mirror of
https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker.git
synced 2024-12-26 20:10:31 +01:00
add --variant to specify what check we want to run
This commit is contained in:
Stéphane Lesimple
parent
5389ac6844
commit
74bc7ba637
@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Stephane Lesimple
|
||||
#
|
||||
VERSION=0.21
|
||||
VERSION=0.22
|
||||
|
||||
# Script configuration
|
||||
show_usage()
|
||||
@ -34,8 +34,10 @@ show_usage()
|
||||
Options:
|
||||
--no-color Don't use color codes
|
||||
-v, --verbose Increase verbosity level
|
||||
--batch Produce machine readable output
|
||||
--batch text Produce machine readable output, this is the default if --batch is specified alone
|
||||
--batch nrpe Produce machine readable output formatted for NRPE
|
||||
--variant [1,2,3] Specify which variant you'd like to check, by default all variants are checked
|
||||
Can be specified multiple times (e.g. --variant 2 --variant 3)
|
||||
|
||||
IMPORTANT:
|
||||
A false sense of security is worse than no security at all.
|
||||
@ -79,6 +81,10 @@ opt_no_color=0
|
||||
opt_batch=0
|
||||
opt_batch_format="text"
|
||||
opt_verbose=1
|
||||
opt_variant1=0
|
||||
opt_variant2=0
|
||||
opt_variant3=0
|
||||
opt_allvariants=1
|
||||
|
||||
nrpe_critical=0
|
||||
nrpe_unknown=0
|
||||
@ -255,6 +261,20 @@ while [ -n "$1" ]; do
|
||||
elif [ "$1" = "-v" -o "$1" = "--verbose" ]; then
|
||||
opt_verbose=$(expr $opt_verbose + 1)
|
||||
shift
|
||||
elif [ "$1" = "--variant" ]; then
|
||||
if [ -z "$2" ]; then
|
||||
echo "$0: error: option --variant expects a parameter (1, 2 or 3)" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
case "$2" in
|
||||
1) opt_variant1=1; opt_allvariants=0;;
|
||||
2) opt_variant2=1; opt_allvariants=0;;
|
||||
3) opt_variant3=1; opt_allvariants=0;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, expected either 1, 2 or 3" >&2;
|
||||
exit 1;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
shift 2
|
||||
elif [ "$1" = "-h" -o "$1" = "--help" ]; then
|
||||
show_header
|
||||
show_usage
|
||||
@ -467,293 +487,330 @@ fi
|
||||
|
||||
_info
|
||||
|
||||
###########
|
||||
# SPECTRE 1
|
||||
_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m"
|
||||
_info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: "
|
||||
# end of header stuff
|
||||
|
||||
status=0
|
||||
if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$vmlinux_err"
|
||||
else
|
||||
if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
|
||||
else
|
||||
# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurences of the LFENCE opcode
|
||||
# in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
|
||||
# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+)
|
||||
# v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches,
|
||||
# so let's push the threshold to 70.
|
||||
# TODO LKML patch is starting to dump LFENCE in favor of the PAUSE opcode, we might need to check that (patch not stabilized yet)
|
||||
nb_lfence=$(objdump -D "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence)
|
||||
if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 70 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 70"
|
||||
status=1
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 70"
|
||||
status=2
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# now we define some util functions and the check_*() funcs, as
|
||||
# the user can choose to execute only some of those
|
||||
|
||||
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
|
||||
else
|
||||
case "$status" in
|
||||
0) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 UNK "impossible to check ${vmlinux}";;
|
||||
1) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 VULN 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';;
|
||||
2) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
###########
|
||||
# VARIANT 2
|
||||
_info
|
||||
_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m"
|
||||
_info "* Mitigation 1"
|
||||
_info_nol "* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: "
|
||||
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
|
||||
# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
|
||||
modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
|
||||
else
|
||||
# the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48
|
||||
# here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x48' but without needing the rdmsr tool
|
||||
# if we get a read error, the MSR is not there
|
||||
dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 skip=9 2>/dev/null
|
||||
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
# if we used modprobe ourselves, rmmod the module
|
||||
rmmod msr 2>/dev/null
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
_info_nol "* Kernel support for IBRS: "
|
||||
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
mount_debugfs()
|
||||
{
|
||||
if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then
|
||||
# try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards
|
||||
mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ]; then
|
||||
# if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
ibrs_supported=1
|
||||
ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled ]; then
|
||||
# RedHat uses a different path (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301)
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
ibrs_supported=1
|
||||
ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
umount_debugfs()
|
||||
{
|
||||
if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
# umount debugfs if we did mount it ourselves
|
||||
umount /sys/kernel/debug
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
|
||||
if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
ibrs_supported=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_info_nol "* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: "
|
||||
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
# 0 means disabled
|
||||
# 1 is enabled only for kernel space
|
||||
# 2 is enabled for kernel and user space
|
||||
case "$ibrs_enabled" in
|
||||
"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
0) pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
1 | 2) pstatus green YES;;
|
||||
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
###################
|
||||
# SPECTRE VARIANT 1
|
||||
check_variant1()
|
||||
{
|
||||
_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m"
|
||||
_info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: "
|
||||
|
||||
_info_nol "* IBRS enabled for User space: "
|
||||
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
case "$ibrs_enabled" in
|
||||
"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
0 | 1) pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
2) pstatus green YES;;
|
||||
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
_info "* Mitigation 2"
|
||||
_info_nol "* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: "
|
||||
# We check the RETPOLINE kernel options
|
||||
if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
|
||||
if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
retpoline=1
|
||||
status=0
|
||||
if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$vmlinux_err"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
|
||||
else
|
||||
# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurences of the LFENCE opcode
|
||||
# in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
|
||||
# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+)
|
||||
# v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches,
|
||||
# so let's push the threshold to 70.
|
||||
# TODO LKML patch is starting to dump LFENCE in favor of the PAUSE opcode, we might need to check that (patch not stabilized yet)
|
||||
nb_lfence=$(objdump -D "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence)
|
||||
if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 70 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 70"
|
||||
status=1
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 70"
|
||||
status=2
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
_info_nol "* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: "
|
||||
# Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm
|
||||
# For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles)
|
||||
# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79
|
||||
# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set
|
||||
# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol
|
||||
if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
|
||||
# look for the symbol
|
||||
if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then
|
||||
retpoline_compiler=1
|
||||
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map"
|
||||
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
case "$status" in
|
||||
0) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 UNK "impossible to check ${vmlinux}";;
|
||||
1) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 VULN 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';;
|
||||
2) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
fi
|
||||
elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
|
||||
# look for the symbol
|
||||
if which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
# the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol
|
||||
if nm "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then
|
||||
retpoline_compiler=1
|
||||
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux symbols"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
###################
|
||||
# SPECTRE VARIANT 2
|
||||
check_variant2()
|
||||
{
|
||||
_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m"
|
||||
_info "* Mitigation 1"
|
||||
_info_nol "* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: "
|
||||
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
|
||||
# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
|
||||
modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
|
||||
else
|
||||
# the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48
|
||||
# here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x48' but without needing the rdmsr tool
|
||||
# if we get a read error, the MSR is not there
|
||||
dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 skip=9 2>/dev/null
|
||||
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then
|
||||
# if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have
|
||||
# any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary
|
||||
retpoline_compiler=1
|
||||
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux"
|
||||
else
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
# if we used modprobe ourselves, rmmod the module
|
||||
rmmod msr 2>/dev/null
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
_info_nol "* Kernel support for IBRS: "
|
||||
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
mount_debugfs
|
||||
if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ]; then
|
||||
# if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
ibrs_supported=1
|
||||
ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled ]; then
|
||||
# RedHat uses a different path (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301)
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
ibrs_supported=1
|
||||
ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
|
||||
if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
ibrs_supported=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
|
||||
elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "retpoline mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
if [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability"
|
||||
_info_nol "* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: "
|
||||
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
# 0 means disabled
|
||||
# 1 is enabled only for kernel space
|
||||
# 2 is enabled for kernel and user space
|
||||
case "$ibrs_enabled" in
|
||||
"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
0) pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
1 | 2) pstatus green YES;;
|
||||
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
else
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
##########
|
||||
# MELTDOWN
|
||||
_info
|
||||
_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m"
|
||||
_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
|
||||
kpti_support=0
|
||||
kpti_can_tell=0
|
||||
if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
|
||||
kpti_can_tell=1
|
||||
if grep -Eq '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config"; then
|
||||
kpti_support=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
|
||||
# it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch
|
||||
# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
|
||||
kpti_can_tell=1
|
||||
if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then
|
||||
kpti_support=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
|
||||
# same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the
|
||||
# nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option)
|
||||
kpti_can_tell=1
|
||||
if ! which strings >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
|
||||
_info_nol "* IBRS enabled for User space: "
|
||||
