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Author SHA1 Message Date
Stéphane Lesimple
e2d110a3b5 doc: update output formats doc + normalize json to bool 2026-04-20 12:55:34 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
1bb33d5cf2 chore: remove from test branch workflows that must live on master 2026-04-20 12:53:36 +02:00
9 changed files with 83 additions and 432 deletions

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@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
name: autoupdate
on:
workflow_dispatch:
schedule:
- cron: '42 9 * * *'
permissions:
pull-requests: write
jobs:
autoupdate:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Install prerequisites
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends iucode-tool sqlite3 unzip
- name: Update microcode versions
run: ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --update-builtin-fwdb
- name: Check git diff
id: diff
run: |
echo change="$(git diff spectre-meltdown-checker.sh | awk '/MCEDB/ { if(V) { print V" to "$4; exit } else { V=$4 } }')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo nbdiff="$(git diff spectre-meltdown-checker.sh | grep -cE -- '^\+# [AI],')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
git diff
cat "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Create Pull Request if needed
if: steps.diff.outputs.nbdiff != '0'
uses: peter-evans/create-pull-request@v7
with:
branch: autoupdate-fwdb
commit-message: "update: fwdb from ${{ steps.diff.outputs.change }}, ${{ steps.diff.outputs.nbdiff }} microcode changes"
title: "[Auto] Update fwdb from ${{ steps.diff.outputs.change }}"
body: |
Automated PR to update fwdb from ${{ steps.diff.outputs.change }}
Detected ${{ steps.diff.outputs.nbdiff }} microcode changes

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@@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
# Daily transient-execution vulnerability scan
You are a scheduled agent running inside a GitHub Actions job. Your job
is to audit public news/advisory sources for **transient-execution and
CPU side-channel vulnerabilities** that may need to be added to
**spectre-meltdown-checker** (this repository).
## What counts as "relevant"
spectre-meltdown-checker detects, reports, and suggests mitigations for
CPU vulnerabilities such as: Spectre v1/v2/v4, Meltdown, Foreshadow/L1TF,
MDS (ZombieLoad/RIDL/Fallout), TAA, SRBDS, iTLB Multihit, Zenbleed,
Downfall (GDS), Retbleed, Inception, SRSO, BHI, RFDS, Reptar, FP-DSS,
and any similar microarchitectural side-channel or speculative-execution
issue on x86 (Intel/AMD) or ARM CPUs. It also surfaces related hardware
mitigation features (SMAP/SMEP/UMIP/IBPB/eIBRS/STIBP…) when they gate
the remediation for a tracked CVE.
It does **not** track generic software CVEs, GPU driver bugs, networking
stacks, filesystem bugs, userspace crypto issues, or unrelated kernel
subsystems.
## Inputs handed to you by the workflow
- Working directory: the repo root (`/github/workspace` in Actions, or
wherever `actions/checkout` placed it). You may `grep` the repo to
check whether a CVE or codename is already covered.
- `state/seen.json` — memory carried over from the previous run, with
shape:
```json
{
"last_run": "2026-04-17T08:00:12Z",
"seen": {
"<stable-id-1>": { "bucket": "unrelated", "seen_at": "2026-04-17T08:00:12Z", "source": "phoronix" },
"<stable-id-2>": { "bucket": "tocheck", "seen_at": "2026-04-17T08:00:12Z", "source": "oss-sec", "cve": "CVE-2026-1234" }
}
}
```
On the very first run, or when the prior artifact has expired,
the file exists but `seen` is empty and `last_run` is `null`.
- Environment: `SCAN_DATE` (ISO-8601 timestamp of the run start, set by
the workflow). Treat this as "now" for all time-window decisions.
## Time window
This is a belt-and-suspenders design — use **both** mechanisms:
1. **Primary: stable-id dedup.** If an item's stable identifier (see
below) is already present in `state.seen`, skip it entirely — it
was classified on a previous day.
2. **Secondary: 25-hour window.** Among *new* items, prefer those whose
publication/update timestamp is within the last 25 h relative to
`SCAN_DATE`. This bounds work when the prior artifact expired
(90-day retention) or when `last_run` is stale (missed runs).
