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https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker.git
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feat: implement check for MMIO Stale Data (CVE-2022-21123 CVE-2022-21125 CVE-2022-21166) (#437)
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@@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ CVE-2019-11091|MDSUM|mdsum|RIDL, microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable me
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CVE-2019-11135|TAA|taa|ZombieLoad V2, TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA)
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CVE-2018-12207|ITLBMH|itlbmh|No eXcuses, iTLB Multihit, machine check exception on page size changes (MCEPSC)
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CVE-2020-0543|SRBDS|srbds|Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)
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CVE-2022-21123|SBDR|mmio|Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR), MMIO Stale Data
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CVE-2022-21125|SBDS|mmio|Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), MMIO Stale Data
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CVE-2022-21166|DRPW|mmio|Device Register Partial Write (DRPW), MMIO Stale Data
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CVE-2023-20588|DIV0|div0|Division by Zero, AMD Zen1 speculative data leak
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CVE-2023-20593|ZENBLEED|zenbleed|Zenbleed, cross-process information leak
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CVE-2022-40982|DOWNFALL|downfall|Downfall, gather data sampling (GDS)
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@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
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affected_taa=''
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affected_itlbmh=''
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affected_srbds=''
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affected_mmio=''
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affected_sls=''
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# DIV0, Zenbleed and Inception are all AMD specific, look for "is_amd" below:
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_set_immune div0
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@@ -135,6 +136,11 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
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pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: cpu not affected by Special Register Buffer Data Sampling"
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fi
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if is_cpu_mmio_free; then
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_infer_immune mmio
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pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: cpu not affected by MMIO Stale Data"
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fi
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# NO_SPECTRE_V2: Centaur family 7 and Zhaoxin family 7 are immune to Spectre V2
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# kernel commit 1e41a766c98b (v5.6-rc1): added NO_SPECTRE_V2 exemption
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# Zhaoxin vendor_id is " Shanghai " in cpuinfo (parsed as "Shanghai" by awk)
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@@ -156,6 +162,7 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
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_set_immune mdsum
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_set_immune taa
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_set_immune srbds
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_set_immune mmio
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elif is_intel; then
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# Intel
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# https://github.com/crozone/SpectrePoC/issues/1 ^F E5200 => spectre 2 not affected
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@@ -805,7 +812,7 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
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pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: variant4=$affected_variant4 variantl1tf=$affected_variantl1tf msbds=$affected_msbds mfbds=$affected_mfbds"
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pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: mlpds=$affected_mlpds mdsum=$affected_mdsum taa=$affected_taa itlbmh=$affected_itlbmh srbds=$affected_srbds"
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pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: div0=$affected_div0 zenbleed=$affected_zenbleed inception=$affected_inception retbleed=$affected_retbleed tsa=$affected_tsa downfall=$affected_downfall reptar=$affected_reptar rfds=$affected_rfds its=$affected_its"
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pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: vmscape=$affected_vmscape bpi=$affected_bpi sls=$affected_sls"
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pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: final results: vmscape=$affected_vmscape bpi=$affected_bpi sls=$affected_sls mmio=$affected_mmio"
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}
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affected_variantl1tf_sgx="$affected_variantl1tf"
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# even if we are affected to L1TF, if there's no SGX, we're not affected to the original foreshadow
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@@ -156,6 +156,61 @@ is_cpu_srbds_free() {
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}
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# Check whether the CPU is known to be unaffected by MMIO Stale Data (CVE-2022-21123/21125/21166)
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# Returns: 0 if MMIO-free, 1 if affected or unknown
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is_cpu_mmio_free() {
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# source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
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#
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# CPU affection logic from kernel (51802186158c, v5.19):
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# Bug is set when: cpu_matches(blacklist, MMIO) AND NOT arch_cap_mmio_immune()
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# arch_cap_mmio_immune() requires ALL THREE bits set:
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# ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO (bit 14) AND ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO (bit 15) AND ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO (bit 13)
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#
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# Intel Family 6 model blacklist (unchanged since v5.19):
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# HASWELL_X (0x3F)
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# BROADWELL_D (0x56), BROADWELL_X (0x4F)
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# SKYLAKE_X (0x55), SKYLAKE_L (0x4E), SKYLAKE (0x5E)
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# KABYLAKE_L (0x8E), KABYLAKE (0x9E)
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# ICELAKE_L (0x7E), ICELAKE_D (0x6C), ICELAKE_X (0x6A)
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# COMETLAKE (0xA5), COMETLAKE_L (0xA6)
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# LAKEFIELD (0x8A)
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# ROCKETLAKE (0xA7)
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# ATOM_TREMONT (0x96), ATOM_TREMONT_D (0x86), ATOM_TREMONT_L (0x9C)
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#
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# Vendor scope: Intel only. Non-Intel CPUs are not affected.
