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33 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Stéphane Lesimple fd7caec415 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/source-build' 2026-06-02 18:17:06 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 68116d87fd update: fwdb from v349+i20260227+615b to v349+i20260512+1cce, 19 microcode changes
built from commit 645a79846b
 dated 2026-06-01 20:56:45 +0000
 by github-actions[bot] (41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com)
2026-06-01 20:58:15 +00:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3f4801e6a7 autoupdate workflow: add missing pkg 2026-06-01 20:55:08 +00:00
Stéphane Lesimple 9a3688b6fd chore: use scripts in autoupdate workflow (#572) 2026-06-01 20:52:54 +00:00
github-actions[bot] c060a2d2c9 Merge pull request #571 from speed47/test
built from commit 0045d237fa
 dated 2026-06-01 20:44:44 +0000
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)

 Prepare next release
2026-06-01 20:46:12 +00:00
Stéphane Lesimple 0c89d162a3 chore: fix autoupdate workflow 2026-05-31 14:50:31 +02:00
林博仁 Buo-ren Lin 02fa416bab doc: readme: correct markdown indentation for unordered list items (#569)
Signed-off-by: 林博仁(Buo-ren Lin) <buo.ren.lin@gmail.com>
2026-04-20 16:02:47 +00:00
Stéphane Lesimple 1c067add59 release v26.33.0420460 (#567) 2026-04-20 15:18:11 +00:00
github-actions[bot] fe0d3f49f4 Merge pull request #566 from speed47/test
built from commit 3e2b6cc734
 dated 2026-04-20 11:02:38 +0000
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)

 Prepare release v26.33.0420xxx
2026-04-20 11:04:05 +00:00
Stéphane Lesimple 00bb4a951c workflow: expose reconsider_age_days input + env var 2026-04-19 14:46:56 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 43d5b77885 chore: workflow: add manual model + window_hours inputs, add reconsider 2026-04-19 12:55:03 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 78a6e4a418 chore: move cron vuln-watch workflow script files to their own branch 2026-04-19 11:14:21 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5af1a9fec9 chore: workflow: add scan id 2026-04-18 16:23:47 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple b93027640f chore: vuln workflow: use opus, no persist creds, conditional upload 2026-04-18 16:19:10 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 5c27284119 chore: workflow: save logs 2026-04-18 16:05:15 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple f2e5999fc0 chore: explicit prompt for workflow 2026-04-18 15:41:03 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 25f20b8860 chore: fix workflow perms (#558) 2026-04-18 15:29:54 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 77e3dbd6b2 add scheduled vuln research (#557) 2026-04-18 15:14:13 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 8a6f9d5d63 Implement ITS/VMScape/BTI and misc enhancements (#539)
7a7408d fix: add rebleet to --variant
cccb3c0 enh: add known fixed ucode versions for CVE-2023-23583 (Reptar) and CVE-2024-45332 (BPI)
090f109 doc: add CVE-2023-31315 (SinkClose) to the unsupported list, add categories
5dc9c3c chore: reorder CVE list in README.md
a00fab1 feat: implement CVE-2025-40300 (VMScape) and CVE-2024-45332 (BTI)
e0b818f chore: stalebot: disable dryrun by default
4af1155 feat: implement CVE-2024-28956 (ITS, Indirect Target Selection) vulnerability and mitigation detection
dfed6f3 doc: add note about more unsupported CVEs
1652977 add a generated version of src/libs/003_intel_models.sh
a089ae8 fix: sys_interface_check() must set the caller's $msg var (closes #533)
cc6bbaa chore: don't include src/ generated files in build
2717b0a doc: CVE-2020-12965 unsupported (#478)
2026-04-04 18:38:49 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 73b67b4a80 Merge branch 'master' into source-build 2026-04-04 16:25:35 +00:00
github-actions[bot] ea6b8efd18 fix: add rebleet to --variant
built from commit 7a7408d124
 dated 2026-04-04 18:17:35 +0200
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)
2026-04-04 16:23:18 +00:00
github-actions[bot] 24d92540a7 enh: add known fixed ucode versions for CVE-2023-23583 (Reptar) and CVE-2024-45332 (BPI)
built from commit cccb3c0081
 dated 2026-04-04 17:50:04 +0200
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)
2026-04-04 16:08:25 +00:00
Stéphane Lesimple f2d871acff fix: spurious local keyword broke sysfs based detection (#533) (#534)
The $msg var assigned in sys_interface_check() must not be
local to the func, but must capture and modify the callers'
own local $msg var
2026-04-03 01:31:58 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 553a9ec60f Merge pull request #532 from speed47/test
built from commit 6fac2d8ff1
 dated 2026-04-02 21:32:39 +0000
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)

 Retbleed / Downfall overhald / doc updates
2026-04-02 21:33:46 +00:00
Stéphane Lesimple 83ebe2f75f chore: update workflows (#531)
* chore: add stalebot in dryrun

 built from commit afadf53f7f
 dated 2026-04-02 13:13:19 +0200
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)

* Merge branch 'test' into source

 built from commit 952fe6a87f
 dated 2026-04-02 18:40:05 +0200
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)

* Merge pull request #530 from speed47/test

 built from commit d3c0f1a24d
 dated 2026-04-02 16:49:41 +0000
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)

 chore: workflows revamp

---------

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-02 18:53:44 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple 75ad60f42a Merge branch 'master' into source-build 2026-04-02 16:53:03 +00:00
github-actions[bot] 931c955765 Merge pull request #530 from speed47/test
built from commit d3c0f1a24d
 dated 2026-04-02 16:49:41 +0000
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)

 chore: workflows revamp
2026-04-02 16:50:52 +00:00
github-actions[bot] c5ef0c488a Merge branch 'test' into source
built from commit 952fe6a87f
 dated 2026-04-02 18:40:05 +0200
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)
2026-04-02 16:41:33 +00:00
github-actions[bot] a05f8aab34 chore: add stalebot in dryrun
built from commit afadf53f7f
 dated 2026-04-02 13:13:19 +0200
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)
2026-04-02 11:34:30 +00:00
github-actions[bot] 99301d1cbb chore: add stalebot in dryrun
built from commit afadf53f7f
 dated 2026-04-02 13:13:19 +0200
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)
2026-04-02 13:33:36 +02:00
github-actions[bot] f9c3d19f72 enh: CVE-2017-5715; check for unprivileged eBPF for paranoid mode
built from commit e5c6d2d905
 dated 2026-04-01 20:37:54 +0000
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)
2026-04-01 21:30:51 +00:00
github-actions[bot] 8389d9593c chore: prepare for dev-build renaming to test-build
built from commit 9497abbee2723cedc561b6b785fe01fbe965ec1c
 dated 2026-03-31 19:34:52 +0200
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)
2026-04-01 21:30:51 +00:00
Stéphane Lesimple 3a822fdcf2 chore: master: remove obsolete workflow 2026-03-31 19:53:57 +02:00
11 changed files with 987 additions and 496 deletions
+10 -5
View File
@@ -7,21 +7,26 @@ on:
permissions:
pull-requests: write
contents: write
jobs:
autoupdate:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
ref: source
- name: Install prerequisites
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends iucode-tool sqlite3 unzip
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends iucode-tool sqlite3 unzip shfmt
- name: Update microcode versions
run: ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --update-builtin-fwdb
run: ./scripts/update_mcedb.sh
- name: Update Intel models
run: ./scripts/update_intel_models.sh
- name: Check git diff
id: diff
run: |
echo change="$(git diff spectre-meltdown-checker.sh | awk '/MCEDB/ { if(V) { print V" to "$4; exit } else { V=$4 } }')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo nbdiff="$(git diff spectre-meltdown-checker.sh | grep -cE -- '^\+# [AI],')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo change="$(git diff | awk '/MCEDB/ { if(V) { print V" to "$4; exit } else { V=$4 } }')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo nbdiff="$(git diff | grep -cE -- '^\+# [AI],')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
git diff
cat "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Create Pull Request if needed
-199
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@@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
# Daily transient-execution vulnerability scan
You are a scheduled agent running inside a GitHub Actions job. Your job
is to audit public news/advisory sources for **transient-execution and
CPU side-channel vulnerabilities** that may need to be added to
**spectre-meltdown-checker** (this repository).
## What counts as "relevant"
spectre-meltdown-checker detects, reports, and suggests mitigations for
CPU vulnerabilities such as: Spectre v1/v2/v4, Meltdown, Foreshadow/L1TF,
MDS (ZombieLoad/RIDL/Fallout), TAA, SRBDS, iTLB Multihit, Zenbleed,
Downfall (GDS), Retbleed, Inception, SRSO, BHI, RFDS, Reptar, FP-DSS,
and any similar microarchitectural side-channel or speculative-execution
issue on x86 (Intel/AMD) or ARM CPUs. It also surfaces related hardware
mitigation features (SMAP/SMEP/UMIP/IBPB/eIBRS/STIBP…) when they gate
the remediation for a tracked CVE.
It does **not** track generic software CVEs, GPU driver bugs, networking
stacks, filesystem bugs, userspace crypto issues, or unrelated kernel
subsystems.
## Inputs handed to you by the workflow
- Working directory: the repo root (`/github/workspace` in Actions, or
wherever `actions/checkout` placed it). You may `grep` the repo to
check whether a CVE or codename is already covered.
- `state/seen.json` — memory carried over from the previous run, with
shape:
```json
{
"last_run": "2026-04-17T08:00:12Z",
"seen": {
"<stable-id-1>": { "bucket": "unrelated", "seen_at": "2026-04-17T08:00:12Z", "source": "phoronix" },
"<stable-id-2>": { "bucket": "tocheck", "seen_at": "2026-04-17T08:00:12Z", "source": "oss-sec", "cve": "CVE-2026-1234" }
}
}
```
On the very first run, or when the prior artifact has expired,
the file exists but `seen` is empty and `last_run` is `null`.
- Environment: `SCAN_DATE` (ISO-8601 timestamp of the run start, set by
the workflow). Treat this as "now" for all time-window decisions.
