mirror of
https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker.git
synced 2026-04-03 05:37:11 +02:00
enh: CVE-2022-40982 (Downfall) overhaul & Spectre V2 enhancements
Downfall: - added `--kernel-config` support for all three Kconfig variants seen over all kernel versions up to now - added `--kernel-map` support for `gds_select_mitigation` in `System.map` - fixed the `--sysfs-only` mode - added verbose information about remediation when `--explain` is used - implemented `--paranoid mode`, requiring `GDS_MITIGATION_LOCKED` so that mitigation can't be disabled at runtime - fixed offline mode (was wrongly looking at the system `dmesg`) - better microcode status reporting (enabled, disabled, unsupported, unknown) - fixed unknown (EOL) AVX-capable Intel family 6 CPUs now defaulting to affected - fixed 2 missing known affected CPU models: INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L and INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE - fixed case when we're running in a VM and the hypervisor doesn't let us read the MSR Spectre V2: - fix: affected_cpu: added Centaur family 7 (CentaurHauls) and Zhaoxin family 7 (Shanghai) as immune - fix: added Centaur family 5 (CentaurHauls) and NSC family 5 (Geode by NSC) to is_cpu_specex_free() - enh: offline mode: added detection logic by probing System.map and Kconfig
This commit is contained in:
Stéphane Lesimple
@@ -126,6 +126,14 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
|
||||
pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: cpu not affected by Special Register Buffer Data Sampling"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# NO_SPECTRE_V2: Centaur family 7 and Zhaoxin family 7 are immune to Spectre V2
|
||||
# kernel commit 1e41a766c98b (v5.6-rc1): added NO_SPECTRE_V2 exemption
|
||||
# Zhaoxin vendor_id is " Shanghai " in cpuinfo (parsed as "Shanghai" by awk)
|
||||
if { [ "$cpu_vendor" = "CentaurHauls" ] || [ "$cpu_vendor" = "Shanghai" ]; } && [ "$cpu_family" = 7 ]; then
|
||||
_infer_immune variant2
|
||||
pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: Centaur/Zhaoxin family 7 immune to Spectre V2 (NO_SPECTRE_V2)"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if is_cpu_specex_free; then
|
||||
_set_immune variant1
|
||||
_set_immune variant2
|
||||
@@ -222,9 +230,12 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
|
||||
pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: downfall: not affected (GDS_NO)"
|
||||
_set_immune downfall
|
||||
elif [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
|
||||
# list from https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=64094e7e3118aff4b0be8ff713c242303e139834
|
||||
# model blacklist from the kernel (arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c cpu_vuln_blacklist):
|
||||
# 8974eb588283 (initial list) + c9f4c45c8ec3 (added Skylake/Skylake_L client)
|
||||
set -u
|
||||
if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X" ] ||
|
||||
if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L" ] ||
|
||||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE" ] ||
|
||||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X" ] ||
|
||||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L" ] ||
|
||||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE" ] ||
|
||||
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_L" ] ||
|
||||
@@ -239,10 +250,12 @@ is_cpu_affected() {
|
||||
_set_vuln downfall
|
||||
elif [ "$cap_avx2" = 0 ] && [ "$cap_avx512" = 0 ]; then
|
||||
pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: downfall: no avx; immune"
|
||||
_infer_immune downfall
|
||||
else
|
||||
# old Intel CPU (not in their DB), not listed as being affected by the Linux kernel,
|
||||
# but with AVX2 or AVX512: unclear for now
|
||||
pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: downfall: unclear, defaulting to non-affected for now"
