kernel_info, before check_cpu)
-check_kernel_cpu_arch_mismatch() {
-    local host_arch
-    _detect_kernel_arch
-
-    host_arch='unknown'
-    if is_x86_cpu; then
-        host_arch='x86'
-    elif is_arm_cpu; then
-        host_arch='arm'
-    fi
-
-    # Unsupported CPU architecture (MIPS, RISC-V, PowerPC, ...): force no-hw
-    # since we have no hardware-level checks for these platforms
-    if [ "$host_arch" = 'unknown' ]; then
-        pr_warn "Unsupported CPU architecture (vendor: $cpu_vendor), forcing no-hw mode"
-        g_mode='no-hw'
-        return 0
-    fi
-
-    # If kernel arch is unknown, we can't tell if there's a mismatch
-    [ "$g_kernel_arch" = 'unknown' ] && return 0
-    [ "$host_arch" = "$g_kernel_arch" ] && return 0
-
-    pr_warn "Target kernel architecture ($g_kernel_arch) differs from host CPU ($host_arch), forcing no-hw mode"
-    g_mode='no-hw'
-}

src/libs/380_hw_microcode.sh

@@ -26,16 +26,18 @@ read_mcedb() {
 
 # Read the Intel official affected CPUs database (builtin) to stdout
 read_inteldb() {
-    awk '/^# %%% ENDOFINTELDB/ { exit } { if (DELIM==1) { print $2 } } /^# %%% INTELDB/ { DELIM=1 }' "$0"
+    if [ "$opt_intel_db" = 1 ]; then
+        awk '/^# %%% ENDOFINTELDB/ { exit } { if (DELIM==1) { print $2 } } /^# %%% INTELDB/ { DELIM=1 }' "$0"
+    fi
+    # otherwise don't output nothing, it'll be as if the database is empty
 }
 
 # Check whether the CPU is running the latest known microcode version
-# Sets: ret_is_latest_known_ucode_latest, ret_is_latest_known_ucode_version
+# Sets: ret_is_latest_known_ucode_latest
 # Returns: 0=latest, 1=outdated, 2=unknown
 is_latest_known_ucode() {
     local brand_prefix tuple pfmask ucode ucode_date
     parse_cpu_details
-    ret_is_latest_known_ucode_version=''
     if [ "$cpu_cpuid" = 0 ]; then
         ret_is_latest_known_ucode_latest="couldn't get your cpuid"
         return 2
@@ -62,8 +64,6 @@ is_latest_known_ucode() {
         ucode_date=$(echo "$tuple" | cut -d, -f5 | sed -E 's=(....)(..)(..)=\1/\2/\3=')
         pr_debug "is_latest_known_ucode: with cpuid $cpu_cpuid has ucode $cpu_ucode, last known is $ucode from $ucode_date"
         ret_is_latest_known_ucode_latest=$(printf "latest version is 0x%x dated $ucode_date according to $g_mcedb_info" "$ucode")
-        # shellcheck disable=SC2034
-        ret_is_latest_known_ucode_version=$(printf "0x%x" "$ucode")
         if [ "$cpu_ucode" -ge "$ucode" ]; then
             return 0
         else

src/libs/400_hw_check.sh

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ if [ "$g_os" = Darwin ] || [ "$g_os" = VMkernel ]; then
 fi
 
 # check for mode selection inconsistency
-if [ "$g_mode" = hw-only ]; then
+if [ "$opt_hw_only" = 1 ]; then
     if [ "$opt_cve_all" = 0 ]; then
         show_usage
         echo "$0: error: incompatible modes specified, --hw-only vs --variant" >&2
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ if [ "$opt_cpu" != all ] && [ "$opt_cpu" -gt "$g_max_core_id" ]; then
     exit 255
 fi
 
-if has_runtime; then
+if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
     pr_info "Checking for vulnerabilities on current system"
 
     # try to find the image of the current running kernel
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ if [ -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then
     if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}readelf" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
         pr_debug "readelf not found"
         g_kernel_err="missing '${opt_arch_prefix}readelf' tool, please install it, usually it's in the 'binutils' package"
-    elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ] || [ "$g_mode" = hw-only ]; then
+    elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ] || [ "$opt_hw_only" = 1 ]; then
         g_kernel_err='kernel image decompression skipped'
     else
         extract_kernel "$opt_kernel"
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ else
     fi
     if [ -n "$g_kernel_version" ]; then
         # in live mode, check if the img we found is the correct one
-        if has_runtime; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             pr_verbose "Kernel image is \033[35m$g_kernel_version"
             if ! echo "$g_kernel_version" | grep -qF "$(uname -r)"; then
                 pr_warn "Possible discrepancy between your running kernel '$(uname -r)' and the image '$g_kernel_version' we found ($opt_kernel), results might be incorrect"
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ sys_interface_check() {
     msg=''
     ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg=''
 
-    if has_runtime && [ "$opt_no_sysfs" = 0 ] && [ -r "$file" ]; then
+    if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_no_sysfs" = 0 ] && [ -r "$file" ]; then
         :
     else
         g_mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$g_mockme" "SMC_MOCK_SYSFS_$(basename "$file")_RET=1")
@@ -312,14 +312,9 @@ sys_interface_check() {
         g_mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$g_mockme" "SMC_MOCK_SYSFS_$(basename "$file")='$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg'")
     fi
     if [ "$mode" = silent ]; then
-        # capture sysfs message for JSON even in silent mode
-        # shellcheck disable=SC2034
-        g_json_cve_sysfs_msg="$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg"
         return 0
     elif [ "$mode" = quiet ]; then
         pr_info "* Information from the /sys interface: $ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg"
-        # shellcheck disable=SC2034
-        g_json_cve_sysfs_msg="$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg"
         return 0
     fi
     pr_info_nol "* Mitigated according to the /sys interface: "
@@ -339,11 +334,6 @@ sys_interface_check() {
         ret_sys_interface_check_status=UNK
         pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg"
     fi
-    # capture for JSON full output (read by _emit_json_full via pvulnstatus)
-    # shellcheck disable=SC2034
-    g_json_cve_sysfs_status="$ret_sys_interface_check_status"
-    # shellcheck disable=SC2034
-    g_json_cve_sysfs_msg="$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg"
     pr_debug "sys_interface_check: $file=$msg (re=$regex)"
     return 0
 }
@@ -352,7 +342,7 @@ sys_interface_check() {
 check_kernel_info() {
     local config_display
     pr_info "\033[1;34mKernel information\033[0m"
-    if has_runtime; then
+    if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
         pr_info "* Kernel is \033[35m$g_os $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)\033[0m"
     elif [ -n "$g_kernel_version" ]; then
         pr_info "* Kernel is \033[35m$g_kernel_version\033[0m"
@@ -456,7 +446,7 @@ check_cpu() {
         ret=invalid
         pstatus yellow NO "unknown CPU"
     fi
-    if [ -z "$cap_ibrs" ] && [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && has_runtime; then
+    if [ -z "$cap_ibrs" ] && [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
         # CPUID device unavailable (e.g. in a VM): fall back to /proc/cpuinfo
         if grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw ibrs; then
             cap_ibrs='IBRS (cpuinfo)'
@@ -533,7 +523,7 @@ check_cpu() {
         if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
             cap_ibpb='IBPB_SUPPORT'
             pstatus green YES "IBPB_SUPPORT feature bit"
-        elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && has_runtime && grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw ibpb; then
+        elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw ibpb; then
             # CPUID device unavailable (e.g. in a VM): fall back to /proc/cpuinfo
             cap_ibpb='IBPB (cpuinfo)'
             pstatus green YES "ibpb flag in $g_procfs/cpuinfo"
@@ -604,7 +594,7 @@ check_cpu() {
         ret=invalid
         pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "unknown CPU"
     fi
-    if [ -z "$cap_stibp" ] && [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && has_runtime; then
+    if [ -z "$cap_stibp" ] && [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
         # CPUID device unavailable (e.g. in a VM): fall back to /proc/cpuinfo
         if grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw stibp; then
             cap_stibp='STIBP (cpuinfo)'
@@ -676,7 +666,7 @@ check_cpu() {
         fi
     fi
 
-    if [ -z "$cap_ssbd" ] && [ "$ret24" = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && [ "$ret25" = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && has_runtime; then
+    if [ -z "$cap_ssbd" ] && [ "$ret24" = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && [ "$ret25" = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
         # CPUID device unavailable (e.g. in a VM): fall back to /proc/cpuinfo
         if grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw ssbd; then
             cap_ssbd='SSBD (cpuinfo)'
@@ -740,7 +730,7 @@ check_cpu() {
     if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
         pstatus green YES "L1D flush feature bit"
         cap_l1df=1
-    elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && has_runtime && grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw flush_l1d; then
+    elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw flush_l1d; then
         # CPUID device unavailable (e.g. in a VM): fall back to /proc/cpuinfo
         pstatus green YES "flush_l1d flag in $g_procfs/cpuinfo"
         cap_l1df=1
@@ -760,7 +750,7 @@ check_cpu() {
         if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
             cap_md_clear=1
             pstatus green YES "MD_CLEAR feature bit"
-        elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && has_runtime && grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw md_clear; then
+        elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw md_clear; then
             # CPUID device unavailable (e.g. in a VM): fall back to /proc/cpuinfo
             cap_md_clear=1
             pstatus green YES "md_clear flag in $g_procfs/cpuinfo"
@@ -830,7 +820,7 @@ check_cpu() {
         if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
             pstatus green YES
             cap_arch_capabilities=1
-        elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && has_runtime && grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw arch_capabilities; then
+        elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw arch_capabilities; then
             # CPUID device unavailable (e.g. in a VM): fall back to /proc/cpuinfo
             pstatus green YES "arch_capabilities flag in $g_procfs/cpuinfo"
             cap_arch_capabilities=1
@@ -1093,7 +1083,7 @@ check_cpu() {
         pr_info_nol "  * CPU explicitly indicates not being affected by MMIO Stale Data (FBSDP_NO & PSDP_NO & SBDR_SSDP_NO): "
         if [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = -1 ]; then
             pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read MSR"
-        elif is_arch_cap_mmio_immune; then
+        elif [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_fbsdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_psdp_no" = 1 ]; then
             pstatus green YES
         else
             pstatus yellow NO
@@ -1367,19 +1357,11 @@ check_cpu() {
     fi
 }
 
-# Display per-CVE CPU vulnerability status based on CPU model/family.
-# Mirrors the main dispatch gate: under a default "all CVEs" run, skip CVEs
-# whose arch tag doesn't match this system. Explicit selection via
-# --cve/--variant/--errata bypasses the gate.
+# Display per-CVE CPU vulnerability status based on CPU model/family
 check_cpu_vulnerabilities() {
     local cve
     pr_info "* CPU vulnerability to the speculative execution attack variants"
     for cve in $g_supported_cve_list; do
-        if [ "$opt_cve_all" = 1 ]; then
-            _is_cve_relevant_arch "$cve" || continue
-        elif ! echo "$opt_cve_list" | grep -qw "$cve"; then
-            continue
-        fi
         pr_info_nol "  * Affected by $cve ($(cve2name "$cve")): "
         if is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
             pstatus yellow YES

src/main.sh

@@ -1,63 +1,22 @@
 # vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
 
 check_kernel_info
-
-# Detect arch mismatch between host CPU and target kernel (e.g. x86 host
-# inspecting an ARM kernel): force no-hw mode so CPUID/MSR/sysfs reads
-# from the host don't pollute the results.
-check_kernel_cpu_arch_mismatch
-
-# Build JSON meta and system sections early (after kernel info is resolved)
-if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "json" ]; then
-    _build_json_meta
-fi
-
 pr_info
 
-if [ "$g_mode" != no-hw ] && [ -z "$opt_arch_prefix" ]; then
+if [ "$opt_no_hw" = 0 ] && [ -z "$opt_arch_prefix" ]; then
     pr_info "\033[1;34mHardware check\033[0m"
     check_cpu
     check_cpu_vulnerabilities
     pr_info
 fi
 
-# Build JSON system/cpu/microcode sections (after check_cpu has populated cap_* vars and VMM detection)
-if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "json" ]; then
-    _build_json_system
-    if [ "$g_mode" != no-hw ] && [ -z "$opt_arch_prefix" ]; then
-        _build_json_cpu
-        _build_json_cpu_microcode
-    fi
-fi
-
-# Build Prometheus info metric lines (same timing requirement as JSON builders above)
-if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "prometheus" ]; then
-    _build_prometheus_system_info
-    if [ "$g_mode" != no-hw ] && [ -z "$opt_arch_prefix" ]; then
-        _build_prometheus_cpu_info
-    fi
-fi
-
-# now run the checks the user asked for (hw-only mode skips CVE checks)
-if [ "$g_mode" = hw-only ]; then
-    pr_info "Hardware-only mode, skipping vulnerability checks"
-else
-    for cve in $g_supported_cve_list; do
-        # In a default "all CVEs" run, skip checks whose arch tag doesn't match
-        # the host CPU or the inspected kernel. Explicit --cve/--variant/--errata
-        # selection bypasses the gate.
-        if [ "$opt_cve_all" = 1 ]; then
-            if ! _is_cve_relevant_arch "$cve"; then
-                pr_debug "main: skipping $cve (arch tag not relevant)"
-                continue
-            fi
-        elif ! echo "$opt_cve_list" | grep -qw "$cve"; then
-            continue
-        fi
+# now run the checks the user asked for
+for cve in $g_supported_cve_list; do
+    if [ "$opt_cve_all" = 1 ] || echo "$opt_cve_list" | grep -qw "$cve"; then
         check_"$(echo "$cve" | tr - _)"
         pr_info
-    done
-fi # g_mode != hw-only
+    fi
+done
 
 if [ -n "$g_final_summary" ]; then
     pr_info "> \033[46m\033[30mSUMMARY:\033[0m$g_final_summary"
@@ -110,121 +69,25 @@ if [ "$g_mocked" = 1 ]; then
 fi
 
 if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "nrpe" ]; then
-    _nrpe_is_root=0
-    [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ] && _nrpe_is_root=1
-
-    # Non-root + VULN: demote to UNKNOWN, MSR reads were skipped so VULN findings
-    # may be false positives or genuine mitigations may have gone undetected
-    _nrpe_demoted=0
-    [ "$g_nrpe_vuln_count" -gt 0 ] && [ "$_nrpe_is_root" = 0 ] && _nrpe_demoted=1
-
-    # Determine status word and build the one-line summary
-    if [ "$_nrpe_demoted" = 1 ]; then
-        _nrpe_status_word='UNKNOWN'
-        _nrpe_summary="${g_nrpe_vuln_count}/${g_nrpe_total} CVE(s) appear vulnerable (unconfirmed, not root): ${g_nrpe_vuln_ids}"
-        [ "$g_nrpe_unk_count" -gt 0 ] && _nrpe_summary="${_nrpe_summary}, ${g_nrpe_unk_count} inconclusive"
-    elif [ "$g_nrpe_vuln_count" -gt 0 ]; then
-        _nrpe_status_word='CRITICAL'
-        _nrpe_summary="${g_nrpe_vuln_count}/${g_nrpe_total} CVE(s) vulnerable: ${g_nrpe_vuln_ids}"
-        [ "$g_nrpe_unk_count" -gt 0 ] && _nrpe_summary="${_nrpe_summary}, ${g_nrpe_unk_count} inconclusive"
-    elif [ "$g_nrpe_unk_count" -gt 0 ]; then
-        _nrpe_status_word='UNKNOWN'
-        _nrpe_summary="${g_nrpe_unk_count}/${g_nrpe_total} CVE checks inconclusive"
+    if [ -n "$g_nrpe_vuln" ]; then
+        echo "Vulnerable:$g_nrpe_vuln"
     else
-        _nrpe_status_word='OK'
-        _nrpe_summary="All ${g_nrpe_total} CVE checks passed"
+        echo "OK"
     fi
-
-    # Line 1: status word + summary + performance data (Nagios plugin spec)
-    echo "${_nrpe_status_word}: ${_nrpe_summary} | checked=${g_nrpe_total} vulnerable=${g_nrpe_vuln_count} unknown=${g_nrpe_unk_count}"
-
-    # Long output (lines 2+): context notes, then per-CVE details
-    [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ] && echo "NOTE: paranoid mode active, stricter mitigation requirements applied"
-    case "${g_has_vmm:-}" in
-        1) echo "NOTE: hypervisor host detected (${g_has_vmm_reason:-VMM}); L1TF/MDS severity is elevated" ;;
-        0) echo "NOTE: not a hypervisor host" ;;
-    esac
-    [ "$_nrpe_is_root" = 0 ] && echo "NOTE: not running as root; MSR reads skipped, results may be incomplete"
-
-    # VULN details first, then UNK details (each group in CVE-registry order)
-    [ -n "${g_nrpe_vuln_details:-}" ] && printf "%b\n" "$g_nrpe_vuln_details"
-    [ -n "${g_nrpe_unk_details:-}" ] && printf "%b\n" "$g_nrpe_unk_details"
-
-    # Exit with the correct Nagios code when we demoted VULN→UNKNOWN due to non-root
-    # (g_critical=1 would otherwise cause exit 2 below)
-    [ "$_nrpe_demoted" = 1 ] && exit 3
 fi
 
 if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "short" ]; then
     _pr_echo 0 "${g_short_output% }"
 fi
 
-if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "json-terse" ]; then
+if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "json" ]; then
     _pr_echo 0 "${g_json_output%?}]"
 fi
 
-if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "json" ]; then
-    # Assemble the comprehensive JSON output from pre-built sections
-    # Inject mocked flag into meta (g_mocked can be set at any point during the run)
-    g_json_meta="${g_json_meta%\}},\"mocked\":$(_json_bool "${g_mocked:-0}")}"
-    _json_final='{'
-    _json_final="${_json_final}\"meta\":${g_json_meta:-null}"
-    _json_final="${_json_final},\"system\":${g_json_system:-null}"
-    _json_final="${_json_final},\"cpu\":${g_json_cpu:-null}"
-    _json_final="${_json_final},\"cpu_microcode\":${g_json_cpu_microcode:-null}"
-    if [ -n "${g_json_vulns:-}" ]; then
-        _json_final="${_json_final},\"vulnerabilities\":[${g_json_vulns%,}]"
-    else
-        _json_final="${_json_final},\"vulnerabilities\":[]"
-    fi
-    _json_final="${_json_final}}"
-    _pr_echo 0 "$_json_final"
-fi
-
 if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "prometheus" ]; then
-    prom_run_as_root='false'
-    [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ] && prom_run_as_root='true'
-    prom_mode="$g_mode"
-    prom_paranoid='false'
-    [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ] && prom_paranoid='true'
-    prom_sysfs_only='false'
-    [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ] && prom_sysfs_only='true'
-    prom_reduced_accuracy='false'
-    [ "${g_bad_accuracy:-0}" = 1 ] && prom_reduced_accuracy='true'
-    prom_mocked='false'
-    [ "${g_mocked:-0}" = 1 ] && prom_mocked='true'
-    echo "# HELP smc_build_info spectre-meltdown-checker script metadata (always 1)"
-    echo "# TYPE smc_build_info gauge"
-    printf 'smc_build_info{version="%s",mode="%s",run_as_root="%s",paranoid="%s",sysfs_only="%s",reduced_accuracy="%s",mocked="%s"} 1\n' \
-        "$(_prom_escape "$VERSION")" \
-        "$prom_mode" \
-        "$prom_run_as_root" \
-        "$prom_paranoid" \
-        "$prom_sysfs_only" \
-        "$prom_reduced_accuracy" \
-        "$prom_mocked"
-    if [ -n "${g_smc_system_info_line:-}" ]; then
-        echo "# HELP smc_system_info Operating system and kernel metadata (always 1)"
-        echo "# TYPE smc_system_info gauge"
-        echo "$g_smc_system_info_line"
-    fi
-    if [ -n "${g_smc_cpu_info_line:-}" ]; then
-        echo "# HELP smc_cpu_info CPU hardware and microcode metadata (always 1)"
-        echo "# TYPE smc_cpu_info gauge"
-        echo "$g_smc_cpu_info_line"
-    fi
-    echo "# HELP smc_vulnerability_status Vulnerability check result per CVE: 0=not_vulnerable, 1=vulnerable, 2=unknown"
-    echo "# TYPE smc_vulnerability_status gauge"
-    printf "%b\n" "$g_smc_vuln_output"
-    echo "# HELP smc_vulnerable_count Number of CVEs with vulnerable status"
-    echo "# TYPE smc_vulnerable_count gauge"
-    echo "smc_vulnerable_count $g_smc_vuln_count"
-    echo "# HELP smc_unknown_count Number of CVEs with unknown status"
-    echo "# TYPE smc_unknown_count gauge"
-    echo "smc_unknown_count $g_smc_unk_count"
-    echo "# HELP smc_last_scan_timestamp_seconds Unix timestamp when this scan completed"
-    echo "# TYPE smc_last_scan_timestamp_seconds gauge"
-    echo "smc_last_scan_timestamp_seconds $(date +%s 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
+    echo "# TYPE specex_vuln_status untyped"
+    echo "# HELP specex_vuln_status Exposure of system to speculative execution vulnerabilities"
+    printf "%b\n" "$g_prometheus_output"
 fi
 
 # exit with the proper exit code

src/vulns-helpers/check_mds.sh

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 check_mds_bsd() {
     local kernel_md_clear kernel_smt_allowed kernel_mds_enabled kernel_mds_state
     pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: "
-    if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+    if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
         if sysctl hw.mds_disable >/dev/null 2>&1; then
             pstatus green YES
             kernel_md_clear=1
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ check_mds_bsd() {
     else
         if [ "$cap_md_clear" = 1 ]; then
             if [ "$kernel_md_clear" = 1 ]; then
-                if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+                if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
                     # mitigation must also be enabled
                     if [ "$kernel_mds_enabled" -ge 1 ]; then
                         if [ "$opt_paranoid" != 1 ] || [ "$kernel_smt_allowed" = 0 ]; then
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ check_mds_bsd() {
                 pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode supports mitigation, but your kernel doesn't, upgrade it to mitigate the vulnerability"
             fi
         else
-            if [ "$kernel_md_clear" = 1 ] && [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+            if [ "$kernel_md_clear" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
                 # no MD_CLEAR in microcode, but FreeBSD may still have software-only mitigation active
                 case "$kernel_mds_state" in
                     software*)
@@ -132,54 +132,50 @@ check_mds_linux() {
     fi
 
     if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
-        # MDS is Intel-only; skip x86-specific kernel/cpuinfo checks on non-x86 kernels
+        pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: "
         kernel_md_clear=''
-        kernel_md_clear_can_tell=0
-        if is_x86_kernel; then
-            pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: "
-            kernel_md_clear_can_tell=1
-            if [ "$g_mode" = live ] && grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw md_clear; then
-                kernel_md_clear="md_clear found in $g_procfs/cpuinfo"
+        kernel_md_clear_can_tell=1
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw md_clear; then
+            kernel_md_clear="md_clear found in $g_procfs/cpuinfo"
+            pstatus green YES "$kernel_md_clear"
+        fi
+        if [ -z "$kernel_md_clear" ]; then
+            if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                kernel_md_clear_can_tell=0
+            elif [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
+                kernel_md_clear_can_tell=0
+            elif "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$g_kernel" | grep -q 'Clear CPU buffers'; then
+                pr_debug "md_clear: found 'Clear CPU buffers' string in kernel image"
+                kernel_md_clear='found md_clear implementation evidence in kernel image'
                 pstatus green YES "$kernel_md_clear"
             fi
-            if [ -z "$kernel_md_clear" ]; then
-                if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                    kernel_md_clear_can_tell=0
-                elif [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
-                    kernel_md_clear_can_tell=0
-                elif "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$g_kernel" | grep -q 'Clear CPU buffers'; then
-                    pr_debug "md_clear: found 'Clear CPU buffers' string in kernel image"
-                    kernel_md_clear='found md_clear implementation evidence in kernel image'
-                    pstatus green YES "$kernel_md_clear"
-                fi
-            fi
-            if [ -z "$kernel_md_clear" ]; then
-                if [ "$kernel_md_clear_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
-                    pstatus yellow NO
-                else
-                    pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
-                fi
+        fi
+        if [ -z "$kernel_md_clear" ]; then
+            if [ "$kernel_md_clear_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
+                pstatus yellow NO
+            else
+                pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
             fi
+        fi
 