## Time window
This is a belt-and-suspenders design — use **both** mechanisms:
1. **Primary: stable-id dedup.** If an item's stable identifier (see
below) is already present in `state.seen`, skip it entirely — it
was classified on a previous day.
2. **Secondary: 25-hour window.** Among *new* items, prefer those whose
publication/update timestamp is within the last 25 h relative to
`SCAN_DATE`. This bounds work when the prior artifact expired
(90-day retention) or when `last_run` is stale (missed runs).
If `last_run` is older than 25 h, widen the window to
`now - last_run + 1h` so no items are lost across missed runs.
3. Items without a parseable timestamp: include them (fail-safe).
## Sources to poll
Fetch each URL with
`curl -sS -A "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36" -L --max-time 20`.
On non-2xx or timeout, record the failure in the run summary and
continue — do not abort.
### RSS / Atom feeds (primary — parse feed timestamps)
| Short name | URL |
|-----------------|-----|
| phoronix | https://www.phoronix.com/rss.php |
| oss-sec | https://seclists.org/rss/oss-sec.rss |
| lwn | https://lwn.net/headlines/newrss |
| project-zero | https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default |
| vusec | https://www.vusec.net/feed/ |
| comsec-eth | https://comsec.ethz.ch/category/news/feed/ |
| msrc | https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/rss |
| cisa | https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-advisories/all.xml |
| cert-cc | https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/atomfeed/ |
### HTML pages (no RSS — fetch, extract dated entries)
| Short name | URL |
|-----------------|-----|
| intel-psirt | https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/default.html |
| amd-psirt | https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security.html |
| arm-spec | https://developer.arm.com/Arm%20Security%20Center/Speculative%20Processor%20Vulnerability |
| transient-fail | https://transient.fail/ |
For HTML pages: look for advisory tables or listings with dates. Extract
the advisory title, permalink, and date. If a page has no dates at all,
compare its content against `state.seen` — any new advisory IDs not yet
classified count as "new this run".
## Stable identifier per source
Use the first available of these, in order, as the dedup key:
1. Vendor advisory ID (`INTEL-SA-01234`, `AMD-SB-7001`, `ARM-2024-0042`,
`VU#123456`, `CVE-YYYY-NNNNN`)
2. RSS `<guid>` / Atom `<id>`
3. Permalink URL (`<link>`)
Always also record the permalink URL in the output file so a human can
click through.
## Classification rules
For each **new** item (not in `state.seen`) that passes the time window,
pick exactly one bucket:
- **toimplement** — a clearly-identified new transient-execution / CPU
side-channel vulnerability in scope, **and not already covered by
this repo**. Verify the second half by grepping the repo for the CVE
ID *and* the codename before classifying; if either matches existing
code, demote to `tocheck`.
- **tocheck** — plausibly in-scope but ambiguous: mitigation-only
feature (LASS, IBT, APIC-virt, etc.); item seemingly already
implemented but worth confirming scope; unclear applicability
(e.g. embedded-only ARM SKU); CVE-ID pending; contradictory info
across sources. State clearly what would resolve the ambiguity.
- **unrelated** — everything else.
Tie-breakers: prefer `tocheck` over `unrelated` when uncertain. Prefer
`tocheck` over `toimplement` when the CVE ID is still "reserved" /
"pending" — false positives in `toimplement` waste human time more than
false positives in `tocheck`.
## Outputs
Compute `TODAY=$(date -u -d "$SCAN_DATE" +%F)`. Write these files under
the repo root, overwriting if they already exist (they shouldn't unless
the workflow re-ran the same day):
- `rss_${TODAY}_toimplement.md`
- `rss_${TODAY}_tocheck.md`
- `rss_${TODAY}_unrelated.md`
Each file uses level-2 headers per source short-name, then one bullet
per item: the stable ID (if any), the permalink URL, and 12 sentences.
Keep entries terse — a human skims these daily.
```markdown
## oss-sec
- **CVE-2026-1234** — https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/18/3
New Intel transient-execution bug "Foo" disclosed today; affects
Redwood Cove cores, microcode fix pending. Not yet covered by this
repo (grepped for CVE-2026-1234 and "Foo" — no matches).
## phoronix
- https://www.phoronix.com/news/Some-Article
Linux 7.2 drops a compiler-target flag; unrelated to CPU side channels.
```
If a bucket has no items, write the file with a single line
`(no new items in this window)` so it is obvious the job ran.
### Run summary
Append this block to the **tocheck** file (creating it if empty):
```markdown
## Run summary
- SCAN_DATE: <value>
- window cutoff: <computed cutoff>
- prior state size: <N> entries, last_run=<value>
- per-source new item counts: phoronix=<n>, oss-sec=<n>, lwn=<n>, ...
- fetch failures: <list, or "none">
- total classified this run: toimplement=<n>, tocheck=<n>, unrelated=<n>
```
### State update
Rewrite `state/seen.json` with:
- `last_run` = `SCAN_DATE`
- `seen` = union of (pruned prior `seen`) (all items classified this
run, keyed by stable ID, with `{bucket, seen_at=SCAN_DATE, source, cve?}`)
Pruning (keep state bounded): drop any entry whose `seen_at` is older
than 30 days before `SCAN_DATE`. The workflow step also does this as
a safety net, but do it here too so the in-memory view is consistent.
