0eb563adc6
Merge c40b2b3195 into 5962d20ba7
2018-05-27 20:40:50 +00:00
5962d20ba7
fix(variant4): whitelist from common.c::cpu_no_spec_store_bypass ( #202 )
...
* variant4 from common.c::cpu_no_spec_store_bypass
Variant 4 - Add function to 'whitelist' the hand-full of CPUs unaffected by speculative store bypass.
This would allow improved determination of variant 4 status ( #189 ) of immune CPUs while waiting for the 4.17/stable patches to be backported to distro kernels.
Source of cpu list : https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c#n945 )
Modeled after is_cpu_specex_free()
* amd families fix
amd families are reported by parse_cpu_details() in decimal
* remove duplicates
Only list processors which speculate and are immune to variant 4.
Avoids duplication with non-speculating CPUs listed in is_cpu_specex_free()
2018-05-27 15:14:29 +02:00
17a3488505
fix(help): add missing references to variants 3a & 4 ( #201 )
2018-05-24 16:35:57 +02:00
e54e8b3e84
chore: remove warning in README, fix display indentation
2018-05-24 16:32:53 +02:00
39c778e3ac
fix(amd): AMD families 0x15-0x17 non-arch MSRs are a valid way to control SSB
2018-05-23 23:08:07 +02:00
2cde6e4649
feat(ssbd): add detection of proper CPUID bits on AMD
2018-05-23 22:50:52 +02:00
f4d51e7e53
fix(variant4): add another detection way for Red Hat kernel
2018-05-23 22:47:54 +02:00
85d46b2799
feat(variant4): add more detailed explanations
2018-05-23 21:08:58 +02:00
61e02abd0c
feat(variant3a): detect up to date microcode
2018-05-23 21:08:08 +02:00
114756fab7
fix(amd): not vulnerable to variant3a
2018-05-23 20:38:43 +02:00
ea75969eb7
fix(help): Update variant options in usage message ( #200 )
2018-05-22 15:54:25 +02:00
c40b2b3195
Update spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
2018-05-22 21:11:19 +10:00
7451022f05
Update spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
2018-05-22 20:46:49 +10:00
e04c6b9850
Check for obsolete dd
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On linux systems which need dd, this check if the version is compatible before continuing with hardware checks.
If the install of dd is obsolete, user is warnd, and hardware checks do not continue, any other requested checks performed as normal.
(Old versions (before circa 2012) of dd do not support the iflag=skip_bytes option. They are therefore unable to read from cpuid, or msr, where read offset is used to pass the required page. To complicate matters, some versions of dd may not return an error code when this happens.)
2018-05-22 20:40:57 +10:00
ca391cbfc9
fix(variant2): correctly detect IBRS/IBPB in SLES kernels
2018-05-22 12:06:46 +02:00
68af5c5f92
feat(variant4): detect SSBD-aware kernel
2018-05-22 12:05:46 +02:00
f75cc0bb6f
feat(variant4): add sysfs mitigation hint and some explanation about the vuln
2018-05-22 09:39:11 +02:00
f33d65ff71
feat(variant3a): add information about microcode-sufficient mitigation
2018-05-22 09:38:29 +02:00
725eaa8bf5
feat(arm): adjust vulnerable ARM CPUs for variant3a and variant4
2018-05-22 09:19:29 +02:00
c6ee0358d1
feat(variant4): report SSB_NO CPUs as not vulnerable
2018-05-22 09:18:30 +02:00
22d0b203da
fix(ssb_no): rename ssbd_no to ssb_no and fix shift
2018-05-22 00:38:31 +02:00
3062a8416a
fix(msg): add missing words
2018-05-22 00:10:08 +02:00
6a4318addf
feat(variant3a/4): initial support for 2 new CVEs
2018-05-22 00:06:56 +02:00
c19986188f
fix(variant2): adjust detection for SLES kernels
2018-05-19 09:53:12 +02:00
7e4899bcb8
ibrs can't be enabled on no ibrs cpu ( #195 )
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* ibrs can't be enabled on no ibrs cpu
If the cpu is identified, and does not support SPEC_CTRL or IBRS, then ibrs can't be enabled, even if supported by the kernel.
Instead of reporting IBRS enabled and active UNKNOWN, report IBRS enabled and active NO.
2018-05-17 15:39:48 +02:00
5cc77741af
Update spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
2018-05-05 13:00:44 +02:00
1c0f6d9580
cpuid and msr module check
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This adds a check before loading the cpuid and msr modules under linux, ensuring they are not unloaded in exit_cleanup() if they were initially present.
2018-05-05 13:00:44 +02:00
4acd0f647a
Suggestion to change VM to a CPU with IBRS capability
2018-04-20 20:35:12 +02:00
fb52dbe7bf
set master branch to v0.37+
2018-04-20 20:34:42 +02:00
edebe4dcd4
bump to v0.37
2018-04-18 23:51:45 +02:00
83ea78f523
fix: arm: also detect variant 1 mitigation when using native objdump
2018-04-17 18:50:32 +02:00
602b68d493
fix(spectrev2): explain that retpoline is possible for Skylake+ if there is RSB filling, even if IBRS is still better
2018-04-16 09:27:28 +02:00
97bccaa0d7
feat: rephrase IBPB warning when only retpoline is enabled in non-paranoid mode
2018-04-16 09:13:25 +02:00
68e619b0d3
feat: show RSB filling capability for non-Skylake in verbose mode
2018-04-16 09:08:25 +02:00
a6f4475cee
feat: make IBRS_FW blue instead of green
2018-04-16 09:07:54 +02:00
223f5028df
feat: add --paranoid to choose whether we require IBPB
2018-04-15 23:05:30 +02:00
c0108b9690
fix(spectre2): don't explain how to fix when NOT VULNERABLE
2018-04-15 20:55:55 +02:00
a3016134bd
feat: make RSB filling support mandatory for Skylake+ CPUs
2018-04-15 20:55:31 +02:00
59d85b39c9
feat: detect RSB filling capability in the kernel
2018-04-15 20:55:01 +02:00
baaefb0c31
fix: remove shellcheck warnings
2018-04-11 22:24:03 +02:00
d452aca03a
fix: invalid bash syntax when ibpb_enabled or ibrs_enabled are empty
2018-04-11 10:29:42 +02:00
10b8d94724
feat: detect latest Red Hat kernels' RO ibpb_enabled knob
2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
8606e60ef7
refactor: no longer display the retoline-aware compiler test when we can't tell for sure
2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
6a48251647
fix: regression in 51aeae25, when retpoline & ibpb are enabled
2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
f4bf5e95ec
fix: typos
2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
60eac1ad43
feat: also do PTI performance check with (inv)pcid for BSD
2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
b3cc06a6ad
fix regression introduced by 82c25dc
2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
5553576e31
feat(amd/zen): re-introduce IBRS for AMD except ZEN family
2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
e16ad802da
feat(ibpb=2): add detection of SMT before concluding the system is not vulnerable
2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
29c294edff
feat(bsd): explain how to mitigate variant2
2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Rob Gill
Stéphane Lesimple
rrobgill
Onno Zweers
Igor Lubashev