-            if [ "$g_mode" = live ] && [ "$sys_interface_available" = 1 ]; then
-                pr_info_nol "* Kernel mitigation is enabled and active: "
-                if echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -qi ^mitigation; then
-                    mds_mitigated=1
-                    pstatus green YES
-                else
-                    mds_mitigated=0
-                    pstatus yellow NO
-                fi
-                pr_info_nol "* SMT is either mitigated or disabled: "
-                if echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -Eq 'SMT (disabled|mitigated)'; then
-                    mds_smt_mitigated=1
-                    pstatus green YES
-                else
-                    mds_smt_mitigated=0
-                    pstatus yellow NO
-                fi
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ "$sys_interface_available" = 1 ]; then
+            pr_info_nol "* Kernel mitigation is enabled and active: "
+            if echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -qi ^mitigation; then
+                mds_mitigated=1
+                pstatus green YES
+            else
+                mds_mitigated=0
+                pstatus yellow NO
             fi
-        fi # is_x86_kernel
+            pr_info_nol "* SMT is either mitigated or disabled: "
+            if echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -Eq 'SMT (disabled|mitigated)'; then
+                mds_smt_mitigated=1
+                pstatus green YES
+            else
+                mds_smt_mitigated=0
+                pstatus yellow NO
+            fi
+        fi
     elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
         # we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
         msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
@@ -194,7 +190,7 @@ check_mds_linux() {
             # compute mystatus and mymsg from our own logic
             if [ "$cap_md_clear" = 1 ]; then
                 if [ -n "$kernel_md_clear" ]; then
-                    if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+                    if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
                         # mitigation must also be enabled
                         if [ "$mds_mitigated" = 1 ]; then
                             if [ "$opt_paranoid" != 1 ] || [ "$mds_smt_mitigated" = 1 ]; then

src/vulns-helpers/check_mmio.sh

@@ -1,30 +1,16 @@
 # vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
 # MMIO Stale Data (Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities) - BSD mitigation check
 check_mmio_bsd() {
-    # No BSD (FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, DragonFlyBSD) has implemented an OS-level
-    # MMIO Stale Data mitigation. All four stopped at MDS/TAA. Microcode update is
-    # the only partial defense available, and without OS-level VERW invocation it
-    # cannot close the vulnerability.
-    local unk
-    unk="your CPU's MMIO Stale Data status is unknown (Intel never officially assessed this CPU, its servicing period has ended)"
     if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
         pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
-    elif is_cpu_mmio_unknown; then
-        if [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ]; then
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "$unk, and no BSD mitigation exists"
-            explain "There is no known mitigation for this CPU model. Even with up-to-date microcode, BSD kernels do not invoke VERW for MMIO Stale Data clearing. Only a hardware replacement can fully address this."
-        else
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "$unk; no BSD mitigation exists in any case"
-        fi
     else
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "your CPU is affected and no BSD has implemented an MMIO Stale Data mitigation"
-        explain "No BSD kernel currently implements an MMIO Stale Data mitigation (which would require invoking VERW at context switches and VM-entries). Updating CPU microcode alone does not mitigate this vulnerability without OS cooperation."
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "your CPU is affected, but mitigation detection has not yet been implemented for BSD in this script"
     fi
 }
 
 # MMIO Stale Data (Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities) - Linux mitigation check
 check_mmio_linux() {
-    local status sys_interface_available msg kernel_mmio kernel_mmio_can_tell mmio_mitigated mmio_smt_mitigated mystatus mymsg unk
+    local status sys_interface_available msg kernel_mmio kernel_mmio_can_tell mmio_mitigated mmio_smt_mitigated mystatus mymsg
     status=UNK
     sys_interface_available=0
     msg=''
@@ -126,33 +112,9 @@ check_mmio_linux() {
         #
         # No models have been added to or removed from the MMIO blacklist since v5.19.
         #
-        # 7df548840c49 (v6.0, NO_MMIO whitelist added, Pawan Gupta 2022-08-03):
-        #   Intel Family 6:
-        #     TIGERLAKE (0x8D), TIGERLAKE_L (0x8C)
-        #     ALDERLAKE (0x97), ALDERLAKE_L (0x9A)
-        #     ATOM_GOLDMONT (0x5C), ATOM_GOLDMONT_D (0x5F), ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS (0x7A)
-        #   AMD: fam 0x0f-0x12 + X86_FAMILY_ANY (all families)
-        #   Hygon: all families
-        #   Centaur fam 7, Zhaoxin fam 7
-        #
-        # Kernel logic (v6.0+):
-        #   if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) {
-        #       if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO))
-        #           setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
-        #       else if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MMIO))
-        #           setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
-        #   }
-        #   => Intel CPUs that are neither blacklisted nor whitelisted (e.g. Ivy Bridge,
-        #      Haswell client, Broadwell client, Sandy Bridge, pre-Goldmont Atom, etc.) get
-        #      X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN and report "Unknown: No mitigations" in sysfs. Intel
-        #      never published an affected-processor evaluation for these models because
-        #      their servicing period had already ended.
-        #   => is_cpu_mmio_unknown() matches this set so the script can report UNK (or
-        #      VULN under --paranoid) rather than the misleading "not affected" that
-        #      a plain blacklist check would produce.
-        #
         # immunity: ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO (bit 13) AND ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO (bit 14) AND ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO (bit 15)
         #   All three must be set. Checked via arch_cap_mmio_immune() in common.c.
+        #   Bug is set only when: cpu_matches(blacklist, MMIO) AND NOT arch_cap_mmio_immune().
         #
         # microcode mitigation: ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR (bit 17) -- VERW clears fill buffers.
         #   Alternative: MD_CLEAR CPUID + FLUSH_L1D CPUID when MDS_NO is not set (legacy path).
@@ -163,65 +125,61 @@ check_mmio_linux() {
     fi
 
     if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
-        # MMIO Stale Data is Intel-only; skip x86-specific kernel/MSR checks on non-x86 kernels
+        pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports MMIO Stale Data mitigation: "
         kernel_mmio=''
-        kernel_mmio_can_tell=0
-        if is_x86_kernel; then
-            pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports MMIO Stale Data mitigation: "
-            kernel_mmio_can_tell=1
-            if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
-                kernel_mmio_can_tell=0
-            elif grep -q 'mmio_stale_data' "$g_kernel" 2>/dev/null; then
-                pr_debug "mmio: found 'mmio_stale_data' string in kernel image"
-                kernel_mmio='found MMIO Stale Data mitigation evidence in kernel image'
+        kernel_mmio_can_tell=1
+        if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
+            kernel_mmio_can_tell=0
+        elif grep -q 'mmio_stale_data' "$g_kernel" 2>/dev/null; then
+            pr_debug "mmio: found 'mmio_stale_data' string in kernel image"
+            kernel_mmio='found MMIO Stale Data mitigation evidence in kernel image'
+            pstatus green YES "$kernel_mmio"
+        fi
+        if [ -z "$kernel_mmio" ] && [ -n "$opt_config" ] && grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA=y' "$opt_config"; then
+            kernel_mmio='found MMIO Stale Data mitigation config option enabled'
+            pstatus green YES "$kernel_mmio"
+        fi
+        if [ -z "$kernel_mmio" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+            if grep -qE 'mmio_select_mitigation|cpu_show_mmio_stale_data' "$opt_map"; then
+                kernel_mmio='found MMIO Stale Data mitigation function in System.map'
                 pstatus green YES "$kernel_mmio"
             fi
-            if [ -z "$kernel_mmio" ] && [ -n "$opt_config" ] && grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA=y' "$opt_config"; then
-                kernel_mmio='found MMIO Stale Data mitigation config option enabled'
-                pstatus green YES "$kernel_mmio"
-            fi
-            if [ -z "$kernel_mmio" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
-                if grep -qE 'mmio_select_mitigation|cpu_show_mmio_stale_data' "$opt_map"; then
-                    kernel_mmio='found MMIO Stale Data mitigation function in System.map'
-                    pstatus green YES "$kernel_mmio"
-                fi
-            fi
-            if [ -z "$kernel_mmio" ]; then
-                if [ "$kernel_mmio_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
-                    pstatus yellow NO
-                else
-                    pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
-                fi
-            fi
-
-            pr_info_nol "* CPU microcode supports Fill Buffer clearing: "
-            if [ "$cap_fb_clear" = -1 ]; then
+        fi
+        if [ -z "$kernel_mmio" ]; then
+            if [ "$kernel_mmio_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
+                pstatus yellow NO
+            else
                 pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
-            elif [ "$cap_fb_clear" = 1 ]; then
+            fi
+        fi
+
+        pr_info_nol "* CPU microcode supports Fill Buffer clearing: "
+        if [ "$cap_fb_clear" = -1 ]; then
+            pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+        elif [ "$cap_fb_clear" = 1 ]; then
+            pstatus green YES
+        else
+            pstatus yellow NO
+        fi
+
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ "$sys_interface_available" = 1 ]; then
+            pr_info_nol "* Kernel mitigation is enabled and active: "
+            if echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -qi ^mitigation; then
+                mmio_mitigated=1
                 pstatus green YES
             else
+                mmio_mitigated=0
                 pstatus yellow NO
             fi
-
-            if [ "$g_mode" = live ] && [ "$sys_interface_available" = 1 ]; then
-                pr_info_nol "* Kernel mitigation is enabled and active: "
-                if echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -qi ^mitigation; then
-                    mmio_mitigated=1
-                    pstatus green YES
-                else
-                    mmio_mitigated=0
-                    pstatus yellow NO
-                fi
-                pr_info_nol "* SMT is either mitigated or disabled: "
-                if echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -Eq 'SMT (disabled|mitigated)'; then
-                    mmio_smt_mitigated=1
-                    pstatus green YES
-                else
-                    mmio_smt_mitigated=0
-                    pstatus yellow NO
-                fi
+            pr_info_nol "* SMT is either mitigated or disabled: "
+            if echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -Eq 'SMT (disabled|mitigated)'; then
+                mmio_smt_mitigated=1
+                pstatus green YES
+            else
+                mmio_smt_mitigated=0
+                pstatus yellow NO
             fi
-        fi # is_x86_kernel
+        fi
     elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
         # we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
         msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
@@ -231,23 +189,12 @@ check_mmio_linux() {
     if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
         # override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
         pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
-    elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ] && is_cpu_mmio_unknown; then
-        # Bypass the normal sysfs reconciliation: sysfs reports "Unknown: No mitigations"
-        # only on v6.0-v6.15. On earlier and on v6.16+ kernels it wrongly says "Not affected"
-        # for these CPUs (which predate FB_CLEAR microcode and Intel's affected-processor list).
-        unk="your CPU's MMIO Stale Data status is unknown (Intel never officially assessed this CPU, its servicing period has ended)"
-        if [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ]; then
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "$unk, and no mitigation is available"
-            explain "There is no known mitigation for this CPU model. Intel ended its servicing period without evaluating whether it is affected by MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities, so no FB_CLEAR-capable microcode was released. Consider replacing affected hardware."
-        else
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "$unk; no mitigation is available in any case"
-        fi
     else
         if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
             # compute mystatus and mymsg from our own logic
             if [ "$cap_fb_clear" = 1 ]; then
                 if [ -n "$kernel_mmio" ]; then
-                    if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+                    if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
                         # mitigation must also be enabled
                         if [ "$mmio_mitigated" = 1 ]; then
                             if [ "$opt_paranoid" != 1 ] || [ "$mmio_smt_mitigated" = 1 ]; then

src/vulns-helpers/check_sls.sh

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
 ###############################
-# Straight-Line Speculation (SLS) supplementary check (--extra only)
+# Straight-Line Speculation (SLS) — supplementary check (--extra only)
 #
 # SLS: x86 CPUs may speculatively execute instructions past unconditional
 # control flow changes (RET, indirect JMP/CALL). Mitigated at compile time
@@ -173,8 +173,10 @@ check_CVE_0000_0001_linux() {
             return
         fi
 
-        # --- ARM: no kernel mitigation available ---
-        if is_arm_kernel; then
+        # --- arm64: no kernel mitigation available ---
+        local _sls_arch
+        _sls_arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)
+        if echo "$_sls_arch" | grep -qw 'aarch64'; then
             pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "no kernel mitigation available for arm64 SLS (CVE-2020-13844)"
             explain "Your ARM processor is affected by Straight-Line Speculation (CVE-2020-13844).\n" \
                 "GCC and Clang support -mharden-sls=all for aarch64, which inserts SB (Speculation Barrier)\n" \
@@ -184,12 +186,7 @@ check_CVE_0000_0001_linux() {
             return
         fi
 
-        # --- x86: config check and binary heuristic ---
-        if ! is_x86_kernel; then
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "SLS mitigation detection not supported for this kernel architecture"
-            return
-        fi
-
+        # --- method 1: kernel config check (x86_64) ---
         local _sls_config=''
         if [ -n "$opt_config" ] && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
             pr_info_nol "  * Kernel compiled with SLS mitigation: "
@@ -261,6 +258,9 @@ check_CVE_0000_0001_linux() {
         # --- verdict (x86_64) ---
         if [ "$_sls_config" = 1 ] || [ "$_sls_heuristic" = 1 ]; then
             pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "kernel compiled with SLS mitigation"
+            explain "Your kernel was compiled with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS=y (or CONFIG_SLS=y on kernels before 6.8),\n" \
+                "which enables the GCC flag -mharden-sls=all to insert INT3 instructions after unconditional\n" \
+                "control flow changes, blocking straight-line speculation."
         elif [ "$_sls_config" = 0 ] || [ "$_sls_heuristic" = 0 ]; then
             pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "kernel not compiled with SLS mitigation"
             explain "Recompile your kernel with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS=y (or CONFIG_SLS=y on kernels before 6.8).\n" \

src/vulns/CVE-0001-0001.sh

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
-###############################
-# CVE-0001-0001, ARM SPEC AT, ARM64 errata 1165522/1319367/1319537/1530923, Speculative AT TLB corruption
-
-check_CVE_0001_0001() {
-    check_cve 'CVE-0001-0001'
-}
-
-# On affected cores, a speculative address translation (AT) instruction issued from the hypervisor
-# using an out-of-context translation regime may poison the TLB, causing a subsequent guest-context
-# request to see an incorrect translation. Relevant mainly to KVM hosts. Kernel workaround:
-# invalidate TLB state across world-switch for affected cores (ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT).
-#   * Cortex-A76 r0p0..r2p0   erratum 1165522   CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1165522
-#   * Cortex-A72 all revs     erratum 1319367   CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1319367
-#   * Cortex-A57 all revs     erratum 1319537   CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1319367 (same kconfig)
-#   * Cortex-A55 r0p0..r2p0   erratum 1530923   CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1530923
-# References:
-#   arch/arm64/Kconfig (ARM64_ERRATUM_{1165522,1319367,1530923})
-#   arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c (erratum_speculative_at_list, "ARM errata 1165522, 1319367, or 1530923")
-#   Cortex-A55 SDEN: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-1301074/latest
-check_CVE_0001_0001_linux() {
-    local cve kernel_mitigated config_found
-    cve='CVE-0001-0001'
-    kernel_mitigated=''
-    config_found=''
-
-    if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ] && is_arm_kernel; then
-        # kconfig: any of the three erratum config options implies the workaround is compiled in
-        if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
-            for erratum in 1165522 1319367 1530923; do
-                if grep -q "^CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_$erratum=y" "$opt_config"; then
-                    config_found="${config_found:+$config_found, }$erratum"
-                fi
-            done
-            [ -n "$config_found" ] && kernel_mitigated="found CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_$config_found=y in kernel config"
-        fi
-        # kernel image: look for the descriptor string the kernel prints at boot
-        if [ -z "$kernel_mitigated" ] && [ -n "$g_kernel" ]; then
-            if "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$g_kernel" 2>/dev/null | grep -qE 'ARM errata 1165522, 1319367'; then
-                kernel_mitigated="found erratum descriptor string in kernel image"
-            fi
-        fi
-        # live mode: dmesg prints the workaround once at boot
-        if [ -z "$kernel_mitigated" ] && [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
-            if dmesg 2>/dev/null | grep -qE 'ARM errata 1165522, 1319367'; then
-                kernel_mitigated="erratum workaround reported as applied in dmesg"
-            fi
-        fi
-
-        pr_info_nol "* Kernel has the ARM64 Speculative-AT workaround compiled in: "
-        if [ -n "$kernel_mitigated" ]; then
-            pstatus green YES "$kernel_mitigated"
-        else
-            pstatus yellow NO
-        fi
-    fi
-
-    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU is not affected by this erratum family"
-    elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "no sysfs interface exists for this erratum, own checks have been skipped (--sysfs-only)"
-    elif [ -n "$kernel_mitigated" ]; then
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your kernel includes the erratum workaround"
-    else
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "your CPU is affected by this erratum family and the kernel does not appear to include the workaround"
-        explain "Run a kernel built with CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1165522=y, CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1319367=y, and/or CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1530923=y (matching your CPU core). These options are 'default y' in mainline and enabled by most distro kernels. Refer to the ARM Software Developers Errata Notice for your core for full details."
-    fi
-}
-
-check_CVE_0001_0001_bsd() {
-    local cve
-    cve='CVE-0001-0001'
-    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU is not affected by this erratum family"
-    else
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "your CPU is affected, but mitigation detection has not yet been implemented for BSD in this script"
-    fi
-}

src/vulns/CVE-0001-0002.sh

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
-###############################
-# CVE-0001-0002, ARM SPEC UNPRIV LOAD, ARM64 errata 2966298/3117295, Speculative unprivileged load
-
-check_CVE_0001_0002() {
-    check_cve 'CVE-0001-0002'
-}
-
-# On affected cores, a speculatively-executed unprivileged load from a page that is mapped as
-# privileged can leak the loaded value into the cache hierarchy, allowing a Spectre-style
-# cache side-channel to expose privileged kernel data to userspace. Kernel workaround:
-# sandwich kernel-exit sequences with an additional speculation barrier/DSB so that
-# speculative unprivileged loads cannot observe privileged state
-# (ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD).
-#   * Cortex-A510 all revs    erratum 3117295   CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3117295
-#   * Cortex-A520 r0p0..r0p1  erratum 2966298   CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_2966298
-# References:
-#   arch/arm64/Kconfig (ARM64_ERRATUM_{2966298,3117295})
-#   arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c (erratum_spec_unpriv_load_list, "ARM errata 2966298, 3117295")
-#   Cortex-A510 SDEN: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-2397239/latest
-check_CVE_0001_0002_linux() {
-    local cve kernel_mitigated config_found erratum
-    cve='CVE-0001-0002'
-    kernel_mitigated=''
-    config_found=''
-
-    if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ] && is_arm_kernel; then
-        if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
-            for erratum in 2966298 3117295; do
-                if grep -q "^CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_$erratum=y" "$opt_config"; then
-                    config_found="${config_found:+$config_found, }$erratum"
-                fi
-            done
-            [ -n "$config_found" ] && kernel_mitigated="found CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_$config_found=y in kernel config"
-        fi
-        if [ -z "$kernel_mitigated" ] && [ -n "$g_kernel" ]; then
-            if "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$g_kernel" 2>/dev/null | grep -qE 'ARM errata 2966298, 3117295'; then
-                kernel_mitigated="found erratum descriptor string in kernel image"
-            fi
-        fi
-        if [ -z "$kernel_mitigated" ] && [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
-            if dmesg 2>/dev/null | grep -qE 'ARM errata 2966298, 3117295'; then
-                kernel_mitigated="erratum workaround reported as applied in dmesg"
-            fi
-        fi
-
-        pr_info_nol "* Kernel has the ARM64 Speculative-Unprivileged-Load workaround compiled in: "
-        if [ -n "$kernel_mitigated" ]; then
-            pstatus green YES "$kernel_mitigated"
-        else
-            pstatus yellow NO
-        fi
-    fi
-
-    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU is not affected by this erratum family"
-    elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "no sysfs interface exists for this erratum, own checks have been skipped (--sysfs-only)"
-    elif [ -n "$kernel_mitigated" ]; then
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your kernel includes the erratum workaround"
-    else
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "your CPU is affected by this erratum family and the kernel does not appear to include the workaround"
-        explain "Run a kernel built with CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_2966298=y (Cortex-A520) and/or CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3117295=y (Cortex-A510). These options are 'default y' in mainline and enabled by most distro kernels. Refer to the ARM Software Developers Errata Notice for your core for full details."
-    fi
-}
-
-check_CVE_0001_0002_bsd() {
-    local cve
-    cve='CVE-0001-0002'
-    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU is not affected by this erratum family"
-    else
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "your CPU is affected, but mitigation detection has not yet been implemented for BSD in this script"
-    fi
-}

src/vulns/CVE-0001-0003.sh

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
-###############################
-# CVE-0001-0003, ARM SSBS NOSYNC, ARM64 erratum 3194386, MSR SSBS not self-synchronizing
-
-check_CVE_0001_0003() {
-    check_cve 'CVE-0001-0003'
-}
-
-# On affected cores, the "MSR SSBS, #x" instruction is not self-synchronizing, so subsequent
-# speculative instructions may execute without observing the new SSBS state. This can permit
-# unintended speculative store bypass (Spectre V4 / CVE-2018-3639) even when software thinks
-# the mitigation is in effect. Kernel workaround (ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_SSBS):
-#   - place a Speculation Barrier (SB) or ISB after every kernel-side SSBS change
-#   - hide SSBS from userspace hwcaps and EL0 reads of ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 so that userspace
-#     routes SSB mitigation changes through the prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) path
-# Affected cores (via ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386, with individual sub-errata numbers):
-#   Cortex-A76/A77/A78/A78C/A710/A715/A720/A720AE/A725, X1/X1C/X2/X3/X4/X925,
-#   Neoverse-N1/N2/N3, Neoverse-V1/V2/V3/V3AE
-# References:
-#   arch/arm64/Kconfig (ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386)
-#   arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c (erratum_spec_ssbs_list, "SSBS not fully self-synchronizing")
-check_CVE_0001_0003_linux() {
-    local cve kernel_mitigated
-    cve='CVE-0001-0003'
-    kernel_mitigated=''
-
-    if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ] && is_arm_kernel; then
-        if [ -n "$opt_config" ] && grep -q '^CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386=y' "$opt_config"; then
-            kernel_mitigated="found CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386=y in kernel config"
-        fi
-        if [ -z "$kernel_mitigated" ] && [ -n "$g_kernel" ]; then
-            if "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$g_kernel" 2>/dev/null | grep -qE 'SSBS not fully self-synchronizing'; then
-                kernel_mitigated="found erratum descriptor string in kernel image"
-            fi
-        fi
-        if [ -z "$kernel_mitigated" ] && [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
-            if dmesg 2>/dev/null | grep -qE 'SSBS not fully self-synchronizing'; then
-                kernel_mitigated="erratum workaround reported as applied in dmesg"
-            fi
-        fi
-
-        pr_info_nol "* Kernel has the ARM64 SSBS self-sync workaround compiled in: "
-        if [ -n "$kernel_mitigated" ]; then
-            pstatus green YES "$kernel_mitigated"
-        else
-            pstatus yellow NO
-        fi
-    fi
-
-    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU is not affected by this erratum"
-    elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "no sysfs interface exists for this erratum, own checks have been skipped (--sysfs-only)"
-    elif [ -n "$kernel_mitigated" ]; then
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your kernel includes the erratum workaround"
-    else
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "your CPU is affected by this erratum and the kernel does not appear to include the workaround; Spectre V4 (CVE-2018-3639) mitigation may be unreliable on this system"
-        explain "Run a kernel built with CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386=y. This option is 'default y' in mainline and enabled by most distro kernels. Without it, the Spectre V4 / speculative-store-bypass mitigation advertised by SSBS is not reliably applied. Userspace should use prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, ...) to request the mitigation rather than rely on the SSBS hwcap."
-    fi
-}
-
-check_CVE_0001_0003_bsd() {
-    local cve
-    cve='CVE-0001-0003'
-    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU is not affected by this erratum"
-    else
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "your CPU is affected, but mitigation detection has not yet been implemented for BSD in this script"
-    fi
-}

src/vulns/CVE-2017-5753.sh

@@ -57,12 +57,12 @@ check_CVE_2017_5753_linux() {
         status=$ret_sys_interface_check_status
     fi
     if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
-        # no /sys interface (or no-runtime mode), fallback to our own ways
+        # no /sys interface (or offline mode), fallback to our own ways
 
         # Primary detection: grep for sysfs mitigation strings in the kernel binary.
         # The string "__user pointer sanitization" is present in all kernel versions
         # that have spectre_v1 sysfs support (x86 v4.16+, ARM64 v5.2+, ARM32 v5.17+),
-        # including RHEL "Load fences" variants. This is cheap and works in no-runtime mode.
+        # including RHEL "Load fences" variants. This is cheap and works offline.
         pr_info_nol "* Kernel has spectre_v1 mitigation (kernel image): "
         v1_kernel_mitigated=''
         v1_kernel_mitigated_err=''
@@ -98,51 +98,63 @@ check_CVE_2017_5753_linux() {
         # Fallback for v4.15-era kernels: binary pattern matching for array_index_mask_nospec().
         # The sysfs mitigation strings were not present in the kernel image until v4.16 (x86)
         # and v5.2 (ARM64), but the actual mitigation code landed in v4.15 (x86) and v4.16 (ARM64).
-        # For no-runtime analysis of these old kernels, match the specific instruction patterns.
+        # For offline analysis of these old kernels, match the specific instruction patterns.
         if [ -z "$v1_kernel_mitigated" ]; then
             pr_info_nol "* Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec (v4.15 binary pattern): "
+            # vanilla: look for the Linus' mask aka array_index_mask_nospec()
+            # that is inlined at least in raw_copy_from_user (__get_user_X symbols)
+            #mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
+            #cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
+            #jae bad_get_user
+            # /* array_index_mask_nospec() are the 2 opcodes that follow */
+            #+sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX
+            #+and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
+            #ASM_STAC
+            # x86 64bits: jae(0x0f 0x83 0x?? 0x?? 0x?? 0x??) sbb(0x48 0x19 0xd2) and(0x48 0x21 0xd0)
+            # x86 32bits: cmp(0x3b 0x82 0x?? 0x?? 0x00 0x00) jae(0x73 0x??) sbb(0x19 0xd2) and(0x21 0xd0)
+            #
+            # arm32
+            ##ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
+            ##define CSDB	".inst.w 0xf3af8014"
+            ##else
+            ##define CSDB	".inst	0xe320f014"     e320f014
+            ##endif
+            #asm volatile(
+            #	"cmp	%1, %2\n"      e1500003
+            #"	sbc	%0, %1, %1\n"  e0c03000
+            #CSDB
+            #: "=r" (mask)
+            #: "r" (idx), "Ir" (sz)
+            #: "cc");
+            #
+            # http://git.arm.linux.org.uk/cgit/linux-arm.git/commit/?h=spectre&id=a78d156587931a2c3b354534aa772febf6c9e855
             v1_mask_nospec=''
             if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
                 pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($g_kernel_err)"
-            elif is_x86_kernel; then
-                # x86: binary pattern matching for array_index_mask_nospec()
-                # x86 64bits: jae(0x0f 0x83 ....) sbb(0x48 0x19 0xd2) and(0x48 0x21 0xd0)
-                # x86 32bits: cmp(0x3b 0x82 .. .. 0x00 0x00) jae(0x73 ..) sbb(0x19 0xd2) and(0x21 0xd0)
-                if ! command -v perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                    pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it"
+            elif ! command -v perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it"
+            else
+                perl -ne '/\x0f\x83....\x48\x19\xd2\x48\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found ? 0 : 1) }' "$g_kernel"
+                ret=$?
+                if [ "$ret" -eq 0 ]; then
+                    pstatus green YES "x86 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
+                    v1_mask_nospec="x86 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec"
                 else
-                    perl -ne '/\x0f\x83....\x48\x19\xd2\x48\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found ? 0 : 1) }' "$g_kernel"
+                    perl -ne '/\x3b\x82..\x00\x00\x73.\x19\xd2\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found ? 0 : 1) }' "$g_kernel"
                     ret=$?
                     if [ "$ret" -eq 0 ]; then
-                        pstatus green YES "x86 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
-                        v1_mask_nospec="x86 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec"
+                        pstatus green YES "x86 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
+                        v1_mask_nospec="x86 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec"
                     else
-                        perl -ne '/\x3b\x82..\x00\x00\x73.\x19\xd2\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found ? 0 : 1) }' "$g_kernel"
-                        ret=$?
-                        if [ "$ret" -eq 0 ]; then
-                            pstatus green YES "x86 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
-                            v1_mask_nospec="x86 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec"
+                        ret=$("${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" "$g_objdump_options" "$g_kernel" | grep -w -e f3af8014 -e e320f014 -B2 | grep -B1 -w sbc | grep -w -c cmp)
+                        if [ "$ret" -gt 0 ]; then
+                            pstatus green YES "$ret occurrence(s) found of arm 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
+                            v1_mask_nospec="arm 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec"
                         else
                             pstatus yellow NO
                         fi
                     fi
                 fi
-            elif is_arm_kernel; then
-                # arm32: match CSDB instruction (0xf3af8014 Thumb2 or 0xe320f014 ARM) preceded by sbc+cmp
-                # http://git.arm.linux.org.uk/cgit/linux-arm.git/commit/?h=spectre&id=a78d156587931a2c3b354534aa772febf6c9e855
-                if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                    pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
-                else
-                    ret=$("${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" "$g_objdump_options" "$g_kernel" | grep -w -e f3af8014 -e e320f014 -B2 | grep -B1 -w sbc | grep -w -c cmp)
-                    if [ "$ret" -gt 0 ]; then
-                        pstatus green YES "$ret occurrence(s) found of arm 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
-                        v1_mask_nospec="arm 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec"
-                    else
-                        pstatus yellow NO
-                    fi
-                fi
-            else
-                pstatus yellow NO
             fi
         fi
 
@@ -160,69 +172,67 @@ check_CVE_2017_5753_linux() {
             pstatus yellow NO
         fi
 
-        if is_arm_kernel; then
-            pr_info_nol "* Kernel has mask_nospec64 (arm64): "
-            #.macro	mask_nospec64, idx, limit, tmp
-            #sub	\tmp, \idx, \limit
-            #bic	\tmp, \tmp, \idx
-            #and	\idx, \idx, \tmp, asr #63
-            #csdb
-            #.endm
-            #$ aarch64-linux-gnu-objdump -d vmlinux | grep -w bic -A1 -B1 | grep -w sub -A2 | grep -w and -B2
-            #ffffff8008082e44:       cb190353        sub     x19, x26, x25
-            #ffffff8008082e48:       8a3a0273        bic     x19, x19, x26
-            #ffffff8008082e4c:       8a93ff5a        and     x26, x26, x19, asr #63
-            #ffffff8008082e50:       d503229f        hint    #0x14
-            # /!\ can also just be "csdb" instead of "hint #0x14" for native objdump
-            #
-            # if we already have a detection, don't bother disassembling the kernel, the answer is no.
-            if [ -n "$v1_kernel_mitigated" ] || [ -n "$v1_mask_nospec" ] || [ "$g_redhat_canonical_spectre" -gt 0 ]; then
-                pstatus yellow NO
-            elif [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
-                pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($g_kernel_err)"
-            elif ! command -v perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it"
-            elif ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+        pr_info_nol "* Kernel has mask_nospec64 (arm64): "
+        #.macro	mask_nospec64, idx, limit, tmp
+        #sub	\tmp, \idx, \limit
+        #bic	\tmp, \tmp, \idx
+        #and	\idx, \idx, \tmp, asr #63
+        #csdb
+        #.endm
+        #$ aarch64-linux-gnu-objdump -d vmlinux | grep -w bic -A1 -B1 | grep -w sub -A2 | grep -w and -B2
+        #ffffff8008082e44:       cb190353        sub     x19, x26, x25
+        #ffffff8008082e48:       8a3a0273        bic     x19, x19, x26
+        #ffffff8008082e4c:       8a93ff5a        and     x26, x26, x19, asr #63
+        #ffffff8008082e50:       d503229f        hint    #0x14
+        # /!\ can also just be "csdb" instead of "hint #0x14" for native objdump
+        #
+        # if we already have a detection, don't bother disassembling the kernel, the answer is no.
+        if [ -n "$v1_kernel_mitigated" ] || [ -n "$v1_mask_nospec" ] || [ "$g_redhat_canonical_spectre" -gt 0 ]; then
+            pstatus yellow NO
+        elif [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
+            pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($g_kernel_err)"
+        elif ! command -v perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it"
+        elif ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+        else
+            "${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" "$g_objdump_options" "$g_kernel" | perl -ne 'push @r, $_; /\s(hint|csdb)\s/ && $r[0]=~/\ssub\s+(x\d+)/ && $r[1]=~/\sbic\s+$1,\s+$1,/ && $r[2]=~/\sand\s/ && exit(9); shift @r if @r>3'
+            ret=$?
+            if [ "$ret" -eq 9 ]; then
+                pstatus green YES "mask_nospec64 macro is present and used"
+                v1_mask_nospec="arm64 mask_nospec64"
             else
-                "${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" "$g_objdump_options" "$g_kernel" | perl -ne 'push @r, $_; /\s(hint|csdb)\s/ && $r[0]=~/\ssub\s+(x\d+)/ && $r[1]=~/\sbic\s+$1,\s+$1,/ && $r[2]=~/\sand\s/ && exit(9); shift @r if @r>3'
-                ret=$?
-                if [ "$ret" -eq 9 ]; then
-                    pstatus green YES "mask_nospec64 macro is present and used"
-                    v1_mask_nospec="arm64 mask_nospec64"
-                else
-                    pstatus yellow NO
-                fi
+                pstatus yellow NO
             fi
+        fi
 
-            pr_info_nol "* Kernel has array_index_nospec (arm64): "
-            # in 4.19+ kernels, the mask_nospec64 asm64 macro is replaced by array_index_nospec, defined in nospec.h, and used in invoke_syscall()
-            # ffffff8008090a4c:       2a0203e2        mov     w2, w2
-            # ffffff8008090a50:       eb0200bf        cmp     x5, x2
-            # ffffff8008090a54:       da1f03e2        ngc     x2, xzr
-            # ffffff8008090a58:       d503229f        hint    #0x14
-            # /!\ can also just be "csdb" instead of "hint #0x14" for native objdump
-            #
-            # if we already have a detection, don't bother disassembling the kernel, the answer is no.
-            if [ -n "$v1_kernel_mitigated" ] || [ -n "$v1_mask_nospec" ] || [ "$g_redhat_canonical_spectre" -gt 0 ]; then
-                pstatus yellow NO
-            elif [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
-                pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($g_kernel_err)"
-            elif ! command -v perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it"
-            elif ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+        pr_info_nol "* Kernel has array_index_nospec (arm64): "
+        # in 4.19+ kernels, the mask_nospec64 asm64 macro is replaced by array_index_nospec, defined in nospec.h, and used in invoke_syscall()
+        # ffffff8008090a4c:       2a0203e2        mov     w2, w2
+        # ffffff8008090a50:       eb0200bf        cmp     x5, x2
+        # ffffff8008090a54:       da1f03e2        ngc     x2, xzr
+        # ffffff8008090a58:       d503229f        hint    #0x14
+        # /!\ can also just be "csdb" instead of "hint #0x14" for native objdump
+        #
+        # if we already have a detection, don't bother disassembling the kernel, the answer is no.
+        if [ -n "$v1_kernel_mitigated" ] || [ -n "$v1_mask_nospec" ] || [ "$g_redhat_canonical_spectre" -gt 0 ]; then
+            pstatus yellow NO
+        elif [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
+            pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($g_kernel_err)"
+        elif ! command -v perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it"
+        elif ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+        else
+            "${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" "$g_objdump_options" "$g_kernel" | perl -ne 'push @r, $_; /\s(hint|csdb)\s/ && $r[0]=~/\smov\s+(w\d+),\s+(w\d+)/ && $r[1]=~/\scmp\s+(x\d+),\s+(x\d+)/ && $r[2]=~/\sngc\s+$2,/ && exit(9); shift @r if @r>3'
+            ret=$?
+            if [ "$ret" -eq 9 ]; then
+                pstatus green YES "array_index_nospec macro is present and used"
+                v1_mask_nospec="arm64 array_index_nospec"
             else
-                "${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" "$g_objdump_options" "$g_kernel" | perl -ne 'push @r, $_; /\s(hint|csdb)\s/ && $r[0]=~/\smov\s+(w\d+),\s+(w\d+)/ && $r[1]=~/\scmp\s+(x\d+),\s+(x\d+)/ && $r[2]=~/\sngc\s+$2,/ && exit(9); shift @r if @r>3'
-                ret=$?
-                if [ "$ret" -eq 9 ]; then
-                    pstatus green YES "array_index_nospec macro is present and used"
-                    v1_mask_nospec="arm64 array_index_nospec"
-                else
-                    pstatus yellow NO
-                fi
+                pstatus yellow NO
             fi
-        fi # is_arm_kernel
+        fi
 
     elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
         msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"

src/vulns/CVE-2017-5754.sh

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ check_CVE_2017_5754_linux() {
 
         mount_debugfs
         pr_info_nol "  * PTI enabled and active: "
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             dmesg_grep="Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled"
             dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|Kernel page table isolation enabled"
             dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|x86/pti: Unmapping kernel while in userspace"
@@ -150,13 +150,10 @@ check_CVE_2017_5754_linux() {
                 pstatus yellow NO
             fi
         else
-            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in no-runtime mode"
+            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
         fi
 
-        # PCID/INVPCID are x86-only CPU features
-        if is_x86_cpu; then
-            pti_performance_check
-        fi
+        pti_performance_check
 
     elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
         # we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
@@ -170,7 +167,7 @@ check_CVE_2017_5754_linux() {
     is_xen_dom0 && xen_pv_domo=1
     is_xen_domU && xen_pv_domu=1
 
-    if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+    if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
         # checking whether we're running under Xen PV 64 bits. If yes, we are affected by affected_variant3
         # (unless we are a Dom0)
         pr_info_nol "* Running as a Xen PV DomU: "
@@ -186,7 +183,7 @@ check_CVE_2017_5754_linux() {
         pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
     elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
         # if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
                 pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
             elif [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
@@ -212,12 +209,12 @@ check_CVE_2017_5754_linux() {
             fi
         else
             if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
-                pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "no-runtime mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
             elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
                 pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
                 explain "If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_(MITIGATION_)PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
             else
-                pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "no-runtime mode: not enough information"
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "offline mode: not enough information"
                 explain "Re-run this script with root privileges, and give it the kernel image (--kernel), the kernel configuration (--config) and the System.map file (--map) corresponding to the kernel you would like to inspect."
             fi
         fi

src/vulns/CVE-2018-12207.sh

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ check_CVE_2018_12207_linux() {
         if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
             kernel_itlbmh_err="$g_kernel_err"
         # commit 5219505fcbb640e273a0d51c19c38de0100ec5a9
-        elif is_x86_kernel && grep -q 'itlb_multihit' "$g_kernel"; then
+        elif grep -q 'itlb_multihit' "$g_kernel"; then
             kernel_itlbmh="found itlb_multihit in kernel image"
         fi
         if [ -n "$kernel_itlbmh" ]; then
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ check_CVE_2018_12207_linux() {
         fi
 
         pr_info_nol "* iTLB Multihit mitigation enabled and active: "
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             if [ -n "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" ]; then
                 if echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -qF 'Mitigation'; then
                     pstatus green YES "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg"
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ check_CVE_2018_12207_linux() {
                 pstatus yellow NO "itlb_multihit not found in sysfs hierarchy"
             fi
         else
-            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in no-runtime mode"
+            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
         fi
     elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
         # we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ check_CVE_2018_12207_linux() {
     elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
         # if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
         if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
-            if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+            if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
                 # if we're in live mode and $msg is empty, sysfs file is not there so kernel is too old
                 pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your kernel doesn't support iTLB Multihit mitigation, update it"
             else

