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https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker.git
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fix: xen: consider Xen dom0 as non-guest (#343 continued)
built from commit bc00a81526
dated 2026-07-30 15:51:23 +0200
by Stéphane Lesimple (speed47_github@speed47.net)
This commit is contained in:
github-actions[bot]
+65
-19
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
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#
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# Stephane Lesimple
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#
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VERSION='26.36.0610898'
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VERSION='26.36.0730588'
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# --- Common paths and basedirs ---
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readonly VULN_SYSFS_BASE="/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities"
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@@ -381,6 +381,7 @@ fi
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readonly INTEL_FAM6_ARROWLAKE_U=$((0xB5))
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readonly INTEL_FAM6_LUNARLAKE_M=$((0xBD)) # /* Lion Cove / Skymont */
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readonly INTEL_FAM6_PANTHERLAKE_L=$((0xCC)) # /* Cougar Cove / Darkmont */
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readonly INTEL_FAM6_PANTHERLAKE_R=$((0xE5)) # /* Cougar Cove / Darkmont */
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readonly INTEL_FAM6_WILDCATLAKE_L=$((0xD5))
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readonly INTEL_FAM18_NOVALAKE=$((0x01)) # /* Coyote Cove / Arctic Wolf */
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readonly INTEL_FAM18_NOVALAKE_L=$((0x03)) # /* Coyote Cove / Arctic Wolf */
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@@ -4184,8 +4185,18 @@ is_arm_cpu() {
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# Check whether SMT (HyperThreading) is enabled on the system
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# Returns: 0 if SMT enabled, 1 otherwise
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is_cpu_smt_enabled() {
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local siblings cpucores
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# SMT / HyperThreading is enabled if siblings != cpucores
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local siblings cpucores smt_active
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# Most reliable: /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active mirrors the kernel's
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# sched_smt_active() (1=SMT active, 0=not), which is exactly what the kernel
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# itself uses to derive the "SMT (disabled|vulnerable)" vulnerability strings.
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if [ -r /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active ]; then
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smt_active=$(cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active 2>/dev/null)
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case "$smt_active" in
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1) return 0 ;;
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0) return 1 ;;
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esac
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fi
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# Fallback: SMT / HyperThreading is enabled if siblings != cpucores
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if [ -e "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" ]; then
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siblings=$(awk '/^siblings/ {print $3;exit}' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo")
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cpucores=$(awk '/^cpu cores/ {print $4;exit}' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo")
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@@ -4637,7 +4648,14 @@ is_running_as_guest() {
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if [ "${g_is_guest_vm_cached:-0}" != 1 ]; then
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g_is_guest_vm=0
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g_is_guest_vm_reason=''
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if [ -e "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" ] && grep -qw 'hypervisor' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" 2>/dev/null; then
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# A Xen dom0 runs on top of the hypervisor and therefore also has the
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# 'hypervisor' CPUID flag set, but it's the privileged control domain:
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# it has direct hardware access and a truthful view of the host CPU
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# topology, so it must not be classified as a guest (#343). Check it
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# before the cpuinfo probe below, which would otherwise match.
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if is_xen_dom0; then
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g_is_guest_vm=0
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elif [ -e "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" ] && grep -qw 'hypervisor' "$g_procfs/cpuinfo" 2>/dev/null; then
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g_is_guest_vm=1
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g_is_guest_vm_reason="'hypervisor' flag in $g_procfs/cpuinfo"
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fi
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@@ -6558,11 +6576,21 @@ check_mds_linux() {
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mds_smt_mitigated=1
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pstatus green YES
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elif echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -q 'SMT Host state unknown'; then
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# The kernel appends "SMT Host state unknown" when running under
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# a hypervisor (X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR): the host controls SMT
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# scheduling, so it can't be determined from inside the guest (#343).
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mds_smt_mitigated=2
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "running in a VM guest, the hypervisor host controls SMT"
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# The kernel appends "SMT Host state unknown" whenever the
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# HYPERVISOR CPUID bit is set. That's true both inside a guest
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# AND on a Xen dom0 (#343). In a guest we genuinely can't see
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# the host's SMT scheduling; on dom0/bare metal the local SMT
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# state is authoritative, so trust it there.
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if is_running_as_guest; then
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mds_smt_mitigated=2
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "running in a VM guest, the hypervisor host controls SMT"
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elif is_cpu_smt_enabled; then
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mds_smt_mitigated=0
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pstatus yellow NO
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else
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mds_smt_mitigated=1
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pstatus green YES
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fi
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else
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mds_smt_mitigated=0
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pstatus yellow NO
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@@ -6876,11 +6904,21 @@ check_mmio_linux() {
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mmio_smt_mitigated=1
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pstatus green YES
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elif echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -q 'SMT Host state unknown'; then
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# The kernel appends "SMT Host state unknown" when running under
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# a hypervisor (X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR): the host controls SMT
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# scheduling, so it can't be determined from inside the guest (#343).
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mmio_smt_mitigated=2
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "running in a VM guest, the hypervisor host controls SMT"
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# The kernel appends "SMT Host state unknown" whenever the
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# HYPERVISOR CPUID bit is set. That's true both inside a guest
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# AND on a Xen dom0 (#343). In a guest we genuinely can't see
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# the host's SMT scheduling; on dom0/bare metal the local SMT
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# state is authoritative, so trust it there.
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if is_running_as_guest; then
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mmio_smt_mitigated=2
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "running in a VM guest, the hypervisor host controls SMT"
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elif is_cpu_smt_enabled; then
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mmio_smt_mitigated=0
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pstatus yellow NO
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else
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mmio_smt_mitigated=1
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pstatus green YES
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fi
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else
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mmio_smt_mitigated=0
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pstatus yellow NO
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@@ -10320,10 +10358,18 @@ check_CVE_2019_11135_linux() {
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elif echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -qF 'SMT vulnerable'; then
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pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "SMT (HyperThreading) must be disabled for full mitigation"
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elif echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -qF 'SMT Host state unknown'; then
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# The kernel appends "SMT Host state unknown" when running under a
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# hypervisor (X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR): the host controls SMT
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# scheduling, so it can't be determined from inside the guest (#343).
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pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "TAA is mitigated and TSX is disabled, but SMT (Hyper-Threading) cross-thread protection can't be verified from inside a VM guest: it depends on the hypervisor host's SMT/core-scheduling configuration"
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# "SMT Host state unknown" is emitted whenever the HYPERVISOR
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# CPUID bit is set -- true both inside a guest AND on a Xen dom0
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# (#343). In a guest we can't see the host's SMT scheduling; on
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# dom0/bare metal the local SMT state is authoritative, so trust
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# it there.
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if is_running_as_guest; then
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pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "TAA is mitigated and TSX is disabled, but SMT (Hyper-Threading) cross-thread protection can't be verified from inside a VM guest: it depends on the hypervisor host's SMT/core-scheduling configuration"
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elif is_cpu_smt_enabled; then
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pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "SMT (HyperThreading) must be disabled for full mitigation"
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else
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pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$msg"
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fi
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else
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pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$msg"
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fi
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@@ -13339,7 +13385,7 @@ exit 0 # ok
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# with X being either I for Intel, or A for AMD
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# When the date is unknown it defaults to 20000101
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# %%% MCEDB v351+i20260512+1cce
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# %%% MCEDB v351+i20260512+16e5
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# I,0x00000611,0xFF,0x00000B27,19961218
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# I,0x00000612,0xFF,0x000000C6,19961210
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# I,0x00000616,0xFF,0x000000C6,19961210
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