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Added support for SRBDS related vulnerabilities

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This commit is contained in:
Agata Gruza
2020-04-16 03:59:28 -07:00
committed by Stéphane Lesimple
parent cb6d139629
commit 62d3448a54
2 changed files with 219 additions and 5 deletions
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216
spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
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@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ show_usage()
--batch prometheus produce output for consumption by prometheus-node-exporter
--variant VARIANT specify which variant you'd like to check, by default all variants are checked
VARIANT can be one of 1, 2, 3, 3a, 4, l1tf, msbds, mfbds, mlpds, mdsum, taa, mcepsc
VARIANT can be one of 1, 2, 3, 3a, 4, l1tf, msbds, mfbds, mlpds, mdsum, taa, mcepsc, srbds
can be specified multiple times (e.g. --variant 2 --variant 3)
--cve [cve1,cve2,...] specify which CVE you'd like to check, by default all supported CVEs are checked
--hw-only only check for CPU information, don't check for any variant
@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ global_critical=0
global_unknown=0
nrpe_vuln=''
supported_cve_list='CVE-2017-5753 CVE-2017-5715 CVE-2017-5754 CVE-2018-3640 CVE-2018-3639 CVE-2018-3615 CVE-2018-3620 CVE-2018-3646 CVE-2018-12126 CVE-2018-12130 CVE-2018-12127 CVE-2019-11091 CVE-2019-11135 CVE-2018-12207'
supported_cve_list='CVE-2017-5753 CVE-2017-5715 CVE-2017-5754 CVE-2018-3640 CVE-2018-3639 CVE-2018-3615 CVE-2018-3620 CVE-2018-3646 CVE-2018-12126 CVE-2018-12130 CVE-2018-12127 CVE-2019-11091 CVE-2019-11135 CVE-2018-12207 CVE-2020-0543'
# find a sane command to print colored messages, we prefer `printf` over `echo`
# because `printf` behavior is more standard across Linux/BSD
@ -287,6 +287,7 @@ cve2name()
CVE-2019-11091) echo "RIDL, microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable memory (MDSUM)";;
CVE-2019-11135) echo "ZombieLoad V2, TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA)";;
CVE-2018-12207) echo "No eXcuses, iTLB Multihit, machine check exception on page size changes (MCEPSC)";;
CVE-2020-0543) echo "Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)";;
*) echo "$0: error: invalid CVE '$1' passed to cve2name()" >&2; exit 255;;
esac
}
@ -310,6 +311,7 @@ _is_cpu_vulnerable_cached()
CVE-2019-11091) return $variant_mdsum;;
CVE-2019-11135) return $variant_taa;;
CVE-2018-12207) return $variant_itlbmh;;
CVE-2020-0543) return $variant_srbds;;
*) echo "$0: error: invalid variant '$1' passed to is_cpu_vulnerable()" >&2; exit 255;;
esac
}
@ -338,6 +340,7 @@ is_cpu_vulnerable()
variant_mdsum=''
variant_taa=''
variant_itlbmh=''
variant_srbds=''
if is_cpu_mds_free; then
[ -z "$variant_msbds" ] && variant_msbds=immune
@ -352,6 +355,11 @@ is_cpu_vulnerable()
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: cpu not affected by TSX Asynhronous Abort"
fi
if is_cpu_srbds_free; then
[ -z "$variant_srbds" ] && variant_srbds=immune
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: cpu not affected by Special Register Buffer Data Sampling"
fi
if is_cpu_specex_free; then
variant1=immune
variant2=immune
@ -364,6 +372,7 @@ is_cpu_vulnerable()
variant_mlpds=immune
variant_mdsum=immune
variant_taa=immune
variant_srbds=immune
elif is_intel; then
# Intel
# https://github.com/crozone/SpectrePoC/issues/1 ^F E5200 => spectre 2 not vulnerable
@ -594,8 +603,9 @@ is_cpu_vulnerable()
[ "$variant_mdsum" = "immune" ] && variant_mdsum=1 || variant_mdsum=0
[ "$variant_taa" = "immune" ] && variant_taa=1 || variant_taa=0
[ "$variant_itlbmh" = "immune" ] && variant_itlbmh=1 || variant_itlbmh=0
[ "$variant_srbds" = "immune" ] && variant_srbds=1 || variant_srbds=0
variantl1tf_sgx="$variantl1tf"
# even if we are vulnerable to L1TF, if there's no SGX, we're safe for the original foreshadow
# even if we are vulnerable to L1TF, if there's no SGX, we're not vulnerable to the original foreshadow
[ "$cpuid_sgx" = 0 ] && variantl1tf_sgx=1
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: final results are <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3> <$variant3a> <$variant4> <$variantl1tf> <$variantl1tf_sgx>"
is_cpu_vulnerable_cached=1
@ -702,6 +712,61 @@ is_cpu_taa_free()
return 1
}
is_cpu_srbds_free()
{
# return zero (0) if the CPU isn't affected by special register buffer data sampling, one (1) if it is.
# If it's not in the list we know, return one (1).
# source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
#
# A processor is affected by SRBDS if its Family_Model and stepping is in the
# following list:
#
# ============= ============ ========
# common name Family_Model Stepping
# ============= ============ ========
# IvyBridge 06_3AH All (INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE)
#
# Haswell 06_3CH All (INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL)
# Haswell_L 06_45H All (INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L)
# Haswell_G 06_46H All (INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G)
#
# Broadwell_G 06_47H All (INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_G)
# Broadwell 06_3DH All (INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL)
#
# Skylake_L 06_4EH All (INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L)
# Skylake 06_5EH All (INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE)
#
# Kabylake_L 06_8EH <=0xC (MDS_NO) (INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L)
#
# Kabylake 06_9EH <=0xD (MDS_NO) (INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE)
# ============= ============ ========
parse_cpu_details
if is_intel; then
if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_G" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE" ]; then
return 1
elif [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L" ] && [ "$cpu_stepping" -le 12 ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE" ] && [ "$cpu_stepping" -le 13 ]; then
if [ "$capabilities_mds_no" -eq 1 ] && { [ "$cpuid_rtm" -eq 0 ] || [ "$tsx_ctrl_msr_rtm_disable" -eq 1 ] ;} ; then
return 0
else
return 1
fi
fi
fi
fi
return 0
}
is_cpu_ssb_free()
{
# return true (0) if the CPU isn't affected by speculative store bypass, false (1) if it does.
@ -1041,8 +1106,9 @@ while [ -n "$1" ]; do
l1tf) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2018-3615 CVE-2018-3620 CVE-2018-3646"; opt_cve_all=0;;
taa) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2019-11135"; opt_cve_all=0;;
mcepsc) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2018-12207"; opt_cve_all=0;;
srbds) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2020-0543"; opt_cve_all=0;;
*)
echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, expected either 1, 2, 3, 3a, 4, l1tf, msbds, mfbds, mlpds, mdsum, taa or mcepsc" >&2;
echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, expected either 1, 2, 3, 3a, 4, l1tf, msbds, mfbds, mlpds, mdsum, taa, mcepsc or srbds" >&2;
exit 255
;;
esac
@ -1129,6 +1195,7 @@ pvulnstatus()
CVE-2019-11091) aka="MDSUM";;
CVE-2019-11135) aka="TAA";;
CVE-2018-12207) aka="ITLBMH";;
CVE-2020-0543) aka="SRBDS";;
*) echo "$0: error: invalid CVE '$1' passed to pvulnstatus()" >&2; exit 255;;
esac
@ -2986,6 +3053,37 @@ check_cpu()
pstatus green NO
fi
_info_nol " * CPU supports Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS): "
# A processor supports SRBDS if it enumerates CPUID (EAX=7H,ECX=0):EDX[9] as 1
# That means the mitigation disabling SRBDS exists
ret=1
cpuid_srbds=0
srbds_on=0
if is_intel; then
read_cpuid 0x7 $EDX 9 1 1; ret=$?
fi
if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
pstatus blue YES
cpuid_srbds=1
read_msr 0x123 0; ret=$?
if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
if [ $read_msr_value -eq 0 ]; then
#SRBDS mitigation control exists and is enabled via microcode
srbds_on=1
else
#SRBDS mitigation control exists but is disabled via microcode
srbds_on=0
fi
else
srbds_on=-1
fi
elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is cpuid kernel module available?"
cpuid_srbds=0
else
pstatus green NO
fi
_info_nol " * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems: "
if is_ucode_blacklisted; then
pstatus red YES "$ucode_found"
@ -5248,6 +5346,116 @@ check_CVE_2018_12207_linux()
fi
}
###################
# SRBDS SECTION
# Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)
check_CVE_2020_0543()
{
cve='CVE-2020-0543'
_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
check_CVE_2020_0543_linux
else
_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
fi
}
check_CVE_2020_0543_linux()
{
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds"; then
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
sys_interface_available=1
fi
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
_info_nol "* SRBDS mitigation control is supported by the kernel: "
kernel_srbds=''
if [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
kernel_srbds_err="$kernel_err"
elif grep -q 'Dependent on hypervisor' "$kernel"; then
kernel_srbds="found SRBDS implementation evidence in kernel image. Your kernel is up to date for SRBDS mitigation"
fi
if [ -n "$kernel_srbds" ]; then
pstatus green YES "$kernel_srbds"
elif [ -n "$kernel_srbds_err" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$kernel_srbds_err"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
_info_nol "* SRBDS mitigation control is enabled and active: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ -n "$fullmsg" ]; then
if echo "$fullmsg" | grep -qE '^Mitigation'; then
pstatus green YES "$fullmsg"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
else
pstatus yellow NO "SRBDS not found in sysfs hierarchy"
fi
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
status=UNK
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve" ; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
else
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
if [ "$cpuid_srbds" = 1 ]; then
# SRBDS mitigation control exists
if [ "$srbds_on" = 1 ]; then
# SRBDS mitigation control is enabled
if [ -z "$msg" ]; then
# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# if we're in live mode and $msg is empty, sysfs file is not there so kernel is too old
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Your microcode is up to date for SRBDS mitigation control. The kernel needs to be updated"
fi
else
if [ -n "$kernel_srbds" ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for SRBDS mitigation control. Mitigation is enabled"
else
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Your microcode is up to date for SRBDS mitigation control. The kernel needs to be updated"
fi
fi
elif [ "$srbds_on" = 0 ]; then
# SRBDS mitigation control is disabled
if [ -z "$msg" ]; then
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# if we're in live mode and $msg is empty, sysfs file is not there so kernel is too old
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode is up to date for SRBDS mitigation control. The kernel needs to be updated. Mitigation is disabled"
fi
else
if [ -n "$kernel_srbds" ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for SRBDS mitigation control. Mitigation is disabled"
else
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode is up to date for SRBDS mitigation control. The kernel needs to be updated. Mitigation is disabled"
fi
fi
else
# rdmsr: CPU 0 cannot read MSR 0x00000123
pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "Not able to enumerate MSR for SRBDS mitigation control"
fi
else
# [ $cpuid_srbds != 1 ]
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your CPU microcode may need to be updated to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
else
# sysfs only: return the status/msg we got
pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$fullmsg"
return
fi
fi
}
#######################
# END OF VULNS SECTIONS