src/vulns/CVE-2018-3615.sh.rej

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
---- src/vulns/CVE-2018-3615.sh
-+++ src/vulns/CVE-2018-3615.sh
-@@ -8,15 +8,10 @@ check_CVE_2018_3615() {
-     pr_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
- 
-     pr_info_nol "* CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: "
--    if { [ "$cap_flush_cmd" = 1 ] || { [ "$g_msr_locked_down" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_l1df" = 1 ]; }; } && [ "$cap_sgx" = 1 ]; then
--        # no easy way to detect a fixed SGX but we know that
--        # microcodes that have the FLUSH_CMD MSR also have the
--        # fixed SGX (for CPUs that support it), because Intel
--        # delivered fixed microcodes for both issues at the same time
--        #
--        # if the system we're running on is locked down (no way to write MSRs),
--        # make the assumption that if the L1D flush CPUID bit is set, probably
--        # that FLUSH_CMD MSR is here too
-+    if [ "$cap_l1df" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_sgx" = 1 ]; then
-+        # the L1D flush CPUID bit indicates that the microcode supports L1D flushing,
-+        # and microcodes that have this also have the fixed SGX (for CPUs that support it),
-+        # because Intel delivered fixed microcodes for both issues at the same time
-         pstatus green YES
-     elif [ "$cap_sgx" = 1 ]; then
-         pstatus red NO
-@@ -27,7 +22,7 @@ check_CVE_2018_3615() {
-     if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
-         # override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
-         pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
--    elif [ "$cap_flush_cmd" = 1 ] || { [ "$g_msr_locked_down" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_l1df" = 1 ]; }; then
-+    elif [ "$cap_l1df" = 1 ]; then
-         pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability"
-     else
-         pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "your CPU supports SGX and the microcode is not up to date"

src/vulns/CVE-2018-3620.sh

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ check_CVE_2018_3620_linux() {
         fi
 
         pr_info_nol "* PTE inversion enabled and active: "
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             if [ -n "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" ]; then
                 if echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -q 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion'; then
                     pstatus green YES
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ check_CVE_2018_3620_linux() {
                 pteinv_active=-1
             fi
         else
-            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in no-runtime mode"
+            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
         fi
     elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
         # we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ check_CVE_2018_3620_linux() {
         # if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
         if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
             if [ "$pteinv_supported" = 1 ]; then
-                if [ "$pteinv_active" = 1 ] || [ "$g_mode" != live ]; then
+                if [ "$pteinv_active" = 1 ] || [ "$opt_live" != 1 ]; then
                     pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "PTE inversion mitigates the vulnerability"
                 else
                     pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your kernel supports PTE inversion but it doesn't seem to be enabled"

src/vulns/CVE-2018-3639.sh

@@ -18,19 +18,19 @@ check_CVE_2018_3639_linux() {
     fi
     if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
         pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports disabling speculative store bypass (SSB): "
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             if grep -Eq 'Speculation.?Store.?Bypass:' "$g_procfs/self/status" 2>/dev/null; then
                 kernel_ssb="found in $g_procfs/self/status"
                 pr_debug "found Speculation.Store.Bypass: in $g_procfs/self/status"
             fi
         fi
-        # spec_store_bypass is x86-specific; ARM kernels use ARM64_SSBD instead
-        if [ -z "$kernel_ssb" ] && [ -n "$g_kernel" ] && is_x86_kernel; then
+        # arm64 kernels can have cpu_show_spec_store_bypass with ARM64_SSBD, so exclude them
+        if [ -z "$kernel_ssb" ] && [ -n "$g_kernel" ] && ! grep -q 'arm64_sys_' "$g_kernel"; then
             kernel_ssb=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$g_kernel" | grep spec_store_bypass | head -n1)
             [ -n "$kernel_ssb" ] && kernel_ssb="found $kernel_ssb in kernel"
         fi
-        # spec_store_bypass is x86-specific; ARM kernels use ARM64_SSBD instead
-        if [ -z "$kernel_ssb" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ] && is_x86_kernel; then
+        # arm64 kernels can have cpu_show_spec_store_bypass with ARM64_SSBD, so exclude them
+        if [ -z "$kernel_ssb" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ] && ! grep -q 'arm64_sys_' "$opt_map"; then
             kernel_ssb=$(grep spec_store_bypass "$opt_map" | awk '{print $3}' | head -n1)
             [ -n "$kernel_ssb" ] && kernel_ssb="found $kernel_ssb in System.map"
         fi
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ check_CVE_2018_3639_linux() {
         fi
 
         kernel_ssbd_enabled=-1
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             # https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.0/source/fs/proc/array.c#L340
             pr_info_nol "* SSB mitigation is enabled and active: "
             if grep -Eq 'Speculation.?Store.?Bypass:[[:space:]]+thread' "$g_procfs/self/status" 2>/dev/null; then
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ check_CVE_2018_3639_linux() {
         # if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
         if [ -n "$cap_ssbd" ]; then
             if [ -n "$kernel_ssb" ]; then
-                if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+                if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
                     if [ "$kernel_ssbd_enabled" -gt 0 ]; then
                         pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU and kernel both support SSBD and mitigation is enabled"
                     else
@@ -121,21 +121,11 @@ check_CVE_2018_3639_linux() {
             fi
         else
             if [ -n "$kernel_ssb" ]; then
-                if is_arm_kernel; then
-                    pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "no SSB mitigation is active on your system"
-                    explain "ARM CPUs mitigate SSB either through a hardware SSBS bit (ARMv8.5+ CPUs) or through firmware support for SMCCC ARCH_WORKAROUND_2. Your kernel reports SSB status but neither mechanism appears to be active. For CPUs predating ARMv8.5 (such as Cortex-A57 or Cortex-A72), check with your board or SoC vendor for a firmware update that provides SMCCC ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 support."
-                else
-                    pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your CPU doesn't support SSBD"
-                    explain "Your kernel is recent enough to use the CPU microcode features for mitigation, but your CPU microcode doesn't actually provide the necessary features for the kernel to use. The microcode of your CPU hence needs to be upgraded. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section)."
-                fi
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your CPU doesn't support SSBD"
+                explain "Your kernel is recent enough to use the CPU microcode features for mitigation, but your CPU microcode doesn't actually provide the necessary features for the kernel to use. The microcode of your CPU hence needs to be upgraded. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section)."
             else
-                if is_arm_kernel; then
-                    pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "your kernel and firmware do not support SSB mitigation"
-                    explain "ARM SSB mitigation requires kernel support (CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD) combined with either a hardware SSBS bit (ARMv8.5+ CPUs) or firmware support for SMCCC ARCH_WORKAROUND_2. Ensure you are running a recent kernel compiled with CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD. For CPUs predating ARMv8.5, also check with your board or SoC vendor for a firmware update providing SMCCC ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 support."
-                else
-                    pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Neither your CPU nor your kernel support SSBD"
-                    explain "Both your CPU microcode and your kernel are lacking support for mitigation. If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel from recent-enough sources. The microcode of your CPU also needs to be upgraded. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section)."
-                fi
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Neither your CPU nor your kernel support SSBD"
+                explain "Both your CPU microcode and your kernel are lacking support for mitigation. If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel from recent-enough sources. The microcode of your CPU also needs to be upgraded. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section)."
             fi
         fi
     else

src/vulns/CVE-2018-3640.sh

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 # CVE-2018-3640, Variant 3a, Rogue System Register Read
 
 check_CVE_2018_3640() {
-    local status sys_interface_available msg cve arm_v3a_mitigation
+    local status sys_interface_available msg cve
     cve='CVE-2018-3640'
     pr_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
 
@@ -11,52 +11,22 @@ check_CVE_2018_3640() {
     sys_interface_available=0
     msg=''
 
-    if is_arm_kernel; then
-        # ARM64: mitigation is via an EL2 indirect trampoline (spectre_v3a_enable_mitigation),
-        # applied automatically at boot for affected CPUs (Cortex-A57, Cortex-A72).
-        # No microcode update is involved.
-        arm_v3a_mitigation=''
-        if [ -n "$opt_map" ] && grep -qw spectre_v3a_enable_mitigation "$opt_map" 2>/dev/null; then
-            arm_v3a_mitigation="found spectre_v3a_enable_mitigation in System.map"
-        fi
-        if [ -z "$arm_v3a_mitigation" ] && [ -n "$g_kernel" ]; then
-            if "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$g_kernel" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw spectre_v3a_enable_mitigation; then
-                arm_v3a_mitigation="found spectre_v3a_enable_mitigation in kernel image"
-            fi
-        fi
-
-        pr_info_nol "* Kernel mitigates the vulnerability via EL2 hardening: "
-        if [ -n "$arm_v3a_mitigation" ]; then
-            pstatus green YES "$arm_v3a_mitigation"
-        else
-            pstatus yellow NO
-        fi
-
-        if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
-        elif [ -n "$arm_v3a_mitigation" ]; then
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your kernel mitigates the vulnerability via EL2 vector hardening"
-        else
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "your kernel does not include the EL2 vector hardening mitigation"
-            explain "ARM64 Spectre v3a mitigation is provided by the kernel using an indirect trampoline for EL2 (hypervisor) vectors (spectre_v3a_enable_mitigation). Ensure you are running a recent kernel. If you're using a distro kernel, upgrading your distro should provide a kernel with this mitigation included."
-        fi
+    pr_info_nol "* CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: "
+    if [ -n "$cap_ssbd" ]; then
+        # microcodes that ship with SSBD are known to also fix affected_variant3a
+        # there is no specific cpuid bit as far as we know
+        pstatus green YES
     else
-        # x86: microcodes that ship with SSBD are known to also fix variant 3a;
-        # there is no specific CPUID bit for variant 3a as far as we know.
-        pr_info_nol "* CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: "
-        if [ -n "$cap_ssbd" ]; then
-            pstatus green YES
-        else
-            pstatus yellow NO
-        fi
+        pstatus yellow NO
+    fi
 
-        if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
-        elif [ -n "$cap_ssbd" ]; then
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability"
-        else
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "an up-to-date CPU microcode is needed to mitigate this vulnerability"
-            explain "The microcode of your CPU needs to be upgraded to mitigate this vulnerability. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section). The microcode update is enough, there is no additional OS, kernel or software change needed."
-        fi
+    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
+        # override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
+    elif [ -n "$cap_ssbd" ]; then
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability"
+    else
+        pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "an up-to-date CPU microcode is needed to mitigate this vulnerability"
+        explain "The microcode of your CPU needs to be upgraded to mitigate this vulnerability. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section). The microcode update is enough, there is no additional OS, kernel or software change needed."
     fi
 }

src/vulns/CVE-2018-3646.sh

@@ -69,27 +69,22 @@ check_CVE_2018_3646_linux() {
         pr_info "* Mitigation 1 (KVM)"
         pr_info_nol "  * EPT is disabled: "
         ept_disabled=-1
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             if ! [ -r "$SYS_MODULE_BASE/kvm_intel/parameters/ept" ]; then
                 pstatus blue N/A "the kvm_intel module is not loaded"
+            elif [ "$(cat "$SYS_MODULE_BASE/kvm_intel/parameters/ept")" = N ]; then
+                pstatus green YES
+                ept_disabled=1
             else
-                ept_value="$(cat "$SYS_MODULE_BASE/kvm_intel/parameters/ept" 2>/dev/null || echo ERROR)"
-                if [ "$ept_value" = N ]; then
-                    pstatus green YES
-                    ept_disabled=1
-                elif [ "$ept_value" = ERROR ]; then
-                    pstatus yellow UNK "Couldn't read $SYS_MODULE_BASE/kvm_intel/parameters/ept"
-                else
-                    pstatus yellow NO
-                fi
+                pstatus yellow NO
             fi
         else
-            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in no-runtime mode"
+            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
         fi
 
         pr_info "* Mitigation 2"
         pr_info_nol "  * L1D flush is supported by kernel: "
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ] && grep -qw flush_l1d "$g_procfs/cpuinfo"; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && grep -qw flush_l1d "$g_procfs/cpuinfo"; then
             l1d_kernel="found flush_l1d in $g_procfs/cpuinfo"
         fi
         if [ -z "$l1d_kernel" ]; then
@@ -111,7 +106,7 @@ check_CVE_2018_3646_linux() {
         fi
 
         pr_info_nol "  * L1D flush enabled: "
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             if [ -n "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" ]; then
                 # vanilla: VMX: $l1dstatus, SMT $smtstatus
                 # Red Hat: VMX: SMT $smtstatus, L1D $l1dstatus
@@ -157,18 +152,18 @@ check_CVE_2018_3646_linux() {
             fi
         else
             l1d_mode=-1
-            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in no-runtime mode"
+            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
         fi
 
         pr_info_nol "  * Hardware-backed L1D flush supported: "
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             if grep -qw flush_l1d "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" || [ -n "$l1d_xen_hardware" ]; then
                 pstatus green YES "performance impact of the mitigation will be greatly reduced"
             else
                 pstatus blue NO "flush will be done in software, this is slower"
             fi
         else
-            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in no-runtime mode"
+            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
         fi
 
         pr_info_nol "  * Hyper-Threading (SMT) is enabled: "

src/vulns/CVE-2019-11135.sh

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ check_CVE_2019_11135_linux() {
         kernel_taa=''
         if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
             kernel_taa_err="$g_kernel_err"
-        elif is_x86_kernel && grep -q 'tsx_async_abort' "$g_kernel"; then
+        elif grep -q 'tsx_async_abort' "$g_kernel"; then
             kernel_taa="found tsx_async_abort in kernel image"
         fi
         if [ -n "$kernel_taa" ]; then
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ check_CVE_2019_11135_linux() {
         fi
 
