mirror of
https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker.git
synced 2026-06-07 23:23:01 +02:00
arm64: add SSBS detection
built from commit 737cfe4a5f
dated 2026-06-06 17:01:46 +0200
by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)
This commit is contained in:
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Stephane Lesimple
|
||||
#
|
||||
VERSION='26.36.0606593'
|
||||
VERSION='26.36.0606627'
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Common paths and basedirs ---
|
||||
readonly VULN_SYSFS_BASE="/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities"
|
||||
@@ -5158,6 +5158,22 @@ check_cpu() {
|
||||
pstatus green NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# ARM exposes no userspace-readable CPUID/MSR to query SSBD support directly.
|
||||
# The ARMv8.5 SSBS ("Speculative Store Bypass Safe") hardware bit, when present,
|
||||
# surfaces as the 'ssbs' hwcap in /proc/cpuinfo. We use it *only* as a positive
|
||||
# confirmation of SSB mitigation capability (Variant 4 / CVE-2018-3639): its
|
||||
# absence proves nothing, because the kernel deliberately hides the hwcap on some
|
||||
# cores (e.g. the erratum-3194386 SSBS self-sync workaround), so we must never
|
||||
# infer immunity from a missing 'ssbs'.
|
||||
if has_runtime; then
|
||||
pr_info_nol " * CPU indicates SSBS (Speculative Store Bypass Safe) capability: "
|
||||
if grep '^Features' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw ssbs; then
|
||||
cap_ssbd='ARM SSBS (cpuinfo)'
|
||||
pstatus green YES "$cap_ssbd"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus blue UNKNOWN "not exposed (the kernel may hide it; cannot conclude)"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
return
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user