If `last_run` is older than 25 h, widen the window to
`now - last_run + 1h` so no items are lost across missed runs.
3. Items without a parseable timestamp: include them (fail-safe).
## Sources to poll
Fetch each URL with
`curl -sS -A "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36" -L --max-time 20`.
On non-2xx or timeout, record the failure in the run summary and
continue — do not abort.
### RSS / Atom feeds (primary — parse feed timestamps)
| Short name | URL |
|-----------------|-----|
| phoronix | https://www.phoronix.com/rss.php |
| oss-sec | https://seclists.org/rss/oss-sec.rss |
| lwn | https://lwn.net/headlines/newrss |
| project-zero | https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default |
| vusec | https://www.vusec.net/feed/ |
| comsec-eth | https://comsec.ethz.ch/category/news/feed/ |
| msrc | https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/rss |
| cisa | https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-advisories/all.xml |
| cert-cc | https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/atomfeed/ |
### HTML pages (no RSS — fetch, extract dated entries)
| Short name | URL |
|-----------------|-----|
| intel-psirt | https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/default.html |
| amd-psirt | https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security.html |
| arm-spec | https://developer.arm.com/Arm%20Security%20Center/Speculative%20Processor%20Vulnerability |
| transient-fail | https://transient.fail/ |
For HTML pages: look for advisory tables or listings with dates. Extract
the advisory title, permalink, and date. If a page has no dates at all,
compare its content against `state.seen` — any new advisory IDs not yet
classified count as "new this run".
## Stable identifier per source
Use the first available of these, in order, as the dedup key:
1. Vendor advisory ID (`INTEL-SA-01234`, `AMD-SB-7001`, `ARM-2024-0042`,
`VU#123456`, `CVE-YYYY-NNNNN`)
2. RSS `<guid>` / Atom `<id>`
3. Permalink URL (`<link>`)
Always also record the permalink URL in the output file so a human can
click through.
## Classification rules
For each **new** item (not in `state.seen`) that passes the time window,
pick exactly one bucket:
- **toimplement** — a clearly-identified new transient-execution / CPU
side-channel vulnerability in scope, **and not already covered by
this repo**. Verify the second half by grepping the repo for the CVE
ID *and* the codename before classifying; if either matches existing
code, demote to `tocheck`.
- **tocheck** — plausibly in-scope but ambiguous: mitigation-only
feature (LASS, IBT, APIC-virt, etc.); item seemingly already
implemented but worth confirming scope; unclear applicability
(e.g. embedded-only ARM SKU); CVE-ID pending; contradictory info
across sources. State clearly what would resolve the ambiguity.
- **unrelated** — everything else.
Tie-breakers: prefer `tocheck` over `unrelated` when uncertain. Prefer
`tocheck` over `toimplement` when the CVE ID is still "reserved" /
"pending" — false positives in `toimplement` waste human time more than
false positives in `tocheck`.
## Outputs
Compute `TODAY=$(date -u -d "$SCAN_DATE" +%F)`. Write these files under
the repo root, overwriting if they already exist (they shouldn't unless
the workflow re-ran the same day):
- `rss_${TODAY}_toimplement.md`
- `rss_${TODAY}_tocheck.md`
- `rss_${TODAY}_unrelated.md`
Each file uses level-2 headers per source short-name, then one bullet
per item: the stable ID (if any), the permalink URL, and 12 sentences.
Keep entries terse — a human skims these daily.
```markdown
## oss-sec
- **CVE-2026-1234** — https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/18/3
New Intel transient-execution bug "Foo" disclosed today; affects
Redwood Cove cores, microcode fix pending. Not yet covered by this
repo (grepped for CVE-2026-1234 and "Foo" — no matches).
## phoronix
- https://www.phoronix.com/news/Some-Article
Linux 7.2 drops a compiler-target flag; unrelated to CPU side channels.
```
If a bucket has no items, write the file with a single line
`(no new items in this window)` so it is obvious the job ran.
### Run summary
Append this block to the **tocheck** file (creating it if empty):
```markdown
## Run summary
- SCAN_DATE: <value>
- window cutoff: <computed cutoff>
- prior state size: <N> entries, last_run=<value>
- per-source new item counts: phoronix=<n>, oss-sec=<n>, lwn=<n>, ...
- fetch failures: <list, or "none">
- total classified this run: toimplement=<n>, tocheck=<n>, unrelated=<n>
```
### State update
Rewrite `state/seen.json` with:
- `last_run` = `SCAN_DATE`
- `seen` = union of (pruned prior `seen`) (all items classified this
run, keyed by stable ID, with `{bucket, seen_at=SCAN_DATE, source, cve?}`)
Pruning (keep state bounded): drop any entry whose `seen_at` is older
than 30 days before `SCAN_DATE`. The workflow step also does this as
a safety net, but do it here too so the in-memory view is consistent.
## Guardrails
- Do NOT modify any repo source code. Only write the three markdown
output files and `state/seen.json`.
- Do NOT create commits, branches, or PRs.
- Do NOT call any tool that posts externally (Slack, GitHub comments,
issues, email, etc.).
- Do NOT follow links off-site for deeper investigation unless strictly
needed to resolve a `tocheck` ambiguity — budget of at most 5 such
follow-ups per run.
- If a source returns unexpectedly large content, truncate to the first
~200 items before parsing.
- If total runtime exceeds 15 minutes, finish whatever you can,
write partial outputs, and note it in the run summary.

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@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
name: 'Manage stale issues and PRs'
on:
schedule:
- cron: '37 7 * * *'
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
action:
description: "dry-run"
required: true
default: "dryrun"
type: choice
options:
- dryrun
- apply
permissions:
issues: write
pull-requests: write
jobs:
stale:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/stale@v10
with:
any-of-labels: 'needs-more-info,answered'
labels-to-remove-when-unstale: 'needs-more-info,answered'
days-before-stale: 30
days-before-close: 7
stale-issue-label: stale
remove-stale-when-updated: true
debug-only: ${{ case(inputs.action == 'dryrun', true, false) }}

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@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
name: Online search for vulns
on:
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
workflow_dispatch: {} # allow manual trigger
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read # needed to list/download previous run artifacts
id-token: write # needed to mint OIDC token
concurrency:
group: vuln-scan
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 20
steps:
- name: Checkout repository (for grep-based dedup against existing checks)
uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
fetch-depth: 1
persist-credentials: false
# ---- Load previous state ---------------------------------------------
# Find the most recent successful run of THIS workflow (other than the
# current one) and pull its `vuln-scan-state` artifact. On the very
# first run there will be none — that's fine, we start empty.
- name: Find previous successful run id
id: prev
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -e
run_id=$(gh run list \
--workflow="${{ github.workflow }}" \
--status=success \
--limit 1 \
--json databaseId \
--jq '.[0].databaseId // empty')
echo "run_id=${run_id}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
if [ -n "$run_id" ]; then
echo "Found previous successful run: $run_id"
else
echo "No previous successful run — starting from empty state."
fi
- name: Download previous state artifact
if: steps.prev.outputs.run_id != ''
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
continue-on-error: true # tolerate retention expiry
with:
name: vuln-scan-state
path: state/
run-id: ${{ steps.prev.outputs.run_id }}
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Ensure state file exists
run: |
mkdir -p state
if [ ! -f state/seen.json ]; then
echo '{"last_run": null, "seen": {}}' > state/seen.json
echo "Initialized empty state."
fi
echo "State size: $(wc -c < state/seen.json) bytes"
# ---- Run the scan ----------------------------------------------------
# Runs Claude Code against daily_vuln_scan_prompt.md.
# That prompt file fully specifies: sources to poll, how to read
# state/seen.json, the 25-hour window, the output files to write,
# and how to rewrite state/seen.json at the end of the run.
- name: Research for online mentions of new vulns
id: scan
uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
env:
SCAN_DATE: ${{ github.run_started_at }}
with:
claude_args: |
--model claude-opus-4-7 --allowedTools "Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Grep,Glob,WebFetch"
prompt: |
Read the full task instructions from .github/workflows/daily_vuln_scan_prompt.md and execute them end-to-end. That file fully specifies: sources to poll, how to read and update state/seen.json, the 25-hour window, which rss_YYYY-MM-DD_*.md files to write, and the run guardrails. Use $SCAN_DATE (env var) as "now" for time-window decisions.
claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Upload Claude execution log
if: ${{ always() && steps.scan.outputs.execution_file != '' }}
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: claude-execution-log-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ steps.scan.outputs.execution_file }}
retention-days: 30
if-no-files-found: warn
# ---- Persist outputs -------------------------------------------------
- name: Prune state (keep only entries from the last 30 days)
run: |
python3 - <<'PY'
import json, datetime, pathlib
p = pathlib.Path("state/seen.json")
data = json.loads(p.read_text())
cutoff = (datetime.datetime.utcnow() - datetime.timedelta(days=30)).isoformat()
before = len(data.get("seen", {}))
data["seen"] = {
k: v for k, v in data.get("seen", {}).items()
if v.get("seen_at", "9999") >= cutoff
}
after = len(data["seen"])
p.write_text(json.dumps(data, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
print(f"Pruned state: {before} -> {after} entries")
PY
- name: Upload new state artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: vuln-scan-state
path: state/seen.json
retention-days: 90
if-no-files-found: error
- name: Upload daily report
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: vuln-scan-report-${{ github.run_id }}
path: rss_*.md
retention-days: 90
if-no-files-found: warn

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@@ -102,7 +102,9 @@ boundaries by a malicious guest. Prioritise remediation where
### `cpu` ### `cpu`
CPU hardware identification. `null` when `--no-hw` is active. CPU hardware identification. `null` when `--no-hw` is active, or when
`--arch-prefix` is set (host CPU info is then suppressed to avoid mixing
with a different-arch target kernel).
The object uses `arch` as a discriminator: `"x86"` for Intel/AMD/Hygon CPUs, The object uses `arch` as a discriminator: `"x86"` for Intel/AMD/Hygon CPUs,
`"arm"` for ARM/Cavium/Phytium. Arch-specific fields live under a matching `"arm"` for ARM/Cavium/Phytium. Arch-specific fields live under a matching
@@ -140,7 +142,7 @@ fields from the other architecture.
#### `cpu.x86.capabilities` #### `cpu.x86.capabilities`
Each capability is a **tri-state**: `true` (present), `false` (absent), or Every capability is a **tri-state**: `true` (present), `false` (absent), or
`null` (not applicable or could not be read, e.g. when not root or on AMD for `null` (not applicable or could not be read, e.g. when not root or on AMD for
Intel-specific features). Intel-specific features).
@@ -238,7 +240,7 @@ with an unknown CVE ID).
| `status` | string | `"OK"` / `"VULN"` / `"UNK"` | Check outcome (see below) | | `status` | string | `"OK"` / `"VULN"` / `"UNK"` | Check outcome (see below) |
| `vulnerable` | boolean \| null | `false` / `true` / `null` | `false`=OK, `true`=VULN, `null`=UNK | | `vulnerable` | boolean \| null | `false` / `true` / `null` | `false`=OK, `true`=VULN, `null`=UNK |
| `info` | string | | Human-readable description of the specific mitigation state or reason | | `info` | string | | Human-readable description of the specific mitigation state or reason |
| `sysfs_status` | string \| null | `"OK"` / `"VULN"` / `"UNK"` / null | Status as reported by the kernel via `/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/`; null if sysfs was not consulted for this CVE | | `sysfs_status` | string \| null | `"OK"` / `"VULN"` / `"UNK"` / null | Status as reported by the kernel via `/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/`; null if sysfs was not consulted for this CVE, or if the CVE's check read sysfs in silent/quiet mode (raw message is still captured in `sysfs_message`) |
| `sysfs_message` | string \| null | | Raw text from the sysfs file (e.g. `"Mitigation: PTI"`); null if sysfs was not consulted | | `sysfs_message` | string \| null | | Raw text from the sysfs file (e.g. `"Mitigation: PTI"`); null if sysfs was not consulted |
#### Status values #### Status values

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@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
}, },
"cpu": { "cpu": {
"description": "CPU hardware identification. Null when --no-hw is active. Contains an 'arch' discriminator ('x86' or 'arm') and a matching arch-specific sub-object with identification fields and capabilities.", "description": "CPU hardware identification. Null when --no-hw is active or when --arch-prefix is set (host CPU info is then suppressed to avoid mixing with a different-arch target kernel). Contains an 'arch' discriminator ('x86' or 'arm') and a matching arch-specific sub-object with identification fields and capabilities.",
"oneOf": [ "oneOf": [
{ "type": "null" }, { "type": "null" },
{ {
@@ -180,16 +180,16 @@
"type": ["string", "null"] "type": ["string", "null"]