         pr_info_nol "* TAA mitigation enabled and active: "
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             if [ -n "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" ]; then
                 if echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -qE '^Mitigation'; then
                     pstatus green YES "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg"
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ check_CVE_2019_11135_linux() {
                 pstatus yellow NO "tsx_async_abort not found in sysfs hierarchy"
             fi
         else
-            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in no-runtime mode"
+            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
         fi
     elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
         # we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ check_CVE_2019_11135_linux() {
         pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
     elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
         # if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             # if we're in live mode and $msg is empty, sysfs file is not there so kernel is too old
             pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your kernel doesn't support TAA mitigation, update it"
         else

src/vulns/CVE-2020-0543.sh

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ check_CVE_2020_0543_linux() {
         kernel_srbds=''
         if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
             kernel_srbds_err="$g_kernel_err"
-        elif is_x86_kernel && grep -q 'Dependent on hypervisor' "$g_kernel"; then
+        elif grep -q 'Dependent on hypervisor' "$g_kernel"; then
             kernel_srbds="found SRBDS implementation evidence in kernel image. Your kernel is up to date for SRBDS mitigation"
         fi
         if [ -n "$kernel_srbds" ]; then
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ check_CVE_2020_0543_linux() {
             pstatus yellow NO
         fi
         pr_info_nol "* SRBDS mitigation control is enabled and active: "
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             if [ -n "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" ]; then
                 if echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -qE '^Mitigation'; then
                     pstatus green YES "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg"
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ check_CVE_2020_0543_linux() {
                 pstatus yellow NO "SRBDS not found in sysfs hierarchy"
             fi
         else
-            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in no-runtime mode"
+            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
         fi
     elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
         # we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ check_CVE_2020_0543_linux() {
                     # SRBDS mitigation control is enabled
                     if [ -z "$msg" ]; then
                         # if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
-                        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+                        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
                             # if we're in live mode and $msg is empty, sysfs file is not there so kernel is too old
                             pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Your microcode is up to date for SRBDS mitigation control. The kernel needs to be updated"
                         fi
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ check_CVE_2020_0543_linux() {
                 elif [ "$cap_srbds_on" = 0 ]; then
                     # SRBDS mitigation control is disabled
                     if [ -z "$msg" ]; then
-                        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+                        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
                             # if we're in live mode and $msg is empty, sysfs file is not there so kernel is too old
                             pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode is up to date for SRBDS mitigation control. The kernel needs to be updated. Mitigation is disabled"
                         fi

src/vulns/CVE-2022-29900.sh

@@ -174,14 +174,14 @@ check_CVE_2022_29900_linux() {
         # Zen/Zen+/Zen2: check IBPB microcode support and SMT
         if [ "$cpu_family" = $((0x17)) ]; then
             pr_info_nol "* CPU supports IBPB: "
-            if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+            if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
                 if [ -n "$cap_ibpb" ]; then
                     pstatus green YES "$cap_ibpb"
                 else
                     pstatus yellow NO
                 fi
             else
-                pstatus blue N/A "not testable in no-runtime mode"
+                pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
             fi
 
             pr_info_nol "* Hyper-Threading (SMT) is enabled: "
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ check_CVE_2022_29900_linux() {
                         "doesn't fully protect cross-thread speculation."
                 elif [ -z "$kernel_unret" ] && [ -z "$kernel_ibpb_entry" ]; then
                     pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your kernel doesn't have either UNRET_ENTRY or IBPB_ENTRY compiled-in"
-                elif [ "$smt_enabled" = 0 ] && [ -z "$cap_ibpb" ] && [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+                elif [ "$smt_enabled" = 0 ] && [ -z "$cap_ibpb" ] && [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
                     pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "SMT is enabled and your microcode doesn't support IBPB"
                     explain "Update your CPU microcode to get IBPB support, or disable SMT by adding\n" \
                         "\`nosmt\` to your kernel command line."

src/vulns/CVE-2022-29901.sh

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ check_CVE_2022_29901_linux() {
         fi
 
         pr_info_nol "* CPU supports Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL): "
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ] || [ "$cap_ibrs_all" != -1 ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] || [ "$cap_ibrs_all" != -1 ]; then
             if [ "$cap_ibrs_all" = 1 ]; then
                 pstatus green YES
             elif [ "$cap_ibrs_all" = 0 ]; then
@@ -93,11 +93,11 @@ check_CVE_2022_29901_linux() {
                 pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
             fi
         else
-            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in no-runtime mode"
+            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
         fi
 
         pr_info_nol "* CPU has RSB Alternate Behavior (RSBA): "
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ] || [ "$cap_rsba" != -1 ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] || [ "$cap_rsba" != -1 ]; then
             if [ "$cap_rsba" = 1 ]; then
                 pstatus yellow YES "this CPU is affected by RSB underflow"
             elif [ "$cap_rsba" = 0 ]; then
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ check_CVE_2022_29901_linux() {
                 pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
             fi
         else
-            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in no-runtime mode"
+            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
         fi
 
     elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then

src/vulns/CVE-2022-40982.sh

@@ -119,17 +119,17 @@ check_CVE_2022_40982_linux() {
         kernel_gds_err=''
         if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
             kernel_gds_err="$g_kernel_err"
-        elif is_x86_kernel && grep -q 'gather_data_sampling' "$g_kernel"; then
+        elif grep -q 'gather_data_sampling' "$g_kernel"; then
             kernel_gds="found gather_data_sampling in kernel image"
         fi
-        if [ -z "$kernel_gds" ] && is_x86_kernel && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
+        if [ -z "$kernel_gds" ] && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
             if grep -q '^CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION=y' "$opt_config" ||
                 grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE=y' "$opt_config" ||
                 grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS=y' "$opt_config"; then
                 kernel_gds="GDS mitigation config option found enabled in kernel config"
             fi
         fi
-        if [ -z "$kernel_gds" ] && is_x86_kernel && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+        if [ -z "$kernel_gds" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
             if grep -q 'gds_select_mitigation' "$opt_map"; then
                 kernel_gds="found gds_select_mitigation in System.map"
             fi
@@ -145,17 +145,17 @@ check_CVE_2022_40982_linux() {
         if [ -n "$kernel_gds" ]; then
             pr_info_nol "* Kernel has disabled AVX as a mitigation: "
 
-            if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+            if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
                 # Check dmesg message to see whether AVX has been disabled
                 dmesg_grep 'Microcode update needed! Disabling AVX as mitigation'
                 dmesgret=$?
                 if [ "$dmesgret" -eq 0 ]; then
                     kernel_avx_disabled="AVX disabled by the kernel (dmesg)"
                     pstatus green YES "$kernel_avx_disabled"
-                elif [ "$cap_avx2" = 0 ] && is_x86_cpu; then
+                elif [ "$cap_avx2" = 0 ]; then
                     # Find out by ourselves
                     # cpuinfo says we don't have AVX2, query
-                    # the CPU directly about AVX2 support (x86-only)
+                    # the CPU directly about AVX2 support
                     read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 "$EBX" 5 1 1
                     ret=$?
                     if [ "$ret" -eq "$READ_CPUID_RET_OK" ]; then
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ check_CVE_2022_40982_linux() {
                     pstatus yellow NO "AVX support is enabled"
                 fi
             else
-                pstatus blue N/A "not testable in no-runtime mode"
+                pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
             fi
         fi
 

src/vulns/CVE-2023-20588.sh

@@ -88,10 +88,10 @@ check_CVE_2023_20588_linux() {
         kernel_mitigated=''
         if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
             pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$g_kernel_err"
-        elif is_x86_kernel && grep -q 'amd_clear_divider' "$g_kernel"; then
+        elif grep -q 'amd_clear_divider' "$g_kernel"; then
             kernel_mitigated="found amd_clear_divider in kernel image"
             pstatus green YES "$kernel_mitigated"
-        elif is_x86_kernel && [ -n "$opt_map" ] && grep -q 'amd_clear_divider' "$opt_map"; then
+        elif [ -n "$opt_map" ] && grep -q 'amd_clear_divider' "$opt_map"; then
             kernel_mitigated="found amd_clear_divider in System.map"
             pstatus green YES "$kernel_mitigated"
         else
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ check_CVE_2023_20588_linux() {
         pr_info_nol "* DIV0 mitigation enabled and active: "
         cpuinfo_div0=''
         dmesg_div0=''
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             if [ -e "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" ] && grep -qw 'div0' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" 2>/dev/null; then
                 cpuinfo_div0=1
                 pstatus green YES "div0 found in $g_procfs/cpuinfo bug flags"
@@ -119,19 +119,11 @@ check_CVE_2023_20588_linux() {
                 fi
             fi
         else
-            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in no-runtime mode"
+            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
         fi
 
-        pr_info_nol "* SMT (Simultaneous Multi-Threading) is enabled: "
+        pr_info_nol "* SMT (Simultaneous Multi-Threading) status: "
         is_cpu_smt_enabled
-        smt_ret=$?
-        if [ "$smt_ret" = 0 ]; then
-            pstatus yellow YES
-        elif [ "$smt_ret" = 2 ]; then
-            pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
-        else
-            pstatus green NO
-        fi
     elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
         msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
         status=UNK
@@ -141,7 +133,7 @@ check_CVE_2023_20588_linux() {
         pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
     elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
         if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
-            if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+            if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
                 # live mode: cpuinfo div0 flag is the strongest proof the mitigation is active
                 if [ "$cpuinfo_div0" = 1 ] || [ "$dmesg_div0" = 1 ]; then
                     _cve_2023_20588_pvulnstatus_smt
@@ -153,7 +145,7 @@ check_CVE_2023_20588_linux() {
                     _cve_2023_20588_pvulnstatus_no_kernel
                 fi
             else
-                # no-runtime mode: only kernel image / System.map evidence is available
+                # offline mode: only kernel image / System.map evidence is available
                 if [ -n "$kernel_mitigated" ]; then
                     pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Mitigation: amd_clear_divider found in kernel image"
                 else

src/vulns/CVE-2023-20593.sh

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ check_CVE_2023_20593_linux() {
             pstatus yellow NO
         fi
         pr_info_nol "* Zenbleed kernel mitigation enabled and active: "
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             # read the DE_CFG MSR, we want to check the 9th bit
             # don't do it on non-Zen2 AMD CPUs or later, aka Family 17h,
             # as the behavior could be unknown on others
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ check_CVE_2023_20593_linux() {
                 pstatus blue N/A "CPU is incompatible"
             fi
         else
-            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in no-runtime mode"
+            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
         fi
 
         pr_info_nol "* Zenbleed mitigation is supported by CPU microcode: "
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ check_CVE_2023_20593_linux() {
     elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
         # if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
         zenbleed_print_vuln=0
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
             if [ "$fp_backup_fix" = 1 ] && [ "$ucode_zenbleed" = 1 ]; then
                 # this should never happen, but if it does, it's interesting to know
                 pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Both your CPU microcode and kernel are mitigating Zenbleed"

src/vulns/CVE-2023-28746.sh

@@ -69,48 +69,44 @@ check_CVE_2023_28746_linux() {
     fi
 
     if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
-        if is_x86_cpu; then
-            pr_info_nol "* CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: "
-            if [ "$cap_rfds_clear" = 1 ]; then
-                pstatus green YES "RFDS_CLEAR capability indicated by microcode"
-            elif [ "$cap_rfds_clear" = 0 ]; then
-                pstatus yellow NO
-            else
-                pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read MSR"
-            fi
+        pr_info_nol "* CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: "
+        if [ "$cap_rfds_clear" = 1 ]; then
+            pstatus green YES "RFDS_CLEAR capability indicated by microcode"
+        elif [ "$cap_rfds_clear" = 0 ]; then
+            pstatus yellow NO
+        else
+            pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read MSR"
         fi
 