|
||||
# Intel family 6 CPU with AVX2 or AVX512, not in the known-affected list
|
||||
# and GDS_NO not set: assume affected (whitelist principle)
|
||||
pr_debug "is_cpu_affected: downfall: unknown AVX-capable CPU, defaulting to affected"
|
||||
_infer_vuln downfall
|
||||
fi
|
||||
set +u
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +27,13 @@ is_cpu_specex_free() {
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# Centaur family 5 and NSC family 5 are also non-speculative
|
||||
if [ "$cpu_vendor" = "CentaurHauls" ] && [ "$cpu_family" = 5 ]; then
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$cpu_vendor" = "Geode by NSC" ] && [ "$cpu_family" = 5 ]; then
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
[ "$cpu_family" = 4 ] && return 0
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,14 +1,12 @@
|
||||
# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 et:
|
||||
###################
|
||||
# SPECTRE 2 SECTION
|
||||
###############################
|
||||
# CVE-2017-5715, Spectre V2, Branch Target Injection
|
||||
|
||||
# CVE-2017-5715 Spectre Variant 2 (branch target injection) - entry point
|
||||
# Sets: vulnstatus
|
||||
check_CVE_2017_5715() {
|
||||
check_cve 'CVE-2017-5715'
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# CVE-2017-5715 Spectre Variant 2 (branch target injection) - Linux mitigation check
|
||||
# Sets: g_ibrs_can_tell, g_ibrs_supported, g_ibrs_enabled, g_ibrs_fw_enabled,
|
||||
# g_ibpb_can_tell, g_ibpb_supported, g_ibpb_enabled, g_specex_knob_dir
|
||||
check_CVE_2017_5715_linux() {
|
||||
@@ -208,6 +206,43 @@ check_CVE_2017_5715_linux() {
|
||||
# rocky9 (RHEL 9, kernel 5.14): matches mainline. Semicolons, BHI, all fields.
|
||||
# rocky10 (RHEL 10, kernel 6.12): matches mainline.
|
||||
#
|
||||
#
|
||||
# --- Kconfig symbols ---
|
||||
# 76b043848fd2 (v4.15-rc8): CONFIG_RETPOLINE
|
||||
# f43b9876e857 (v5.19-rc7): CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY (kernel IBRS on entry)
|
||||
# aefb2f2e619b (v6.9-rc1): renamed CONFIG_RETPOLINE => CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
|
||||
# 1da8d2172ce5 (v6.9-rc1): renamed CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY => CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
|
||||
# ec9404e40e8f (v6.9-rc4): CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_ON / CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_OFF
|
||||
# 4f511739c54b (v6.9-rc4): replaced by CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI
|
||||
# 72c70f480a70 (v6.12-rc1): CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 (top-level on/off)
|
||||
# 8754e67ad4ac (v6.15-rc7): CONFIG_MITIGATION_ITS (indirect target selection)
|
||||
# stable 5.4.y-6.6.y: CONFIG_RETPOLINE (pre-rename)
|
||||
# stable 6.12.y: CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE, CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2
|
||||
#
|
||||
# --- kernel functions (for $opt_map / System.map) ---
|
||||
# da285121560e (v4.15-rc8): spectre_v2_select_mitigation(),
|
||||
# spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(), nospectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
|
||||
# 20ffa1caecca (v4.16-rc1): spectre_v2_module_string(), retpoline_module_ok()
|
||||
# a8f76ae41cd6 (v4.20-rc5): spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(),
|
||||
# spectre_v2_user_parse_cmdline()
|
||||
# 7c693f54c873 (v5.19-rc7): spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(), spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode()
|
||||
# 44a3918c8245 (v5.17-rc8): spectre_v2_show_state()
|
||||
# 480e803dacf8 (v6.16-rc1): split into spectre_v2_select_mitigation() +
|
||||
# spectre_v2_apply_mitigation() + spectre_v2_update_mitigation() +
|
||||
# spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation() + spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation()