## Guardrails
- Do NOT modify any repo source code. Only write the three markdown
output files and `state/seen.json`.
- Do NOT create commits, branches, or PRs.
- Do NOT call any tool that posts externally (Slack, GitHub comments,
issues, email, etc.).
- Do NOT follow links off-site for deeper investigation unless strictly
needed to resolve a `tocheck` ambiguity — budget of at most 5 such
follow-ups per run.
- If a source returns unexpectedly large content, truncate to the first
~200 items before parsing.
- If total runtime exceeds 15 minutes, finish whatever you can,
write partial outputs, and note it in the run summary.
-129
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@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
name: Online search for vulns
on:
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
workflow_dispatch: {} # allow manual trigger
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read # needed to list/download previous run artifacts
id-token: write # needed to mint OIDC token
concurrency:
group: vuln-scan
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 20
steps:
- name: Checkout repository (for grep-based dedup against existing checks)
uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
fetch-depth: 1
persist-credentials: false
# ---- Load previous state ---------------------------------------------
# Find the most recent successful run of THIS workflow (other than the
# current one) and pull its `vuln-scan-state` artifact. On the very
# first run there will be none — that's fine, we start empty.
- name: Find previous successful run id
id: prev
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -e
run_id=$(gh run list \
--workflow="${{ github.workflow }}" \
--status=success \
--limit 1 \
--json databaseId \
--jq '.[0].databaseId // empty')
echo "run_id=${run_id}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
if [ -n "$run_id" ]; then
echo "Found previous successful run: $run_id"
else
echo "No previous successful run — starting from empty state."
fi
- name: Download previous state artifact
if: steps.prev.outputs.run_id != ''
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
continue-on-error: true # tolerate retention expiry
with:
name: vuln-scan-state
path: state/
run-id: ${{ steps.prev.outputs.run_id }}
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Ensure state file exists
run: |
mkdir -p state
if [ ! -f state/seen.json ]; then
echo '{"last_run": null, "seen": {}}' > state/seen.json
echo "Initialized empty state."
fi
echo "State size: $(wc -c < state/seen.json) bytes"
# ---- Run the scan ----------------------------------------------------
# Runs Claude Code against daily_vuln_scan_prompt.md.
# That prompt file fully specifies: sources to poll, how to read
# state/seen.json, the 25-hour window, the output files to write,
# and how to rewrite state/seen.json at the end of the run.
- name: Research for online mentions of new vulns
id: scan
uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
env:
SCAN_DATE: ${{ github.run_started_at }}
with:
claude_args: |
--model claude-opus-4-7 --allowedTools "Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Grep,Glob,WebFetch"
prompt: |
Read the full task instructions from .github/workflows/daily_vuln_scan_prompt.md and execute them end-to-end. That file fully specifies: sources to poll, how to read and update state/seen.json, the 25-hour window, which rss_YYYY-MM-DD_*.md files to write, and the run guardrails. Use $SCAN_DATE (env var) as "now" for time-window decisions.
claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Upload Claude execution log
if: ${{ always() && steps.scan.outputs.execution_file != '' }}
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: claude-execution-log-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ steps.scan.outputs.execution_file }}
retention-days: 30
if-no-files-found: warn
# ---- Persist outputs -------------------------------------------------
- name: Prune state (keep only entries from the last 30 days)
run: |
python3 - <<'PY'
import json, datetime, pathlib
p = pathlib.Path("state/seen.json")
data = json.loads(p.read_text())
cutoff = (datetime.datetime.utcnow() - datetime.timedelta(days=30)).isoformat()
before = len(data.get("seen", {}))
data["seen"] = {
k: v for k, v in data.get("seen", {}).items()
if v.get("seen_at", "9999") >= cutoff
}
after = len(data["seen"])
p.write_text(json.dumps(data, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
print(f"Pruned state: {before} -> {after} entries")
PY
- name: Upload new state artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: vuln-scan-state
path: state/seen.json
retention-days: 90
if-no-files-found: error
- name: Upload daily report
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: vuln-scan-report-${{ github.run_id }}
path: rss_*.md
retention-days: 90
if-no-files-found: warn
+190
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@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
name: Online search for vulns
on:
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
model:
description: 'Claude model to use (cron runs default to Sonnet)'
required: false
type: choice
default: claude-sonnet-4-6
options:
- claude-sonnet-4-6
- claude-opus-4-7
- claude-haiku-4-5-20251001
window_hours:
description: 'Lookback window in hours (cron runs use 25)'
required: false
type: string
default: '25'
reconsider_age_days:
description: 'Only reconsider backlog entries last reviewed ≥ N days ago (0 = all, default 7)'
required: false
type: string
default: '7'
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read # needed to list/download previous run artifacts
id-token: write # needed by claude-code-action for OIDC auth
concurrency:
group: vuln-watch
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
watch:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 20
steps:
# The scripts driving this workflow live on the `vuln-watch` branch so
# they don't clutter master (which is what ships to production). The
# workflow file itself MUST stay on the default branch, as GitHub only
# honors `schedule:` triggers on the default branch.
- name: Checkout vuln-watch branch (scripts + prompt)
uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
ref: vuln-watch
fetch-depth: 1
persist-credentials: false
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: '3.12'
- name: Install Python dependencies
run: python -m pip install --quiet feedparser
# ---- Load previous state ---------------------------------------------
# Find the most recent successful run of THIS workflow (other than the
# current one) and pull its `vuln-watch-state` artifact. On the very
# first run there will be none — that's fine, we start empty.
- name: Find previous successful run id
id: prev
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -e
run_id=$(gh run list \
--workflow="${{ github.workflow }}" \
--status=success \
--limit 1 \
--json databaseId \
--jq '.[0].databaseId // empty')
echo "run_id=${run_id}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
if [ -n "$run_id" ]; then
echo "Found previous successful run: $run_id"
else
echo "No previous successful run — starting from empty state."
fi
- name: Download previous state artifact
if: steps.prev.outputs.run_id != ''
uses: actions/download-artifact@v5
continue-on-error: true # tolerate retention expiry
with:
name: vuln-watch-state
path: state/
run-id: ${{ steps.prev.outputs.run_id }}
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
# ---- Fetch + diff (token-free; runs every time) ---------------------
# Performs conditional GETs (ETag / If-Modified-Since) against every
# source, parses RSS/Atom/HTML, dedups against state.seen + state.aliases,
# applies the time-window filter, and emits new_items.json.
# Updates state.sources (HTTP cache metadata + per-source high-water
# marks) in place so the cache survives even when Claude doesn't run.
- name: Fetch + diff all sources
id: diff
env:
SCAN_DATE: ${{ github.run_started_at }}
# Cron runs have no `inputs` context, so the fallback kicks in.
WINDOW_HOURS: ${{ inputs.window_hours || '25' }}
RECONSIDER_AGE_DAYS: ${{ inputs.reconsider_age_days || '7' }}
run: python -m scripts.vuln_watch.fetch_and_diff
# ---- Fetch checker code so Claude can grep it for coverage ---------
# The orphan vuln-watch branch has none of the actual checker code,
# so we pull the `test` branch (the dev branch where coded-but-
# unreleased CVE checks live) into ./checker/. The prompt tells
# Claude this is the canonical source of truth for "is CVE-X already
# implemented?". Only fetched on days with something to classify.
- name: Checkout checker code (test branch) for coverage grep
if: steps.diff.outputs.new_count != '0' || steps.diff.outputs.reconsider_count != '0'
uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
ref: test
path: checker
fetch-depth: 1
persist-credentials: false
# ---- Classify new items with Claude (skipped when nothing is new) ---
# Model selection: a manual workflow_dispatch run picks from a dropdown
# (defaulting to Sonnet). Scheduled cron runs have no `inputs` context,
# so the `|| 'claude-sonnet-4-6'` fallback kicks in — cron always uses
# Sonnet to keep the daily cost floor low.
- name: Run classifier with Claude
id: classify
if: steps.diff.outputs.new_count != '0' || steps.diff.outputs.reconsider_count != '0'
uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
env:
SCAN_DATE: ${{ github.run_started_at }}
with:
prompt: |
Read the full task instructions from scripts/daily_vuln_watch_prompt.md
and execute them end-to-end. Your input is new_items.json (already
deduped, windowed, and pre-filtered — do NOT re-fetch sources).
Write the three watch_${TODAY}_*.md files and classifications.json.
Use $SCAN_DATE as the canonical timestamp.
claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
# model + tool allowlist pass through claude_args (v1 dropped the
# dedicated `model:` and `allowed_tools:` inputs). Job-level
# `timeout-minutes: 20` above bounds total runtime.
claude_args: |
--model ${{ inputs.model || 'claude-sonnet-4-6' }}
--allowedTools "Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Grep,Glob,WebFetch"
- name: Upload Claude execution log
if: ${{ always() && steps.classify.outputs.execution_file != '' }}
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5
with:
name: claude-execution-log-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ steps.classify.outputs.execution_file }}
retention-days: 30
if-no-files-found: warn
# ---- Merge classifications back into state --------------------------
# Also writes stub watch_*.md files if the classify step was skipped, so
# the report artifact is consistent across runs.
- name: Merge classifications into state
if: always()
env:
SCAN_DATE: ${{ github.run_started_at }}
run: python -m scripts.vuln_watch.merge_state
- name: Upload new state artifact
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5
with:
name: vuln-watch-state
path: state/seen.json
retention-days: 90
if-no-files-found: error
- name: Upload daily report
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5
with:
name: vuln-watch-report-${{ github.run_id }}
path: |
watch_*.md
current_toimplement.md
current_tocheck.md
new_items.json
classifications.json
retention-days: 90
if-no-files-found: warn
+8
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,14 @@ CVE | Name | Aliases
[CVE-2024-45332](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-45332) | Branch Privilege Injection | BPI
[CVE-2025-54505](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-54505) | AMD Zen1 Floating-Point Divider Stale Data Leak | FPDSS
The following entries are ARM64 silicon errata that the kernel actively works around. They have no assigned CVE; they are tracked only by ARM's erratum numbers. Select them with `--errata <number>` or the associated `--variant` mnemonic.