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parse_cpu_details
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# ARCH_CAP immunity: all three bits must be set
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if [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_fbsdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_psdp_no" = 1 ]; then
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return 0
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fi
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if is_intel; then
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if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
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if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_L" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_D" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_X" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_LAKEFIELD" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ROCKETLAKE" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_D" ] ||
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_L" ]; then
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return 1
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fi
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fi
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fi
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return 0
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}
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# Check whether the CPU is known to be unaffected by Speculative Store Bypass (SSB)
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# Returns: 0 if SSB-free, 1 if affected or unknown
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is_cpu_ssb_free() {
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@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ while [ -n "${1:-}" ]; do
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case "$2" in
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help)
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echo "The following parameters are supported for --variant (can be used multiple times):"
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echo "1, 2, 3, 3a, 4, msbds, mfbds, mlpds, mdsum, l1tf, taa, mcepsc, srbds, div0, zenbleed, downfall, retbleed, inception, reptar, rfds, tsa, tsa-sq, tsa-l1, its, vmscape, bpi, sls"
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echo "1, 2, 3, 3a, 4, msbds, mfbds, mlpds, mdsum, l1tf, taa, mcepsc, srbds, mmio, sbdr, sbds, drpw, div0, zenbleed, downfall, retbleed, inception, reptar, rfds, tsa, tsa-sq, tsa-l1, its, vmscape, bpi, sls"
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exit 0
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;;
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1)
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@@ -224,6 +224,22 @@ while [ -n "${1:-}" ]; do
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opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2020-0543"
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opt_cve_all=0
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;;
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mmio)
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opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2022-21123 CVE-2022-21125 CVE-2022-21166"
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opt_cve_all=0
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;;
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sbdr)
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opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2022-21123"
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opt_cve_all=0
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;;
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sbds)
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opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2022-21125"
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opt_cve_all=0
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;;
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drpw)
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opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2022-21166"
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opt_cve_all=0
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;;
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div0)
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opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2023-20588"
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opt_cve_all=0
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@@ -757,6 +757,10 @@ check_cpu() {
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cap_rfds_no=-1
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cap_rfds_clear=-1
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cap_its_no=-1
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cap_sbdr_ssdp_no=-1
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cap_fbsdp_no=-1
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cap_psdp_no=-1
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cap_fb_clear=-1
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if [ "$cap_arch_capabilities" = -1 ]; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
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elif [ "$cap_arch_capabilities" != 1 ]; then
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@@ -774,6 +778,10 @@ check_cpu() {
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cap_rfds_no=0
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cap_rfds_clear=0
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cap_its_no=0
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cap_sbdr_ssdp_no=0
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cap_fbsdp_no=0
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cap_psdp_no=0
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cap_fb_clear=0
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pstatus yellow NO
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else
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read_msr $MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
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@@ -792,6 +800,10 @@ check_cpu() {
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cap_rfds_no=0
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cap_rfds_clear=0
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cap_its_no=0
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cap_sbdr_ssdp_no=0
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cap_fbsdp_no=0
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cap_psdp_no=0
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cap_fb_clear=0
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if [ $ret = $READ_MSR_RET_OK ]; then
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capabilities=$ret_read_msr_value
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# https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h#n82
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@@ -805,12 +817,16 @@ check_cpu() {
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[ $((ret_read_msr_value_lo >> 6 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_pschange_msc_no=1
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[ $((ret_read_msr_value_lo >> 7 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_tsx_ctrl_msr=1
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[ $((ret_read_msr_value_lo >> 8 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_taa_no=1
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[ $((ret_read_msr_value_lo >> 13 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_sbdr_ssdp_no=1
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[ $((ret_read_msr_value_lo >> 14 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_fbsdp_no=1
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[ $((ret_read_msr_value_lo >> 15 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_psdp_no=1
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[ $((ret_read_msr_value_lo >> 17 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_fb_clear=1
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[ $((ret_read_msr_value_lo >> 25 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_gds_ctrl=1
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[ $((ret_read_msr_value_lo >> 26 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_gds_no=1
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[ $((ret_read_msr_value_lo >> 27 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_rfds_no=1
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[ $((ret_read_msr_value_lo >> 28 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_rfds_clear=1
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[ $((ret_read_msr_value_hi >> 30 & 1)) -eq 1 ] && cap_its_no=1
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pr_debug "capabilities says rdcl_no=$cap_rdcl_no ibrs_all=$cap_ibrs_all rsba=$cap_rsba l1dflush_no=$cap_l1dflush_no ssb_no=$cap_ssb_no mds_no=$cap_mds_no taa_no=$cap_taa_no pschange_msc_no=$cap_pschange_msc_no rfds_no=$cap_rfds_no rfds_clear=$cap_rfds_clear its_no=$cap_its_no"
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pr_debug "capabilities says rdcl_no=$cap_rdcl_no ibrs_all=$cap_ibrs_all rsba=$cap_rsba l1dflush_no=$cap_l1dflush_no ssb_no=$cap_ssb_no mds_no=$cap_mds_no taa_no=$cap_taa_no pschange_msc_no=$cap_pschange_msc_no rfds_no=$cap_rfds_no rfds_clear=$cap_rfds_clear its_no=$cap_its_no sbdr_ssdp_no=$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no fbsdp_no=$cap_fbsdp_no psdp_no=$cap_psdp_no fb_clear=$cap_fb_clear"
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if [ "$cap_ibrs_all" = 1 ]; then
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pstatus green YES
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else
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@@ -971,6 +987,24 @@ check_cpu() {
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pstatus yellow NO
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fi
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pr_info_nol " * CPU explicitly indicates not being affected by MMIO Stale Data (FBSDP_NO & PSDP_NO & SBDR_SSDP_NO): "
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if [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = -1 ]; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read MSR"
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elif [ "$cap_sbdr_ssdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_fbsdp_no" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_psdp_no" = 1 ]; then
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pstatus green YES
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else
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pstatus yellow NO
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fi
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pr_info_nol " * CPU microcode supports Fill Buffer clearing (FB_CLEAR): "
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if [ "$cap_fb_clear" = -1 ]; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read MSR"
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elif [ "$cap_fb_clear" = 1 ]; then
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pstatus green YES
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else
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pstatus yellow NO
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fi
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pr_info_nol " * CPU explicitly indicates not being affected by RFDS (RFDS_NO): "
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if [ "$cap_rfds_no" = -1 ]; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read MSR"
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