# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et: ############################### # Straight-Line Speculation (SLS) — supplementary check (--extra only) # # SLS: x86 CPUs may speculatively execute instructions past unconditional # control flow changes (RET, indirect JMP/CALL). Mitigated at compile time # by CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS (formerly CONFIG_SLS before kernel 6.8), which # enables -mharden-sls=all to insert INT3 after these instructions. # No sysfs interface, no MSR, no CPU feature flag. # Related: CVE-2021-26341 (AMD Zen1/Zen2 direct-branch SLS subset). # Heuristic: scan the kernel .text section for indirect call/jmp thunks # (retpoline-style stubs), then check whether tail-call JMPs to those thunks # are followed by INT3 (0xcc). With SLS enabled: >80%. Without: <20%. # # Thunk signature: e8 01 00 00 00 cc 48 89 XX 24 # call +1; int3; mov ,(%rsp); ... # Tail-call pattern: e9 XX XX XX XX [cc?] # jmp ; [int3 if SLS] # Perl implementation of the SLS heuristic byte scanner. # Args: $1 = path to raw .text binary (from objcopy -O binary -j .text) # Output: thunks=N jmps=N sls=N # # The heuristic looks for two types of thunks and counts how many jmp rel32 # instructions targeting them are followed by INT3 (the SLS mitigation): # # 1. Indirect call/jmp thunks (retpoline stubs used for indirect tail calls): # e8 01 00 00 00 cc 48 89 XX 24 (call +1; int3; mov ,(%rsp)) # # 2. Return thunk (used for all function returns via jmp __x86_return_thunk): # c3 90 90 90 90 cc cc cc cc cc (ret; nop*4; int3*5+) # This is the most common jmp target in retpoline-enabled kernels. # # Some kernels only use indirect thunks, some only the return thunk, and some # use both. We check both and combine the results. _sls_heuristic_perl() { perl -e ' use strict; use warnings; local $/; open my $fh, "<:raw", $ARGV[0] or die "open: $!"; my $text = <$fh>; close $fh; my $len = length($text); # Collect two types of thunks separately, as different kernels # apply SLS to different thunk types. my (%indirect_thunks, %return_thunks); # Pattern 1: indirect call/jmp thunks (retpoline stubs) while ($text =~ /\xe8\x01\x00\x00\x00\xcc\x48\x89.\x24/gs) { $indirect_thunks{ pos($text) - length($&) } = 1; } # Pattern 2: return thunk (ret; nop*4; int3*5) while ($text =~ /\xc3\x90\x90\x90\x90\xcc\xcc\xcc\xcc\xcc/gs) { $return_thunks{ pos($text) - length($&) } = 1; } my $n_indirect = scalar keys %indirect_thunks; my $n_return = scalar keys %return_thunks; if ($n_indirect + $n_return == 0) { print "thunks=0 jmps=0 sls=0\n"; exit 0; } # Count jmps to each thunk type separately my ($ind_total, $ind_sls) = (0, 0); my ($ret_total, $ret_sls) = (0, 0); for (my $i = 0; $i + 5 < $len; $i++) { next unless substr($text, $i, 1) eq "\xe9"; my $rel = unpack("V", substr($text, $i + 1, 4)); $rel -= 4294967296 if $rel >= 2147483648; my $target = $i + 5 + $rel; my $has_int3 = ($i + 5 < $len && substr($text, $i + 5, 1) eq "\xcc") ? 1 : 0; if (exists $indirect_thunks{$target}) { $ind_total++; $ind_sls += $has_int3; } if (exists $return_thunks{$target}) { $ret_total++; $ret_sls += $has_int3; } } # Use whichever thunk type has jmps; prefer indirect thunks if both have data my ($total, $sls, $n_thunks); if ($ind_total > 0) { ($total, $sls, $n_thunks) = ($ind_total, $ind_sls, $n_indirect); } elsif ($ret_total > 0) { ($total, $sls, $n_thunks) = ($ret_total, $ret_sls, $n_return); } else { ($total, $sls, $n_thunks) = (0, 0, $n_indirect + $n_return); } printf "thunks=%d jmps=%d sls=%d\n", $n_thunks, $total, $sls; ' "$1" 2>/dev/null } # Awk fallback implementation of the SLS heuristic byte scanner. # Slower than perl but uses only POSIX tools (od + awk). # Args: $1 = path to raw .text binary (from objcopy -O binary -j .text) # Output: thunks=N jmps=N sls=N _sls_heuristic_awk() { od -An -tu1 -v "$1" | awk ' { for (i = 1; i <= NF; i++) b[n++] = $i + 0 } END { # Pattern 1: indirect call/jmp thunks # 232 1 0 0 0 204 72 137 XX 36 (e8 01 00 00 00 cc 48 89 XX 24) for (i = 0; i + 9 < n; i++) { if (b[i]==232 && b[i+1]==1 && b[i+2]==0 && b[i+3]==0 && \ b[i+4]==0 && b[i+5]==204 && b[i+6]==72 && b[i+7]==137 && \ b[i+9]==36) { ind[i] = 1 n_ind++ } } # Pattern 2: return thunk (ret; nop*4; int3*5) # 195 144 144 144 144 204 204 204 204 204 (c3 90 90 90 90 cc cc cc cc cc) for (i = 0; i + 9 < n; i++) { if (b[i]==195 && b[i+1]==144 && b[i+2]==144 && b[i+3]==144 && \ b[i+4]==144 && b[i+5]==204 && b[i+6]==204 && b[i+7]==204 && \ b[i+8]==204 && b[i+9]==204) { ret[i] = 1 n_ret++ } } if (n_ind + n_ret == 0) { print "thunks=0 jmps=0 sls=0"; exit } # Count jmps to each thunk type separately ind_total = 0; ind_sls = 0 ret_total = 0; ret_sls = 0 for (i = 0; i + 5 < n; i++) { if (b[i] != 233) continue rel = b[i+1] + b[i+2]*256 + b[i+3]*65536 + b[i+4]*16777216 if (rel >= 2147483648) rel -= 4294967296 target = i + 5 + rel has_int3 = (b[i+5] == 204) ? 1 : 0 if (target in ind) { ind_total++; ind_sls += has_int3 } if (target in ret) { ret_total++; ret_sls += has_int3 } } # Prefer indirect thunks if they have data, else fall back to return thunk if (ind_total > 0) printf "thunks=%d jmps=%d sls=%d\n", n_ind, ind_total, ind_sls else if (ret_total > 0) printf "thunks=%d jmps=%d sls=%d\n", n_ret, ret_total, ret_sls else printf "thunks=%d jmps=0 sls=0\n", n_ind + n_ret }' 2>/dev/null } check_CVE_0000_0001_linux() { local status sys_interface_available msg status=UNK sys_interface_available=0 msg='' # No sysfs interface for SLS # sys_interface_available stays 0 if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then # --- CPU affection check --- if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU is not affected" return fi # --- arm64: no kernel mitigation available --- local _sls_arch _sls_arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || echo unknown) if echo "$_sls_arch" | grep -qw 'aarch64'; then pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "no kernel mitigation available for arm64 SLS (CVE-2020-13844)" explain "Your ARM processor is affected by Straight-Line Speculation (CVE-2020-13844).\n" \ "GCC and Clang support -mharden-sls=all for aarch64, which inserts SB (Speculation Barrier)\n" \ "or DSB+ISB after RET and BR instructions. However, the Linux kernel does not enable this flag:\n" \ "patches to add CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL were submitted in 2021 but were rejected upstream.\n" \ "There is currently no kernel-level mitigation for SLS on arm64." return fi # --- method 1: kernel config check (x86_64) --- local _sls_config='' if [ -n "$opt_config" ] && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then pr_info_nol " * Kernel compiled with SLS mitigation: " if grep -qE '^CONFIG_(MITIGATION_)?SLS=y' "$opt_config"; then _sls_config=1 pstatus green YES else _sls_config=0 pstatus yellow NO fi fi # --- method 2: kernel image heuristic (fallback when no config) --- local _sls_heuristic='' if [ -z "$_sls_config" ]; then pr_info_nol " * Kernel compiled with SLS mitigation: " if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$g_kernel_err" elif [ -z "$g_kernel" ]; then pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "no kernel image available" elif ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}objcopy" >/dev/null 2>&1; then pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}objcopy' tool, usually in the binutils package" else local _sls_result g_sls_text_tmp=$(mktemp -t smc-sls-text-XXXXXX) if ! "${opt_arch_prefix}objcopy" -O binary -j .text "$g_kernel" "$g_sls_text_tmp" 2>/dev/null || [ ! -s "$g_sls_text_tmp" ]; then pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "failed to extract .text section from kernel image" rm -f "$g_sls_text_tmp" g_sls_text_tmp='' else _sls_result='' if command -v perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then _sls_result=$(_sls_heuristic_perl "$g_sls_text_tmp") elif command -v awk >/dev/null 2>&1; then _sls_result=$(_sls_heuristic_awk "$g_sls_text_tmp") fi rm -f "$g_sls_text_tmp" g_sls_text_tmp='' if [ -z "$_sls_result" ]; then pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' or 'awk' tool for heuristic scan" else local _sls_thunks _sls_jmps _sls_int3 _sls_thunks=$(echo "$_sls_result" | sed -n 's/.*thunks=\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p') _sls_jmps=$(echo "$_sls_result" | sed -n 's/.*jmps=\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p') _sls_int3=$(echo "$_sls_result" | sed -n 's/.*sls=\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p') pr_debug "sls heuristic: thunks=$_sls_thunks jmps=$_sls_jmps int3=$_sls_int3" if [ "${_sls_thunks:-0}" = 0 ] || [ "${_sls_jmps:-0}" = 0 ]; then pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "no retpoline indirect thunks found in kernel image" else local _sls_pct=$((_sls_int3 * 100 / _sls_jmps)) if [ "$_sls_pct" -ge 80 ]; then _sls_heuristic=1 pstatus green YES "$_sls_int3/$_sls_jmps indirect tail-call JMPs hardened (${_sls_pct}%%)" elif [ "$_sls_pct" -le 20 ]; then _sls_heuristic=0 pstatus yellow NO "$_sls_int3/$_sls_jmps indirect tail-call JMPs hardened (${_sls_pct}%%)" else pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$_sls_int3/$_sls_jmps indirect tail-call JMPs hardened (${_sls_pct}%%, inconclusive)" fi fi fi fi fi fi # --- verdict (x86_64) --- if [ "$_sls_config" = 1 ] || [ "$_sls_heuristic" = 1 ]; then pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "kernel compiled with SLS mitigation" explain "Your kernel was compiled with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS=y (or CONFIG_SLS=y on kernels before 6.8),\n" \ "which enables the GCC flag -mharden-sls=all to insert INT3 instructions after unconditional\n" \ "control flow changes, blocking straight-line speculation." elif [ "$_sls_config" = 0 ] || [ "$_sls_heuristic" = 0 ]; then pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "kernel not compiled with SLS mitigation" explain "Recompile your kernel with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS=y (or CONFIG_SLS=y on kernels before 6.8).\n" \ "This enables the GCC flag -mharden-sls=all, which inserts INT3 after unconditional control flow\n" \ "instructions to block straight-line speculation. Note: this option defaults to off in most kernels\n" \ "and incurs ~2.4%% text size overhead." else pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "couldn't determine SLS mitigation status" fi elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but there is no sysfs entry for SLS" status=UNK pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$msg" fi } check_CVE_0000_0001_bsd() { if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected" else pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "your CPU is affected, but mitigation detection has not yet been implemented for BSD in this script" fi }