-        if is_x86_kernel; then
-            pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports RFDS mitigation (VERW on transitions): "
-            kernel_rfds=''
-            kernel_rfds_err=''
-            if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
-                kernel_rfds_err="$g_kernel_err"
-            elif grep -q 'Clear Register File' "$g_kernel"; then
-                kernel_rfds="found 'Clear Register File' string in kernel image"
-            elif grep -q 'reg_file_data_sampling' "$g_kernel"; then
-                kernel_rfds="found reg_file_data_sampling in kernel image"
-            fi
-            if [ -z "$kernel_rfds" ] && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
-                if grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS=y' "$opt_config"; then
-                    kernel_rfds="RFDS mitigation config option found enabled in kernel config"
-                fi
-            fi
-            if [ -z "$kernel_rfds" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
-                if grep -q 'rfds_select_mitigation' "$opt_map"; then
-                    kernel_rfds="found rfds_select_mitigation in System.map"
-                fi
-            fi
-            if [ -n "$kernel_rfds" ]; then
-                pstatus green YES "$kernel_rfds"
-            elif [ -n "$kernel_rfds_err" ]; then
-                pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$kernel_rfds_err"
-            else
-                pstatus yellow NO
+        pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports RFDS mitigation (VERW on transitions): "
+        kernel_rfds=''
+        kernel_rfds_err=''
+        if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
+            kernel_rfds_err="$g_kernel_err"
+        elif grep -q 'Clear Register File' "$g_kernel"; then
+            kernel_rfds="found 'Clear Register File' string in kernel image"
+        elif grep -q 'reg_file_data_sampling' "$g_kernel"; then
+            kernel_rfds="found reg_file_data_sampling in kernel image"
+        fi
+        if [ -z "$kernel_rfds" ] && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
+            if grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS=y' "$opt_config"; then
+                kernel_rfds="RFDS mitigation config option found enabled in kernel config"
             fi
         fi
+        if [ -z "$kernel_rfds" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+            if grep -q 'rfds_select_mitigation' "$opt_map"; then
+                kernel_rfds="found rfds_select_mitigation in System.map"
+            fi
+        fi
+        if [ -n "$kernel_rfds" ]; then
+            pstatus green YES "$kernel_rfds"
+        elif [ -n "$kernel_rfds_err" ]; then
+            pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$kernel_rfds_err"
+        else
+            pstatus yellow NO
+        fi
 
-        if is_x86_cpu && [ "$g_mode" = live ] && [ "$sys_interface_available" = 1 ]; then
+        if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ "$sys_interface_available" = 1 ]; then
             pr_info_nol "* RFDS mitigation is enabled and active: "
             if echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -qi '^Mitigation'; then
                 rfds_mitigated=1
@@ -133,7 +129,7 @@ check_CVE_2023_28746_linux() {
         if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
             if [ "$cap_rfds_clear" = 1 ]; then
                 if [ -n "$kernel_rfds" ]; then
-                    if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
+                    if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
                         if [ "$rfds_mitigated" = 1 ]; then
                             pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for this mitigation, and mitigation is enabled"
                         else

src/vulns/CVE-2024-28956.sh

@@ -92,15 +92,15 @@ check_CVE_2024_28956_linux() {
         kernel_its_err=''
         if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
             kernel_its_err="$g_kernel_err"
-        elif is_x86_kernel && grep -q 'indirect_target_selection' "$g_kernel"; then
+        elif grep -q 'indirect_target_selection' "$g_kernel"; then
             kernel_its="found indirect_target_selection in kernel image"
         fi
-        if [ -z "$kernel_its" ] && is_x86_kernel && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
+        if [ -z "$kernel_its" ] && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
             if grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_ITS=y' "$opt_config"; then
                 kernel_its="ITS mitigation config option found enabled in kernel config"
             fi
         fi
-        if [ -z "$kernel_its" ] && is_x86_kernel && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+        if [ -z "$kernel_its" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
             if grep -q 'its_select_mitigation' "$opt_map"; then
                 kernel_its="found its_select_mitigation in System.map"
             fi

src/vulns/CVE-2024-36350.sh

@@ -72,15 +72,15 @@ check_CVE_2024_36350_linux() {
         if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
             kernel_tsa_err="$g_kernel_err"
         # commit d8010d4ba43e: "Transient Scheduler Attacks:" is printed by tsa_select_mitigation()
-        elif is_x86_kernel && grep -q 'Transient Scheduler Attacks' "$g_kernel"; then
+        elif grep -q 'Transient Scheduler Attacks' "$g_kernel"; then
             kernel_tsa="found TSA mitigation message in kernel image"
         fi
-        if [ -z "$kernel_tsa" ] && is_x86_kernel && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
+        if [ -z "$kernel_tsa" ] && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
             if grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_TSA=y' "$opt_config"; then
                 kernel_tsa="CONFIG_MITIGATION_TSA=y found in kernel config"
             fi
         fi
-        if [ -z "$kernel_tsa" ] && is_x86_kernel && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+        if [ -z "$kernel_tsa" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
             if grep -q 'tsa_select_mitigation' "$opt_map"; then
                 kernel_tsa="found tsa_select_mitigation in System.map"
             fi

src/vulns/CVE-2024-36357.sh

@@ -72,15 +72,15 @@ check_CVE_2024_36357_linux() {
         if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
             kernel_tsa_err="$g_kernel_err"
         # commit d8010d4ba43e: "Transient Scheduler Attacks:" is printed by tsa_select_mitigation()
-        elif is_x86_kernel && grep -q 'Transient Scheduler Attacks' "$g_kernel"; then
+        elif grep -q 'Transient Scheduler Attacks' "$g_kernel"; then
             kernel_tsa="found TSA mitigation message in kernel image"
         fi
-        if [ -z "$kernel_tsa" ] && is_x86_kernel && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
+        if [ -z "$kernel_tsa" ] && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
             if grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_TSA=y' "$opt_config"; then
                 kernel_tsa="CONFIG_MITIGATION_TSA=y found in kernel config"
             fi
         fi
-        if [ -z "$kernel_tsa" ] && is_x86_kernel && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+        if [ -z "$kernel_tsa" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
             if grep -q 'tsa_select_mitigation' "$opt_map"; then
                 kernel_tsa="found tsa_select_mitigation in System.map"
             fi

src/vulns/CVE-2025-40300.sh

@@ -85,15 +85,15 @@ check_CVE_2025_40300_linux() {
         kernel_vmscape_err=''
         if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
             kernel_vmscape_err="$g_kernel_err"
-        elif is_x86_kernel && grep -q 'vmscape' "$g_kernel"; then
+        elif grep -q 'vmscape' "$g_kernel"; then
             kernel_vmscape="found vmscape in kernel image"
         fi
-        if [ -z "$kernel_vmscape" ] && is_x86_kernel && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
+        if [ -z "$kernel_vmscape" ] && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
             if grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMSCAPE=y' "$opt_config"; then
                 kernel_vmscape="VMScape mitigation config option found enabled in kernel config"
             fi
         fi
-        if [ -z "$kernel_vmscape" ] && is_x86_kernel && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+        if [ -z "$kernel_vmscape" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
             if grep -q 'vmscape_select_mitigation' "$opt_map"; then
                 kernel_vmscape="found vmscape_select_mitigation in System.map"
             fi

src/vulns/CVE-2025-54505.sh

@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
-# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
-###############################
-# CVE-2025-54505, FPDSS, AMD Zen1 Floating-Point Divider Stale Data Leak
-
-check_CVE_2025_54505() {
-    check_cve 'CVE-2025-54505'
-}
-
-# Print remediation advice for FPDSS when reporting VULN
-# Callers: check_CVE_2025_54505_linux
-_cve_2025_54505_explain_fix() {
-    explain "Update your kernel to one that carries commit e55d98e77561 (\"x86/CPU: Fix FPDSS on Zen1\", mainline Linux 7.1),\n " \
-        "or the equivalent backport from your distribution. The kernel sets bit 9 of MSR 0xc0011028 unconditionally on\n " \
-        "every Zen1 CPU at boot, which disables the hardware optimization responsible for the leak.\n " \
-        "To manually mitigate the issue right now, you may use the following command:\n " \
-        "\`wrmsr -a 0xc0011028 \$((\$(rdmsr -c 0xc0011028) | (1<<9)))\`,\n " \
-        "however note that this manual mitigation will only be active until the next reboot.\n " \
-        "No microcode update is required: the chicken bit is present on every Zen1 CPU."
-}
-
-check_CVE_2025_54505_linux() {
-    local status sys_interface_available msg kernel_mitigated dmesg_fpdss msr_fpdss ret
-    status=UNK
-    sys_interface_available=0
-    msg=''
-    # No sysfs interface exists for this vulnerability (no /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/fpdss).
-    # sys_interface_available stays 0.
-    #
-    # Kernel source inventory for FPDSS, traced via git blame:
-    #
-    # --- sysfs messages ---
-    # none: this vulnerability has no sysfs entry
-    #
-    # --- Kconfig symbols ---
-    # none: the mitigation is unconditional, not configurable (no CONFIG_* knob)
-    #
-    # --- kernel functions (for $opt_map / System.map) ---
-    # none: the fix is two inline lines in init_amd_zen1(), no dedicated function
-    #
-    # --- dmesg ---
-    # e55d98e77561 (v7.1, initial fix): "AMD Zen1 FPDSS bug detected, enabling mitigation."
-    #   (printed via pr_notice_once on every Zen1 CPU)
-    #
-    # --- /proc/cpuinfo bugs field ---
-    # none: no X86_BUG_FPDSS flag defined; no cpuinfo exposure
-    #
-    # --- MSR ---
-    # e55d98e77561 (v7.1): MSR_AMD64_FP_CFG = 0xc0011028, bit 9 = ZEN1_DENORM_FIX_BIT
-    #   kernel calls msr_set_bit() unconditionally on any Zen1 CPU in init_amd_zen1().
-    #   The bit is present in Zen1 silicon independently of microcode (no microcode
-    #   revision gate in the kernel, unlike Zenbleed which uses amd_zenbleed_microcode[]).
-    #
-    # --- CPU affection logic (for is_cpu_affected) ---
-    # e55d98e77561 (v7.1): applied unconditionally in init_amd_zen1(), i.e. all Zen1
-    #   AMD: family 0x17 models 0x00-0x2f, 0x50-0x5f (same cohort as DIV0)
-    # vendor scope: AMD only (Zen1 microarchitecture)
-    #
-    # --- stable backports ---
-    # as of this writing, no stable/LTS backport has landed; only mainline (Linux 7.1).
-
-    if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
-        pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports FPDSS mitigation: "
-        kernel_mitigated=''
-        if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
-            pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$g_kernel_err"
-        elif is_x86_kernel && grep -q 'AMD Zen1 FPDSS bug detected' "$g_kernel"; then
-            kernel_mitigated="found FPDSS mitigation message in kernel image"
-            pstatus green YES "$kernel_mitigated"
-        else
-            pstatus yellow NO
-        fi
-
-        pr_info_nol "* FPDSS mitigation enabled and active: "
-        msr_fpdss=''
-        dmesg_fpdss=''
-        if [ "$g_mode" = live ] && is_x86_cpu && is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
-            # guard with is_cpu_affected to avoid #GP on non-Zen1 CPUs where 0xc0011028 is undefined
-            read_msr 0xc0011028
-            ret=$?
-            if [ "$ret" = "$READ_MSR_RET_OK" ]; then
-                if [ $((ret_read_msr_value_lo >> 9 & 1)) -eq 1 ]; then
-                    msr_fpdss=1
-                    pstatus green YES "ZEN1_DENORM_FIX_BIT set in FP_CFG MSR"
-                else
-                    msr_fpdss=0
-                    pstatus yellow NO "ZEN1_DENORM_FIX_BIT is cleared in FP_CFG MSR"
-                fi
-            else
-                # MSR unreadable (lockdown, no msr module, etc.): fall back to dmesg
-                dmesg_grep 'AMD Zen1 FPDSS bug detected'
-                ret=$?
-                if [ "$ret" -eq 0 ]; then
-                    dmesg_fpdss=1
-                    pstatus green YES "FPDSS mitigation message found in dmesg"
-                elif [ "$ret" -eq 2 ]; then
-                    pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read MSR and dmesg is truncated"
-                else
-                    pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read MSR and no FPDSS message in dmesg"
-                fi
-            fi
-        elif [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
-            pstatus blue N/A "CPU is incompatible"
-        else
-            pstatus blue N/A "not testable in no-runtime mode"
-        fi
-    elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
-        msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
-        status=UNK
-    fi
-
-    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
-    elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
-        if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
-            if [ "$g_mode" = live ]; then
-                if [ "$msr_fpdss" = 1 ] || [ "$dmesg_fpdss" = 1 ]; then
-                    pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "ZEN1_DENORM_FIX_BIT is set in FP_CFG MSR, mitigation is active"
-                elif [ "$msr_fpdss" = 0 ]; then
-                    pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "ZEN1_DENORM_FIX_BIT is cleared in FP_CFG MSR, FPDSS can leak data between threads"
-                    _cve_2025_54505_explain_fix
-                elif [ -n "$kernel_mitigated" ]; then
-                    # MSR unreadable at runtime, but kernel image carries the mitigation code
-                    # and init_amd_zen1() sets the bit unconditionally, so mitigation is active
-                    pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "kernel image carries FPDSS mitigation code (init_amd_zen1 sets the MSR bit unconditionally at boot)"
-                else
-                    pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "your kernel doesn't support FPDSS mitigation"
-                    _cve_2025_54505_explain_fix
-                fi
-            else
-                if [ -n "$kernel_mitigated" ]; then
-                    pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Mitigation: FPDSS message found in kernel image"
-                else
-                    pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "your kernel doesn't support FPDSS mitigation"
-                    _cve_2025_54505_explain_fix
-                fi
-            fi
-        else
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "no sysfs interface available for this CVE, use --no-sysfs to check"
-        fi
-    else
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$msg"
-    fi
-}
-
-check_CVE_2025_54505_bsd() {
-    if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
-    else
-        pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "your CPU is affected, but mitigation detection has not yet been implemented for BSD in this script"
-    fi
-}