ID | Name | Affected cores
-- | ---- | --------------
CVE-0001-0001 | Speculative AT TLB corruption (errata 1165522, 1319367, 1319537, 1530923) | Cortex-A55/A57/A72/A76
CVE-0001-0002 | Speculative unprivileged load (errata 2966298, 3117295) | Cortex-A510/A520
CVE-0001-0003 | MSR SSBS not self-synchronizing (erratum 3194386 + siblings) | Cortex-A76/A77/A78/A78C/A710/A715/A720/A720AE/A725, X1/X1C/X2/X3/X4/X925, Neoverse-N1/N2/N3/V1/V2/V3/V3AE
## Am I at risk?
Depending on your situation, the table below answers whether an attacker in a given position can extract data from a given target.
+10
View File
@@ -307,3 +307,13 @@ A weakness in AMD's microcode signature verification (AES-CMAC hash) allows load
Exploits a synchronization failure in the AMD stack engine via an undocumented MSR bit, targeting AMD SEV-SNP confidential VMs. Requires hypervisor-level (ring 0) access.
**Why out of scope:** Not a transient/speculative execution side channel. This is an architectural attack on AMD SEV-SNP confidential computing that requires hypervisor access, which is outside the threat model of this tool.
## No CVE — Jump Conditional Code (JCC) Erratum
- **Issue:** [#329](https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/329)
- **Intel whitepaper:** [Mitigations for Jump Conditional Code Erratum](https://www.intel.com/content/dam/support/us/en/documents/processors/mitigations-jump-conditional-code-erratum.pdf)
- **Affected CPUs:** Intel 6th through 10th generation Core and Xeon processors (Skylake through Cascade Lake)
A microarchitectural correctness erratum where a conditional jump instruction that straddles or ends at a 64-byte instruction fetch boundary can corrupt the branch predictor state, potentially causing incorrect execution. Intel addressed this in a November 2019 microcode update. Compilers and assemblers (GCC, LLVM, binutils) also introduced alignment options (`-mbranch-alignment`, `-x86-branches-within-32B-boundaries`) to pad jump instructions away from boundary conditions, preserving performance on CPUs with updated microcode.
**Why out of scope:** The JCC erratum is a microarchitectural correctness bug, not a transient or speculative execution side-channel vulnerability. No CVE was ever assigned. Red Hat noted that privilege escalation "has not been ruled out" but made no definitive security finding, and no exploit has been demonstrated. There is no Linux sysfs entry, no CPUID bit, and no MSR flag exposing the mitigation status. The microcode fix introduces no detectable hardware indicator, so checking for it would require maintaining a per-CPU-stepping minimum microcode version table (the design principle 3 exception) — costly to maintain without a CVE anchor or confirmed exploitability to justify the ongoing work. The kernel compiler mitigation is a build-time-only change (instruction alignment) with no observable runtime state.
+5 -3
View File
@@ -102,7 +102,9 @@ boundaries by a malicious guest. Prioritise remediation where
### `cpu`
CPU hardware identification. `null` when `--no-hw` is active.
CPU hardware identification. `null` when `--no-hw` is active, or when
`--arch-prefix` is set (host CPU info is then suppressed to avoid mixing
with a different-arch target kernel).
The object uses `arch` as a discriminator: `"x86"` for Intel/AMD/Hygon CPUs,
`"arm"` for ARM/Cavium/Phytium. Arch-specific fields live under a matching
@@ -140,7 +142,7 @@ fields from the other architecture.
#### `cpu.x86.capabilities`
Each capability is a **tri-state**: `true` (present), `false` (absent), or
Every capability is a **tri-state**: `true` (present), `false` (absent), or
`null` (not applicable or could not be read, e.g. when not root or on AMD for
Intel-specific features).
@@ -238,7 +240,7 @@ with an unknown CVE ID).
| `status` | string | `"OK"` / `"VULN"` / `"UNK"` | Check outcome (see below) |
| `vulnerable` | boolean \| null | `false` / `true` / `null` | `false`=OK, `true`=VULN, `null`=UNK |
| `info` | string | | Human-readable description of the specific mitigation state or reason |
| `sysfs_status` | string \| null | `"OK"` / `"VULN"` / `"UNK"` / null | Status as reported by the kernel via `/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/`; null if sysfs was not consulted for this CVE |
| `sysfs_status` | string \| null | `"OK"` / `"VULN"` / `"UNK"` / null | Status as reported by the kernel via `/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/`; null if sysfs was not consulted for this CVE, or if the CVE's check read sysfs in silent/quiet mode (raw message is still captured in `sysfs_message`) |
| `sysfs_message` | string \| null | | Raw text from the sysfs file (e.g. `"Mitigation: PTI"`); null if sysfs was not consulted |
#### Status values
+7 -7
View File
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
},
"cpu": {
"description": "CPU hardware identification. Null when --no-hw is active. Contains an 'arch' discriminator ('x86' or 'arm') and a matching arch-specific sub-object with identification fields and capabilities.",
"description": "CPU hardware identification. Null when --no-hw is active or when --arch-prefix is set (host CPU info is then suppressed to avoid mixing with a different-arch target kernel). Contains an 'arch' discriminator ('x86' or 'arm') and a matching arch-specific sub-object with identification fields and capabilities.",
"oneOf": [
{ "type": "null" },
{
@@ -180,16 +180,16 @@
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"capabilities": {
"description": "CPU feature flags detected via CPUID and MSR reads. Each value is true (present), false (absent), or null (not applicable or could not be read).",
"description": "CPU feature flags detected via CPUID and MSR reads. Every value is tri-state: true=present, false=absent, null=not applicable or unreadable.",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"spec_ctrl": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "SPEC_CTRL MSR present (Intel; enables IBRS + IBPB via WRMSR)" },
"ibrs": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation" },
"ibpb": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier" },
"ibrs": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "IBRS supported (via SPEC_CTRL, IBRS_SUPPORT, or cpuinfo fallback)" },
"ibpb": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "IBPB supported (via SPEC_CTRL, IBPB_SUPPORT, or cpuinfo fallback)" },
"ibpb_ret": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "IBPB on return (enhanced form)" },
"stibp": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors" },
"ssbd": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" },
"stibp": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "STIBP supported (Intel/AMD/HYGON or cpuinfo fallback)" },
"ssbd": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "SSBD supported (SPEC_CTRL, VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, non-architectural MSR, or cpuinfo fallback)" },
"l1d_flush": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "L1D cache flush instruction" },
"md_clear": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "VERW clears CPU buffers (MDS mitigation)" },
"arch_capabilities": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR is present" },
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@
"tsa_l1_no": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Not susceptible to TSA-L1" },
"verw_clear": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "VERW clears CPU buffers" },
"autoibrs": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "AMD AutoIBRS (equivalent to enhanced IBRS on Intel)" },
"sbpb": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Selective Branch Predictor Barrier (AMD Inception mitigation)" },
"sbpb": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "Selective Branch Predictor Barrier (AMD Inception mitigation): true if PRED_CMD MSR SBPB bit write succeeded; false if write failed; null if not verifiable (non-root, CPUID error, or CPU does not report SBPB support)" },
"avx2": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "AVX2 supported (relevant to Downfall / GDS)" },
"avx512": { "type": ["boolean", "null"], "description": "AVX-512 supported (relevant to Downfall / GDS)" }
}
+7 -2
View File
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ STATUS: summary | perfdata
| VULN + UNK | `N/T CVE(s) vulnerable: CVE-A CVE-B ..., M inconclusive` |
| UNK only | `N/T CVE checks inconclusive` |
| Non-root + VULN | `N/T CVE(s) appear vulnerable (unconfirmed, not root): CVE-A ...` |
| Non-root + VULN + UNK | `N/T CVE(s) appear vulnerable (unconfirmed, not root): CVE-A ..., M inconclusive` |
### Lines 2+ (long output)
@@ -59,15 +60,19 @@ Never parsed by the monitoring core; safe to add or reorder.
#### Context notes
Printed before per-CVE details when applicable:
Printed before per-CVE details when applicable. Notes are emitted in this
order when more than one applies:
| Note | Condition |
|---|---|
| `NOTE: paranoid mode active, stricter mitigation requirements applied` | `--paranoid` was used |
| `NOTE: hypervisor host detected (reason); L1TF/MDS severity is elevated` | System is a VM host (KVM, Xen, VMware…) |
| `NOTE: hypervisor host detected (reason); L1TF/MDS severity is elevated` | System is detected as a VM host (KVM, Xen, VMware…) |
| `NOTE: not a hypervisor host` | System is confirmed not a VM host |
| `NOTE: not running as root; MSR reads skipped, results may be incomplete` | Script ran without root privileges |
When VMM detection did not run (e.g. `--no-hw`), neither the
`hypervisor host detected` nor the `not a hypervisor host` note is printed.
#### Per-CVE detail lines
One line per non-OK CVE. VULN entries (`[CRITICAL]`) appear before UNK
+46 -16
View File
@@ -90,13 +90,16 @@ smc_build_info{version="25.30.0250400123",mode="live",run_as_root="true",paranoi
Operating system and kernel metadata. Always value `1`.
Absent in offline mode when neither `uname -r` nor `uname -m` is available.
Absent entirely when none of `kernel_release`, `kernel_arch`, or
`hypervisor_host` can be determined (e.g. non-live mode with no VMM detection).