}, },
"capabilities": { "capabilities": {
"description": "CPU feature flags detected via CPUID and MSR reads. Each value is true (present), false (absent), or null (not applicable or could not be read).", "description": "CPU feature flags detected via CPUID and MSR reads. Every value is tri-state: true=present, false=absent, null=not applicable or unreadable.",
"type": "object", "type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false, "additionalProperties": false,
"properties": { "properties": {
"spec_ctrl": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "SPEC_CTRL MSR present (Intel; enables IBRS + IBPB via WRMSR)" }, "spec_ctrl": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "SPEC_CTRL MSR present (Intel; enables IBRS + IBPB via WRMSR)" },
"ibrs": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation" }, "ibrs": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "IBRS supported (via SPEC_CTRL, IBRS_SUPPORT, or cpuinfo fallback)" },
"ibpb": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier" }, "ibpb": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "IBPB supported (via SPEC_CTRL, IBPB_SUPPORT, or cpuinfo fallback)" },
"ibpb_ret": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "IBPB on return (enhanced form)" }, "ibpb_ret": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "IBPB on return (enhanced form)" },
"stibp": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors" }, "stibp": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "STIBP supported (Intel/AMD/HYGON or cpuinfo fallback)" },
"ssbd": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" }, "ssbd": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "SSBD supported (SPEC_CTRL, VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, non-architectural MSR, or cpuinfo fallback)" },
"l1d_flush": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "L1D cache flush instruction" }, "l1d_flush": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "L1D cache flush instruction" },
"md_clear": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "VERW clears CPU buffers (MDS mitigation)" }, "md_clear": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "VERW clears CPU buffers (MDS mitigation)" },
"arch_capabilities": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR is present" }, "arch_capabilities": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR is present" },
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@
"tsa_l1_no": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to TSA-L1" }, "tsa_l1_no": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to TSA-L1" },
"verw_clear": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "VERW clears CPU buffers" }, "verw_clear": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "VERW clears CPU buffers" },
"autoibrs": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "AMD AutoIBRS (equivalent to enhanced IBRS on Intel)" }, "autoibrs": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "AMD AutoIBRS (equivalent to enhanced IBRS on Intel)" },
"sbpb": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Selective Branch Predictor Barrier (AMD Inception mitigation)" }, "sbpb": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Selective Branch Predictor Barrier (AMD Inception mitigation): true if PRED_CMD MSR SBPB bit write succeeded; false if write failed; null if not verifiable (non-root, CPUID error, or CPU does not report SBPB support)" },
"avx2": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "AVX2 supported (relevant to Downfall / GDS)" }, "avx2": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "AVX2 supported (relevant to Downfall / GDS)" },
"avx512": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "AVX-512 supported (relevant to Downfall / GDS)" } "avx512": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "AVX-512 supported (relevant to Downfall / GDS)" }
} }

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@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ STATUS: summary | perfdata
| VULN + UNK | `N/T CVE(s) vulnerable: CVE-A CVE-B ..., M inconclusive` | | VULN + UNK | `N/T CVE(s) vulnerable: CVE-A CVE-B ..., M inconclusive` |
| UNK only | `N/T CVE checks inconclusive` | | UNK only | `N/T CVE checks inconclusive` |
| Non-root + VULN | `N/T CVE(s) appear vulnerable (unconfirmed, not root): CVE-A ...` | | Non-root + VULN | `N/T CVE(s) appear vulnerable (unconfirmed, not root): CVE-A ...` |
| Non-root + VULN + UNK | `N/T CVE(s) appear vulnerable (unconfirmed, not root): CVE-A ..., M inconclusive` |
### Lines 2+ (long output) ### Lines 2+ (long output)
@@ -59,15 +60,19 @@ Never parsed by the monitoring core; safe to add or reorder.
#### Context notes #### Context notes
Printed before per-CVE details when applicable: Printed before per-CVE details when applicable. Notes are emitted in this
order when more than one applies:
| Note | Condition | | Note | Condition |
|---|---| |---|---|
| `NOTE: paranoid mode active, stricter mitigation requirements applied` | `--paranoid` was used | | `NOTE: paranoid mode active, stricter mitigation requirements applied` | `--paranoid` was used |
| `NOTE: hypervisor host detected (reason); L1TF/MDS severity is elevated` | System is a VM host (KVM, Xen, VMware…) | | `NOTE: hypervisor host detected (reason); L1TF/MDS severity is elevated` | System is detected as a VM host (KVM, Xen, VMware…) |
| `NOTE: not a hypervisor host` | System is confirmed not a VM host | | `NOTE: not a hypervisor host` | System is confirmed not a VM host |
| `NOTE: not running as root; MSR reads skipped, results may be incomplete` | Script ran without root privileges | | `NOTE: not running as root; MSR reads skipped, results may be incomplete` | Script ran without root privileges |
When VMM detection did not run (e.g. `--no-hw`), neither the
`hypervisor host detected` nor the `not a hypervisor host` note is printed.
#### Per-CVE detail lines #### Per-CVE detail lines
One line per non-OK CVE. VULN entries (`[CRITICAL]`) appear before UNK One line per non-OK CVE. VULN entries (`[CRITICAL]`) appear before UNK

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@@ -90,13 +90,16 @@ smc_build_info{version="25.30.0250400123",mode="live",run_as_root="true",paranoi
Operating system and kernel metadata. Always value `1`. Operating system and kernel metadata. Always value `1`.
Absent in offline mode when neither `uname -r` nor `uname -m` is available. Absent entirely when none of `kernel_release`, `kernel_arch`, or
`hypervisor_host` can be determined (e.g. non-live mode with no VMM detection).
Each label is emitted only when its value is known; missing labels are
omitted rather than set to an empty string.
| Label | Values | Meaning | | Label | Values | Meaning |
|---|---|---| |---|---|---|
| `kernel_release` | string | Output of `uname -r` (live mode only) | | `kernel_release` | string | Output of `uname -r`; emitted only in live mode |
| `kernel_arch` | string | Output of `uname -m` (live mode only) | | `kernel_arch` | string | Output of `uname -m`; emitted only in live mode |
| `hypervisor_host` | `true` / `false` | Whether this machine is detected as a hypervisor host (running KVM, Xen, VMware, etc.) | | `hypervisor_host` | `true` / `false` | Whether this machine is detected as a hypervisor host (running KVM, Xen, VMware, etc.); absent when VMM detection did not run (e.g. `--no-hw`) |
**Example:** **Example:**
``` ```
@@ -114,26 +117,47 @@ a malicious guest. Always prioritise remediation on hosts where
### `smc_cpu_info` ### `smc_cpu_info`
CPU hardware and microcode metadata. Always value `1`. Absent when `--no-hw` CPU hardware and microcode metadata. Always value `1`. Absent when `--no-hw`
is used. is used or when `--arch-prefix` is set (host CPU info is suppressed to avoid
mixing with a different-arch target kernel).
Common labels (always emitted when the data is available):
| Label | Values | Meaning | | Label | Values | Meaning |
|---|---|---| |---|---|---|
| `vendor` | string | CPU vendor (e.g. `Intel`, `AuthenticAMD`) | | `vendor` | string | CPU vendor (e.g. `GenuineIntel`, `AuthenticAMD`, `HygonGenuine`, `ARM`) |
| `model` | string | CPU friendly name from `/proc/cpuinfo` | | `model` | string | CPU friendly name from `/proc/cpuinfo` |
| `arch` | `x86` / `arm` | Architecture family; determines which arch-specific labels follow |
| `smt` | `true` / `false` | Whether SMT (HyperThreading) is currently enabled; absent if undeterminable |
| `microcode` | hex string | Installed microcode version (e.g. `0xf4`); absent if unreadable |
| `microcode_latest` | hex string | Latest known-good microcode version from the firmware database; absent if the CPU is not in the database |
| `microcode_up_to_date` | `true` / `false` | Whether `microcode == microcode_latest`; absent if either is unavailable |
| `microcode_blacklisted` | `true` / `false` | Whether the installed microcode is known to cause problems and should be rolled back; emitted whenever `microcode` is emitted |
x86-only labels (emitted when `arch="x86"`):
| Label | Values | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `family` | integer string | CPU family number | | `family` | integer string | CPU family number |
| `model_id` | integer string | CPU model number | | `model_id` | integer string | CPU model number |
| `stepping` | integer string | CPU stepping number | | `stepping` | integer string | CPU stepping number |
| `cpuid` | hex string | Full CPUID value (e.g. `0x000906ed`); absent on some ARM CPUs | | `cpuid` | hex string | Full CPUID value (e.g. `0x000906ed`) |
| `codename` | string | Intel CPU codename (e.g. `Coffee Lake`); absent on AMD and ARM | | `codename` | string | Intel CPU codename (e.g. `Coffee Lake`); absent on AMD/Hygon |
| `smt` | `true` / `false` | Whether SMT (HyperThreading) is currently enabled |
| `microcode` | hex string | Installed microcode version (e.g. `0xf4`) |
| `microcode_latest` | hex string | Latest known-good microcode version from the firmware database |
| `microcode_up_to_date` | `true` / `false` | Whether `microcode == microcode_latest` |
| `microcode_blacklisted` | `true` / `false` | Whether the installed microcode is known to cause problems and should be rolled back |
**Example:** ARM-only labels (emitted when `arch="arm"`):
| Label | Values | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `part_list` | string | Space-separated list of ARM part numbers across cores (e.g. `0xd0b 0xd05` on big.LITTLE) |
| `arch_list` | string | Space-separated list of ARM architecture levels across cores (e.g. `8 8`) |
**x86 example:**
``` ```
smc_cpu_info{vendor="Intel",model="Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-9700K CPU @ 3.60GHz",family="6",model_id="158",stepping="13",cpuid="0x000906ed",codename="Coffee Lake",smt="true",microcode="0xf4",microcode_latest="0xf4",microcode_up_to_date="true",microcode_blacklisted="false"} 1 smc_cpu_info{vendor="GenuineIntel",model="Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-9700K CPU @ 3.60GHz",arch="x86",family="6",model_id="158",stepping="13",cpuid="0x000906ed",codename="Coffee Lake",smt="true",microcode="0xf4",microcode_latest="0xf4",microcode_up_to_date="true",microcode_blacklisted="false"} 1
```
**ARM example:**
```
smc_cpu_info{vendor="ARM",model="ARM v8 model 0xd0b",arch="arm",part_list="0xd0b 0xd05",arch_list="8 8",smt="false"} 1
``` ```
**Microcode labels:** **Microcode labels:**
@@ -352,9 +376,15 @@ queries. CVE checks that rely on hardware capability detection (`cap_*` flags,
MSR reads) will report `unknown` status. `mode="no-hw"` in `smc_build_info` MSR reads) will report `unknown` status. `mode="no-hw"` in `smc_build_info`
signals this. signals this.
**Cross-arch inspection (`--arch-prefix`)**
When a cross-arch toolchain prefix is passed, the script suppresses the host
CPU metadata so it does not get mixed with data from a different-arch target
kernel: `smc_cpu_info` is not emitted, the same as under `--no-hw`.
**Hardware-only mode (`--hw-only`)** **Hardware-only mode (`--hw-only`)**
Only hardware detection is performed; CVE checks are skipped. `smc_cpu_info` Only hardware detection is performed; CVE checks are skipped. `smc_cpu_info`
is emitted but no `smc_vuln` metrics appear. `mode="hw-only"` in is emitted but no `smc_vulnerability_status` metrics appear (and
`smc_vulnerable_count` / `smc_unknown_count` are `0`). `mode="hw-only"` in
`smc_build_info` signals this. `smc_build_info` signals this.
**`--sysfs-only`** **`--sysfs-only`**

View File

@@ -15,15 +15,17 @@ _prom_escape() {
printf '%s' "$1" | sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/"/\\"/g' | tr '\n' ' ' printf '%s' "$1" | sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/"/\\"/g' | tr '\n' ' '
} }
# Convert a shell capability value to a JSON token # Convert a shell capability value to a JSON boolean token
# Args: $1=value (1=true, 0=false, -1/empty=null, other string=quoted string) # Args: $1=value (1=true, 0=false, -1/empty=null, any other non-empty string=true)
# Prints: JSON token # Prints: JSON token (true/false/null)
# Note: capability variables can be set to arbitrary strings internally to carry
# detection-path context (e.g. cap_ssbd='Intel SSBD'); for the JSON output those
# are normalized to true so consumers see a clean boolean | null type.
_json_cap() { _json_cap() {
case "${1:-}" in case "${1:-}" in
1) printf 'true' ;;
0) printf 'false' ;; 0) printf 'false' ;;
-1 | '') printf 'null' ;; -1 | '') printf 'null' ;;
*) printf '"%s"' "$(_json_escape "$1")" ;; *) printf 'true' ;;
esac esac
} }
@@ -126,7 +128,7 @@ _build_json_system() {
# Sets: g_json_cpu # Sets: g_json_cpu
# shellcheck disable=SC2034 # shellcheck disable=SC2034
_build_json_cpu() { _build_json_cpu() {
local cpuid_hex codename caps arch_sub arch_type local cpuid_hex codename caps arch_sub arch_type sbpb_norm
if [ -n "${cpu_cpuid:-}" ]; then if [ -n "${cpu_cpuid:-}" ]; then
cpuid_hex=$(printf '0x%08x' "$cpu_cpuid") cpuid_hex=$(printf '0x%08x' "$cpu_cpuid")
else else
@@ -137,6 +139,15 @@ _build_json_cpu() {
codename=$(get_intel_codename 2>/dev/null || true) codename=$(get_intel_codename 2>/dev/null || true)
fi fi
# cap_sbpb uses non-standard encoding (1=YES, 2=NO, 3=UNKNOWN) because the
# CVE-2023-20569 check distinguishes the unknown case. Normalize for JSON.
case "${cap_sbpb:-}" in
1) sbpb_norm=1 ;;
2) sbpb_norm=0 ;;
3) sbpb_norm=-1 ;;
*) sbpb_norm='' ;;
esac
# Determine architecture type and build the arch-specific sub-object # Determine architecture type and build the arch-specific sub-object
case "${cpu_vendor:-}" in case "${cpu_vendor:-}" in
GenuineIntel | AuthenticAMD | HygonGenuine) GenuineIntel | AuthenticAMD | HygonGenuine)
@@ -190,7 +201,7 @@ _build_json_cpu() {
"$(_json_cap "${cap_tsa_l1_no:-}")" \ "$(_json_cap "${cap_tsa_l1_no:-}")" \
"$(_json_cap "${cap_verw_clear:-}")" \ "$(_json_cap "${cap_verw_clear:-}")" \
"$(_json_cap "${cap_autoibrs:-}")" \ "$(_json_cap "${cap_autoibrs:-}")" \
"$(_json_cap "${cap_sbpb:-}")" \ "$(_json_cap "$sbpb_norm")" \
"$(_json_cap "${cap_avx2:-}")" \ "$(_json_cap "${cap_avx2:-}")" \
"$(_json_cap "${cap_avx512:-}")") "$(_json_cap "${cap_avx512:-}")")
arch_sub=$(printf '{"family":%s,"model":%s,"stepping":%s,"cpuid":%s,"platform_id":%s,"hybrid":%s,"codename":%s,"capabilities":%s}' \ arch_sub=$(printf '{"family":%s,"model":%s,"stepping":%s,"cpuid":%s,"platform_id":%s,"hybrid":%s,"codename":%s,"capabilities":%s}' \