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https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker.git
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split script in multiple files, reassembled through build.sh
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281
src/vulns/CVE-2017-5754.sh
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281
src/vulns/CVE-2017-5754.sh
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# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
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##################
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# MELTDOWN SECTION
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# no security impact but give a hint to the user in verbose mode
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# about PCID/INVPCID cpuid features that must be present to avoid
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# Check whether PCID/INVPCID are available to reduce PTI performance impact
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# refs:
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# https://marc.info/?t=151532047900001&r=1&w=2
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# https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!topic/mechanical-sympathy/L9mHTbeQLNU
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pti_performance_check() {
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local ret pcid invpcid
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pr_info_nol " * Reduced performance impact of PTI: "
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if [ -e "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" ] && grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw pcid; then
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pcid=1
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else
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read_cpuid 0x1 0x0 "$ECX" 17 1 1
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ret=$?
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if [ "$ret" = "$READ_CPUID_RET_OK" ]; then
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pcid=1
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fi
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fi
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if [ -e "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" ] && grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw invpcid; then
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invpcid=1
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else
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read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 "$EBX" 10 1 1
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ret=$?
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if [ "$ret" = "$READ_CPUID_RET_OK" ]; then
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invpcid=1
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fi
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fi
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if [ "$invpcid" = 1 ]; then
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pstatus green YES 'CPU supports INVPCID, performance impact of PTI will be greatly reduced'
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elif [ "$pcid" = 1 ]; then
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pstatus green YES 'CPU supports PCID, performance impact of PTI will be reduced'
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else
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pstatus blue NO 'PCID/INVPCID not supported, performance impact of PTI will be significant'
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fi
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}
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# CVE-2017-5754 Meltdown (rogue data cache load) - entry point
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check_CVE_2017_5754() {
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check_cve 'CVE-2017-5754'
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}
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# CVE-2017-5754 Meltdown (rogue data cache load) - Linux mitigation check
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check_CVE_2017_5754_linux() {
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local status sys_interface_available msg kpti_support kpti_can_tell kpti_enabled dmesg_grep pti_xen_pv_domU xen_pv_domo xen_pv_domu explain_text
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status=UNK
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sys_interface_available=0
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msg=''
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if sys_interface_check "$VULN_SYSFS_BASE/meltdown"; then
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# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
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sys_interface_available=1
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status=$ret_sys_interface_check_status
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fi
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if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
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pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
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kpti_support=''
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kpti_can_tell=0
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if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
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kpti_can_tell=1
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kpti_support=$(grep -E -w -e 'CONFIG_(MITIGATION_)?PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y' -e CONFIG_KAISER=y -e CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0=y "$opt_config")
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if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
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pr_debug "kpti_support: found option '$kpti_support' in $opt_config"
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fi
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fi
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if [ -z "$kpti_support" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
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# it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch
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# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
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# parse_kpti: arm
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kpti_can_tell=1
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kpti_support=$(grep -w -e kpti_force_enabled -e parse_kpti "$opt_map")
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if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
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pr_debug "kpti_support: found '$kpti_support' in $opt_map"
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fi
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fi
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if [ -z "$kpti_support" ] && [ -n "$g_kernel" ]; then
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# same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only kernel, look for the
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# nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option)
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# 'kpti=': arm
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kpti_can_tell=1
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if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
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else
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kpti_support=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$g_kernel" | grep -w -e nopti -e kpti=)
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if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
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pr_debug "kpti_support: found '$kpti_support' in $g_kernel"
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fi
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fi
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fi
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if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
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if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
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pstatus green YES "found '$kpti_support'"
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else
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pstatus green YES
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fi
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elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
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pstatus yellow NO
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else
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file"
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fi
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mount_debugfs
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pr_info_nol " * PTI enabled and active: "
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if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
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dmesg_grep="Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled"
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dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|Kernel page table isolation enabled"
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dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|x86/pti: Unmapping kernel while in userspace"
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# aarch64
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dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|CPU features: detected( feature)?: Kernel page table isolation \(KPTI\)"
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if grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw pti; then
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# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
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pr_debug "kpti_enabled: found 'pti' flag in $g_procfs/cpuinfo"
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kpti_enabled=1
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elif grep ^flags "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw kaiser; then
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# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
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pr_debug "kpti_enabled: found 'kaiser' flag in $g_procfs/cpuinfo"
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kpti_enabled=1
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elif [ -e "$DEBUGFS_BASE/x86/pti_enabled" ]; then
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# Red Hat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
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kpti_enabled=$(cat "$DEBUGFS_BASE/x86/pti_enabled" 2>/dev/null)
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pr_debug "kpti_enabled: file $DEBUGFS_BASE/x86/pti_enabled exists and says: $kpti_enabled"
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elif is_xen_dom0; then
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pti_xen_pv_domU=$(xl dmesg 2>/dev/null | grep 'XPTI' | grep 'DomU enabled' | head -n1)
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[ -n "$pti_xen_pv_domU" ] && kpti_enabled=1
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fi
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if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
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dmesg_grep "$dmesg_grep"
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ret=$?
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if [ "$ret" -eq 0 ]; then
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pr_debug "kpti_enabled: found hint in dmesg: $ret_dmesg_grep_grepped"
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kpti_enabled=1
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elif [ "$ret" -eq 2 ]; then
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pr_debug "kpti_enabled: dmesg truncated"
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kpti_enabled=-1
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fi
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fi
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if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
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pr_debug "kpti_enabled: couldn't find any hint that PTI is enabled"
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kpti_enabled=0
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fi
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if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
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pstatus green YES
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elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = -1 ]; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "dmesg truncated, please reboot and relaunch this script"
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else
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pstatus yellow NO
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fi
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else
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pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
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fi
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pti_performance_check
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elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
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# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
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msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
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status=UNK
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fi
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# Test if the current host is a Xen PV Dom0 / DomU
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xen_pv_domo=0
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xen_pv_domu=0
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is_xen_dom0 && xen_pv_domo=1
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is_xen_domU && xen_pv_domu=1
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if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
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# checking whether we're running under Xen PV 64 bits. If yes, we are affected by affected_variant3
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# (unless we are a Dom0)
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pr_info_nol "* Running as a Xen PV DomU: "
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if [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
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pstatus yellow YES
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else
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pstatus blue NO
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fi
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fi
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if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
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# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
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pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
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elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
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# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
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if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
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if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
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pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
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elif [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
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pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI"
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elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
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pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM, PVH mode, or the Xen hypervisor must have the Xen's own PTI patch"
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explain "Go to https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ for more information"
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elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = -1 ]; then
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pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "couldn't find any clue of PTI activation due to a truncated dmesg, please reboot and relaunch this script"
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else
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pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
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if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
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if [ -e "$DEBUGFS_BASE/x86/pti_enabled" ]; then
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explain "Your kernel supports PTI but it's disabled, you can enable it with \`echo 1 > $DEBUGFS_BASE/x86/pti_enabled\`"
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elif echo "$g_kernel_cmdline" | grep -q -w -e nopti -e pti=off; then
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explain "Your kernel supports PTI but it has been disabled on command-line, remove the nopti or pti=off option from your bootloader configuration"
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else
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explain "Your kernel supports PTI but it has been disabled, check \`dmesg\` right after boot to find clues why the system disabled it"
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fi
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else
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explain "If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_(MITIGATION_)PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
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fi
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fi
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else
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if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
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pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
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elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
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pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
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explain "If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_(MITIGATION_)PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
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else
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pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "offline mode: not enough information"
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explain "Re-run this script with root privileges, and give it the kernel image (--kernel), the kernel configuration (--config) and the System.map file (--map) corresponding to the kernel you would like to inspect."
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fi
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fi
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else
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if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
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msg="Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI"
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status="OK"
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elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
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msg="Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM, PVH mode, or the Xen hypervisor must have the Xen's own PTI patch"
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status="VULN"
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explain_text="Go to https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ for more information"
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elif [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ]; then
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msg="PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
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explain_text="If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_(MITIGATION_)PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
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fi
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pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$msg"
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[ -z "${explain_text:-}" ] && [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && explain_text="If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_(MITIGATION_)PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
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[ -n "${explain_text:-}" ] && explain "$explain_text"
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unset explain_text
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fi
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# Warn the user about XSA-254 recommended mitigations
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if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
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pr_warn
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pr_warn "This host is a Xen Dom0. Please make sure that you are running your DomUs"
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pr_warn "in HVM, PVHVM or PVH mode to prevent any guest-to-host / host-to-guest attacks."
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pr_warn
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pr_warn "See https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ and XSA-254 for details."
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fi
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}
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# CVE-2017-5754 Meltdown (rogue data cache load) - BSD mitigation check
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check_CVE_2017_5754_bsd() {
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local kpti_enabled
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pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
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kpti_enabled=$(sysctl -n vm.pmap.pti 2>/dev/null)
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if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
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pstatus yellow NO
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else
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pstatus green YES
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fi
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pr_info_nol " * PTI enabled and active: "
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if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
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pstatus green YES
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else
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pstatus yellow NO
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fi
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pti_performance_check
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if ! is_cpu_affected "$cve"; then
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# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
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pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
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elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
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pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
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elif [ -n "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
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pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "PTI is supported but disabled on your system"
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else
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pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
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fi
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}
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