Each label is emitted only when its value is known; missing labels are
omitted rather than set to an empty string.
| Label | Values | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `kernel_release` | string | Output of `uname -r` (live mode only) |
| `kernel_arch` | string | Output of `uname -m` (live mode only) |
| `hypervisor_host` | `true` / `false` | Whether this machine is detected as a hypervisor host (running KVM, Xen, VMware, etc.) |
| `kernel_release` | string | Output of `uname -r`; emitted only in live mode |
| `kernel_arch` | string | Output of `uname -m`; emitted only in live mode |
| `hypervisor_host` | `true` / `false` | Whether this machine is detected as a hypervisor host (running KVM, Xen, VMware, etc.); absent when VMM detection did not run (e.g. `--no-hw`) |
**Example:**
```
@@ -114,26 +117,47 @@ a malicious guest. Always prioritise remediation on hosts where
### `smc_cpu_info`
CPU hardware and microcode metadata. Always value `1`. Absent when `--no-hw`
is used.
is used or when `--arch-prefix` is set (host CPU info is suppressed to avoid
mixing with a different-arch target kernel).
Common labels (always emitted when the data is available):
| Label | Values | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `vendor` | string | CPU vendor (e.g. `Intel`, `AuthenticAMD`) |
| `vendor` | string | CPU vendor (e.g. `GenuineIntel`, `AuthenticAMD`, `HygonGenuine`, `ARM`) |
| `model` | string | CPU friendly name from `/proc/cpuinfo` |
| `arch` | `x86` / `arm` | Architecture family; determines which arch-specific labels follow |
| `smt` | `true` / `false` | Whether SMT (HyperThreading) is currently enabled; absent if undeterminable |
| `microcode` | hex string | Installed microcode version (e.g. `0xf4`); absent if unreadable |
| `microcode_latest` | hex string | Latest known-good microcode version from the firmware database; absent if the CPU is not in the database |
| `microcode_up_to_date` | `true` / `false` | Whether `microcode == microcode_latest`; absent if either is unavailable |
| `microcode_blacklisted` | `true` / `false` | Whether the installed microcode is known to cause problems and should be rolled back; emitted whenever `microcode` is emitted |
x86-only labels (emitted when `arch="x86"`):
| Label | Values | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `family` | integer string | CPU family number |
| `model_id` | integer string | CPU model number |
| `stepping` | integer string | CPU stepping number |
| `cpuid` | hex string | Full CPUID value (e.g. `0x000906ed`); absent on some ARM CPUs |
| `codename` | string | Intel CPU codename (e.g. `Coffee Lake`); absent on AMD and ARM |
| `smt` | `true` / `false` | Whether SMT (HyperThreading) is currently enabled |
| `microcode` | hex string | Installed microcode version (e.g. `0xf4`) |
| `microcode_latest` | hex string | Latest known-good microcode version from the firmware database |
| `microcode_up_to_date` | `true` / `false` | Whether `microcode == microcode_latest` |
| `microcode_blacklisted` | `true` / `false` | Whether the installed microcode is known to cause problems and should be rolled back |
| `cpuid` | hex string | Full CPUID value (e.g. `0x000906ed`) |
| `codename` | string | Intel CPU codename (e.g. `Coffee Lake`); absent on AMD/Hygon |
**Example:**
ARM-only labels (emitted when `arch="arm"`):
| Label | Values | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `part_list` | string | Space-separated list of ARM part numbers across cores (e.g. `0xd0b 0xd05` on big.LITTLE) |
| `arch_list` | string | Space-separated list of ARM architecture levels across cores (e.g. `8 8`) |
**x86 example:**
```
smc_cpu_info{vendor="Intel",model="Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-9700K CPU @ 3.60GHz",family="6",model_id="158",stepping="13",cpuid="0x000906ed",codename="Coffee Lake",smt="true",microcode="0xf4",microcode_latest="0xf4",microcode_up_to_date="true",microcode_blacklisted="false"} 1
smc_cpu_info{vendor="GenuineIntel",model="Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-9700K CPU @ 3.60GHz",arch="x86",family="6",model_id="158",stepping="13",cpuid="0x000906ed",codename="Coffee Lake",smt="true",microcode="0xf4",microcode_latest="0xf4",microcode_up_to_date="true",microcode_blacklisted="false"} 1
```
**ARM example:**
```
smc_cpu_info{vendor="ARM",model="ARM v8 model 0xd0b",arch="arm",part_list="0xd0b 0xd05",arch_list="8 8",smt="false"} 1
```
**Microcode labels:**
@@ -352,9 +376,15 @@ queries. CVE checks that rely on hardware capability detection (`cap_*` flags,
MSR reads) will report `unknown` status. `mode="no-hw"` in `smc_build_info`
signals this.
**Cross-arch inspection (`--arch-prefix`)**
When a cross-arch toolchain prefix is passed, the script suppresses the host
CPU metadata so it does not get mixed with data from a different-arch target
kernel: `smc_cpu_info` is not emitted, the same as under `--no-hw`.
**Hardware-only mode (`--hw-only`)**
Only hardware detection is performed; CVE checks are skipped. `smc_cpu_info`
is emitted but no `smc_vuln` metrics appear. `mode="hw-only"` in
is emitted but no `smc_vulnerability_status` metrics appear (and
`smc_vulnerable_count` / `smc_unknown_count` are `0`). `mode="hw-only"` in
`smc_build_info` signals this.
**`--sysfs-only`**
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff