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Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2026 22:05:17 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] chore: readme: add a second table one about impact/mitigation
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 built from commit 4f16822bb11f5b8461647c228a7f2087d5716aea
 dated 2026-03-31 22:57:00 +0200
 by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)
---
 README.md                   | 5 +++++
 spectre-meltdown-checker.sh | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 81948ed..346162f 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -57,10 +57,15 @@ CVE-2024-36350 (TSA-SQ) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + kernel
 CVE-2024-36357 (TSA-L1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | 💥 | 💥 (1) | Microcode + kernel update
 
 > 💥 Data can be leaked across this boundary.
+
 > ✅ Not affected in this scenario.
+
 > ☠️ Denial of service (system crash or unpredictable behavior), no data leak.
+
 > (1) Cross-process leakage requires SMT (Hyper-Threading) to be active — attacker and victim must share a physical core.
+
 > (2) Only leaks RDRAND/RDSEED output, not arbitrary memory; still allows recovering cryptographic material from any victim.
+
 > (3) CVE-2018-3615 (Foreshadow SGX) inverts the normal trust model: the OS reads SGX enclave data. It is irrelevant unless the system runs SGX enclaves, and the attacker must already have OS-level access.
 
 <details>
diff --git a/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh b/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
index cc04061..bfbe126 100755
--- a/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+++ b/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 #
 # Stephane Lesimple
 #
-VERSION='26.21.0331915'
+VERSION='26.21.0331917'
 
 # --- Common paths and basedirs ---
 readonly VULN_SYSFS_BASE="/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities"