fix: mmio: don't report "Intel never assessed this CPU" when the MSR is unreadable

When IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (0x10a) can't be read from userspace (no msr
module, or kernel lockdown under Secure Boot), the FBSDP_NO/PSDP_NO/SBDR_SSDP_NO
bits were left at 0 ("explicitly not immune") instead of -1 ("unknown"). For a
recent CPU not in any kernel model list (e.g. Arrow Lake), this wrongly flipped
the MMIO Stale Data verdict into the "out of servicing period, Intel never
assessed this CPU" bucket.

src/libs/210_cpu_detect.sh

@@ -195,6 +195,14 @@ is_arch_cap_mmio_immune() {
     [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_fbsdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_psdp_no" = 1 ]
 }
 
+# Whether the MMIO arch-cap immunity bits are undetermined because the
+# IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR couldn't be read (msr module unavailable or kernel
+# lockdown).
+# Returns: 0 if undetermined, 1 otherwise
+is_arch_cap_mmio_undetermined() {
+    [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = -1 ] || [ "$cap_fbsdp_no" = -1 ] || [ "$cap_psdp_no" = -1 ]
+}
+
 # Check whether the CPU is known to be unaffected by MMIO Stale Data (CVE-2022-21123/21125/21166)
 # Matches the kernel's NO_MMIO whitelist plus arch_cap_mmio_immune().
 # Model inventory and kernel-commit history are documented in check_mmio_linux().

src/libs/330_cpu_misc.sh

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ dmesg_grep() {
         # dmesg truncated
         return 2
     fi
-    ret_dmesg_grep_grepped=$(dmesg 2>/dev/null | grep -E "$1" | head -n1)
+    ret_dmesg_grep_grepped=$(dmesg 2>/dev/null | grep -m 1 -E "$1")
     # not found:
     [ -z "$ret_dmesg_grep_grepped" ] && return 1
     # found, output is in $ret_dmesg_grep_grepped

src/libs/400_hw_check.sh

@@ -987,8 +987,33 @@ check_cpu() {
                     pstatus yellow NO
                 fi
             elif [ $ret = $READ_MSR_RET_KO ]; then
+                # the MSR access faulted: the register is genuinely absent, so the
+                # pre-seeded 0 ("not advertised") values are correct.
                 pstatus yellow NO
             else
+                # RET_ERR (no msr module) or RET_LOCKDOWN (MSR reads restricted):
+                # CPUID told us the MSR exists but we couldn't read it, so its bits
+                # are undetermined, not 0. Leaving them at 0 would falsely claim the
+                # CPU "explicitly indicates not immune".
+                # Reset every arch-cap-derived value to -1 (UNKNOWN) instead.
+                cap_rdcl_no=-1
+                cap_taa_no=-1
+                cap_mds_no=-1
+                cap_ibrs_all=-1
+                cap_rsba=-1
+                cap_l1dflush_no=-1
+                cap_ssb_no=-1
+                cap_pschange_msc_no=-1
+                cap_tsx_ctrl_msr=-1
+                cap_gds_ctrl=-1
+                cap_gds_no=-1
+                cap_rfds_no=-1
+                cap_rfds_clear=-1
+                cap_its_no=-1
+                cap_sbdr_ssdp_no=-1
+                cap_fbsdp_no=-1
+                cap_psdp_no=-1
+                cap_fb_clear=-1
                 pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$ret_read_msr_msg"
             fi
         fi

src/vulns-helpers/check_mmio.sh

@@ -6,15 +6,22 @@ check_mmio_bsd() {
     # the only partial defense available, and without OS-level VERW invocation it
     # cannot close the vulnerability.
     local unk
-    unk="your CPU's MMIO Stale Data status is unknown (Intel never officially assessed this CPU, its servicing period has ended)"
     if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
         pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
     elif is_cpu_mmio_unknown; then
-        if [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ]; then
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "$unk, and no BSD mitigation exists"
-            explain "There is no known mitigation for this CPU model. Even with up-to-date microcode, BSD kernels do not invoke VERW for MMIO Stale Data clearing. Only a hardware replacement can fully address this."
+        if is_arch_cap_mmio_undetermined; then
+            # We only landed in the "unknown" bucket because the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+            # MSR couldn't be read: the CPU might actually advertise MMIO immunity.
+            unk="your CPU's MMIO Stale Data status could not be determined: the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (0x10a) couldn't be read"
+            pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "$unk; load the cpuctl module and/or re-run as root to get a definitive answer"
         else
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "$unk; no BSD mitigation exists in any case"
+            unk="your CPU's MMIO Stale Data status is unknown (Intel never officially assessed this CPU, its servicing period has ended)"
+            if [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ]; then
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "$unk, and no BSD mitigation exists"
+                explain "There is no known mitigation for this CPU model. Even with up-to-date microcode, BSD kernels do not invoke VERW for MMIO Stale Data clearing. Only a hardware replacement can fully address this."
+            else
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "$unk; no BSD mitigation exists in any case"
+            fi
         fi
     else
         pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "your CPU is affected and no BSD has implemented an MMIO Stale Data mitigation"
@@ -24,7 +31,7 @@ check_mmio_bsd() {
 
 # MMIO Stale Data (Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities) - Linux mitigation check
 check_mmio_linux() {
-    local status sys_interface_available msg kernel_mmio kernel_mmio_can_tell mmio_mitigated mmio_smt_mitigated mystatus mymsg unk
+    local status sys_interface_available msg kernel_mmio kernel_mmio_can_tell kernel_mmio_unknown_aware mmio_mitigated mmio_smt_mitigated mystatus mymsg unk
     status=UNK
     sys_interface_available=0
     msg=''
@@ -166,6 +173,11 @@ check_mmio_linux() {
         # MMIO Stale Data is Intel-only; skip x86-specific kernel/MSR checks on non-x86 kernels
         kernel_mmio=''
         kernel_mmio_can_tell=0
+        # Whether this kernel implements the X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN distinction, i.e. can
+        # report "Unknown: No mitigations" for CPUs Intel never assessed. Only such kernels
+        # emit a *trustworthy* "Not affected": they would have said "Unknown" instead if the
+        # CPU were in the unknown bucket. Detected by the presence of the literal sysfs string in the kernel image.
+        kernel_mmio_unknown_aware=0
         if is_x86_kernel; then
             pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports MMIO Stale Data mitigation: "
             kernel_mmio_can_tell=1
@@ -176,6 +188,10 @@ check_mmio_linux() {
                 kernel_mmio='found MMIO Stale Data mitigation evidence in kernel image'
                 pstatus green YES "$kernel_mmio"
             fi
+            if [ -z "$g_kernel_err" ] && grep -qF 'Unknown: No mitigations' "$g_kernel" 2>/dev/null; then
+                pr_debug "mmio: kernel image knows the 'Unknown: No mitigations' state (X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN-aware)"
+                kernel_mmio_unknown_aware=1
+            fi
             if [ -z "$kernel_mmio" ] && [ -n "$opt_config" ] && grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA=y' "$opt_config"; then
                 kernel_mmio='found MMIO Stale Data mitigation config option enabled'
                 pstatus green YES "$kernel_mmio"
@@ -241,12 +257,32 @@ check_mmio_linux() {
         # Bypass the normal sysfs reconciliation: sysfs reports "Unknown: No mitigations"
         # only on v6.0-v6.15. On earlier and on v6.16+ kernels it wrongly says "Not affected"
         # for these CPUs (which predate FB_CLEAR microcode and Intel's affected-processor list).
-        unk="your CPU's MMIO Stale Data status is unknown (Intel never officially assessed this CPU, its servicing period has ended)"
-        if [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ]; then
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "$unk, and no mitigation is available"
-            explain "There is no known mitigation for this CPU model. Intel ended its servicing period without evaluating whether it is affected by MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities, so no FB_CLEAR-capable microcode was released. Consider replacing affected hardware."
+        if is_arch_cap_mmio_undetermined; then
+            # We landed in the "unknown" bucket only because the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+            # MSR couldn't be read from userspace (no msr module, or kernel lockdown under
+            # Secure Boot): the CPU might actually advertise MMIO immunity
+            # through FBSDP_NO/PSDP_NO/SBDR_SSDP_NO, but we can't read it, however the kernel can.
+            #
+            # We can trust a sysfs "Not affected" only if this kernel is X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN-aware:
+            # such a kernel would have reported "Unknown: No mitigations" instead if the CPU were in
+            # the unknown bucket, so "Not affected" genuinely means arch-cap immune.
+            # On kernels that lack that distinction, a "Not affected" is not trustworthy for these CPUs,
+            # so we keep UNK.
+            if [ "$g_mode" = live ] && [ "$sys_interface_available" = 1 ] &&
+                [ "$kernel_mmio_unknown_aware" = 1 ] && [ "$status" = OK ]; then
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your kernel reports your CPU as not affected, and this kernel distinguishes the MMIO 'unknown' state, so its verdict is trustworthy (we couldn't read the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR ourselves)"
+            else
+                unk="your CPU's MMIO Stale Data status could not be determined: the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (0x10a) couldn't be read"
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "$unk; load the msr module and/or disable kernel lockdown, then re-run as root to get a definitive answer"
+            fi
         else
-            pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "$unk; no mitigation is available in any case"
+            unk="your CPU's MMIO Stale Data status is unknown (Intel never officially assessed this CPU, its servicing period has ended)"
+            if [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ]; then
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "$unk, and no mitigation is available"
+                explain "There is no known mitigation for this CPU model. Intel ended its servicing period without evaluating whether it is affected by MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities, so no FB_CLEAR-capable microcode was released."
+            else
+                pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "$unk; no mitigation is available in any case"
+            fi
         fi
     else
         if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then