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
case "$ibrs_enabled" in
|
||||
"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
0 | 1) pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
2) pstatus green YES;;
|
||||
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
else
|
||||
if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then
|
||||
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
_info "* Mitigation 2"
|
||||
_info_nol "* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: "
|
||||
# We check the RETPOLINE kernel options
|
||||
if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
|
||||
if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
retpoline=1
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
_info_nol "* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: "
|
||||
# Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm
|
||||
# For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles)
|
||||
# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79
|
||||
# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set
|
||||
# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol
|
||||
if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
|
||||
# look for the symbol
|
||||
if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then
|
||||
retpoline_compiler=1
|
||||
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
|
||||
# look for the symbol
|
||||
if which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
# the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol
|
||||
if nm "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then
|
||||
retpoline_compiler=1
|
||||
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux symbols"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then
|
||||
# if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have
|
||||
# any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary
|
||||
retpoline_compiler=1
|
||||
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
|
||||
elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "retpoline mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
if [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
########################
|
||||
# MELTDOWN aka VARIANT 3
|
||||
check_variant3()
|
||||
{
|
||||
_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m"
|
||||
_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
|
||||
kpti_support=0
|
||||
kpti_can_tell=0
|
||||
if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
|
||||
kpti_can_tell=1
|
||||
if grep -Eq '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config"; then
|
||||
kpti_support=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
_info_nol "* PTI enabled and active: "
|
||||
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then
|
||||
# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
|
||||
kpti_enabled=1
|
||||
elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then
|
||||
# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
|
||||
kpti_enabled=1
|
||||
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then
|
||||
# RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
|
||||
kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
elif dmesg | grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled'; then
|
||||
# if we can't find the flag, grep dmesg output
|
||||
kpti_enabled=1
|
||||
elif [ -r /var/log/dmesg ] && grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled' /var/log/dmesg; then
|
||||
# if we can't find the flag in dmesg output, grep in /var/log/dmesg when readable
|
||||
kpti_enabled=1
|
||||
else
|
||||
kpti_enabled=0
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
|
||||
# it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch
|
||||
# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
|
||||
kpti_can_tell=1
|
||||
if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then
|
||||
kpti_support=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
|
||||
# same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the
|
||||
# nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option)
|
||||
kpti_can_tell=1
|
||||
if ! which strings >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
|
||||
else
|
||||
if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then
|
||||
kpti_support=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
# umount debugfs if we did mount it ourselves
|
||||
umount /sys/kernel/debug
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
|
||||
elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
else
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
_info
|
||||
mount_debugfs
|
||||
_info_nol "* PTI enabled and active: "
|
||||
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then
|
||||
# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
|
||||
kpti_enabled=1
|
||||
elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then
|
||||
# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
|
||||
kpti_enabled=1
|
||||
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then
|
||||
# RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
|
||||
kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
elif dmesg | grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled'; then
|
||||
# if we can't find the flag, grep dmesg output
|
||||
kpti_enabled=1
|
||||
elif [ -r /var/log/dmesg ] && grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled' /var/log/dmesg; then
|
||||
# if we can't find the flag in dmesg output, grep in /var/log/dmesg when readable
|
||||
kpti_enabled=1
|
||||
else
|
||||
kpti_enabled=0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
|
||||
elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# now run the checks the user asked for
|
||||
if [ "$opt_variant1" = 1 -o "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
check_variant1
|
||||
_info
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$opt_variant2" = 1 -o "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
check_variant2
|
||||
_info
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$opt_variant3" = 1 -o "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
check_variant3
|
||||
_info
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
_info "A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer"
|
||||
|
||||
# this'll umount only if we mounted debugfs ourselves
|
||||
umount_debugfs
|
||||
|
||||
# cleanup the temp decompressed config
|
||||
[ -n "$dumped_config" ] && rm -f "$dumped_config"
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 -a "$opt_batch_format" = "nrpe" ]; then
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user