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Author SHA1 Message Date
Rob Gill
c181978d7c fix(arm): Updated arm cortex status (#209) 
* Cortex A8 Vulnerable

Arm Cortex A8 is vulnerable to variants 1 & 2  (https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability)

Part number is 0xc08 (https://developer.arm.com/docs/ddi0344/b/system-control-coprocessor/system-control-coprocessorregisters/c0-main-id-register)

False negative reported by @V10lator in #206

* ARM Cortex A12 Vulnerable to 1&2

https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability

* A76 vulnerable to variant 4

All arch 8 cortex A57-A76 are vulnerable to variant 4.

https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability

* Whitelist variant4 nonvuln Arms

* ARM Cortex Whitelist & Cumulative Blacklist

Applies all information about vulnerabilities of ARM Cortex processors (from https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability).

Whitelist & blacklist approach, using both vulnerable and non vulnerable status for each identified CPU, with vulnerabilities tracked cumulatively for multi CPU systems.
 2018-06-16 12:14:39 +02:00
Jan
9a6406a9a2 chore: add docker support (#203) 2018-06-14 20:25:35 +02:00
Rob Gill
5962d20ba7 fix(variant4): whitelist from common.c::cpu_no_spec_store_bypass (#202) 
* variant4 from common.c::cpu_no_spec_store_bypass

Variant 4 - Add function to 'whitelist' the hand-full of CPUs unaffected by speculative store bypass. 

This would allow improved determination of variant 4 status ( #189 ) of immune CPUs while waiting for the 4.17/stable patches to be backported to distro kernels.

Source of cpu list : https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c#n945)
Modeled after is_cpu_specex_free()

* amd families fix

amd families are reported by parse_cpu_details() in decimal

* remove duplicates

Only list processors which speculate and are immune to variant 4.
Avoids duplication with non-speculating CPUs listed in is_cpu_specex_free()
 2018-05-27 15:14:29 +02:00
Rob Gill
17a3488505 fix(help): add missing references to variants 3a & 4 (#201) 2018-05-24 16:35:57 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
e54e8b3e84 chore: remove warning in README, fix display indentation 2018-05-24 16:32:53 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
39c778e3ac fix(amd): AMD families 0x15-0x17 non-arch MSRs are a valid way to control SSB 2018-05-23 23:08:07 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
2cde6e4649 feat(ssbd): add detection of proper CPUID bits on AMD 2018-05-23 22:50:52 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
f4d51e7e53 fix(variant4): add another detection way for Red Hat kernel 2018-05-23 22:47:54 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
85d46b2799 feat(variant4): add more detailed explanations 2018-05-23 21:08:58 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
61e02abd0c feat(variant3a): detect up to date microcode 2018-05-23 21:08:08 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
114756fab7 fix(amd): not vulnerable to variant3a 2018-05-23 20:38:43 +02:00
Rob Gill
ea75969eb7 fix(help): Update variant options in usage message (#200) 2018-05-22 15:54:25 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
ca391cbfc9 fix(variant2): correctly detect IBRS/IBPB in SLES kernels 2018-05-22 12:06:46 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
68af5c5f92 feat(variant4): detect SSBD-aware kernel 2018-05-22 12:05:46 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
19be8f79eb doc: update README with some info about variant3 and variant4 2018-05-22 09:43:29 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
f75cc0bb6f feat(variant4): add sysfs mitigation hint and some explanation about the vuln 2018-05-22 09:39:11 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
f33d65ff71 feat(variant3a): add information about microcode-sufficient mitigation 2018-05-22 09:38:29 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
725eaa8bf5 feat(arm): adjust vulnerable ARM CPUs for variant3a and variant4 2018-05-22 09:19:29 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
c6ee0358d1 feat(variant4): report SSB_NO CPUs as not vulnerable 2018-05-22 09:18:30 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
22d0b203da fix(ssb_no): rename ssbd_no to ssb_no and fix shift 2018-05-22 00:38:31 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
3062a8416a fix(msg): add missing words 2018-05-22 00:10:08 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
6a4318addf feat(variant3a/4): initial support for 2 new CVEs 2018-05-22 00:06:56 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
c19986188f fix(variant2): adjust detection for SLES kernels 2018-05-19 09:53:12 +02:00
Rob Gill
7e4899bcb8 ibrs can't be enabled on no ibrs cpu (#195) 
* ibrs can't be enabled on no ibrs cpu

If the cpu is identified, and does not support SPEC_CTRL or IBRS, then ibrs can't be enabled, even if supported by the kernel.
Instead of reporting IBRS enabled and active UNKNOWN, report IBRS enabled and active NO.
 2018-05-17 15:39:48 +02:00
rrobgill
5cc77741af Update spectre-meltdown-checker.sh 2018-05-05 13:00:44 +02:00
rrobgill
1c0f6d9580 cpuid and msr module check 
This adds a check before loading the cpuid and msr modules under linux, ensuring they are not unloaded in exit_cleanup() if they were initially present.
 2018-05-05 13:00:44 +02:00
Onno Zweers
4acd0f647a Suggestion to change VM to a CPU with IBRS capability 2018-04-20 20:35:12 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
fb52dbe7bf set master branch to v0.37+ 2018-04-20 20:34:42 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
edebe4dcd4 bump to v0.37 2018-04-18 23:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
83ea78f523 fix: arm: also detect variant 1 mitigation when using native objdump 2018-04-17 18:50:32 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
602b68d493 fix(spectrev2): explain that retpoline is possible for Skylake+ if there is RSB filling, even if IBRS is still better 2018-04-16 09:27:28 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
97bccaa0d7 feat: rephrase IBPB warning when only retpoline is enabled in non-paranoid mode 2018-04-16 09:13:25 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
68e619b0d3 feat: show RSB filling capability for non-Skylake in verbose mode 2018-04-16 09:08:25 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
a6f4475cee feat: make IBRS_FW blue instead of green 2018-04-16 09:07:54 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
223f5028df feat: add --paranoid to choose whether we require IBPB 2018-04-15 23:05:30 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
c0108b9690 fix(spectre2): don't explain how to fix when NOT VULNERABLE 2018-04-15 20:55:55 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
a3016134bd feat: make RSB filling support mandatory for Skylake+ CPUs 2018-04-15 20:55:31 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
59d85b39c9 feat: detect RSB filling capability in the kernel 2018-04-15 20:55:01 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
baaefb0c31 fix: remove shellcheck warnings 2018-04-11 22:24:03 +02:00
Igor Lubashev
d452aca03a fix: invalid bash syntax when ibpb_enabled or ibrs_enabled are empty 2018-04-11 10:29:42 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
10b8d94724 feat: detect latest Red Hat kernels' RO ibpb_enabled knob 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
8606e60ef7 refactor: no longer display the retoline-aware compiler test when we can't tell for sure 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
6a48251647 fix: regression in 51aeae25, when retpoline & ibpb are enabled 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
f4bf5e95ec fix: typos 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
60eac1ad43 feat: also do PTI performance check with (inv)pcid for BSD 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
b3cc06a6ad fix regression introduced by 82c25dc 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
5553576e31 feat(amd/zen): re-introduce IBRS for AMD except ZEN family 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
e16ad802da feat(ibpb=2): add detection of SMT before concluding the system is not vulnerable 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
29c294edff feat(bsd): explain how to mitigate variant2 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
59714011db refactor: IBRS_ALL & RDCL_NO are Intel-only 2018-04-10 22:51:45 +02:00