|
||||
#
|
||||
# --- CPU affection logic (for is_cpu_affected) ---
|
||||
# X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 is set for ALL x86 CPUs except:
|
||||
# - CPUs matching NO_SPECULATION: family 4 (all vendors), Centaur/Intel/NSC/Vortex
|
||||
# family 5, Intel Atom Bonnell/Saltwell
|
||||
# - CPUs matching NO_SPECTRE_V2: Centaur family 7, Zhaoxin family 7
|
||||
# 99c6fa2511d8 (v4.15-rc8): unconditional for all x86 CPUs
|
||||
# 1e41a766c98b (v5.6-rc1): added NO_SPECTRE_V2 exemption for Centaur/Zhaoxin
|
||||
# 98c7a713db91 (v6.15-rc1): added X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER as separate bit
|
||||
# No MSR/CPUID immunity bits — purely whitelist-based.
|
||||
# vendor scope: all x86 vendors affected (Intel, AMD, Hygon, etc.)
|
||||
# except Centaur family 7 and Zhaoxin family 7.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# all messages start with either "Not affected", "Mitigation", or "Vulnerable"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
|
||||
@@ -332,6 +367,19 @@ check_CVE_2017_5715_linux() {
|
||||
if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then
|
||||
g_ibrs_supported="found spec_ctrl in symbols file"
|
||||
pr_debug "ibrs: found '*spec_ctrl*' symbol in $opt_map"
|
||||
elif grep -q -e spectre_v2_select_mitigation -e spectre_v2_apply_mitigation "$opt_map"; then
|
||||
# spectre_v2_select_mitigation exists since v4.15; split into
|
||||
# spectre_v2_select_mitigation + spectre_v2_apply_mitigation in v6.16
|
||||
g_ibrs_supported="found spectre_v2 mitigation function in symbols file"
|
||||
pr_debug "ibrs: found spectre_v2_*_mitigation symbol in $opt_map"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY (v5.19) / CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY (v6.9): kernel IBRS on entry
|
||||
if [ -z "$g_ibrs_supported" ] && [ -n "$opt_config" ] && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
|
||||
g_ibrs_can_tell=1
|
||||
if grep -q '^CONFIG_\(CPU_\|MITIGATION_\)IBRS_ENTRY=y' "$opt_config"; then
|
||||
g_ibrs_supported="CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY/CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY found in kernel config"
|
||||
pr_debug "ibrs: found IBRS entry config option in $opt_config"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# recent (4.15) vanilla kernels have IBPB but not IBRS, and without the debugfs tunables of Red Hat
|
||||
@@ -579,7 +627,7 @@ check_CVE_2017_5715_linux() {
|
||||
rsb_filling=0
|
||||
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_no_sysfs" != 1 ]; then
|
||||
# if we're live and we aren't denied looking into /sys, let's do it
|
||||
if echo "$msg" | grep -qw RSB; then
|
||||
if echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -qw RSB; then
|
||||
rsb_filling=1
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
fi
|
||||
@@ -679,6 +727,11 @@ check_CVE_2017_5715_linux() {
|
||||
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
# --- SMT state (used in STIBP inference and verdict) ---
|
||||
is_cpu_smt_enabled
|
||||
smt_enabled=$?
|
||||
# smt_enabled: 0=enabled, 1=disabled, 2=unknown
|
||||
|
||||
# --- v2_stibp_status ---
|
||||
pr_info_nol " * STIBP status: "
|
||||
if [ -n "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" ]; then
|
||||
@@ -821,11 +874,6 @@ check_CVE_2017_5715_linux() {
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# --- SMT state (used in verdict) ---
|
||||
is_cpu_smt_enabled
|
||||
smt_enabled=$?
