adding support for new /sys interface (#55)

* adding support for new /sys interface
* fix(objdump): prefer -d instead of -D, some kernels crash objdump otherwise
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Stéphane Lesimple 2018-01-11 12:23:16 +01:00 committed by GitHub
parent 56b67f8082
commit 62f8ed6f61
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1 changed files with 312 additions and 237 deletions

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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
#
# Stephane Lesimple
#
VERSION=0.25
VERSION=0.26
# Script configuration
show_usage()
@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ show_usage()
Options:
--no-color Don't use color codes
-v, --verbose Increase verbosity level
--verbose, -v Increase verbosity level
--no-sysfs Don't use the /sys interface even if present
--batch text Produce machine readable output, this is the default if --batch is specified alone
--batch json Produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef...
--batch nrpe Produce machine readable output formatted for NRPE
@ -86,6 +87,7 @@ opt_variant1=0
opt_variant2=0
opt_variant3=0
opt_allvariants=1
opt_no_sysfs=0
nrpe_critical=0
nrpe_unknown=0
@ -95,13 +97,13 @@ __echo()
{
opt="$1"
shift
msg="$@"
_msg="$@"
if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ] ; then
# strip ANSI color codes
msg=$(/bin/echo -e "$msg" | sed -r "s/\x1B\[([0-9]{1,2}(;[0-9]{1,2})?)?[m|K]//g")
_msg=$(/bin/echo -e "$_msg" | sed -r "s/\x1B\[([0-9]{1,2}(;[0-9]{1,2})?)?[m|K]//g")
fi
# explicitely call /bin/echo to avoid shell builtins that might not take options
/bin/echo $opt -e "$msg"
/bin/echo $opt -e "$_msg"
}
_echo()
@ -250,6 +252,9 @@ while [ -n "$1" ]; do
elif [ "$1" = "--no-color" ]; then
opt_no_color=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--no-sysfs" ]; then
opt_no_sysfs=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--batch" ]; then
opt_batch=1
opt_verbose=0
@ -548,46 +553,83 @@ umount_debugfs()
fi
}
sys_interface_check()
{
[ "$opt_live" = 1 -a "$opt_no_sysfs" = 0 -a -r "$1" ] || return 1
_info_nol "* Checking wheter we're safe according to the /sys interface: "
if grep -qi '^not affected' "$1"; then
# Not affected
status=OK
pstatus green YES "kernel confirms that your CPU is unaffected"
elif grep -qi '^mitigation' "$1"; then
# Mitigation: PTI
status=OK
pstatus green YES "kernel confirms that the mitigation is active"
elif grep -qi '^vulnerable' "$1"; then
# Vulnerable
status=VULN
pstatus red NO "kernel confirms your system is vulnerable"
else
status=UNK
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "unknown value reported by kernel"
fi
msg=$(cat "$1")
return 0
}
###################
# SPECTRE VARIANT 1
check_variant1()
{
_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m"
_info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: "
status=0
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1"; then
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
sys_interface_available=1
else
# no /sys interface (or offline mode), fallback to our own ways
_info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: "
if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$vmlinux_err"
msg="couldn't check ($vmlinux_err)"
status=UNK
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
else
if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
msg="missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
status=UNK
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
else
# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurences of the LFENCE opcode
# in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+)
# v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches,
# so let's push the threshold to 70.
# TODO LKML patch is starting to dump LFENCE in favor of the PAUSE opcode, we might need to check that (patch not stabilized yet)
nb_lfence=$(objdump -D "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence)
nb_lfence=$(objdump -d "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence)
if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 70 ]; then
pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 70"
status=1
msg="only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 70, heuristic to be improved when official patches become available"
status=VULN
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
else
pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 70"
status=2
msg="$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 70, heuristic to be improved when official patches become available"
status=OK
pstatus green YES
fi
fi
fi
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
else
case "$status" in
0) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 UNK "impossible to check ${vmlinux}";;
1) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 VULN 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';;
2) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';;
esac
# if we have the /sys interface, don't even check is_cpu_vulnerable ourselves, the kernel already does it
if [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ] && ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
msg="your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
status=OK
fi
# report status
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 "$status" "$msg"
}
###################
@ -595,6 +637,14 @@ check_variant1()
check_variant2()
{
_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m"
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2"; then
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
sys_interface_available=1
else
_info "* Mitigation 1"
_info_nol "* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: "
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
@ -725,10 +775,15 @@ check_variant2()
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map"
fi
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then
# if we have the /sys interface, don't even check is_cpu_vulnerable ourselves, the kernel already does it
if [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ] && ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
if [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "retpoline mitigate the vulnerability"
elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then
@ -743,6 +798,9 @@ check_variant2()
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
fi
else
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 "$status" "$msg"
fi
}
########################
@ -750,6 +808,14 @@ check_variant2()
check_variant3()
{
_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m"
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown"; then
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
sys_interface_available=1
else
_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
kpti_support=0
kpti_can_tell=0
@ -817,22 +883,31 @@ check_variant3()
else
pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode"
fi
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# if we have the /sys interface, don't even check is_cpu_vulnerable ourselves, the kernel already does it
cve='CVE-2017-5754'
if [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ] && ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
pvulnstatus $cve OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
else
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
else
if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
else
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
fi
else
pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
fi
}
# now run the checks the user asked for