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spectre-meltdown-checker/src/vulns/CVE-2017-5754.sh
2026-04-02 21:03:29 +02:00

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# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
###############################
# CVE-2017-5754, Meltdown, Rogue Data Cache Load
# no security impact but give a hint to the user in verbose mode
# about PCID/INVPCID cpuid features that must be present to avoid
# Check whether PCID/INVPCID are available to reduce PTI performance impact
# refs:
# https://marc.info/?t=151532047900001&r=1&w=2
# https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!topic/mechanical-sympathy/L9mHTbeQLNU
pti_performance_check() {
local ret pcid invpcid
pr_info_nol " * Reduced performance impact of PTI: "
if [ -e "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" ] && grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw pcid; then
pcid=1
else
read_cpuid 0x1 0x0 "$ECX" 17 1 1
ret=$?
if [ "$ret" = "$READ_CPUID_RET_OK" ]; then
pcid=1
fi
fi
if [ -e "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" ] && grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw invpcid; then
invpcid=1
else
read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 "$EBX" 10 1 1
ret=$?
if [ "$ret" = "$READ_CPUID_RET_OK" ]; then
invpcid=1
fi
fi
if [ "$invpcid" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES 'CPU supports INVPCID, performance impact of PTI will be greatly reduced'
elif [ "$pcid" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES 'CPU supports PCID, performance impact of PTI will be reduced'
else
pstatus blue NO 'PCID/INVPCID not supported, performance impact of PTI will be significant'
fi
}
check_CVE_2017_5754() {
check_cve 'CVE-2017-5754'
}
check_CVE_2017_5754_linux() {
local status sys_interface_available msg kpti_support kpti_can_tell kpti_enabled dmesg_grep pti_xen_pv_domU xen_pv_domo xen_pv_domu explain_text
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
if sys_interface_check "$VULN_SYSFS_BASE/meltdown"; then
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
sys_interface_available=1
status=$ret_sys_interface_check_status
fi
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
kpti_support=''
kpti_can_tell=0
if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
kpti_can_tell=1
kpti_support=$(grep -E -w -e 'CONFIG_(MITIGATION_)?PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y' -e CONFIG_KAISER=y -e CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0=y "$opt_config")
if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
pr_debug "kpti_support: found option '$kpti_support' in $opt_config"
fi
fi
if [ -z "$kpti_support" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
# it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch
# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
# parse_kpti: arm
kpti_can_tell=1
kpti_support=$(grep -w -e kpti_force_enabled -e parse_kpti "$opt_map")
if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
pr_debug "kpti_support: found '$kpti_support' in $opt_map"
fi
fi
if [ -z "$kpti_support" ] && [ -n "$g_kernel" ]; then
# same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only kernel, look for the
# nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option)
# 'kpti=': arm
kpti_can_tell=1
if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
else
kpti_support=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$g_kernel" | grep -w -e nopti -e kpti=)
if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
pr_debug "kpti_support: found '$kpti_support' in $g_kernel"
fi
fi
fi
if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
pstatus green YES "found '$kpti_support'"
else
pstatus green YES
fi
elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file"
fi
mount_debugfs
pr_info_nol " * PTI enabled and active: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
dmesg_grep="Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled"
dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|Kernel page table isolation enabled"
dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|x86/pti: Unmapping kernel while in userspace"
# aarch64
dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|CPU features: detected( feature)?: Kernel page table isolation \(KPTI\)"
if grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw pti; then
# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
pr_debug "kpti_enabled: found 'pti' flag in $g_procfs/cpuinfo"
kpti_enabled=1
elif grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw kaiser; then
# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
pr_debug "kpti_enabled: found 'kaiser' flag in $g_procfs/cpuinfo"
kpti_enabled=1
elif [ -e "$DEBUGFS_BASE/x86/pti_enabled" ]; then
# Red Hat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
kpti_enabled=$(cat "$DEBUGFS_BASE/x86/pti_enabled" 2>/dev/null)
pr_debug "kpti_enabled: file $DEBUGFS_BASE/x86/pti_enabled exists and says: $kpti_enabled"
elif is_xen_dom0; then
pti_xen_pv_domU=$(xl dmesg 2>/dev/null | grep 'XPTI' | grep 'DomU enabled' | head -n1)
[ -n "$pti_xen_pv_domU" ] && kpti_enabled=1
fi
if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
dmesg_grep "$dmesg_grep"
ret=$?
if [ "$ret" -eq 0 ]; then
pr_debug "kpti_enabled: found hint in dmesg: $ret_dmesg_grep_grepped"
kpti_enabled=1
elif [ "$ret" -eq 2 ]; then
pr_debug "kpti_enabled: dmesg truncated"
kpti_enabled=-1
fi
fi
if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
pr_debug "kpti_enabled: couldn't find any hint that PTI is enabled"
kpti_enabled=0
fi
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = -1 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "dmesg truncated, please reboot and relaunch this script"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
pti_performance_check
elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
status=UNK
fi
# Test if the current host is a Xen PV Dom0 / DomU
xen_pv_domo=0
xen_pv_domu=0
is_xen_dom0 && xen_pv_domo=1
is_xen_domU && xen_pv_domu=1
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# checking whether we're running under Xen PV 64 bits. If yes, we are affected by affected_variant3
# (unless we are a Dom0)
pr_info_nol "* Running as a Xen PV DomU: "
if [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
pstatus yellow YES
else
pstatus blue NO
fi
fi
if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
elif [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI"
elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM, PVH mode, or the Xen hypervisor must have the Xen's own PTI patch"
explain "Go to https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ for more information"
elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = -1 ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "couldn't find any clue of PTI activation due to a truncated dmesg, please reboot and relaunch this script"
else
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
if [ -e "$DEBUGFS_BASE/x86/pti_enabled" ]; then
explain "Your kernel supports PTI but it's disabled, you can enable it with \`echo 1 > $DEBUGFS_BASE/x86/pti_enabled\`"
elif echo "$g_kernel_cmdline" | grep -q -w -e nopti -e pti=off; then
explain "Your kernel supports PTI but it has been disabled on command-line, remove the nopti or pti=off option from your bootloader configuration"
else
explain "Your kernel supports PTI but it has been disabled, check \`dmesg\` right after boot to find clues why the system disabled it"
fi
else
explain "If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_(MITIGATION_)PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
fi
fi
else
if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
explain "If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_(MITIGATION_)PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
else
pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "offline mode: not enough information"
explain "Re-run this script with root privileges, and give it the kernel image (--kernel), the kernel configuration (--config) and the System.map file (--map) corresponding to the kernel you would like to inspect."
fi
fi
else
if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
msg="Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI"
status="OK"
elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
msg="Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM, PVH mode, or the Xen hypervisor must have the Xen's own PTI patch"
status="VULN"
explain_text="Go to https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ for more information"
elif [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ]; then
msg="PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
explain_text="If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_(MITIGATION_)PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
fi
pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$msg"
[ -z "${explain_text:-}" ] && [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && explain_text="If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_(MITIGATION_)PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
[ -n "${explain_text:-}" ] && explain "$explain_text"
unset explain_text
fi
# Warn the user about XSA-254 recommended mitigations
if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
pr_warn
pr_warn "This host is a Xen Dom0. Please make sure that you are running your DomUs"
pr_warn "in HVM, PVHVM or PVH mode to prevent any guest-to-host / host-to-guest attacks."
pr_warn
pr_warn "See https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ and XSA-254 for details."
fi
}
check_CVE_2017_5754_bsd() {
local kpti_enabled
pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
kpti_enabled=$(sysctl -n vm.pmap.pti 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus green YES
fi
pr_info_nol " * PTI enabled and active: "
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
pti_performance_check
if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
elif [ -n "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "PTI is supported but disabled on your system"
else
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
}