|
||||
# smt_enabled: 0=enabled, 1=disabled, 2=unknown
|
||||
|
||||
elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
|
||||
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
|
||||
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
|
||||
@@ -840,6 +888,8 @@ check_CVE_2017_5715_linux() {
|
||||
# --- own logic using Phase 2 variables ---
|
||||
# Helper: collect caveats for the verdict message
|
||||
_v2_caveats=''
|
||||
# Append a caveat string to the _v2_caveats list
|
||||
# Callers: check_CVE_2017_5715_linux (eIBRS, IBRS, retpoline verdict paths)
|
||||
_v2_add_caveat() { _v2_caveats="${_v2_caveats:+$_v2_caveats; }$1"; }
|
||||
|
||||
# ARM branch predictor hardening (unchanged)
|
||||
@@ -1107,6 +1157,9 @@ check_CVE_2017_5715_linux() {
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "offline mode: kernel supports IBRS + IBPB to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
elif [ "$cap_ibrs_all" = 1 ] || [ "$cap_autoibrs" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "offline mode: CPU supports Enhanced / Automatic IBRS"
|
||||
# CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 (v6.12+): top-level on/off for all Spectre V2 mitigations
|
||||
elif [ -n "$opt_config" ] && [ -r "$opt_config" ] && grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2=y' "$opt_config"; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "offline mode: kernel has Spectre V2 mitigation framework enabled (CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2)"
|
||||
elif [ "$g_ibrs_can_tell" != 1 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "offline mode: not enough information"
|
||||
explain "Re-run this script with root privileges, and give it the kernel image (--kernel), the kernel configuration (--config) and the System.map file (--map) corresponding to the kernel you would like to inspect."
|
||||
@@ -1137,7 +1190,6 @@ check_CVE_2017_5715_linux() {
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# CVE-2017-5715 Spectre Variant 2 (branch target injection) - BSD mitigation check
|
||||
# Sets: vulnstatus
|
||||
check_CVE_2017_5715_bsd() {
|
||||
local ibrs_disabled ibrs_active retpoline nb_thunks
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,22 +17,132 @@ check_CVE_2022_40982_linux() {
|
||||
if sys_interface_check "$VULN_SYSFS_BASE/gather_data_sampling"; then
|
||||
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
|
||||
sys_interface_available=1
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Kernel source inventory for gather_data_sampling (GDS/Downfall)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# --- sysfs messages ---
|
||||
# all versions:
|
||||
# "Not affected" (cpu_show_common, pre-existing)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# --- mainline ---
|
||||
# 8974eb588283 (v6.5-rc6, initial GDS sysfs):
|
||||
# "Vulnerable" (GDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
|
||||
# "Vulnerable: No microcode" (GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED)
|
||||
# "Mitigation: Microcode" (GDS_MITIGATION_FULL)
|
||||
# "Mitigation: Microcode (locked)" (GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED)
|
||||
# "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status" (GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR)
|
||||
# 553a5c03e90a (v6.5-rc6, added force option):
|
||||
# "Mitigation: AVX disabled, no microcode" (GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE)
|
||||
# 53cf5797f114 (v6.5-rc6, added CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION):
|
||||
# no string changes; default becomes FORCE when Kconfig enabled
|
||||
# 81ac7e5d7417 (v6.5-rc6, KVM GDS_NO plumbing):
|
||||
# no string changes
|
||||
# be83e809ca67 (v6.9-rc1, Kconfig rename):
|
||||
# no string changes; CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION => CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
|
||||
# 03267a534bb3 (v6.12-rc1, removed force Kconfig):
|
||||
# no string changes; CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE removed
|
||||
# 225f2bd064c3 (v6.12-rc1, added on/off Kconfig):
|
||||
# no string changes; added CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS (default y)
|
||||
# 9dcad2fb31bd (v6.16-rc1, restructured select/apply):
|
||||
# no string changes; added GDS_MITIGATION_AUTO (internal, resolved before display)
|
||||
# split gds_select_mitigation() + gds_apply_mitigation()
|
||||
# d4932a1b148b (v6.17-rc3, bug fix):
|
||||
# no string changes; CPUs without ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL were incorrectly classified
|
||||
# as OFF ("Vulnerable") instead of UCODE_NEEDED ("Vulnerable: No microcode"),
|
||||
# and locked-mitigation detection was skipped.
|
||||
# NOT backported to any stable or RHEL branch as of 2026-04.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# --- stable backports ---
|
||||
# 5.4.y, 5.10.y, 5.15.y, 6.1.y, 6.6.y: same 7 strings as mainline.
|
||||
# use CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION; no GDS_MITIGATION_AUTO enum;
|
||||
# missing d4932a1b148b bug fix (UCODE_NEEDED vs OFF misclassification).
|
||||
# 6.12.y: same 7 strings as mainline.
|
||||
# uses CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS; no GDS_MITIGATION_AUTO enum;
|
||||
# missing d4932a1b148b bug fix.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# --- RHEL/CentOS ---
|
||||
# centos7 (3.10), rocky8 (4.18): same 7 strings; CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION.
|
||||
# centos7 uses sprintf (not sysfs_emit) and __read_mostly.
|
||||
# rocky9 (5.14): same 7 strings; CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS (skipped FORCE rename).
|
||||
# rocky10 (6.12): same 7 strings; CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS; has gds_apply_mitigation().
|
||||
#
|
||||
# --- Kconfig symbols ---
|
||||
# 53cf5797f114 (v6.5-rc6): CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION (default n)
|
||||
# be83e809ca67 (v6.9-rc1): renamed to CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
|
||||
# 03267a534bb3 (v6.12-rc1): CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE removed
|
||||
# 225f2bd064c3 (v6.12-rc1): CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS (default y)
|
||||
# vendor kernels: rocky9 uses CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS on 5.14-based kernel
|
||||
#
|
||||
# --- kernel functions (for $opt_map / System.map) ---
|
||||
# 8974eb588283 (v6.5-rc6): gds_select_mitigation(), update_gds_msr(),
|
||||
# gds_parse_cmdline(), gds_show_state()
|
||||
# 81ac7e5d7417 (v6.5-rc6): gds_ucode_mitigated() (exported for KVM)
|
||||
# 9dcad2fb31bd (v6.16-rc1): split into gds_select_mitigation() + gds_apply_mitigation()
|
||||
# stable 5.4.y-6.12.y: same 5 functions (no gds_apply_mitigation)
|
||||
# rocky10 (6.12): has gds_apply_mitigation()
|
||||
#
|
||||
# --- CPU affection logic (for is_cpu_affected) ---
|
||||
# X86_BUG_GDS is set when ALL three conditions are true:
|
||||
# 1. CPU matches model blacklist (cpu_vuln_blacklist[] in common.c)
|
||||
# 2. ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO (bit 26 of IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) is NOT set
|
||||
# 3. X86_FEATURE_AVX is present (GATHER instructions require AVX)
|
||||
# 8974eb588283 (v6.5-rc6, initial model list):
|
||||
# Intel: SKYLAKE_X, KABYLAKE_L, KABYLAKE, ICELAKE_L, ICELAKE_D,
|
||||
# ICELAKE_X, COMETLAKE, COMETLAKE_L, TIGERLAKE_L, TIGERLAKE,
|
||||
# ROCKETLAKE (all steppings)
|
||||
# c9f4c45c8ec3 (v6.5-rc6, added missing client Skylake):
|
||||
# Intel: + SKYLAKE_L, SKYLAKE
|
||||
# 159013a7ca18 (v6.10-rc1, ITS stepping splits):
|
||||
# no GDS model changes; some entries split by stepping for ITS but
|
||||
# GDS flag remains on all stepping ranges for these models
|
||||
# immunity: ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO (bit 26 of IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)
|
||||
# feature dependency: requires AVX (if AVX absent, CPU is immune)
|
||||
# vendor scope: Intel only
|
||||
#
|
||||
# all messages start with either "Not affected", "Vulnerable", "Mitigation",
|
||||
# or "Unknown"
|
||||
status=$ret_sys_interface_check_status
|
||||
# Override: when the kernel says "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status", it
|
||||
# gave up because it's running as a VM guest and can't read MCU_OPT_CTRL.
|
||||
# We can often do better: the hypervisor may have exposed GDS_NO or GDS_CTRL
|
||||
# to us via ARCH_CAPABILITIES, so let our own Phase 2 checks take over.
|
||||
if echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -qi 'Dependent on hypervisor'; then
|
||||
status=UNK
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
|
||||
pr_info_nol "* GDS is mitigated by microcode: "
|
||||
if [ "$cap_gds_ctrl" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_gds_mitg_dis" = 0 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green OK "microcode mitigation is supported and enabled"
|
||||
elif [ "$cap_gds_ctrl" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_gds_mitg_dis" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus yellow NO "microcode mitigation is supported but disabled"
|
||||
elif [ "$cap_gds_ctrl" = 0 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus yellow NO "microcode doesn't support GDS mitigation"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus yellow NO
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read MSR for GDS capability"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
pr_info_nol "* Kernel supports software mitigation by disabling AVX: "
|
||||
kernel_gds=''
|
||||
kernel_gds_err=''
|
||||
if [ -n "$g_kernel_err" ]; then
|
||||
kernel_gds_err="$g_kernel_err"
|
||||
elif grep -q 'gather_data_sampling' "$g_kernel"; then
|
||||
kernel_gds="found gather_data_sampling in kernel image"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ -z "$kernel_gds" ] && [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
|
||||
if grep -q '^CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION=y' "$opt_config" ||
|
||||
grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE=y' "$opt_config" ||
|
||||
grep -q '^CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS=y' "$opt_config"; then
|
||||
kernel_gds="GDS mitigation config option found enabled in kernel config"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ -z "$kernel_gds" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
|
||||
if grep -q 'gds_select_mitigation' "$opt_map"; then
|
||||
kernel_gds="found gds_select_mitigation in System.map"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ -n "$kernel_gds" ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES "$kernel_gds"
|
||||
elif [ -n "$kernel_gds_err" ]; then
|
||||
@@ -44,30 +154,34 @@ check_CVE_2022_40982_linux() {
|
||||
if [ -n "$kernel_gds" ]; then
|
||||
pr_info_nol "* Kernel has disabled AVX as a mitigation: "
|
||||
|
||||
# Check dmesg message to see whether AVX has been disabled
|
||||
dmesg_grep 'Microcode update needed! Disabling AVX as mitigation'
|
||||
dmesgret=$?
|
||||
if [ "$dmesgret" -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||
kernel_avx_disabled="AVX disabled by the kernel (dmesg)"
|
||||
pstatus green YES "$kernel_avx_disabled"
|
||||
elif [ "$cap_avx2" = 0 ]; then
|
||||
# Find out by ourselves
|
||||
# cpuinfo says we don't have AVX2, query
|
||||
# the CPU directly about AVX2 support
|
||||
read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 "$EBX" 5 1 1
|
||||
ret=$?
|
||||
if [ "$ret" -eq "$READ_CPUID_RET_OK" ]; then
|
||||
kernel_avx_disabled="AVX disabled by the kernel (cpuid)"
|
||||
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
# Check dmesg message to see whether AVX has been disabled
|
||||
dmesg_grep 'Microcode update needed! Disabling AVX as mitigation'
|
||||
dmesgret=$?
|
||||
if [ "$dmesgret" -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||
kernel_avx_disabled="AVX disabled by the kernel (dmesg)"
|
||||
pstatus green YES "$kernel_avx_disabled"
|
||||
elif [ "$ret" -eq "$READ_CPUID_RET_KO" ]; then
|
||||
pstatus yellow NO "CPU doesn't support AVX"
|
||||
elif [ "$dmesgret" -eq 2 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "dmesg truncated, can't tell whether mitigation is active, please reboot and relaunch this script"
|
||||
elif [ "$cap_avx2" = 0 ]; then
|
||||
# Find out by ourselves
|
||||
# cpuinfo says we don't have AVX2, query
|
||||
# the CPU directly about AVX2 support
|
||||
read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 "$EBX" 5 1 1
|
||||
ret=$?
|
||||
if [ "$ret" -eq "$READ_CPUID_RET_OK" ]; then
|
||||
kernel_avx_disabled="AVX disabled by the kernel (cpuid)"
|
||||
pstatus green YES "$kernel_avx_disabled"
|
||||
elif [ "$ret" -eq "$READ_CPUID_RET_KO" ]; then
|
||||
pstatus yellow NO "CPU doesn't support AVX"
|
||||
elif [ "$dmesgret" -eq 2 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "dmesg truncated, can't tell whether mitigation is active, please reboot and relaunch this script"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "No sign of mitigation in dmesg and couldn't read cpuid info"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "No sign of mitigation in dmesg and couldn't read cpuid info"
|
||||
pstatus yellow NO "AVX support is enabled"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus yellow NO "AVX support is enabled"
|
||||
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -82,16 +196,40 @@ check_CVE_2022_40982_linux() {
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
|
||||
elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
|
||||
# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
|
||||
if [ "$cap_gds_ctrl" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_gds_mitg_dis" = 0 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Your microcode is up to date and mitigation is enabled"
|
||||
elif [ "$cap_gds_ctrl" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_gds_mitg_dis" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode is up to date but mitigation is disabled"
|
||||
elif [ -z "$kernel_gds" ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode doesn't mitigate the vulnerability, and your kernel doesn't support mitigation"
|
||||
elif [ -z "$kernel_avx_disabled" ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode doesn't mitigate the vulnerability, your kernel support the mitigation but the script did not detect AVX as disabled by the kernel"
|
||||
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
|
||||
if [ "$cap_gds_ctrl" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_gds_mitg_dis" = 0 ]; then
|
||||
if [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_gds_mitg_lock" != 1 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Microcode mitigation is enabled but not locked"
|
||||
explain "In paranoid mode, the GDS mitigation must be locked to prevent a privileged attacker\n " \
|
||||
"(e.g. in a guest VM) from disabling it. Check your firmware/BIOS for an option to lock the\n " \
|
||||
"GDS mitigation, or update your microcode."
|
||||
else
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Your microcode is up to date and mitigation is enabled"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
elif [ "$cap_gds_ctrl" = 1 ] && [ "$cap_gds_mitg_dis" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode is up to date but mitigation is disabled"
|
||||
explain "The GDS mitigation has been explicitly disabled (gather_data_sampling=off or mitigations=off).\n " \
|
||||
"Remove the kernel parameter to re-enable it."
|
||||
elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 1 ] &&
|
||||
echo "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg" | grep -qi 'Dependent on hypervisor'; then
|
||||
# We're in a VM guest, the kernel gave up, and we couldn't read the
|
||||
# GDS MSR bits either (cap_gds_ctrl != 1). We genuinely can't tell.
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "Running in a VM, mitigation depends on the hypervisor"
|
||||
explain "This system is running as a virtual machine guest. GDS mitigation must be handled by\n " \
|
||||
"the host hypervisor. Contact your VM/cloud provider to verify that GDS is mitigated on the host."
|
||||
elif [ -z "$kernel_gds" ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode doesn't mitigate the vulnerability, and your kernel doesn't support mitigation"
|
||||
explain "Update both your CPU microcode (via BIOS/firmware update from your OEM) and your kernel\n " \
|
||||
"to a version that supports GDS mitigation (Linux 6.5+, or check if your distro has a backport)."
|
||||
elif [ -z "$kernel_avx_disabled" ]; then
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode doesn't mitigate the vulnerability, your kernel supports the mitigation but AVX was not disabled"
|
||||
explain "Update your CPU microcode (via BIOS/firmware update from your OEM). If no microcode update\n " \
|
||||
"is available, use gather_data_sampling=force on the kernel command line to disable AVX as a workaround."
|
||||
else
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Your microcode doesn't mitigate the vulnerability, but your kernel has disabled AVX support"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Your microcode doesn't mitigate the vulnerability, but your kernel has disabled AVX support"
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$ret_sys_interface_check_fullmsg"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$msg"
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user